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}}The '''War of 1812''' was fought between the United States and Britain and lasted from June 18, 1812 until February 18, 1815. Americans had various grievances against Britain: Suppressing American trade with France, impressing (seizing) sailors with U.S. papers, and supplying and inciting hostile Indian tribes in the West. The specific grievances counted for less than the feeling that many Americans had that Britain did not respect U.S. sovereignty. It was "a war for honour, like that of the Greeks against Troy," as Virginia [[Republicans (Jeffersonian)| Republican]] John Taylor put it.<ref>Wood, Gordon S. ''Empire of Liberty: A History of the Early Republic, 1789-1815'' (Oxford History of the United States Book 4) (p. 313). Oxford University Press. Kindle Edition. p. 658-659.</ref> For its part, Britain felt that emergency measures were justified by the struggle against [[Napoleon]].

}}The '''War of 1812''' was fought between the United States and Britain and lasted from June 18, 1812 until February 18, 1815. Americans had various grievances against Britain: Suppressing American trade with France, impressing (seizing) sailors with U.S. papers, and supplying and inciting hostile Indian tribes in the West. The specific grievances counted for less than the feeling that many Americans had that Britain did not respect U.S. sovereignty. It was "a war for honour, like that of the Greeks against Troy," as Virginia [[Republicans (Jeffersonian)|Republican]] John Taylor put it.<ref>Wood, Gordon S. ''Empire of Liberty: A History of the Early Republic, 1789-1815'' (Oxford History of the United States Book 4) (p. 313). Oxford University Press. Kindle Edition. p. 658-659.</ref> For its part, Britain felt that emergency measures were justified by the struggle against [[Napoleon]].

With the [[Napoleonic Wars]] raging, the British issued "Orders in Council" in January 1807 that banned the vessels of neutral nations, including the U.S., from trading with France and its allies. To restrict U.S. trade to Britain would restore colonial trade relations. To President [[Thomas Jefferson]], this was tantamount to a denial of U.S. sovereignty. Congress responded by enacting the [[Embargo of 1807]]. The embargo hurt the U.S. economy, especially in New England, and was unpopular. After it collapsed in 1809, President [[James Madison]] tried other forms of economic pressure to overturn the Orders in Council. In July 1811, he told Congress that if there was no diplomatic solution by November, he would call a special session to approve preparations for war. A military buildup was authorized in January 1812. Madison requested war on June 1, which Congress declared on June 18. Critics called it "Mr. Madison's War," while supporters rallied under the banner, "Free trade and sailors' rights."<ref>The banner "Free trade and sailors' rights" was first hoisted on the USS Essex by Captain David Porter on July 2, 1812. (See ''Free Trade and Sailors' Rights in the War of 1812'' by Paul A. Gilje (p. 1))</ref>

With the [[Napoleonic Wars]] raging, the British issued "Orders in Council" in January 1807 that banned the vessels of neutral nations, including the U.S., from trading with France and its allies. To restrict U.S. trade to Britain would restore colonial trade relations. To President [[Thomas Jefferson]], this was tantamount to a denial of U.S. sovereignty. Congress responded by enacting the [[Embargo of 1807]]. The embargo hurt the U.S. economy, especially in New England, and was unpopular. After it collapsed in 1809, President [[James Madison]] tried other forms of economic pressure to overturn the Orders in Council. In July 1811, he told Congress that if there was no diplomatic solution by November, he would call a special session to approve preparations for war. A military buildup was authorized in January 1812. Madison requested war on June 1, which Congress declared on June 18. Critics called it "Mr. Madison's War," while supporters rallied under the banner, "Free trade and sailors' rights."<ref>The banner "Free trade and sailors' rights" was first hoisted on the USS Essex by Captain David Porter on July 2, 1812. (See ''Free Trade and Sailors' Rights in the War of 1812'' by Paul A. Gilje (p. 1))</ref>

