Changes

==Origins==

==Origins==

Frustrated by the rearmament of West Germany and the success of NATO, the Kremlin concocted a new strategy in the early 1960s in its quest to help capitalism self-destruct: encourage civil wars of "[[National liberation movement|national liberation]]" in the third world. The Communist logic, following Lenin, was that the economic health of capitalism depended on its exploitation of the wealth of the Third World. Without that exploitation capitalism would finally collapse. Russia would give military and diplomatic support to anti-colonial, anti-capitalist pro- Communist movements. The new slogan of the left across the globe was that America--run by and for the benefit of giant corporations--had succeeded fascism as most dangerous agent of imperialism. Moscow's recent break with Beijing meant that it had to compete for influence among leftists: the winner would be the one seen as more anti-American. Third world proxy operations appeared to be much cheaper and safer than direct confrontation with [[NATO]].  

Frustrated by the rearmament of West Germany and the success of NATO, the Kremlin concocted a new strategy in the early 1960s in its quest to help capitalism self-destruct: encourage civil wars of "[[National liberation movement|national liberation]]" in the third world. The Communist logic, following Lenin, was that the economic health of capitalism depended on its exploitation of the wealth of the Third World. Without that exploitation capitalism would finally collapse. Russia would give military and diplomatic support to anti-colonial, anti-capitalist pro- Communist movements. The new slogan of the left across the globe was that America—run by and for the benefit of giant corporations—had succeeded fascism as most dangerous agent of imperialism. Moscow's recent break with Beijing meant that it had to compete for influence among leftists: the winner would be the one seen as more anti-American. Third world proxy operations appeared to be much cheaper and safer than direct confrontation with [[NATO]].  

==Cuba==

==Cuba==

Soviet leader [[Nikita Khrushchev]]'s first important opportunity to employ the strategy came in 1962, when the US seemed on the verge of rolling back the first pro-Communist regime in the Western Hemisphere, Cuba. [[Fidel Castro]] rubbed Americans the wrong way. In the first months after the bearded guerrilla captain came to power in 1959, Washington was willing to overlook reports that he was a true Marxist-Leninist, not merely some agrarian reformer. By 1960 Cuba had become a Soviet satellite; and President [[John F. Kennedy]] ordered the CIA to destabilize his regime. The invasion at the [[Bay of Pigs]] was a total failure.  Embarrassed, Kennedy cut off dollar trade with Cuba, while the CIA stepped up its sabotage; rumors abounded about a new invasion, this time by the Marines. The rumors were in fact disinformation designed to frighten and weaken Castro. The economic blockade tightened.

Soviet leader [[Nikita Khrushchev]]'s first important opportunity to employ the strategy came in 1962, when the US seemed on the verge of rolling back the first pro-Communist regime in the Western Hemisphere, Cuba. [[Fidel Castro]] rubbed Americans the wrong way. In the first months after the bearded guerrilla captain came to power in 1959, Washington was willing to overlook reports that he was a true Marxist-Leninist, not merely some agrarian reformer. By 1960 Cuba had become a Soviet satellite; and President [[John F. Kennedy]] ordered the CIA to destabilize his regime. The invasion at the [[Bay of Pigs]] was a total failure.  Embarrassed, Kennedy cut off dollar trade with Cuba, while the CIA stepped up its sabotage; rumors abounded about a new invasion, this time by the Marines. The rumors were in fact disinformation designed to frighten and weaken Castro. The economic blockade tightened.

==Havana and Moscow==

==Havana and Moscow==

===Military aid===

===Military aid===

Since 1960 the Soviets had sent over $250 million worth of war matériel to Cuba, including 394 tanks and self-propelled weapons, 888 automatic and antiaircraft guns, 41 warplanes, 13 ships, 13 radio locators, 308 radio sets, and 3,619 trucks and tractors. The Soviets also provided technical training for Cuban crews including 300 crews for tanks and self-propelled weapons, 130 crews for artillery batteries, 20 crews of defensive artillery batteries, 42 pilots for the MiG-15, and 5 pilots for the fighter MiG-19A. Another 107 Cuban pilots and 618 sailors had been trained in Soviet military schools; meanwhile, 178 Cuban military specialists—including 62 pilots, 55 tankers, and 61 artillery technicians—had been trained in Czechoslovakia. Obviously it was far too little to defeat an American invasion that seemed imminent.<ref>Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, ''One Hell of a Gamble: Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958-1964.'' (1997) p. 166. </ref>

