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As a civil leader he played a major role in the [[French Revolution]], then ended democracy and became First Consul in 1799 and Emperor of France in 1804. He modernized the French military, fiscal, political legal and religious systems.  The Napoleonic Civil Code is considered the first successful codification that strongly influenced the law of many other countries.  
 
As a civil leader he played a major role in the [[French Revolution]], then ended democracy and became First Consul in 1799 and Emperor of France in 1804. He modernized the French military, fiscal, political legal and religious systems.  The Napoleonic Civil Code is considered the first successful codification that strongly influenced the law of many other countries.  
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Napoleon was constantly at war against Britain with a complex, ever-changing coalition of European nations on both sides. Refusing to compromise after his immense defeat in Russia in 1812, he was overwhelmed by a coalition of enemies, forced to abdicate in 1814 and sent into exile at Elba (an island near Rome). In 1815, after escaping from Elba, he took control of France again, raised a new army, and almost succeeded in defeating the isolated Prussian and British forces but was defeated at the [[Battle of Waterloo]].  He was exiled to St. Helena--a remote island in the South Atlantic, where he died.  
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Napoleon was constantly at war against Britain with a complex, ever-changing coalition of European nations on both sides. Refusing to compromise after his immense defeat in Russia in 1812, he was overwhelmed by a coalition of enemies, forced to abdicate in 1814 and sent into exile at Elba (an island near Rome). In 1815, after escaping from Elba, he took control of France again, raised a new army, and almost succeeded in defeating the isolated Prussian and British forces but was defeated at the [[Battle of Waterloo]].  He was exiled to St. Helena—a remote island in the South Atlantic, where he died.  
    
Napoleon's image and memory are central to French national identity, but he is despised by the British and Russians and is a controversial figure in Germany and elsewhere in Europe.
 
Napoleon's image and memory are central to French national identity, but he is despised by the British and Russians and is a controversial figure in Germany and elsewhere in Europe.
    
==Early History==
 
==Early History==
He was born ''Napoleone di Buonaparte'' in the town of Ajaccio, one year after the island of [[Corsica]] was transferred to France by the Republic of Genoa.  He was the second son of Carlo Buonaparte, a lawyer of the minor nobility; his mother was Marie-Letizia Bonaparte. The Buonopartes, proud members of the lower aristocracy, were destitute. Carlo Buonaparte had fought for Corsican independence under [[Pasquale Paoli]]; he now switched and became a supporter of the French regime, which recognized his noble rank.  When the King offered free education to impoverished noble families, Napoleon and several siblings were educated at royal expense. In 1779, after a few months' schooling at Autun to improve his French--he always had a thick Corsican accent--Napoleon entered the military academy at Brienne, which was run by a Catholic religious order.  He remained there for five years. Taunted by his schoolmates as being provincial from the wildest, newest and most violent part of France, and uncouth, he professed an intense Corsican patriotism and hatred of the French "oppressors." In 1784 he was selected to attend the top-ranked Ecole Militaire in Paris to study the science and mathematics of artillery. Napoleon spent the year in luxury such as he had never known before, and graduated 42nd in a class of 130. Commissioned as second lieutenant of artillery, he was sent to Valence in southern France.
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He was born ''Napoleone di Buonaparte'' in the town of Ajaccio, one year after the island of [[Corsica]] was transferred to France by the Republic of Genoa.  He was the second son of Carlo Buonaparte, a lawyer of the minor nobility; his mother was Marie-Letizia Bonaparte. The Buonopartes, proud members of the lower aristocracy, were destitute. Carlo Buonaparte had fought for Corsican independence under [[Pasquale Paoli]]; he now switched and became a supporter of the French regime, which recognized his noble rank.  When the King offered free education to impoverished noble families, Napoleon and several siblings were educated at royal expense. In 1779, after a few months' schooling at Autun to improve his French—he always had a thick Corsican accent—Napoleon entered the military academy at Brienne, which was run by a Catholic religious order.  He remained there for five years. Taunted by his schoolmates as being provincial from the wildest, newest and most violent part of France, and uncouth, he professed an intense Corsican patriotism and hatred of the French "oppressors." In 1784 he was selected to attend the top-ranked Ecole Militaire in Paris to study the science and mathematics of artillery. Napoleon spent the year in luxury such as he had never known before, and graduated 42nd in a class of 130. Commissioned as second lieutenant of artillery, he was sent to Valence in southern France.
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There was revolution in the air; Napoleon was an intellectual and an ardent disciple of Voltaire, Rousseau and the philosophes; he saluted the people but hated mob violence.<ref> Englund pp 29-33</ref> During his 10 years as a junior officer made five extended trips to Corsica, seeking a politico-military career, alongside Paoli or against him. He took prolonged leaves, adding up to three years in seven, sometimes failing to report back on time. In June 1793 Napoleon in Corsica was defeated by the Paolists; he and his family fled to France, joined the French revolutionary cause and forgot Corsica.<ref> Englund ch. 1-3</ref>
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There was revolution in the air; Napoleon was an intellectual and an ardent disciple of Voltaire, Rousseau and the philosophes; he saluted the people but hated mob violence.<ref>Englund pp 29-33</ref> During his 10 years as a junior officer made five extended trips to Corsica, seeking a politico-military career, alongside Paoli or against him. He took prolonged leaves, adding up to three years in seven, sometimes failing to report back on time. In June 1793 Napoleon in Corsica was defeated by the Paolists; he and his family fled to France, joined the French revolutionary cause and forgot Corsica.<ref>Englund ch. 1-3</ref>
    
==Rise to Power==
 
==Rise to Power==
 
[[Image:1799italy.jpg|thumb|375px|Italy and Corsica in 1799]]
 
[[Image:1799italy.jpg|thumb|375px|Italy and Corsica in 1799]]
Once the Revolution had begun, so many of the aristocratic officers turned against the Revolutionary government, or were exiled or executed, that a vacuum of senior leadership resulted. Promotions came very quickly now, and loyalty to the Revolution was as important as technical skill; Napoleon had both.  His demerits were overlooked as he was twice reinstated, promoted, and allowed to collect his back pay. Paris knew him as an intellectual soldier deeply involved in politics. His first test of military genius came at Toulon in 1793, where the British had seized this key port. Napoleon, an acting Lieutenant-Colonel,  used his artillery to force the British to abandon the city.  He was immediately promoted by the Jacobin radicals under [[Robespierre]] to brigadier-general, joining the ranks of several brilliant young generals.  He played a major role in defending Paris itself from counter-revolutionaries, and became the operational planner for the Army of Italy and planned two successful attacks in April 1794. He married Josephine (Rose de Beauharnais) in 1796, after falling violently in love with the older aristocratic widow.<ref> Englund pp. 63-73, 91-2, 97-8</ref>  
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Once the Revolution had begun, so many of the aristocratic officers turned against the Revolutionary government, or were exiled or executed, that a vacuum of senior leadership resulted. Promotions came very quickly now, and loyalty to the Revolution was as important as technical skill; Napoleon had both.  His demerits were overlooked as he was twice reinstated, promoted, and allowed to collect his back pay. Paris knew him as an intellectual soldier deeply involved in politics. His first test of military genius came at Toulon in 1793, where the British had seized this key port. Napoleon, an acting Lieutenant-Colonel,  used his artillery to force the British to abandon the city.  He was immediately promoted by the Jacobin radicals under [[Robespierre]] to brigadier-general, joining the ranks of several brilliant young generals.  He played a major role in defending Paris itself from counter-revolutionaries, and became the operational planner for the Army of Italy and planned two successful attacks in April 1794. He married Josephine (Rose de Beauharnais) in 1796, after falling violently in love with the older aristocratic widow.<ref>Englund pp. 63-73, 91-2, 97-8</ref>  
 
===Italy===
 
===Italy===
 
In Italy, Napoleon's rapid maneuvers proved brilliantly successful and had major long-term effects. He defeated [[Austria]], France's most dangerous enemy. He established French hegemony in the Italian peninsula, put Vienna in an impossible strategic situation, and solidified his reputation as a military genius beloved by the men in the ranks; he became a major national hero, and thus a political force in his own right.
 