Various historians argue that the United States was pushed into war a group of congressman called the War Hawks. The group consisted of about a dozen congressmen, most elected in 1810. "The War Congress contained a new faction, one capable of providing leadership and firmness that had hitherto been lacking," according to historian Donald Hickey.<ref>Hickey, Donard R., ''The War of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict'', p. 29.</ref> The memory of Republican losses in election of 1808 made the older generation reluctant to press this issue. The War Hawks were led by Speaker of the House [[Henry Clay]] of Kentucky and by [[John C. Calhoun]] of South Carolina, chairman of the House Foreign Relations Committee. The War Hawk thesis remains controversial among historians. In this era, congressional activity focused on responding to proposals made by the executive. There was no opportunity for a minority faction to initiate policy.

Various historians argue that the United States was pushed into war a group of congressman called the War Hawks. The group consisted of about a dozen congressmen, most elected in 1810. "The War Congress contained a new faction, one capable of providing leadership and firmness that had hitherto been lacking," according to historian Donald Hickey.<ref>Hickey, Donard R., ''The War of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict'', p. 29.</ref> The memory of Republican losses in election of 1808 made the older generation reluctant to press this issue. The War Hawks were led by Speaker of the House [[Henry Clay]] of Kentucky and by [[John C. Calhoun]] of South Carolina, chairman of the House Foreign Relations Committee. The War Hawk thesis remains controversial among historians. In this era, congressional activity focused on responding to proposals made by the executive. There was no opportunity for a minority faction to initiate policy.

Since the War Hawks came from the West and South, historians who blame them for the war have further argued that they were motivated by grievances specific to these two regions. Westerners were supposedly fixated by the prospect of land in Canada, while Southerners eyed Spanish Florida. This interpretation ignores the entire public debate of 1811 to 1812. Virtually every speech in Congress on relations with Britain during this period acknowledges that trade and sailors' rights were the central issues.<ref name=Gilje>Gilje, Paul A. ''[https://books.google.com.hk/books?id=zWURc-BfahsC&dq= Free Trade and Sailors' Rights in the War of 1812]'', Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013, ISBN: 9781107607828, p. 147.</ref> The idea of a War Hawk faction comes from Federalist congressmen who listened to the fiery anti-British speeches of Clay, Calhoun, and others. They concluded, or hoped, that the Republicans were divided. An analysis of private letters does not support the view that the Republican leadership was split into pro-war and pro-peace factions.<ref name="warhawk" />

Since the War Hawks came from the West and South, historians who blame them for the war have further argued that they were motivated by grievances specific to these two regions. Westerners were supposedly fixated by the prospect of land in Canada, while Southerners eyed Spanish Florida. This interpretation ignores the entire public debate of 1811 to 1812. Virtually every speech in Congress on relations with Britain during this period acknowledges that trade and sailors' rights were the central issues.<ref name=Gilje>Gilje, Paul A. ''[https://books.google.com.hk/books?id=zWURc-BfahsC&dq= Free Trade and Sailors' Rights in the War of 1812]'', Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013, ISBN 9781107607828, p. 147.</ref> The idea of a War Hawk faction comes from Federalist congressmen who listened to the fiery anti-British speeches of Clay, Calhoun, and others. They concluded, or hoped, that the Republicans were divided. An analysis of private letters does not support the view that the Republican leadership was split into pro-war and pro-peace factions.<ref name="warhawk" />

===The myth of land hunger===

===The myth of land hunger===

The eminent historians of the war -- Bradford Perkins, Reginald Horsman, Donald R. Hickey, and J. C. A. Stagg -- agree that maritime issues far outweighed frontier and land issues in 1812. Yet Canadians will often argue that the war was motivated by an American desire to annex their country.

The eminent historians of the war—Bradford Perkins, Reginald Horsman, Donald R. Hickey, and J. C. A. Stagg—agree that maritime issues far outweighed frontier and land issues in 1812. Yet Canadians will often argue that the war was motivated by an American desire to annex their country.