Since 1960 the Soviets had sent over $250 million worth of war matériel to Cuba, including 394 tanks and self-propelled weapons, 888 automatic and antiaircraft guns, 41 warplanes, 13 ships, 13 radio locators, 308 radio sets, and 3,619 trucks and tractors. The Soviets also provided technical training for Cuban crews including 300 crews for tanks and self-propelled weapons, 130 crews for artillery batteries, 20 crews of defensive artillery batteries, 42 pilots for the MiG-15, and 5 pilots for the fighter MiG-19A. Another 107 Cuban pilots and 618 sailors had been trained in Soviet military schools; meanwhile, 178 Cuban military specialists—including 62 pilots, 55 tankers, and 61 artillery technicians—had been trained in Czechoslovakia. Obviously it was far too little to defeat an American invasion that seemed imminent.<ref>Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, ''One Hell of a Gamble: Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958-1964.'' (1997) p. 166.</ref>

===Sending nuclear weapons===

===Sending nuclear weapons===

Havana and Moscow, however, were fearful. Without consulting his strategists, Khrushchev personally concocted a reckless scheme; Cuban leaders, terrified for their own safety, eagerly accepted it. The weapons were to remain under Soviet, not Cuban, control.  [[Fidel Castro]] rejected warnings that acceptance of the missiles would make Cuba a helpless pawn of the Kremlin, and he ordered his intelligence agencies to stop studying the matter.<ref> James G. Blight, and David A. Welch, eds.''Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis'' (1998) [http://books.google.com/books?id=aIN7NEKcC-EC&pg=PA134&lpg=PA134&dq=mccone+sam+cuba+kennedy&source=web&ots=mWfsqJuM8s&sig=XSxFaghUc4IQHSUVsNaVmJ6Q3vk&hl=en#PPA141,M1 online p. 141]</ref> Beginning in July, 1962, Khrushchev sent in 70 ships loaded with a billion dollars' worth of munitions--including 42 IL-28 nuclear bombers (without the bombs), 24 surface-to-air anti-aircraft missile complexes [SAM], and 42,000 troops. [[Image:Cuba62a.jpg|thumb|300px|Possible range of Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba]]

Havana and Moscow, however, were fearful. Without consulting his strategists, Khrushchev personally concocted a reckless scheme; Cuban leaders, terrified for their own safety, eagerly accepted it. The weapons were to remain under Soviet, not Cuban, control.  [[Fidel Castro]] rejected warnings that acceptance of the missiles would make Cuba a helpless pawn of the Kremlin, and he ordered his intelligence agencies to stop studying the matter.<ref>James G. Blight, and David A. Welch, eds.''Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis'' (1998) [http://books.google.com/books?id=aIN7NEKcC-EC&pg=PA134&lpg=PA134&dq=mccone+sam+cuba+kennedy&source=web&ots=mWfsqJuM8s&sig=XSxFaghUc4IQHSUVsNaVmJ6Q3vk&hl=en#PPA141,M1 online p. 141]</ref> Beginning in July, 1962, Khrushchev sent in 70 ships loaded with a billion dollars' worth of munitions—including 42 IL-28 nuclear bombers (without the bombs), 24 surface-to-air anti-aircraft missile complexes [SAM], and 42,000 troops. [[Image:Cuba62a.jpg|thumb|300px|Possible range of Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba]]

Most ominously, he delivered 42 medium-range (1100 mile) SS-4 ballistic missiles (MRBMs) with nuclear warheads, and began loading 24 intermediate-range (2200 miles) SS-5 IRBMs. They could hurl H-bombs to any target from Washington to the Panama Canal. Besides deterring an invasion, they would help redress NATO's lead in strategic weapons; above all the missiles on America's doorstep would enhance Soviet prestige across the world.  