In Italy, Napoleon's rapid maneuvers proved brilliantly successful and had major long-term effects. He defeated [[Austria]], France's most dangerous enemy. He established French hegemony in the Italian peninsula, put Vienna in an impossible strategic situation, and solidified his reputation as a military genius beloved by the men in the ranks; he became a major national hero, and thus a political force in his own right.
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He easily defeated the 60,000-man army of the Mamelukes (horsemen) at the [[Battle of the Pyramids]] (July 21, 1798).  
 
He easily defeated the 60,000-man army of the Mamelukes (horsemen) at the [[Battle of the Pyramids]] (July 21, 1798).  
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Intending to transplant French liberty to Egypt, Napoleon encountered stiff resistance and reacted with the same barbarism and repression used by the Ottomans. <ref> Juan Cole, ''Napoleon's Egypt'' (2007); Irene A. Bierman, ed., ''Napoleon in Egypt'' (2003)</ref> The British under Admiral [[Horatio Nelson]] sank Napoleon's entire fleet at the [[Battle of the Nile]] (August 1, 1798), trapping the French army as the [[Turkish]] main army approached. Napoleon attacked first, invading Syria and defeating the Turks in a bloody massacre.  As he laid siege to Acre, plague broke out among his troops, forcing Napoleon to retreat back to Egypt.  At the [[Battle of Aboukir]] (July 25, 1799), his 6000 men defeated a Turkish force three times as strong. Napoleon then slipped through the blockade and returned to France. <ref> The British defeated the French army in Egypt in 1801 and allowed it to return to France. </ref>  Although he won great victories in Egypt, disease and the heat decimated his ranks.  He left most of his forces in Egypt under the command of Jean-Baptiste Kleber, who continued to fight in Egypt for another two years.
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Intending to transplant French liberty to Egypt, Napoleon encountered stiff resistance and reacted with the same barbarism and repression used by the Ottomans.<ref>Juan Cole, ''Napoleon's Egypt'' (2007); Irene A. Bierman, ed., ''Napoleon in Egypt'' (2003)</ref> The British under Admiral [[Horatio Nelson]] sank Napoleon's entire fleet at the [[Battle of the Nile]] (August 1, 1798), trapping the French army as the [[Turkish]] main army approached. Napoleon attacked first, invading Syria and defeating the Turks in a bloody massacre.  As he laid siege to Acre, plague broke out among his troops, forcing Napoleon to retreat back to Egypt.  At the [[Battle of Aboukir]] (July 25, 1799), his 6000 men defeated a Turkish force three times as strong. Napoleon then slipped through the blockade and returned to France.<ref>The British defeated the French army in Egypt in 1801 and allowed it to return to France.</ref>  Although he won great victories in Egypt, disease and the heat decimated his ranks.  He left most of his forces in Egypt under the command of Jean-Baptiste Kleber, who continued to fight in Egypt for another two years.
    
===Coup d'etat of the 18th Brumaire===
 
===Coup d'etat of the 18th Brumaire===
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Despite the failures in Egypt, Napoleon returned to a hero's welcome. In alliance with the director [[Emmanuel Sieyès]] and his brother, [[Lucien Bonaparte]], president of the council of five hundred, he forced the Council of 500 into electing a consular government as the executive branch.  Napoleon became "first consul" for ten years, with two consuls appointed by him who had consultative voices only. His power was confirmed by the new constitution ("Constitution of the year VIII"), originally devised by Sieyès to give Napoleon a minor role, but rewritten by Napoleon, and accepted by direct popular vote (3,000,000 in favor, 1,567 opposed). The constitution preserved the appearance of a [[republic]] but in reality established a military dictatorship. The days of Brumaire sounded the end of the short-lived republic: there was no longer an elected representative government.<ref> Furet (1996) p 212</ref>
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Despite the failures in Egypt, Napoleon returned to a hero's welcome. In alliance with the director [[Emmanuel Sieyès]] and his brother, [[Lucien Bonaparte]], president of the council of five hundred, he forced the Council of 500 into electing a consular government as the executive branch.  Napoleon became "first consul" for ten years, with two consuls appointed by him who had consultative voices only. His power was confirmed by the new constitution ("Constitution of the year VIII"), originally devised by Sieyès to give Napoleon a minor role, but rewritten by Napoleon, and accepted by direct popular vote (3,000,000 in favor, 1,567 opposed). The constitution preserved the appearance of a [[republic]] but in reality established a military dictatorship. The days of Brumaire sounded the end of the short-lived republic: there was no longer an elected representative government.<ref>Furet (1996) p 212</ref>
    
==Diplomacy==
 
==Diplomacy==
The long string of wars was broken by the Treaty of Amiens (1802), which proved to be only a 14 month pause. <ref> Historians often use the Treaty of Amiens to separate what they call the "French Revolutionary wars" from the "Napoleonic wars." The new wars were much more nationalistic and less ideological. John D. Grainger, ''The Amiens Truce: Britain and Bonaparte, 1801-1803.'' (2004)</ref> Napoleon used the interlude to make major territorial gains in Italy and Germany without firing a shot, an unexpected development that forced the British back to the battlefield.   
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The long string of wars was broken by the Treaty of Amiens (1802), which proved to be only a 14 month pause.<ref>Historians often use the Treaty of Amiens to separate what they call the "French Revolutionary wars" from the "Napoleonic wars." The new wars were much more nationalistic and less ideological. John D. Grainger, ''The Amiens Truce: Britain and Bonaparte, 1801-1803.'' (2004)</ref> Napoleon used the interlude to make major territorial gains in Italy and Germany without firing a shot, an unexpected development that forced the British back to the battlefield.   
 