The Americans did not seek to permanently take over Canada, but wanted to seize western Ontario as a bargaining chip. The main British war goal was to defeat France and therefore stop neutrals like the U.S. from helping France. Britain also wanted to assert its dominance of the seas. A secondary British goal was the creation of a "neutral" Indian state in the area of Ohio, Indiana, Michigan and Illinois, that would be "guided" (or controlled) by Britain and serve to block American expansion.<ref>Canadian opinion was not consulted, but the people favored the British and feared the Americans because they opposed monarchy and Catholicism. Relatively few Canadians volunteered to fight the Americans; the fighting was done by British regulars and their Indian allies.</ref>

The Americans did not seek to permanently take over Canada, but wanted to seize western Ontario as a bargaining chip. The main British war goal was to defeat France and therefore stop neutrals like the U.S. from helping France. Britain also wanted to assert its dominance of the seas. A secondary British goal was the creation of a "neutral" Indian state in the area of Ohio, Indiana, Michigan and Illinois, that would be "guided" (or controlled) by Britain and serve to block American expansion.<ref>Canadian opinion was not consulted, but the people favored the British and feared the Americans because they opposed monarchy and Catholicism. Relatively few Canadians volunteered to fight the Americans; the fighting was done by British regulars and their Indian allies.</ref>

Many Canadians falsely believe that a main cause of the war was American expansionism or desire for Canadian land. The topic was much discussed among historians before 1940, but is rarely cited by experts any more.<ref> it was refuted by [http://www.jstor.org/pss/1896211 Warren H. Goodman, "The Origins of the War of 1812: A Survey of Changing Interpretations," ''Mississippi Valley Historical Review'', v 28 (September, 1941), 171-86. in JSTOR].</ref> The myth was propounded after the war by pro-British Canadians who tried to incite anti-Americanism.<ref> W. Arthur Bowler, "Propaganda in Upper Canada in the War of 1812," ''American Review of Canadian Studies'' (1988) 28:11-32; C.P. Stacey, "The War of 1812 in Canadian History" in Morris Zaslow and Wesley B. Turner, eds. ''The Defended Border: Upper Canada and the War of 1812'' (Toronto, 1964)</ref>

Many Canadians falsely believe that a main cause of the war was American expansionism or desire for Canadian land. The topic was much discussed among historians before 1940, but is rarely cited by experts any more.<ref>it was refuted by [http://www.jstor.org/pss/1896211 Warren H. Goodman, "The Origins of the War of 1812: A Survey of Changing Interpretations," ''Mississippi Valley Historical Review'', v 28 (September, 1941), 171-86. in JSTOR].</ref> The myth was propounded after the war by pro-British Canadians who tried to incite anti-Americanism.<ref>W. Arthur Bowler, "Propaganda in Upper Canada in the War of 1812," ''American Review of Canadian Studies'' (1988) 28:11-32; C.P. Stacey, "The War of 1812 in Canadian History" in Morris Zaslow and Wesley B. Turner, eds. ''The Defended Border: Upper Canada and the War of 1812'' (Toronto, 1964)</ref>

Madison and his advisers did believe that conquest of Canada would be easy and that economic coercion would force the British to come to terms by cutting off the food supply for their West Indies colonies. Furthermore, possession of Canada would be a valuable bargaining chip. Frontiersmen demanded the seizure of Canada not because they wanted the land (they had plenty), but because the British were thought to be arming the Indians and thereby blocking settlement of the west.<ref>Stagg (1983)</ref> As Horsman concludes, "The idea of conquering Canada had been present since at least 1807 as a means of forcing England to change her policy at sea. The conquest of Canada was primarily a means of waging war, not a reason for starting it."<ref>Horsman (1962) p. 267</ref> Hickey flatly states, "The desire to annex Canada did not bring on the war."<ref>Hickey (1990) p. 72. Likewise Brown (1964) concludes, "The purpose of the Canadian expedition was to serve negotiation not to annex Canada." Roger H. Brown, ''The Republic in Peril: 1812'' (1964) p. 128. Burt, a leading Canadian scholar, agrees completely, noting that Foster, the British minister to Washington, also rejected the argument that annexation of Canada was a war goal. Alfred L. Burt ''The United States, Great Britain, and British North America from the Revolution to the Establishment of Peace after the War of 1812'' (1940), pp 305-10. </ref>