Most ominously, he delivered 42 medium-range (1100 mile) SS-4 ballistic missiles (MRBMs) with nuclear warheads, and began loading 24 intermediate-range (2200 miles) SS-5 IRBMs. They could hurl H-bombs to any target from Washington to the Panama Canal. Besides deterring an invasion, they would help redress NATO's lead in strategic weapons; above all the missiles on America's doorstep would enhance Soviet prestige across the world.  

==Intelligence failure and response==

==Intelligence failure and response==

Kennedy believed Soviet assurances that there were no missiles--and warned Moscow there had better be none. A breakdown in data gathering prevented the CIA from convincingly refuting Moscow's cover story. An off-year election campaign was underway, and the White House loudly denied charges by Republican Senator Kenneth Keating from New York that the Soviets were installing nuclear weapons in Cuba to threaten the U.S. and Kennedy was covering it up.<ref>Keating's correct information came from dissident Cubans. Max Holland, "A Luce Connection: Senator Keating, William Pawley, and the Cuban Missile Crisis," ''Journal of Cold War Studies'' 1.3 (1999) 139-167 in [[Project Muse]]</ref>

Kennedy believed Soviet assurances that there were no missiles—and warned Moscow there had better be none. A breakdown in data gathering prevented the CIA from convincingly refuting Moscow's cover story. An off-year election campaign was underway, and the White House loudly denied charges by Republican Senator Kenneth Keating from New York that the Soviets were installing nuclear weapons in Cuba to threaten the U.S. and Kennedy was covering it up.<ref>Keating's correct information came from dissident Cubans. Max Holland, "A Luce Connection: Senator Keating, William Pawley, and the Cuban Missile Crisis," ''Journal of Cold War Studies'' 1.3 (1999) 139-167 in [[Project Muse]]</ref>

The missiles were discovered by a lone U-2 reconnaissance plane on October 14. Kennedy was stunned, and immediately assembled a high-level emergency group, called "ExComm" ("the Executive Committee of the National Security Council"), to immediately propose a solution. It considered military action almost inevitable.<ref>The ExComm, or Executive Committee, was the group of government officials whose office or relationship directly played a part in the Cuban Missile Crisis. The ExComm investigated new information, and thought out all possible options, for President Kennedy to consider. The ExComm met at unusual times and in unusual manners in order to keep the situation secret for the time being. The ExComm was composed of 22 members including:

The missiles were discovered by a lone U-2 reconnaissance plane on October 14. Kennedy was stunned, and immediately assembled a high-level emergency group, called "ExComm" ("the Executive Committee of the National Security Council"), to immediately propose a solution. It considered military action almost inevitable.<ref>The ExComm, or Executive Committee, was the group of government officials whose office or relationship directly played a part in the Cuban Missile Crisis. The ExComm investigated new information, and thought out all possible options, for President Kennedy to consider. The ExComm met at unusual times and in unusual manners in order to keep the situation secret for the time being. The ExComm was composed of 22 members including:

[[Image:Excommoj9.jpg|thumb|300px|The ExComm Meeting Inside The White House.]]

[[Image:Excommoj9.jpg|thumb|300px|The ExComm Meeting Inside The White House.]]

Although the president and his brother Robert Kennedy (1925-68), the Attorney General, distrusted men in uniform, they brought in a close friend General [[Maxwell Taylor]] (1901-87), the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. The other chiefs distrusted Taylor's dovish viewpoint and his inability to articulate their urgent advice. The Pentagon's civilian voice on ExComm was Defense Secretary [[Robert McNamara]]. McNamara largely ignored his generals and admirals and generally took a dovish position. ExComm decided that the SS-4 and SS-5s would not upset the strategic balance of power, but nevertheless represented a challenge to American prestige; they had to be removed, even at the risk of threatening war. When Navy Secretary [[Paul Nitze]] was added to ExComm, he forcefully argued the services' viewpoint that the missiles were highly destabilizing.  

Although the president and his brother Robert Kennedy (1925–68), the Attorney General, distrusted men in uniform, they brought in a close friend General [[Maxwell Taylor]] (1901–87), the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. The other chiefs distrusted Taylor's dovish viewpoint and his inability to articulate their urgent advice. The Pentagon's civilian voice on ExComm was Defense Secretary [[Robert McNamara]]. McNamara largely ignored his generals and admirals and generally took a dovish position. ExComm decided that the SS-4 and SS-5s would not upset the strategic balance of power, but nevertheless represented a challenge to American prestige; they had to be removed, even at the risk of threatening war. When Navy Secretary [[Paul Nitze]] was added to ExComm, he forcefully argued the services' viewpoint that the missiles were highly destabilizing.  