===Slavery===
 
===Slavery===
Napoleon's major adventure into the Caribbean--sending 30,000 troops in 1802 to retake Saint Domingue (Haiti) from ex-slaves under [[Toussaint L'Ouverture]] who had revolted. Napoleon wanted to preserve France's financial benefits from the colony's sugar and coffee crops; he then planned to establish a major base at New Orleans. He therefore reestablished slavery in Haiti and Guadeloupe, where it had been abolished after rebellions. Slaves and black freedmen fought the French for their freedom and independence. Revolutionary ideals played a central role in the fighting for it was the slaves and their comrades who were fighting for the revolutionary ideals of freedom and equality, while the French troops under General Charles Leclerc fought to restore the order of the ancien régime. The goal of reestablishing slavery - which explicitly contradicted the ideals of the French Revolution - demoralized the French troops. The demoralized French soldiers were unable to cope with the tropical diseases, and most died of yellow fever.  Slavery was reimposed in Guadeloupe but not in Haiti, which became an independent black republic. <ref> Philippe R. Girard, "Liberte, Egalite, Esclavage: French Revolutionary Ideals and the Failure of the Leclerc Expedition to Saint-Domingue." ''French Colonial History'' 2005 6: 55-77. Issn: 1539-3402 Fulltext: in Project Muse </ref>  Napoleon's vast colonial dreams for Egypt, India, the Caribbean, Louisiana, and even Australia were all doomed for lack of a fleet capable of matching Britain's Royal Navy. Realizing the fiasco Napoleon liquidated the Haiti project, brought home the survivors and sold off Louisiana to the U.S.<ref> Englund p 259. Slavery remained in Guadeloupe until 1848.</ref>   
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Napoleon's major adventure into the Caribbean—sending 30,000 troops in 1802 to retake Saint Domingue (Haiti) from ex-slaves under [[Toussaint L'Ouverture]] who had revolted. Napoleon wanted to preserve France's financial benefits from the colony's sugar and coffee crops; he then planned to establish a major base at New Orleans. He therefore reestablished slavery in Haiti and Guadeloupe, where it had been abolished after rebellions. Slaves and black freedmen fought the French for their freedom and independence. Revolutionary ideals played a central role in the fighting for it was the slaves and their comrades who were fighting for the revolutionary ideals of freedom and equality, while the French troops under General Charles Leclerc fought to restore the order of the ancien régime. The goal of reestablishing slavery - which explicitly contradicted the ideals of the French Revolution - demoralized the French troops. The demoralized French soldiers were unable to cope with the tropical diseases, and most died of yellow fever.  Slavery was reimposed in Guadeloupe but not in Haiti, which became an independent black republic.<ref>Philippe R. Girard, "Liberte, Egalite, Esclavage: French Revolutionary Ideals and the Failure of the Leclerc Expedition to Saint-Domingue." ''French Colonial History'' 2005 6: 55-77. Issn: 1539-3402 Fulltext: in Project Muse</ref>  Napoleon's vast colonial dreams for Egypt, India, the Caribbean, Louisiana, and even Australia were all doomed for lack of a fleet capable of matching Britain's Royal Navy. Realizing the fiasco Napoleon liquidated the Haiti project, brought home the survivors and sold off Louisiana to the U.S.<ref>Englund p 259. Slavery remained in Guadeloupe until 1848.</ref>   
 
   
 
   
    
==Military action to 1812==
 
==Military action to 1812==
 
[[Image:David - Napoleon.jpg|thumb|left|330px|Napoleon Crossing The Alps by [[Jacques Louis David]]--Napoleon actually rode a sure-footed mule over the Alps]]
 
[[Image:David - Napoleon.jpg|thumb|left|330px|Napoleon Crossing The Alps by [[Jacques Louis David]]--Napoleon actually rode a sure-footed mule over the Alps]]
Napoleon's basic military strategy was to identify and defeat the enemy's main force. The goal was to break the enemy's will to resist so that favorable negotiations followed; the conquest of territory was won in negotiations. "I see only one thing," Napoleon explained in 1797, "namely the enemy's main body. I try to crush it, confident that secondary matters will then settle themselves."<ref> Maximilian Yorck von Wartenburg, [http://books.google.com/books?id=CWwPAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA39&dq=%22confident+that+secondary+matters+will+then+settle+%22&lr=&num=30&as_brr=0 ''Napoleon as a General'' (1902) p. 39]</ref>  
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Napoleon's basic military strategy was to identify and defeat the enemy's main force. The goal was to break the enemy's will to resist so that favorable negotiations followed; the conquest of territory was won in negotiations. "I see only one thing," Napoleon explained in 1797, "namely the enemy's main body. I try to crush it, confident that secondary matters will then settle themselves."<ref>Maximilian Yorck von Wartenburg, [http://books.google.com/books?id=CWwPAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA39&dq=%22confident+that+secondary+matters+will+then+settle+%22&lr=&num=30&as_brr=0 ''Napoleon as a General'' (1902) p. 39]</ref>  
    
Less flamboyant was his close attention to selecting his  generals, and his calculations of the logistical needs of a campaign. He also pioneered the use of the [[division]] as a combined arms formation, although he did not standardize their organization. Napoleon also made much more routine use of maps and accurate watches, for synchronizing operations, than had previous military commanders.
 
Less flamboyant was his close attention to selecting his  generals, and his calculations of the logistical needs of a campaign. He also pioneered the use of the [[division]] as a combined arms formation, although he did not standardize their organization. Napoleon also made much more routine use of maps and accurate watches, for synchronizing operations, than had previous military commanders.
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===Artillery===
 
===Artillery===
The increased importance of artillery after 1807 stemmed from Napoleon's creation of a highly mobile artillery force, the growth in artillery numbers, and changes in artillery practices. As a result of these factors, Napoleon, rather than relying on infantry to wear away the enemy's defenses, now could use massed artillery as a spearhead to pound a break in the enemy's line that was then exploited by supporting infantry and cavalry.<ref> Bruce McConachy, "The Roots of Artillery Doctrine: Napoleonic Artillery Tactics Reconsidered." ''Journal of Military History'' 2001 65(3): 617-640. Issn: 0899-3718 [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0899-3718(200107)65%3A3%3C617%3ATROADN%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Z in Jstor]. McConachy rejects the alternative theory that growing reliance on artillery by the French army beginning in 1807 was an outgrowth of the declining quality of the French infantry and, later, France's inferiority in cavalry numbers. </ref>
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The increased importance of artillery after 1807 stemmed from Napoleon's creation of a highly mobile artillery force, the growth in artillery numbers, and changes in artillery practices. As a result of these factors, Napoleon, rather than relying on infantry to wear away the enemy's defenses, now could use massed artillery as a spearhead to pound a break in the enemy's line that was then exploited by supporting infantry and cavalry.<ref>Bruce McConachy, "The Roots of Artillery Doctrine: Napoleonic Artillery Tactics Reconsidered." ''Journal of Military History'' 2001 65(3): 617-640. Issn: 0899-3718 [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0899-3718(200107)65%3A3%3C617%3ATROADN%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Z in Jstor]. McConachy rejects the alternative theory that growing reliance on artillery by the French army beginning in 1807 was an outgrowth of the declining quality of the French infantry and, later, France's inferiority in cavalry numbers.</ref>
    
===Russia to 1812===
 
===Russia to 1812===
 
===The Polish issue===
 
===The Polish issue===
 
[[File:Alejandro Walewski.jpg|thumb|left|His son Alexander Walewski.]]
 
[[File:Alejandro Walewski.jpg|thumb|left|His son Alexander Walewski.]]
In 1807 Napoleon created a powerful outpost of his empire in Eastern Europe. [[Poland]] had recently been divided up by its neighbors, but Napoleon created the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, which depended on France from the very beginning. The duchy consisted of lands seized in Russia, Austria, and Prussia; its Grand Duke was Napoleon's ally the king of Saxony, but Napoleon appointed the intendants who ran the country.  The 2.5 million Poles thrilled to the opportunity and by 1814 sent about 200,000 men to  Napoleon's armies, including about 90,000 who marched with him to Moscow.  The Russians strongly opposed any move toward an independent Poland and to punish them Napoleon invaded in 1812. <ref> Riley (2000) p. 27-8. The Grand Duchy was dissolved in 1815 and Poland would not be a state until 1918.</ref> Napoleon's impact on Poland was dramatic, including the Napoleonic legal code, the abolition of serfdom, and the introduction of modern middle class bureaucracies.
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In 1807 Napoleon created a powerful outpost of his empire in Eastern Europe. [[Poland]] had recently been divided up by its neighbors, but Napoleon created the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, which depended on France from the very beginning. The duchy consisted of lands seized in Russia, Austria, and Prussia; its Grand Duke was Napoleon's ally the king of Saxony, but Napoleon appointed the intendants who ran the country.  The 2.5 million Poles thrilled to the opportunity and by 1814 sent about 200,000 men to  Napoleon's armies, including about 90,000 who marched with him to Moscow.  The Russians strongly opposed any move toward an independent Poland and to punish them Napoleon invaded in 1812.<ref>Riley (2000) p. 27-8. The Grand Duchy was dissolved in 1815 and Poland would not be a state until 1918.</ref> Napoleon's impact on Poland was dramatic, including the Napoleonic legal code, the abolition of serfdom, and the introduction of modern middle class bureaucracies.
    