Madison and his advisers did believe that conquest of Canada would be easy and that economic coercion would force the British to come to terms by cutting off the food supply for their West Indies colonies. Furthermore, possession of Canada would be a valuable bargaining chip. Frontiersmen demanded the seizure of Canada not because they wanted the land (they had plenty), but because the British were thought to be arming the Indians and thereby blocking settlement of the west.<ref>Stagg (1983)</ref> As Horsman concludes, "The idea of conquering Canada had been present since at least 1807 as a means of forcing England to change her policy at sea. The conquest of Canada was primarily a means of waging war, not a reason for starting it."<ref>Horsman (1962) p. 267</ref> Hickey flatly states, "The desire to annex Canada did not bring on the war."<ref>Hickey (1990) p. 72. Likewise Brown (1964) concludes, "The purpose of the Canadian expedition was to serve negotiation not to annex Canada." Roger H. Brown, ''The Republic in Peril: 1812'' (1964) p. 128. Burt, a leading Canadian scholar, agrees completely, noting that Foster, the British minister to Washington, also rejected the argument that annexation of Canada was a war goal. Alfred L. Burt ''The United States, Great Britain, and British North America from the Revolution to the Establishment of Peace after the War of 1812'' (1940), pp 305-10.</ref>

==The opposing forces==

==The opposing forces==

The war hawks in Congress hurriedly tried to remedy years of neglecting the military. In March 1812 it had tried to place the Army’s supply system on a more adequate footing by establishing a Quartermaster Department on the military staff in place of the inefficient and costly military agent system. At the same time Congress created the Office of the Commissary General of Purchases in the War Department, and for the first time since the Revolution the Army’s supply system was placed under the exclusive control of the Secretary of War. In May Congress had made provision for an Ordnance Department responsible for the inspection and testing of all ordnance, cannon balls, shells, and shot; the construction of gun carriages and ammunition wagons; and the preparation and inspection of the "public powder." It enlarged the Corps of Engineers by adding a company of bombardiers, sappers, and miners and expanded and reorganized the Military Academy at West Point. In addition to increasing the Regular Army, Congress had authorized the President to accept volunteer forces and to call upon the states for militia. The difficulty was not planning for an army, but raising one.  

The war hawks in Congress hurriedly tried to remedy years of neglecting the military. In March 1812 it had tried to place the Army’s supply system on a more adequate footing by establishing a Quartermaster Department on the military staff in place of the inefficient and costly military agent system. At the same time Congress created the Office of the Commissary General of Purchases in the War Department, and for the first time since the Revolution the Army’s supply system was placed under the exclusive control of the Secretary of War. In May Congress had made provision for an Ordnance Department responsible for the inspection and testing of all ordnance, cannon balls, shells, and shot; the construction of gun carriages and ammunition wagons; and the preparation and inspection of the "public powder." It enlarged the Corps of Engineers by adding a company of bombardiers, sappers, and miners and expanded and reorganized the Military Academy at West Point. In addition to increasing the Regular Army, Congress had authorized the President to accept volunteer forces and to call upon the states for militia. The difficulty was not planning for an army, but raising one.  

The main flaw in the American strategy was the assumption that inexpensive amateur militia units could fight a war with a very well trained professional army. The war revealed that the militia units sometimes did fight well, if under strong leadership like that of Andrew Jackson.  The militia did very poorly in offensive warfare--refusing at one critical point to cross the border into Canada when a battle was raging. The U.S. lost that battle. [[John C. Calhoun]] learned the lesson well. After the war he became Secretary of War and built a professional army under the leadership of very good generals, especially [[Winfield Scott]].

