Changes

==18th century==

==18th century==

Rodger goes beyond battle history and fleet operations to examine the organizational superiority of the Royal Navy, especially in contrast with the Frenc navy. He argues the British were better at ship architecture (gaining speed via bronze plating), maintanence, practical officer training, and crew care. British repair docks could handle ships of the line better than the French, who concentrated on construction rather than maintenance.  Much credit goes to the Admiralty, the century before, under the direction of civilian [[Samuel Pepys]] as secretary and chief administrative officer.<ref> N. A. M. Rodger, ''The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain, 1649-1815'' (2006)</ref>

Rodger goes beyond battle history and fleet operations to examine the organizational superiority of the Royal Navy, especially in contrast with the Frenc navy. He argues the British were better at ship architecture (gaining speed via bronze plating), maintanence, practical officer training, and crew care. British repair docks could handle ships of the line better than the French, who concentrated on construction rather than maintenance.  Much credit goes to the Admiralty, the century before, under the direction of civilian [[Samuel Pepys]] as secretary and chief administrative officer.<ref>N. A. M. Rodger, ''The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain, 1649-1815'' (2006)</ref>

==19th century==

==19th century==

The British navy's victory, under Admiral [[Horatio Nelson]] over the French fleet in the [[Battle of the Nile]] in 1798 thwarted Napoleon's attempt to cripple Britain and represents the most complete naval triumph of the 18th century and the apogee of naval warfare in the age of sail.

The British navy's victory, under Admiral [[Horatio Nelson]] over the French fleet in the [[Battle of the Nile]] in 1798 thwarted Napoleon's attempt to cripple Britain and represents the most complete naval triumph of the 18th century and the apogee of naval warfare in the age of sail.

Rodger (2005) examines the implications of victory at sea during the Napoleonic wars and the impact that British naval success had on the ultimate defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo in 1815. Naval warfare in the early 19th century was almost never decisive; military engagements on land remained the most crucial determinant of success under arms. However, success at sea could contribute to wasting an enemy's resources via the destruction of technology (complex and costly warships) and skilled manpower. Naval engagements, because they were far removed from the presence of civilians, also had the advantage of arousing little, if any, resentment from civilian populations, resentment that could be transformed into popular uprisings and insurgency. Ultimately, Britain's Royal Navy, despite a string of naval victories, was unable to counter Napoleon's hegemony on the European continent. For that, a coalition of land powers was needed. Naval contributions remained but a sideshow throughout the conflict.<ref> N. A. M. Rodger, "The Nature of Victory at Sea." ''Journal for Maritime Research'' 2005. Issn: 1469-1957 Fulltext: [http://www.jmr.nmm.ac.uk/server/show/ConJmrArticle.190 online]</ref>

Rodger (2005) examines the implications of victory at sea during the Napoleonic wars and the impact that British naval success had on the ultimate defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo in 1815. Naval warfare in the early 19th century was almost never decisive; military engagements on land remained the most crucial determinant of success under arms. However, success at sea could contribute to wasting an enemy's resources via the destruction of technology (complex and costly warships) and skilled manpower. Naval engagements, because they were far removed from the presence of civilians, also had the advantage of arousing little, if any, resentment from civilian populations, resentment that could be transformed into popular uprisings and insurgency. Ultimately, Britain's Royal Navy, despite a string of naval victories, was unable to counter Napoleon's hegemony on the European continent. For that, a coalition of land powers was needed. Naval contributions remained but a sideshow throughout the conflict.<ref>N. A. M. Rodger, "The Nature of Victory at Sea." ''Journal for Maritime Research'' 2005. Issn: 1469-1957 Fulltext: [http://www.jmr.nmm.ac.uk/server/show/ConJmrArticle.190 online]</ref>

The abolition of privateering by the Declaration of Paris in 1852 marks an important stage in the state monopolization of violence in the modern world.  The [[Confederate States of America]] purchased raiders from Britain, but could not sell the prizes and could not get private interests to build privateers against the U.S. merchant fleet.

The abolition of privateering by the Declaration of Paris in 1852 marks an important stage in the state monopolization of violence in the modern world.  The [[Confederate States of America]] purchased raiders from Britain, but could not sell the prizes and could not get private interests to build privateers against the U.S. merchant fleet.

==20th century==

==20th century==

==See Also==

==See also==

* [[Naval warfare]]

* Naval warfare

* [[Naval guns]]

* [[Naval guns]]

* [[Naval Special Warfare]]

* [[Naval Special Warfare]]

====Early Modern: 1500-1700====

====Early Modern: 1500-1700====

* Corbett, Julian S. ''Drake and the Tudor Navy: With a History of the Rise of England as a Maritime Power'' (1898) [http://www.questia.com/read/8906402  online edition vol 1]; also [http://www.questia.com/read/96227572 online edition vol 2]

* Corbett, Julian S. ''Drake and the Tudor Navy: With a History of the Rise of England as a Maritime Power'' (1898) [http://www.questia.com/read/8906402  online edition vol 1]; also [http://www.questia.com/read/96227572 online edition vol 2]

* Palmer, M. A. J. "The 'Military Revolution' Afloat: The Era of the Anglo-Dutch Wars and the Transition to Modern Warfare at Sea." ''War in History'' April 1997, Vol. 4 Issue 2, pp 23-149, ISSN:0968-3445  in [[EBSCO]]  Relates the Anglo-Dutch wars to the transition to modern warfare at sea with attention to the pressures of the military revolution and effects of technology to sea warfare.  

* Palmer, M. A. J. "The 'Military Revolution' Afloat: The Era of the Anglo-Dutch Wars and the Transition to Modern Warfare at Sea." ''War in History'' April 1997, Vol. 4 Issue 2, pp 23–149, ISSN:0968-3445  in [[EBSCO]]  Relates the Anglo-Dutch wars to the transition to modern warfare at sea with attention to the pressures of the military revolution and effects of technology to sea warfare.  

====18th century====

====18th century====

* Allen, Gardner W. ''A Naval History of the American Revolution'' (1913) [http://books.google.com/books?id=fuPb5uhDxUwC&pg=PA1&dq=inauthor:Allen+inauthor:Gardner&num=30&as_brr=1 online at Google]  

* Allen, Gardner W. ''A Naval History of the American Revolution'' (1913) [http://books.google.com/books?id=fuPb5uhDxUwC&pg=PA1&dq=inauthor:Allen+inauthor:Gardner&num=30&as_brr=1 online at Google]  

* Kirby, S. Woodburn.  ''The War Against Japan''. 4 vols. (1957-1965). Highly detailed official Royal Navy history.

* Kirby, S. Woodburn.  ''The War Against Japan''. 4 vols. (1957-1965). Highly detailed official Royal Navy history.

* Miller, Nathan.  ''War at Sea: A Naval History of World War II.'' (1995). 576 pp.  popular

* Miller, Nathan.  ''War at Sea: A Naval History of World War II.'' (1995). 576 pp.  popular

* Morison, Samuel Eliot. ''The Two-Ocean War: A Short History of the United States Navy in the Second World War'' (1963), one-volume version of his massive 15 vol history (1947-62) of combat operations

* Morison, Samuel Eliot. ''The Two-Ocean War: A Short History of the United States Navy in the Second World War'' (1963), one-volume version of his massive 15 vol history (1947–62) of combat operations

* Potter, John D. ''Yamamoto'' 1967.  

* Potter, John D. ''Yamamoto'' 1967.  

* Prange, Gordon W. ''At Dawn We Slept''. 1982. Pearl Harbor

* Prange, Gordon W. ''At Dawn We Slept''. 1982. Pearl Harbor