== Moscow ==
 
== Moscow ==
    
===Collapse, 1813-1814===
 
===Collapse, 1813-1814===
The fiasco in Russia in 1812 wounded Napoleon's political prestige, emptied his treasury and encouraged his enemies to greater exertions and nations on the fence to turn against France. Diplomatic historians blame Napoleon's inflexibility and unwillingness to compromise when he was winning (before Russia), and, especially, when the odds had turned against him in 1813-14; in January 1813, Napoleon rejected Prussian terms; that summer he mishandled Austria; in early 1814 he fumbled the final offer of peace made at Chatillon in March 1814.  That political failure doomed him.  The Allies then signed a 20 year alliance (the Treaty of Chaumont), stuck together, and switched Bavaria away from Napoleon.<ref> Thompson ch 13-14</ref>  
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The fiasco in Russia in 1812 wounded Napoleon's political prestige, emptied his treasury and encouraged his enemies to greater exertions and nations on the fence to turn against France. Diplomatic historians blame Napoleon's inflexibility and unwillingness to compromise when he was winning (before Russia), and, especially, when the odds had turned against him in 1813-14; in January 1813, Napoleon rejected Prussian terms; that summer he mishandled Austria; in early 1814 he fumbled the final offer of peace made at Chatillon in March 1814.  That political failure doomed him.  The Allies then signed a 20 year alliance (the Treaty of Chaumont), stuck together, and switched Bavaria away from Napoleon.<ref>Thompson ch 13-14</ref>  
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Military setbacks in Spain further weakened his cause and exposed France to an attack through Spain. While Napoleon could recruit replacement troops, the loss of experienced cavalry in 1812 meant that he could not exploit his victories at Luetzen and Bautzen in  1813.<ref> Chandler, ''Campaigns of Napoleon'' ch 77</ref>  His army of raw and ill-equipped recruits was outnumbered and France was war-weary; on the other hand, the Allies were also exhausted, and had longer lines of communications and supply. Man for man, except for Wellington's British, the French probably remained better soldiers than their opponents to the very end.<ref> Schroeder (1996) p. 495-6</ref>  
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Military setbacks in Spain further weakened his cause and exposed France to an attack through Spain. While Napoleon could recruit replacement troops, the loss of experienced cavalry in 1812 meant that he could not exploit his victories at Luetzen and Bautzen in  1813.<ref>Chandler, ''Campaigns of Napoleon'' ch 77</ref>  His army of raw and ill-equipped recruits was outnumbered and France was war-weary; on the other hand, the Allies were also exhausted, and had longer lines of communications and supply. Man for man, except for Wellington's British, the French probably remained better soldiers than their opponents to the very end.<ref>Schroeder (1996) p. 495-6</ref>  
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Napoleon mishandled the campaigns in north Germany in 1813. Instead of concentrating his forces for a decisive battle with the enemy's main force, Napoleon repeatedly detached large numbers of troops under ineffective commanders to capture the Prussian capital of Berlin. The heavy losses and strategic reverses sustained by the French in these questionable undertakings left Napoleon's Grande Armée vulnerable to the massive Allied coalition that met him at [[Leipzig]].  He won at [[Dresden]] but Napoleon's mistakes were uncharacteristic of him at a younger age; he now underestimated the strength of his enemies and overestimated his own, and he was driven less by calculation than by thirst for revenge against Prussia, a onetime ally who switched against him.<ref> Michael V. Leggiere, "From Berlin to Leipzig: Napoleon's Gamble in North Germany, 1813." ''Journal of Military History'' 2003 67(1): 39-84. Issn: 0899-3718 Fulltext: in [[Project Muse]] </ref>
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Napoleon mishandled the campaigns in north Germany in 1813. Instead of concentrating his forces for a decisive battle with the enemy's main force, Napoleon repeatedly detached large numbers of troops under ineffective commanders to capture the Prussian capital of Berlin. The heavy losses and strategic reverses sustained by the French in these questionable undertakings left Napoleon's Grande Armée vulnerable to the massive Allied coalition that met him at [[Leipzig]].  He won at [[Dresden]] but Napoleon's mistakes were uncharacteristic of him at a younger age; he now underestimated the strength of his enemies and overestimated his own, and he was driven less by calculation than by thirst for revenge against Prussia, a onetime ally who switched against him.<ref>Michael V. Leggiere, "From Berlin to Leipzig: Napoleon's Gamble in North Germany, 1813." ''Journal of Military History'' 2003 67(1): 39-84. Issn: 0899-3718 Fulltext: in [[Project Muse]]</ref>
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Napoleon's decisive defeat came at the [[Leipzig, Battle of|Battle of Leipzig]], called "the battle of nations" in October 1813. Napoleon's 180,000 French and Saxon and Württemberg troops were overwhelmed by 320,000 Allies, comprising  Austrian, Russian, and Prussian armies.  It was the biggest battle to date in European history, with 100,000 to 120,000 killed, wounded or captured on both sides.<ref>Chandler, ''Campaigns of Napoleon'' ch 80 </ref> Napoleon managed to escape to France with a portion of his army, but the disaster was almost as great as that in Russia in 1812 and even more irreparable; all the German states now joined the Allies, the Dutch expelled the French, and Denmark was forced to accept terms.  In early January, 1814, 200,000 Allied troops invaded France. Napoleon scored some small victories but the Allies took Paris on March 31, his government declared him deposed, and his marshals deserted him. Napoleon abdicated and was sent into exile at Elba (an island north of Rome), as the old monarchy was brought back to France.  The French army, now controlled by [[Louis XVIII]] numbered 460,000 men, but most were still loyal to Napoleon.
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Napoleon's decisive defeat came at the [[Leipzig, Battle of|Battle of Leipzig]], called "the battle of nations" in October 1813. Napoleon's 180,000 French and Saxon and Württemberg troops were overwhelmed by 320,000 Allies, comprising  Austrian, Russian, and Prussian armies.  It was the biggest battle to date in European history, with 100,000 to 120,000 killed, wounded or captured on both sides.<ref>Chandler, ''Campaigns of Napoleon'' ch 80</ref> Napoleon managed to escape to France with a portion of his army, but the disaster was almost as great as that in Russia in 1812 and even more irreparable; all the German states now joined the Allies, the Dutch expelled the French, and Denmark was forced to accept terms.  In early January, 1814, 200,000 Allied troops invaded France. Napoleon scored some small victories but the Allies took Paris on March 31, his government declared him deposed, and his marshals deserted him. Napoleon abdicated and was sent into exile at Elba (an island north of Rome), as the old monarchy was brought back to France.  The French army, now controlled by [[Louis XVIII]] numbered 460,000 men, but most were still loyal to Napoleon.
    