The main flaw in the American strategy was the assumption that inexpensive amateur militia units could fight a war with a very well trained professional army. The war revealed that the militia units sometimes did fight well, if under strong leadership like that of Andrew Jackson.  The militia did very poorly in offensive warfare—refusing at one critical point to cross the border into Canada when a battle was raging. The U.S. lost that battle. [[John C. Calhoun]] learned the lesson well. After the war he became Secretary of War and built a professional army under the leadership of very good generals, especially [[Winfield Scott]].

        

        

One of the world’s major powers was ranged against the United States; but on the basis of available resources, the two belligerents were rather evenly matched. Most of Britain’s forces were tied up in the war against Napoleon, and for the time being very little military and naval assistance could be spared for the defense of Canada. At the outbreak of the war, there were about 7,000 British and Canadian regulars in Upper and Lower Canada (now the provinces of Ontario and Quebec). With a total white population of only half a million, Canada itself had only a small reservoir of militia to draw upon. When the war began, Maj. Gen. Isaac Brock, the military commander and civil governor of Upper Canada, had 800 militiamen available in addition to his 1,600 regulars. In the course of the war, the two provinces put a total of about 10,000 militiamen in the field; whereas in the United States, probably 450,000 of the militiamen saw active service, though not more than half of them ever got near the front.

One of the world’s major powers was ranged against the United States; but on the basis of available resources, the two belligerents were rather evenly matched. Most of Britain’s forces were tied up in the war against Napoleon, and for the time being very little military and naval assistance could be spared for the defense of Canada. At the outbreak of the war, there were about 7,000 British and Canadian regulars in Upper and Lower Canada (now the provinces of Ontario and Quebec). With a total white population of only half a million, Canada itself had only a small reservoir of militia to draw upon. When the war began, Maj. Gen. Isaac Brock, the military commander and civil governor of Upper Canada, had 800 militiamen available in addition to his 1,600 regulars. In the course of the war, the two provinces put a total of about 10,000 militiamen in the field; whereas in the United States, probably 450,000 of the militiamen saw active service, though not more than half of them ever got near the front.

===Raids on Washington and Baltimore===

===Raids on Washington and Baltimore===

[[Image:Bombardment of Ft McHenry.jpg|right|200px|thumb|Bombardment of Ft McHenry, Baltimore Harbor, September 13, 1814]]     

[[Image:Bombardment of Ft McHenry.jpg|right|200px|thumb|Bombardment of Ft McHenry, Baltimore Harbor, September 13, 1814]]     

On August 19 a force of some 4,000 British troops under Maj. Gen. Robert Ross landed on the Patuxent River and marched on Washington. At the Battle of Bladensburg, five days later, under the eyes of President Madison, who had arrived on the scene with a number of civilian officials just before the battle, Ross easily dispersed the 5,000 militia, naval gunners, and regulars hastily gathered together to defend the capital. The British then entered Washington, burned the Capitol Building, the White House, and other public buildings and returned to their ships.<ref> The British probably were not acting in response to American burning of York in Canada, as some speculated.</ref>  

On August 19 a force of some 4,000 British troops under Maj. Gen. Robert Ross landed on the Patuxent River and marched on Washington. At the Battle of Bladensburg, five days later, under the eyes of President Madison, who had arrived on the scene with a number of civilian officials just before the battle, Ross easily dispersed the 5,000 militia, naval gunners, and regulars hastily gathered together to defend the capital. The British then entered Washington, burned the Capitol Building, the White House, and other public buildings and returned to their ships.<ref>The British probably were not acting in response to American burning of York in Canada, as some speculated.</ref>  

        

        

Baltimore was next on the schedule, but that city had been given time to prepare its defenses. A rather formidable line of redoubts covered the land approach; the harbor was guarded by Fort McHenry and blocked by a line of sunken gunboats. On September 13 a spirited engagement fought by Maryland militia, many of whom had run at Bladensburg just two weeks before, delayed the invaders and caused considerable loss, including General Ross, who was killed. When the fleet failed to reduce Fort McHenry, the assault on the city was called off.  