The United States Intelligence Board (USIB) met regularly before the crisis. At its critical September 19, 1962, meeting it decided that the intelligence contained no evidence that the Soviets had sent nuclear missiles to Cuba, and  

The United States Intelligence Board (USIB) met regularly before the crisis. At its critical September 19, 1962, meeting it decided that the intelligence contained no evidence that the Soviets had sent nuclear missiles to Cuba, and  

it unanimously concluded that on balance they would not do so in the future.<ref> USIB had five reasons, all mistaken. The likelihood of discovery was high. Second, they knew the U.S. would react strongly. Third, the missiles would reduce but not end Soviet strategic inferiority. Fourth, Moscow had never in the past sent nuclear weapons outside their own borders. Finally, Castro was not seen as trustworthy or stable by the Kremlin. Ergo, there would be no missiles. CIA director John McCone, dissented but had no counter evidence. McCone, a businessman, had no expertise in intelligence, Cuba or the Kremlin, and undercut his credibility be departing for a month-long honeymoon as the crisis began to escalate; his warnings were ignored. Roger Hilsman, ''The Cuban Missile Crisis: The Struggle over Policy.'' (1996) p. 32-33.</ref>  Kennedy trusted the USIB and repeatedly denied there were Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba. There is no evidence, Kennedy insisted, "of any significant offensive capability either in Cuban hands or under Soviet direction and guidance."<ref> Quoted in [http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,874434,00.html ''Time'' Sept. 14, 1962]</ref>  

it unanimously concluded that on balance they would not do so in the future.<ref>USIB had five reasons, all mistaken. The likelihood of discovery was high. Second, they knew the U.S. would react strongly. Third, the missiles would reduce but not end Soviet strategic inferiority. Fourth, Moscow had never in the past sent nuclear weapons outside their own borders. Finally, Castro was not seen as trustworthy or stable by the Kremlin. Ergo, there would be no missiles. CIA director John McCone, dissented but had no counter evidence. McCone, a businessman, had no expertise in intelligence, Cuba or the Kremlin, and undercut his credibility be departing for a month-long honeymoon as the crisis began to escalate; his warnings were ignored. Roger Hilsman, ''The Cuban Missile Crisis: The Struggle over Policy.'' (1996) p. 32-33.</ref>  Kennedy trusted the USIB and repeatedly denied there were Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba. There is no evidence, Kennedy insisted, "of any significant offensive capability either in Cuban hands or under Soviet direction and guidance."<ref>Quoted in [http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,874434,00.html ''Time'' Sept. 14, 1962]</ref>  

[[Image:Cuba62b.jpg|thumb|300px|Intelligence photo showing Soviet IRBM missile site in Guanajay Cuba Oct 23 1962]]

[[Image:Cuba62b.jpg|thumb|300px|Intelligence photo showing Soviet IRBM missile site in Guanajay Cuba Oct 23 1962]]

High-altitude [[U-2]] aircraft flown by the [[United States Air Force]], took photographs that were analyzed by the National Photointerpretation Center (NPIC), a joint CIA-military analytic group.  They showed missiles. Kennedy was stunned, and immediately assembled a high-level emergency group, called "ExComm" ("the Executive Committee of the National Security Council"), to immediately propose a solution. It considered military action almost inevitable. Although the president and his brother [[Robert Kennedy]], the Attorney General, distrusted men in uniform, they brought in a close friend General [[Maxwell Taylor]] (1901-87), the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. The other chiefs distrusted Taylor's dovish viewpoint and his inability to articulate their urgent advice. The Pentagon's civilian voice on ExComm was Defense Secretary [[Robert McNamara]].  McNamara largely ignored his generals and admirals and generally took a dovish position. ExComm decided that the SS-4 and SS-5s would not upset the strategic balance of power, but nevertheless represented a challenge to American prestige; they had to be removed, even at the risk of threatening war. When Navy Secretary [[Paul Nitze]] was added to ExComm, he forcefully argued the services' viewpoint that the missiles were highly destabilizing.