===100 Days to Waterloo, 1815===
 
===100 Days to Waterloo, 1815===
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==Impact on France==
 
==Impact on France==
Napoleon centralized power in Paris, with all the provinces governed by all-powerful prefects whom he selected. They were more powerful than royal intendants of the ancient régime and had a long-term impact in unifying the nation, minimizing regional differences, and shifting all decisions to Paris.<ref> Goubert (1991) ch 14</ref>  
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Napoleon centralized power in Paris, with all the provinces governed by all-powerful prefects whom he selected. They were more powerful than royal intendants of the ancient régime and had a long-term impact in unifying the nation, minimizing regional differences, and shifting all decisions to Paris.<ref>Goubert (1991) ch 14</ref>  
 
===Law: Code Napoléon ===
 
===Law: Code Napoléon ===
Of permanent importance was the Code Napoléon (1806), created by eminent jurists under Napoleon's supervision. Praised for its Gallic clarity, it spread rapidly throughout Europe and the world in general. The Code recognized the principles of civil liberty, equality before the law, and the secular character of the state. It discarded the old right of primogeniture (where only the eldest son inherited) and ruled that inheritances should be divided equally among all the children.  The court system was standardized, with all judges appointed by Paris.<ref> Goubert (1991) ch 14</ref>   
+
Of permanent importance was the Code Napoléon (1806), created by eminent jurists under Napoleon's supervision. Praised for its Gallic clarity, it spread rapidly throughout Europe and the world in general. The Code recognized the principles of civil liberty, equality before the law, and the secular character of the state. It discarded the old right of primogeniture (where only the eldest son inherited) and ruled that inheritances should be divided equally among all the children.  The court system was standardized, with all judges appointed by Paris.<ref>Goubert (1991) ch 14</ref>   
 
===Religion===
 
===Religion===
Religion had been a major issue during the [[French Revolution]], and Napoleon resolved most of the outstanding problems. Thereby he moved the clergy and large numbers of devout Catholics from hostility to the government to support for him.  The Catholic system was reestablished by the  [[Concordat of 1801]] (signed with Pope [[Pius VII]]), so that church life returned to normal; the church lands were not restored, but the Jesuits were allowed back in and the bitter fights between the government and Church ended. Protestants and atheists were tolerated.<ref> Sutherland (2003) ch 11</ref>  
+
Religion had been a major issue during the [[French Revolution]], and Napoleon resolved most of the outstanding problems. Thereby he moved the clergy and large numbers of devout Catholics from hostility to the government to support for him.  The Catholic system was reestablished by the  [[Concordat of 1801]] (signed with Pope [[Pius VII]]), so that church life returned to normal; the church lands were not restored, but the Jesuits were allowed back in and the bitter fights between the government and Church ended. Protestants and atheists were tolerated.<ref>Sutherland (2003) ch 11</ref>  
 
===Taxes===
 
===Taxes===
 
The French taxation system had collapsed in the 1780s. In the 1790s the government seized and sold church lands and lands of exiled aristocrats. Napoleon instituted a modern, efficient tax system that guaranteed a steady flow of revenues and made long-term financing possible.   
 
The French taxation system had collapsed in the 1780s. In the 1790s the government seized and sold church lands and lands of exiled aristocrats. Napoleon instituted a modern, efficient tax system that guaranteed a steady flow of revenues and made long-term financing possible.   
 
===Conscription===
 
===Conscription===
Napoleon kept the system of conscription that had been created in the 1790s, so that every young man served in the army, which could be rapidly expanded even as it was based on a core of careerist sergeants and talented officers.  Before the Revolution the aristocracy formed the officer corps.  Now promotion was by merit and achievement--every private carried a marshal's baton, it was said.<ref> Goubert (1991) ch 14</ref>
+
Napoleon kept the system of conscription that had been created in the 1790s, so that every young man served in the army, which could be rapidly expanded even as it was based on a core of careerist sergeants and talented officers.  Before the Revolution the aristocracy formed the officer corps.  Now promotion was by merit and achievement—every private carried a marshal's baton, it was said.<ref>Goubert (1991) ch 14</ref>
    
==Impact on Europe==
 
==Impact on Europe==
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Broers (1996) distinguishes the "inner" and "outer" empire. The "Inner" Empire included France itself and Belgium, the Netherlands, the Rhinelands, most of western Germany, Switzerland, and northern Italy. These areas were integrated into an efficiently administered and largely obedient bloc. Napoleon sought to rally hostile political factions of both right and left to his rule (ralliement), as well as to fuse them into a loyal administrative class. In return for their services and obedience, Napoleon offered this new elite social order a coherent legal code and protection of their property.  
 
Broers (1996) distinguishes the "inner" and "outer" empire. The "Inner" Empire included France itself and Belgium, the Netherlands, the Rhinelands, most of western Germany, Switzerland, and northern Italy. These areas were integrated into an efficiently administered and largely obedient bloc. Napoleon sought to rally hostile political factions of both right and left to his rule (ralliement), as well as to fuse them into a loyal administrative class. In return for their services and obedience, Napoleon offered this new elite social order a coherent legal code and protection of their property.  
   −
The "outer" empire, comprised the German Hanseatic territories, former Papal States, Illyrian provinces, and the kingdom of Spain (ruled by his brother Joseph Bonaparte). It displayed little enthusiasm for French occupation and resented the imposition of high taxes, enforcement of the Continental blockade against trade with England and [[America]], application of the Concordat with the Pope to protect the [[Catholic]] Church, and especially, conscription demands to supply troops for the Grande Armee, such as the 300,000 lost in Russia in 1812. In the Outer Empire banditry flourished, elites refused to cooperate with the occupier, and the forces of counterrevolution remained active.  Napoleonic rule rested on an insecure alliance of local collaborators and French administrators, both of whom were unpopular with their subjects. Grab (1996) shows heart of the French occupation of Europe was a combination of reform and exploitation designed to extract men and money more efficiently from the subject states.<ref>Broers (1996) </ref>
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The "outer" empire, comprised the German Hanseatic territories, former Papal States, Illyrian provinces, and the kingdom of Spain (ruled by his brother Joseph Bonaparte). It displayed little enthusiasm for French occupation and resented the imposition of high taxes, enforcement of the Continental blockade against trade with England and [[America]], application of the Concordat with the Pope to protect the [[Catholic]] Church, and especially, conscription demands to supply troops for the Grande Armee, such as the 300,000 lost in Russia in 1812. In the Outer Empire banditry flourished, elites refused to cooperate with the occupier, and the forces of counterrevolution remained active.  Napoleonic rule rested on an insecure alliance of local collaborators and French administrators, both of whom were unpopular with their subjects. Grab (1996) shows heart of the French occupation of Europe was a combination of reform and exploitation designed to extract men and money more efficiently from the subject states.<ref>Broers (1996)</ref>
   −
Napoleon lifted all restriction on [[Jews]] in France and its empire. In Germany and Italy, especially, this marked a dramatic liberation from the ghetto.<ref> Frederic Cople Jaher, ''The Jews and the Nation: Revolution, Emancipation, State Formation, and the Liberal Paradigm in America and France'' (2002) pp 103-37.</ref>
+
Napoleon lifted all restriction on [[Jews]] in France and its empire. In Germany and Italy, especially, this marked a dramatic liberation from the ghetto.<ref>Frederic Cople Jaher, ''The Jews and the Nation: Revolution, Emancipation, State Formation, and the Liberal Paradigm in America and France'' (2002) pp 103-37.</ref>
    
After overcoming the forces of the coalition in 1807, Napoleon decided to create a powerful outpost of his empire in Eastern Europe. He established the [[Grand Duchy of Warsaw]], which depended on France from the very beginning. The duchy consisted of lands seized in Russia, Austria, and Prussia. He gave some support to the Polish struggle with Russia, which wanted to keep [[Poland]] within its sphere of power. The addition of west Galicia to the duchy of Warsaw by the peace of Vienna, had caused Czar Alexander anxiety lest the restoration of Poland should be contemplated, and this was a factor that led to Napoleon's invasion of Russia in 1812.
 