Baltimore was next on the schedule, but that city had been given time to prepare its defenses. A rather formidable line of redoubts covered the land approach; the harbor was guarded by Fort McHenry and blocked by a line of sunken gunboats. On September 13 a spirited engagement fought by Maryland militia, many of whom had run at Bladensburg just two weeks before, delayed the invaders and caused considerable loss, including General Ross, who was killed. When the fleet failed to reduce Fort McHenry, the assault on the city was called off.  

The popular image of the war in the U.S. was an American victory, and in Canada a Canadian victory. The British paid little attention since their were preoccupied with Napoleon.

The popular image of the war in the U.S. was an American victory, and in Canada a Canadian victory. The British paid little attention since their were preoccupied with Napoleon.

Men who promoted British imperialism in Canada called the war a victory for Canada--meaning a victory for British control of Canada. They systematically attacked and harassed democratic spokesmen as too "American" until the spokesman finally erupted in futile revolts in 1837 and the Empire clamped down on them, hanging some and forcing others into exile in the United States. A "militia myth" became popular in Canada to the effect that a spontaneous uprising of the Canadian people defeated the American invaders (historians say it was the British army).

Men who promoted British imperialism in Canada called the war a victory for Canada—meaning a victory for British control of Canada. They systematically attacked and harassed democratic spokesmen as too "American" until the spokesman finally erupted in futile revolts in 1837 and the Empire clamped down on them, hanging some and forcing others into exile in the United States. A "militia myth" became popular in Canada to the effect that a spontaneous uprising of the Canadian people defeated the American invaders (historians say it was the British army).

The news of the peace settlement followed so closely on Jackson’s triumph in New Orleans that the war as a whole was popularly regarded in the United States as a great victory. Yet, at best, it was a draw. American strategy had centered on the conquest of Canada and the harassment of British shipping. The land campaign had failed miserably, and during most of the war the Navy was bottled up behind a tight British blockade of the North American coast. The initial success of the privateering effort had enriched a few individuals but was no substitute for a robust navy and did little to achieve the war aims. Ironically, the greatest losers in the war were probably the Indians. The Battles of the Thames in the north and Horseshoe Bend in the south dealt them blows from which they never recovered and in the south set the stage for the forcible removal of most members of the tribes of the "Five Civilized Nations" to the west.

The news of the peace settlement followed so closely on Jackson’s triumph in New Orleans that the war as a whole was popularly regarded in the United States as a great victory. Yet, at best, it was a draw. American strategy had centered on the conquest of Canada and the harassment of British shipping. The land campaign had failed miserably, and during most of the war the Navy was bottled up behind a tight British blockade of the North American coast. The initial success of the privateering effort had enriched a few individuals but was no substitute for a robust navy and did little to achieve the war aims. Ironically, the greatest losers in the war were probably the Indians. The Battles of the Thames in the north and Horseshoe Bend in the south dealt them blows from which they never recovered and in the south set the stage for the forcible removal of most members of the tribes of the "Five Civilized Nations" to the west.

