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==The Weak Anthropic Principle==

==The Weak Anthropic Principle==

In this version of the principle, Barrow & Tipler <ref>John D. Barrow and Frank J. Tipler (1986). <i>The Anthropic Cosmological Principle. </i>Oxford Univ. Press,  ISBN 0-19-282147-4.</ref> suggest that the values of physical and cosmological quantities may be random, but are not equally probable; The values that they can adopt are governed by two separate requirements:  

In this version of the principle, Barrow & Tipler <ref>John D. Barrow and Frank J. Tipler (1986). ''The Anthropic Cosmological Principle. ''Oxford Univ. Press,  ISBN 0-19-282147-4.</ref> suggest that the values of physical and cosmological quantities may be random, but are not equally probable; The values that they can adopt are governed by two separate requirements:  

#  That in the Universe there are places where carbon-based life can evolve

#  That in the Universe there are places where carbon-based life can evolve

#  That the Universe is old enough for it to have already done so.

#  That the Universe is old enough for it to have already done so.

==Criticisms of the Anthropic Principle==

==Criticisms of the Anthropic Principle==

In his web-page on [http://www.anthropic-principle.com/ The Anthropic Principle], the [[Tranhumanism| transhumanist]] philosopher [[Nick Bostrom]] suggests that the the Anthropic principle is only one manifestation of a much larger theory concerning self-location and observation. Within this he argues that the stronger versions of  anthropic principles are simply confused, and while the weaker versions might be sound, they are in fact too weak to be useful. He argues that the current formulations of the principles are not formulated in any way as to yield observational consequences.

In his web-page on [http://www.anthropic-principle.com/ The Anthropic Principle], the [[Tranhumanism|transhumanist]] philosopher [[Nick Bostrom]] suggests that the the Anthropic principle is only one manifestation of a much larger theory concerning self-location and observation. Within this he argues that the stronger versions of  anthropic principles are simply confused, and while the weaker versions might be sound, they are in fact too weak to be useful. He argues that the current formulations of the principles are not formulated in any way as to yield observational consequences.

== See also ==

== See also ==