After overcoming the forces of the coalition in 1807, Napoleon decided to create a powerful outpost of his empire in Eastern Europe. He established the [[Grand Duchy of Warsaw]], which depended on France from the very beginning. The duchy consisted of lands seized in Russia, Austria, and Prussia. He gave some support to the Polish struggle with Russia, which wanted to keep [[Poland]] within its sphere of power. The addition of west Galicia to the duchy of Warsaw by the peace of Vienna, had caused Czar Alexander anxiety lest the restoration of Poland should be contemplated, and this was a factor that led to Napoleon's invasion of Russia in 1812.
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==Personality==
 
==Personality==
 
[[File:Delaroche Bonaparte franchissant les Alpes 1848 WC PD.jpg|thumb|Paul Delaroche, Bonaparte franchissant les Alpes.]]
 
[[File:Delaroche Bonaparte franchissant les Alpes 1848 WC PD.jpg|thumb|Paul Delaroche, Bonaparte franchissant les Alpes.]]
All historians agree that Napoleon's remarkable personality was one key to his influence.Although short and not physically imposing, in one-on-one situations he immediately had a hypnotic impact on people and seemingly bent the strongest leaders to his will. Second his intellectual powers were unrivaled. He had a photographic memory for facts, people, events, numbers, military units and maps. He devoured statistical information and reports, memorized maps, and had a perfect recall of a fantastic stock of information. He had a thorough command of military technology, as well as the financial and diplomatic secrets of France. He could instantly organize and integrate all that information, generating brilliant insights on complex situations.  He could organize his own thoughts and rapidly dictate a series of complex commands to all his subordinates, keeping in mind where each major unit was expected to be at every future point, and like a chess master, "seeing" the best plays many moves ahead. Combined with his inexhaustible energy, he kept relays of staff and secretaries at work. Unlike many generals Napoleon did not turn to history to ask what Hannibal or Alexander or whoever did in a similar situation.  After 1812 Napoleon seems to have lost his old verve. On the great Russian campaign of 1812, with crisis after crisis at hand, he rarely rose to the occasion. After that debacle compatriots noticed a loss of the old flair. Some historians have suggested a physical deterioration, but others note that an impaired Napoleon was still a brilliant general. <ref> See Chandler, "General Introduction" to ''The Campaigns of Napoleon'' (1975). </ref>  
+
All historians agree that Napoleon's remarkable personality was one key to his influence.Although short and not physically imposing, in one-on-one situations he immediately had a hypnotic impact on people and seemingly bent the strongest leaders to his will. Second his intellectual powers were unrivaled. He had a photographic memory for facts, people, events, numbers, military units and maps. He devoured statistical information and reports, memorized maps, and had a perfect recall of a fantastic stock of information. He had a thorough command of military technology, as well as the financial and diplomatic secrets of France. He could instantly organize and integrate all that information, generating brilliant insights on complex situations.  He could organize his own thoughts and rapidly dictate a series of complex commands to all his subordinates, keeping in mind where each major unit was expected to be at every future point, and like a chess master, "seeing" the best plays many moves ahead. Combined with his inexhaustible energy, he kept relays of staff and secretaries at work. Unlike many generals Napoleon did not turn to history to ask what Hannibal or Alexander or whoever did in a similar situation.  After 1812 Napoleon seems to have lost his old verve. On the great Russian campaign of 1812, with crisis after crisis at hand, he rarely rose to the occasion. After that debacle compatriots noticed a loss of the old flair. Some historians have suggested a physical deterioration, but others note that an impaired Napoleon was still a brilliant general.<ref>See Chandler, "General Introduction" to ''The Campaigns of Napoleon'' (1975).</ref>  
   −
In terms of impact on events, it was more than Napoleon's personality that took effect. He chose outstanding generals, and stood by them. He reorganized France itself to supply the men and money needed for great wars.  Above all he inspired his men--Wellington said his presence on the battlefield was worth 40,000 soldiers,<ref> Thompson, ''Napoleon Bonaparte''  (1951) p 285</ref> for he inspired confidence from privates to field marshals. The force of his personality neutralized material difficulties as his soldiers fought with the confidence that with Napoleon in charge they would surely win.<ref>Englund, ''Napoleon'' (2004) pp 379ff</ref>
+
In terms of impact on events, it was more than Napoleon's personality that took effect. He chose outstanding generals, and stood by them. He reorganized France itself to supply the men and money needed for great wars.  Above all he inspired his men—Wellington said his presence on the battlefield was worth 40,000 soldiers,<ref>Thompson, ''Napoleon Bonaparte''  (1951) p 285</ref> for he inspired confidence from privates to field marshals. The force of his personality neutralized material difficulties as his soldiers fought with the confidence that with Napoleon in charge they would surely win.<ref>Englund, ''Napoleon'' (2004) pp 379ff</ref>
    
Napoleon's ambition and drive inspired the term "[[Napoleonic Complex]]", which is used to describe a person who overcompensates for shortness or other physical deficiencies by excessive aggressiveness or will to dominate other people.
 
Napoleon's ambition and drive inspired the term "[[Napoleonic Complex]]", which is used to describe a person who overcompensates for shortness or other physical deficiencies by excessive aggressiveness or will to dominate other people.
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==Propaganda and memory ==
 
==Propaganda and memory ==
 
[[Image:David-Napoleon I.jpg|right|thumb|The Coronation of Napoleon in Notre Dame by [[Jacques-Louis David|J. L. David]]]]
 
[[Image:David-Napoleon I.jpg|right|thumb|The Coronation of Napoleon in Notre Dame by [[Jacques-Louis David|J. L. David]]]]
Napoleon's extensive and masterful use of propaganda contributed to his rise to power, legitimated his regime, and established his image for posterity. Strict censorship, controlling every aspect of the press, books, theater, and art, was only part of his propaganda scheme, aimed at portraying him as bringing desperately wanted peace and stability to France. The propagandistic rhetoric changed in relation to events and the atmosphere of Napoleon's reign, focusing first on his role as a general in the army and identification as a soldier, and moving to his role as emperor and a civil leader. Specifically targeting his civilian audience, Napoleon fostered an important, though uneasy, relationship with the contemporary art community, taking an active role in commissioning and controlling all forms of art production to suit his propaganda goals.<ref>Forrest (2004) </ref>
+
Napoleon's extensive and masterful use of propaganda contributed to his rise to power, legitimated his regime, and established his image for posterity. Strict censorship, controlling every aspect of the press, books, theater, and art, was only part of his propaganda scheme, aimed at portraying him as bringing desperately wanted peace and stability to France. The propagandistic rhetoric changed in relation to events and the atmosphere of Napoleon's reign, focusing first on his role as a general in the army and identification as a soldier, and moving to his role as emperor and a civil leader. Specifically targeting his civilian audience, Napoleon fostered an important, though uneasy, relationship with the contemporary art community, taking an active role in commissioning and controlling all forms of art production to suit his propaganda goals.<ref>Forrest (2004)</ref>
 
[[Image:Napoleon's Tomb.jpg|thumb|left|280px|The tomb of Napoleon at Les Invalides, in Paris.]]
 