===Indians lose===

===Indians lose===

The Indians allied to the British came out as losers. The British also had the long-standing goal of creating a large "neutral" Indian state that would cover much of Ohio, Indiana and Michigan; it would be a British satellite and block American expansion in the Great Lakes region. They made the demand as late as 1814 at the peace conference, but lost battles at Thames and New Orleans that would have validated their claims.<ref> Dwight L. Smith, "A North American Neutral Indian Zone: Persistence of a British Idea" ''Northwest Ohio Quarterly'' 1989 61(2-4): 46-63; Francis M. Carroll, ''A Good and Wise Measure: The Search for the Canadian-American Boundary, 1783-1842'' (2001) [http://books.google.com/books?id=1AjlS20Q5J8C&pg=PA24&dq=barrier+intitle:Good+intitle:and+intitle:Wise+intitle:Measure+intitle:The+intitle:Search+intitle:for+intitle:the+intitle:Canadian-American+inauthor:Francis+inauthor:M+inauthor:Carroll&lr=&as_drrb_is=q&as_minm_is=1&as_miny_is=2009&as_maxm_is=12&as_maxy_is=2009&num=30&as_brr=0&as_pt=ALLTYPES p 23 online] </ref> The British proposal to create a "neutral" Indian zone was rejected by the Americans at Ghent and never resurfaced. In the decade after 1815, many Americans assumed that the British continued to conspire with their former Indian allies in an attempt to forestall American hegemony in the Great Lakes region. Such perceptions were faulty. After the Treaty of Ghent, the Indians became an undesirable burden to British policymakers who now looked to the United States for markets and raw materials. British agents in the field continued to meet regularly with their former Indian partners, but they did not supply arms or encouragement for Indian campaigns to stop American expansionism in the Midwest. Abandoned by their powerful sponsor, Great Lakes Indians ultimately migrated or reached accommodations with the Americans.<ref> Colin G. Calloway, "The End of an Era: British-Indian Relations in the Great Lakes Region after the War of 1812," ''Michigan Historical Review'' 1986 12(2): 1-20. 0890-1686</ref> In the Southwest, Indian resistance had been crushed by General Andrew Jackson. As president (1829-37), Jackson systematically removed the major tribes to reservations west of the Mississippi.<ref> Robert V. Remini, ''Andrew Jackson and His Indian Wars'' (2002)</ref>

The Indians allied to the British came out as losers. The British also had the long-standing goal of creating a large "neutral" Indian state that would cover much of Ohio, Indiana and Michigan; it would be a British satellite and block American expansion in the Great Lakes region. They made the demand as late as 1814 at the peace conference, but lost battles at Thames and New Orleans that would have validated their claims.<ref>Dwight L. Smith, "A North American Neutral Indian Zone: Persistence of a British Idea" ''Northwest Ohio Quarterly'' 1989 61(2-4): 46-63; Francis M. Carroll, ''A Good and Wise Measure: The Search for the Canadian-American Boundary, 1783-1842'' (2001) [http://books.google.com/books?id=1AjlS20Q5J8C&pg=PA24&dq=barrier+intitle:Good+intitle:and+intitle:Wise+intitle:Measure+intitle:The+intitle:Search+intitle:for+intitle:the+intitle:Canadian-American+inauthor:Francis+inauthor:M+inauthor:Carroll&lr=&as_drrb_is=q&as_minm_is=1&as_miny_is=2009&as_maxm_is=12&as_maxy_is=2009&num=30&as_brr=0&as_pt=ALLTYPES p 23 online]</ref> The British proposal to create a "neutral" Indian zone was rejected by the Americans at Ghent and never resurfaced. In the decade after 1815, many Americans assumed that the British continued to conspire with their former Indian allies in an attempt to forestall American hegemony in the Great Lakes region. Such perceptions were faulty. After the Treaty of Ghent, the Indians became an undesirable burden to British policymakers who now looked to the United States for markets and raw materials. British agents in the field continued to meet regularly with their former Indian partners, but they did not supply arms or encouragement for Indian campaigns to stop American expansionism in the Midwest. Abandoned by their powerful sponsor, Great Lakes Indians ultimately migrated or reached accommodations with the Americans.<ref>Colin G. Calloway, "The End of an Era: British-Indian Relations in the Great Lakes Region after the War of 1812," ''Michigan Historical Review'' 1986 12(2): 1-20. 0890-1686</ref> In the Southwest, Indian resistance had been crushed by General Andrew Jackson. As president (1829–37), Jackson systematically removed the major tribes to reservations west of the Mississippi.<ref>Robert V. Remini, ''Andrew Jackson and His Indian Wars'' (2002)</ref>

==See also==

==See also==

* Burt, Alfred L. ''The United States, Great Britain, and British North America from the Revolution to the Establishment of Peace after the War of 1812''. [http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=750041 (1940), detailed history by Canadian scholar; online]