High-altitude [[U-2]] aircraft flown by the [[United States Air Force]], took photographs that were analyzed by the National Photointerpretation Center (NPIC), a joint CIA-military analytic group.  They showed missiles. Kennedy was stunned, and immediately assembled a high-level emergency group, called "ExComm" ("the Executive Committee of the National Security Council"), to immediately propose a solution. It considered military action almost inevitable. Although the president and his brother [[Robert Kennedy]], the Attorney General, distrusted men in uniform, they brought in a close friend General [[Maxwell Taylor]] (1901–87), the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. The other chiefs distrusted Taylor's dovish viewpoint and his inability to articulate their urgent advice. The Pentagon's civilian voice on ExComm was Defense Secretary [[Robert McNamara]].  McNamara largely ignored his generals and admirals and generally took a dovish position. ExComm decided that the SS-4 and SS-5s would not upset the strategic balance of power, but nevertheless represented a challenge to American prestige; they had to be removed, even at the risk of threatening war. When Navy Secretary [[Paul Nitze]] was added to ExComm, he forcefully argued the services' viewpoint that the missiles were highly destabilizing.

The U.S. could tolerate a gradual evening out of the strategic balance if it took several years and so permitted political adjustments as it proceeded and at least tacit understandings, if not formal ones, on a whole range of matters including arms control. What Washington could not accept was a swift, sudden, and secret shift in the strategic equation by using a new threat of nuclear weapons that would cause massive political and diplomatic upheaval.<ref>Roger Hilsman, ''The Cuban Missile Crisis: The Struggle over Policy.'' (1996) p. 96 </ref>  

The U.S. could tolerate a gradual evening out of the strategic balance if it took several years and so permitted political adjustments as it proceeded and at least tacit understandings, if not formal ones, on a whole range of matters including arms control. What Washington could not accept was a swift, sudden, and secret shift in the strategic equation by using a new threat of nuclear weapons that would cause massive political and diplomatic upheaval.<ref>Roger Hilsman, ''The Cuban Missile Crisis: The Struggle over Policy.'' (1996) p. 96</ref>  

At the time, Moscow had only a few [[intercontinental ballistic missile]]s ([[ICBM]]s) capable of reaching the US from Soviet launch pads, plus 150 long-range bombers. By contrast America had far more weapons  capable of reaching the Soviet homeland. The Strategic Air Command (SAC) had 200 ICBMs (126 Atlas, 60 Titan I, and 20 solid-fueled Minuteman I), plus 2,000 [[B-47]] medium and [[B-52]] long-range bombers; the Navy had 144 Polaris submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM).  

At the time, Moscow had only a few [[intercontinental ballistic missile]]s ([[ICBM]]s) capable of reaching the US from Soviet launch pads, plus 150 long-range bombers. By contrast America had far more weapons  capable of reaching the Soviet homeland. The Strategic Air Command (SAC) had 200 ICBMs (126 Atlas, 60 Titan I, and 20 solid-fueled Minuteman I), plus 2,000 [[B-47]] medium and [[B-52]] long-range bombers; the Navy had 144 Polaris submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM).  

===Jupiters===

===Jupiters===

In early 1962, an Air Force squadron of 15 Jupiter medium range ballistic missiles (MRBM) became operational in Turkey; two squadrons were deployed in Italy but due for retirement. "They have surrounded us with bases on all sides!" grumbled Khrushchev. The ExComm heard that Jupiters were "obsolete"; lacking good military advice they concluded they were therefore worthless. The Jupiters were set up in the open and burned kerosene and liquid oxygen. All three systems were obsolescent in comparison to solid-fuel missiles that could be launched from underground silos or submarines, but all were perfectly capable of delivering 1.5 megaton warheads (one megaton = one million tons of TNT). A Jupiter on alert could be launched on 15 minutes notice; the comparableSoviet SS-4 SS-5 missiles probably needed four or five hours to launch.<ref> NATO asked President [[Dwight D. Eisenhower]] to install the Jupiters as a response to the Soviet's deployment of MRBMs and IRBMs aimed at Western Europe. Kennedy had decided these missiles were useless and provocative and wanted to remove them. He therefore was eager to secretly trade them to get rid of the missiles in Cuba. Roger Hilsman, ''The Cuban Missile Crisis: The Struggle over Policy.'' (1996) p. 97</ref> Missiles in Cuba could knock out much of the US bomber force, and if Kennedy permitted the first 40 to stay, Khrushchev could have shipped hundreds more.  