[[Image:Napoleon's Tomb.jpg|thumb|left|280px|The tomb of Napoleon at Les Invalides, in Paris.]]
   −
The memory of Napoleon in Poland is highly favorable, for his support for independence and opposition to Russia, his legal code, the abolition of serfdom, and the introduction of modern middle class bureaucracies.<ref> Andrzej Nieuwazny, "Napoleon and Polish identity." ''History Today'', May 1998 v48 n5 pp. 50-55</ref>
+
The memory of Napoleon in Poland is highly favorable, for his support for independence and opposition to Russia, his legal code, the abolition of serfdom, and the introduction of modern middle class bureaucracies.<ref>Andrzej Nieuwazny, "Napoleon and Polish identity." ''History Today'', May 1998 v48 n5 pp. 50-55</ref>
 
[[File:Statue de Napoleon I, place Vendome a Paris, par Auguste Dumont,.jpg|thumb|Statue of Napoleon I, at Place Vendome, Paris, by Auguste Dumont.]]  
 
[[File:Statue de Napoleon I, place Vendome a Paris, par Auguste Dumont,.jpg|thumb|Statue of Napoleon I, at Place Vendome, Paris, by Auguste Dumont.]]  
Hazareesingh (2004) explores how Napoleon's image and memory is best understood as playing a key role in collective political defiance of the Bourbon restoration monarchy in 1815-30. People from all walks of life and all areas of France, particularly Napoleonic veterans, drew on the Napoleonic legacy and its connections with the ideals of the 1789 revolution. They spread rumors of Napoleon's return from St. Helena; many talked openly of Napoleon as the great inspiration for French patriotism and for  individual and collective liberties. A pro-Napoleon political mobilization appeared in open displays of the tricolor and rosettes, as well as celebrations of anniversaries of Napoleon's triumphs. Royal celebrations were disrupted by raucous laughter and buffoonery as the many supporters of Napoleon worked, without any central coordination, to destabilize the Bourbon regime.<ref>See Hazareesingh (2004) </ref>
+
Hazareesingh (2004) explores how Napoleon's image and memory is best understood as playing a key role in collective political defiance of the Bourbon restoration monarchy in 1815-30. People from all walks of life and all areas of France, particularly Napoleonic veterans, drew on the Napoleonic legacy and its connections with the ideals of the 1789 revolution. They spread rumors of Napoleon's return from St. Helena; many talked openly of Napoleon as the great inspiration for French patriotism and for  individual and collective liberties. A pro-Napoleon political mobilization appeared in open displays of the tricolor and rosettes, as well as celebrations of anniversaries of Napoleon's triumphs. Royal celebrations were disrupted by raucous laughter and buffoonery as the many supporters of Napoleon worked, without any central coordination, to destabilize the Bourbon regime.<ref>See Hazareesingh (2004)</ref>
   −
Datta (2005) shows that following the collapse of militaristic Boulangism in the late 1880s, the Napoleonic legend was divorced from party politics and revived in popular culture. Concentrating on plays and novels from the period 1893-1913, Datta examines how writers and critics of the "Belle Epoque" exploited the Napoleonic legend for diverse political and cultural ends. Reduced to a minor character, the new fictional Napoleon was not a world historical figure but an intimate one fashioned by each individual's needs and consumed as popular entertainment. In their attempts to represent the emperor as a figure of national unity, proponents and detractors of the Third Republic used the legend as a vehicle for exploring anxieties about gender and fears about the processes of democratization that accompanied this new era of mass politics and culture.<ref>Venita Datta, "'L'appel Au Soldat': Visions of the Napoleonic Legend in Popular Culture of the Belle Epoque." ''French Historical Studies'' 2005 28(1): 1-30. Issn: 0016-1071 Fulltext: in Ebsco </ref>
+
Datta (2005) shows that following the collapse of militaristic Boulangism in the late 1880s, the Napoleonic legend was divorced from party politics and revived in popular culture. Concentrating on plays and novels from the period 1893-1913, Datta examines how writers and critics of the "Belle Epoque" exploited the Napoleonic legend for diverse political and cultural ends. Reduced to a minor character, the new fictional Napoleon was not a world historical figure but an intimate one fashioned by each individual's needs and consumed as popular entertainment. In their attempts to represent the emperor as a figure of national unity, proponents and detractors of the Third Republic used the legend as a vehicle for exploring anxieties about gender and fears about the processes of democratization that accompanied this new era of mass politics and culture.<ref>Venita Datta, "'L'appel Au Soldat': Visions of the Napoleonic Legend in Popular Culture of the Belle Epoque." ''French Historical Studies'' 2005 28(1): 1-30. Issn: 0016-1071 Fulltext: in Ebsco</ref>
    
<blockquote>
 
<blockquote>
''After being defeated by the British in 1815, the French Emperor was exiled to St. Helena--an island in the South Atlantic Ocean. Six years later, at the age of 52, Bonaparte whispered his last words, "Head of Army!"'' <ref>[http://www.livescience.com/history/070116_napoleon_bonaparte.html Mystery of Napoleon's Death Said Solved] </ref>
+
''After being defeated by the British in 1815, the French Emperor was exiled to St. Helena--an island in the South Atlantic Ocean. Six years later, at the age of 52, Bonaparte whispered his last words, "Head of Army!"'' <ref>[http://www.livescience.com/history/070116_napoleon_bonaparte.html Mystery of Napoleon's Death Said Solved]</ref>
 
</blockquote>
 
</blockquote>
   Line 149: Line 149:  
* Fisher, Herbert. ''Napoleon''  (1913) 256pp old classic [http://books.google.com/books?vid=04ZJfyyBn9evm4khfD&id=dJcaAAAAMAAJ&printsec=titlepage&dq=napoleon&as_brr=1 online edition]
 
* Fisher, Herbert. ''Napoleon''  (1913) 256pp old classic [http://books.google.com/books?vid=04ZJfyyBn9evm4khfD&id=dJcaAAAAMAAJ&printsec=titlepage&dq=napoleon&as_brr=1 online edition]
 
* Harold, J. Christopher. ''The Age of Napoleon'' (1963) 480pp, popular history stressing empire and diplomacy  
 
* Harold, J. Christopher. ''The Age of Napoleon'' (1963) 480pp, popular history stressing empire and diplomacy  
* Grab, Alexander. ''Napoleon and the Transformation of Europe.'' (2003), pp. 249, maps; excellent synthesis [http://www.amazon.com/Napoleon-Transformation-European-History-Perspective/dp/0333682742/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1210581950&sr=8-1 excerpt and text search]
+
* Grab, Alexander. ''Napoleon and the Transformation of Europe.'' (2003), pp.&nbsp;249, maps; excellent synthesis [http://www.amazon.com/Napoleon-Transformation-European-History-Perspective/dp/0333682742/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1210581950&sr=8-1 excerpt and text search]
 
* Greiss, Thomas E.  ''West Point Atlas for the Wars of Napoleon'' (1986) 70pp; [http://www.dean.usma.edu/history/web03/atlases/napoleon/napoleon%20war%20index.htm all maps are online]
 