* Burt, Alfred L. ''The United States, Great Britain, and British North America from the Revolution to the Establishment of Peace after the War of 1812''. [http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=750041 (1940), detailed history by Canadian scholar; online]

*Coles, Harry L. ''The War of 1812'' (1965) brief scholarly survey* Goodman, Warren H. "The Origins of the War of 1812: A Survey of Changing Interpretations," ''Mississippi Valley Historical Review'', XXVIII (September, 1941), 171-86. [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0161-391X(194109)28%3A2%3C171%3ATOOTWO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-R in JSTOR]

*Coles, Harry L. ''The War of 1812'' (1965) brief scholarly survey* Goodman, Warren H. "The Origins of the War of 1812: A Survey of Changing Interpretations," ''Mississippi Valley Historical Review'', XXVIII (September, 1941), 171-86. [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0161-391X(194109)28%3A2%3C171%3ATOOTWO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-R in JSTOR]

* Egan, Clifford L. "The Origins of the War of 1812: Three Decades of Historical Writing," ''Military Affairs'', Vol. 38, No. 2 (Apr., 1974), pp. 72-75. short article on historiography [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0026-3931(197404)38%3A2%3C72%3ATOOTWO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-A in JSTOR]

* Egan, Clifford L. "The Origins of the War of 1812: Three Decades of Historical Writing," ''Military Affairs'', Vol. 38, No. 2 (Apr., 1974), pp.&nbsp;72–75. short article on historiography [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0026-3931(197404)38%3A2%3C72%3ATOOTWO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-A in JSTOR]

* Engelman, Fred L. ''The Peace of Christmas Eve'' (1962), popular account; [http://www.americanheritage.com/articles/magazine/ah/1960/1/1960_1_28.shtml online excerpt from ''American Heritage Magazine'' (Dec 1960) v 12#1]

* Engelman, Fred L. ''The Peace of Christmas Eve'' (1962), popular account; [http://www.americanheritage.com/articles/magazine/ah/1960/1/1960_1_28.shtml online excerpt from ''American Heritage Magazine'' (Dec 1960) v 12#1]

* Heidler, Donald & Jeanne T. Heidler  (eds) ''Encyclopedia of the War of 1812'' (2nd ed 2004) 636pp; most comprehensive guide; 500 entries by 70 scholars  

* Heidler, Donald & Jeanne T. Heidler  (eds) ''Encyclopedia of the War of 1812'' (2nd ed 2004) 636pp; most comprehensive guide; 500 entries by 70 scholars  

* Hitsman, J. M. ''The Incredible War of 1812'' (1965), survey by Canadian scholar

* Hitsman, J. M. ''The Incredible War of 1812'' (1965), survey by Canadian scholar

* Horsman, Reginald. ''The Causes of the War of 1812'' (1962). [http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=55079259 online edition]

* Horsman, Reginald. ''The Causes of the War of 1812'' (1962). [http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=55079259 online edition]

* Kaplan, Lawrence S.  "France and Madison's Decision for War 1812," ''The Mississippi Valley Historical Review,'' Vol. 50, No. 4. (Mar., 1964), pp. 652-671. [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0161-391X%28196403%2950%3A4%3C652%3AFAMDFW%3E2.0.CO%3B2-J in JSTOR]

* Kaplan, Lawrence S.  "France and Madison's Decision for War 1812," ''The Mississippi Valley Historical Review,'' Vol. 50, No. 4. (Mar., 1964), pp.&nbsp;652–671. [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0161-391X%28196403%2950%3A4%3C652%3AFAMDFW%3E2.0.CO%3B2-J in JSTOR]

* Langguth, A. J. ''Union 1812: The Americans Who Fought the Second War of Independence'' (2006) 495pp, popular history

* Langguth, A. J. ''Union 1812: The Americans Who Fought the Second War of Independence'' (2006) 495pp, popular history

* Latimer, Jon. ''1812: War with America'' (2007), 656pp; the most recent survey; has a British perspective

* Latimer, Jon. ''1812: War with America'' (2007), 656pp; the most recent survey; has a British perspective