In early 1962, an Air Force squadron of 15 Jupiter medium range ballistic missiles (MRBM) became operational in Turkey; two squadrons were deployed in Italy but due for retirement. "They have surrounded us with bases on all sides!" grumbled Khrushchev. The ExComm heard that Jupiters were "obsolete"; lacking good military advice they concluded they were therefore worthless. The Jupiters were set up in the open and burned kerosene and liquid oxygen. All three systems were obsolescent in comparison to solid-fuel missiles that could be launched from underground silos or submarines, but all were perfectly capable of delivering 1.5 megaton warheads (one megaton = one million tons of TNT). A Jupiter on alert could be launched on 15 minutes notice; the comparableSoviet SS-4 SS-5 missiles probably needed four or five hours to launch.<ref>NATO asked President [[Dwight D. Eisenhower]] to install the Jupiters as a response to the Soviet's deployment of MRBMs and IRBMs aimed at Western Europe. Kennedy had decided these missiles were useless and provocative and wanted to remove them. He therefore was eager to secretly trade them to get rid of the missiles in Cuba. Roger Hilsman, ''The Cuban Missile Crisis: The Struggle over Policy.'' (1996) p. 97</ref> Missiles in Cuba could knock out much of the US bomber force, and if Kennedy permitted the first 40 to stay, Khrushchev could have shipped hundreds more.  

==American options==

==American options==

ExComm debated four options: vigorous diplomatic protest might "talk" the missiles out. Second, a "sea" solution would blockade Cuba and squeeze them out. Third, the "air" solution (Op-Plan 3-12) would use tactical air power to shoot them out. Finally the menace could be ended once and for all by the land option. Op-Plan 3-14 would land one Marine and five Army divisions (with three more in reserve) and seize the entire island within two weeks. US casualties (killed and wounded) were predicted to be 18,000-19,000. The Joint Chiefs recommended the air solution, but ExComm perhaps misunderstood what a "surgical strike" would entail. Finally Robert Kennedy vetoed the air solution, saying it would be too much like Pearl Harbor in reverse. The sea option was chosen; it would not require any casualties, and it would block the arrival of nuclear warheads. (Unknown to Washington, 42 nuclear warheads were already in Cuba.)<ref> for the minutes of the meetings of the [[Joint Chiefs of Staff]], see [http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/621000%20Notes%20Taken%20from%20Transcripts.pdf online]</ref>

ExComm debated four options: vigorous diplomatic protest might "talk" the missiles out. Second, a "sea" solution would blockade Cuba and squeeze them out. Third, the "air" solution (Op-Plan 3-12) would use tactical air power to shoot them out. Finally the menace could be ended once and for all by the land option. Op-Plan 3-14 would land one Marine and five Army divisions (with three more in reserve) and seize the entire island within two weeks. US casualties (killed and wounded) were predicted to be 18,000-19,000. The Joint Chiefs recommended the air solution, but ExComm perhaps misunderstood what a "surgical strike" would entail. Finally Robert Kennedy vetoed the air solution, saying it would be too much like Pearl Harbor in reverse. The sea option was chosen; it would not require any casualties, and it would block the arrival of nuclear warheads. (Unknown to Washington, 42 nuclear warheads were already in Cuba.)<ref>for the minutes of the meetings of the [[Joint Chiefs of Staff]], see [http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/621000%20Notes%20Taken%20from%20Transcripts.pdf online]</ref>

On October 21, 1962, an agreement was reached by the ExComm after much debate, to place a "Quarantine" around Cuba, in order to prevent more Soviet Missiles from being delivered. The quarantine was established at a perimeter of 800 miles around Cuba, to search and reject any ships containing nuclear missiles. The call for a quarantine was a difficult one to make, because a blockade was technically an act of war, and needed caution to avoid a misunderstanding. At a later time, the quarantine line was moved back to 500 miles around Cuba to provide more time for the United States and the Soviet Union to communicate.