* Greiss, Thomas E.  ''West Point Atlas for the Wars of Napoleon'' (1986) 70pp; [http://www.dean.usma.edu/history/web03/atlases/napoleon/napoleon%20war%20index.htm all maps are online]
 
*  Johnson, Paul. ''Napoleon'' (Penguin Lives) (2002) 208pp [http://www.amazon.com/Napoleon-Penguin-Lives-Paul-Johnson/dp/0670030783/ref=sr_1_4?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1210582016&sr=8-4 excerpt and text search]
 
*  Johnson, Paul. ''Napoleon'' (Penguin Lives) (2002) 208pp [http://www.amazon.com/Napoleon-Penguin-Lives-Paul-Johnson/dp/0670030783/ref=sr_1_4?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1210582016&sr=8-4 excerpt and text search]
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* Bergeron, Louis. ''France under Napoleon'' (1981), French viewpoint
 
* Bergeron, Louis. ''France under Napoleon'' (1981), French viewpoint
 
* Forrest, Alan. "Propaganda and the Legitimation of Power in Napoleonic France." ''French History,'' 2004 18(4): 426-445. Issn: 0269-1191 Fulltext: in OUP journals  
 
* Forrest, Alan. "Propaganda and the Legitimation of Power in Napoleonic France." ''French History,'' 2004 18(4): 426-445. Issn: 0269-1191 Fulltext: in OUP journals  
* Furet, François. ''The French Revolution, 1770-1814'' (1996), pp 211-65 on Napoleon
+
* Furet, François. ''The French Revolution, 1770-1814'' (1996), pp 211–65 on Napoleon
 
* Furet, François and Mona Ozouf, eds. ''A Critical Dictionary of the French Revolution'' (1989), 1120pp; long essays by scholars; conservative perspective
 
* Furet, François and Mona Ozouf, eds. ''A Critical Dictionary of the French Revolution'' (1989), 1120pp; long essays by scholars; conservative perspective
 
* Goubert, Pierre. ''The Course of French History.'' 1991; French textbook; ch. 14  [http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=103458094 online edition]
 
* Goubert, Pierre. ''The Course of French History.'' 1991; French textbook; ch. 14  [http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=103458094 online edition]
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* Dwyer, Philip G. ed.''Napoleon and Europe,'' (2001), essays by scholars on each major power
 
* Dwyer, Philip G. ed.''Napoleon and Europe,'' (2001), essays by scholars on each major power
 
* Ellis, Geoffrey. ''The Napoleonic Empire'' (1991)  
 
* Ellis, Geoffrey. ''The Napoleonic Empire'' (1991)  
* Grab, Alexander. ''Napoleon and the Transformation of Europe.'' (2003), pp. 249, maps; excellent synthesis [http://www.amazon.com/Napoleon-Transformation-European-History-Perspective/dp/0333682742/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1210581950&sr=8-1 excerpt and text search]
+
* Grab, Alexander. ''Napoleon and the Transformation of Europe.'' (2003), pp.&nbsp;249, maps; excellent synthesis [http://www.amazon.com/Napoleon-Transformation-European-History-Perspective/dp/0333682742/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1210581950&sr=8-1 excerpt and text search]
 
* Hill, Peter P. ''Napoleon's Troublesome Americans: Franco-American Relations, 1804-1815'' (2005)  
 
* Hill, Peter P. ''Napoleon's Troublesome Americans: Franco-American Relations, 1804-1815'' (2005)  
 
* Lyons, Martyn. ''Napoleon and the Legacy of the Revolution'' (1994)  
 
* Lyons, Martyn. ''Napoleon and the Legacy of the Revolution'' (1994)  
 
* Muir, Rory.  ''Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon, 1807-1815.'' (1996). 466 pp.   
 
* Muir, Rory.  ''Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon, 1807-1815.'' (1996). 466 pp.   
 
* Parker, Harold T. "Why Did Napoleon Invade Russia? A Study in Motivation and the Interrelations of Personality and Social Structure," ''Journal of Military History'' 54 (April 1990): 131–46. [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0899-3718(199004)54%3A2%3C131%3AWDNIRA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Q in JSTOR]
 
* Parker, Harold T. "Why Did Napoleon Invade Russia? A Study in Motivation and the Interrelations of Personality and Social Structure," ''Journal of Military History'' 54 (April 1990): 131–46. [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0899-3718(199004)54%3A2%3C131%3AWDNIRA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Q in JSTOR]
* Rothenberg, Gunther E. "The Origins, Causes, and Extension of the Wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon," ''Journal of Interdisciplinary History,'' Vol. 18, No. 4, (Spring, 1988), pp. 771-793 [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-1953%28198821%2918%3A4%3C771%3ATOCAEO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-N in JSTOR]
+
* Rothenberg, Gunther E. "The Origins, Causes, and Extension of the Wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon," ''Journal of Interdisciplinary History,'' Vol. 18, No. 4, (Spring, 1988), pp.&nbsp;771–793 [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-1953%28198821%2918%3A4%3C771%3ATOCAEO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-N in JSTOR]
 
* Rude, George F. and Harvey J. Kaye.''Revolutionary Europe, 1783-1815' (2000), scholarly survey
 
* Rude, George F. and Harvey J. Kaye.''Revolutionary Europe, 1783-1815' (2000), scholarly survey
 
* Schroeder, Paul W. "Napoleon's Foreign Policy: A Criminal Enterprise," ''Journal of Military History'' 54 (April 1990): 147–62. Highly negative
 
* Schroeder, Paul W. "Napoleon's Foreign Policy: A Criminal Enterprise," ''Journal of Military History'' 54 (April 1990): 147–62. Highly negative
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* Markham, J. David. "Napoleon and the Romantic Poets," ''Consortium on Revolutionary Europe 1750-1850: Selected Papers'' 1998: 651-663,  
 
* Markham, J. David. "Napoleon and the Romantic Poets," ''Consortium on Revolutionary Europe 1750-1850: Selected Papers'' 1998: 651-663,  
 
* Newman, Edgar Leon. "Defanging the Revolution: How the Memory of the French Revolution Was Changed in French Working-class Poetry and Song, 1830-52," ''Consortium on Revolutionary Europe 1750-1850: Selected Papers'' 1995: 591-605,  
 
* Newman, Edgar Leon. "Defanging the Revolution: How the Memory of the French Revolution Was Changed in French Working-class Poetry and Song, 1830-52," ''Consortium on Revolutionary Europe 1750-1850: Selected Papers'' 1995: 591-605,  
* Nieuwazny, Andrzej. "Napoleon and Polish identity." ''History Today'', May 1998 v48 n5 pp. 50-55
+
* Nieuwazny, Andrzej. "Napoleon and Polish identity." ''History Today'', May 1998 v48 n5 pp.&nbsp;50–55
 
* O'Brien, David. ''After the Revolution: Antoine-Jean Gros, Painting and Propaganda under Napoleon'' (2006) 288p.
 
* O'Brien, David. ''After the Revolution: Antoine-Jean Gros, Painting and Propaganda under Napoleon'' (2006) 288p.
 
*{{cite book|last=Prendergast|first=Christopher|title=Napoleon and History Painting: Antoine-Jean Gros's La Bataille d'Eylau|publisher=[[Clarendon Press]]|location=Oxford|date=1997|isbn=0-19-817422-5}}
 
*{{cite book|last=Prendergast|first=Christopher|title=Napoleon and History Painting: Antoine-Jean Gros's La Bataille d'Eylau|publisher=[[Clarendon Press]]|location=Oxford|date=1997|isbn=0-19-817422-5}}
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