On October 21, 1962, an agreement was reached by the ExComm after much debate, to place a "Quarantine" around Cuba, in order to prevent more Soviet Missiles from being delivered. The quarantine was established at a perimeter of 800 miles around Cuba, to search and reject any ships containing nuclear missiles. The call for a quarantine was a difficult one to make, because a blockade was technically an act of war, and needed caution to avoid a misunderstanding. At a later time, the quarantine line was moved back to 500 miles around Cuba to provide more time for the United States and the Soviet Union to communicate.

==Public Alert==

==Public Alert==

On October 22, John Kennedy went on television with perhaps the scariest message Americans had ever heard: the Navy would turn back ("quarantine") all military shipments to Cuba, and the US would immediately attack the Soviet Union (presumably with nuclear weapons) if any of the missiles were launched from Cuba to the USA.<ref> Since "blockade" implied a war, the new term "quarantine" was used to indicate a partial blockade of only military items. </ref>  

On October 22, John Kennedy went on television with perhaps the scariest message Americans had ever heard: the Navy would turn back ("quarantine") all military shipments to Cuba, and the US would immediately attack the Soviet Union (presumably with nuclear weapons) if any of the missiles were launched from Cuba to the USA.<ref>Since "blockade" implied a war, the new term "quarantine" was used to indicate a partial blockade of only military items.</ref>  

When Moscow failed to respond he privately gave the Kremlin a 48 hour ultimatum to remove all the missiles; to allow Khrushchev to save face he secretly suggested a trade for the Jupiters. The next step would either have been a complete blockade, or perhaps the air strike option. People were terrified but rallied behind the president.<ref> Alice L. George,  ''Awaiting Armageddon: How Americans Faced the Cuban Missile Crisis.'' (2003). </ref>

When Moscow failed to respond he privately gave the Kremlin a 48 hour ultimatum to remove all the missiles; to allow Khrushchev to save face he secretly suggested a trade for the Jupiters. The next step would either have been a complete blockade, or perhaps the air strike option. People were terrified but rallied behind the president.<ref>Alice L. George,  ''Awaiting Armageddon: How Americans Faced the Cuban Missile Crisis.'' (2003).</ref>

Realizing how close they had come to war, Kennedy and Khrushchev became much friendlier in public. They signed a test ban treaty that eliminated nuclear testing above ground or in space; the treaty was primarily designed to hobble China and other countries trying to build their first bombs. Defense of the US no longer relied on field armies, but on a triad of strategic forces: 1,054 land-based ICBMs, 650 submarine-based SLBMs, and 400 B-52 bombers.  

Realizing how close they had come to war, Kennedy and Khrushchev became much friendlier in public. They signed a test ban treaty that eliminated nuclear testing above ground or in space; the treaty was primarily designed to hobble China and other countries trying to build their first bombs. Defense of the US no longer relied on field armies, but on a triad of strategic forces: 1,054 land-based ICBMs, 650 submarine-based SLBMs, and 400 B-52 bombers.  

The Kremlin vowed never again would Communism be humiliated by raw American nuclear superiority. Khrushchev was overthrown and replaced with a less volatile, more systematic hardliner, [[Leonid Brezhnev]] (1906-82). Russia built its own submarines and SLBM, and speeded manufacture of ICBMs; by 1971 it had caught up with the US. The US response was to add multiple warheads (MIRV) to each missile; the number of strategic warheads thereby doubled from about 5,000 in the 1960s to about 10,000 after 1976.  

The Kremlin vowed never again would Communism be humiliated by raw American nuclear superiority. Khrushchev was overthrown and replaced with a less volatile, more systematic hardliner, [[Leonid Brezhnev]] (1906–82). Russia built its own submarines and SLBM, and speeded manufacture of ICBMs; by 1971 it had caught up with the US. The US response was to add multiple warheads (MIRV) to each missile; the number of strategic warheads thereby doubled from about 5,000 in the 1960s to about 10,000 after 1976.  

Kennedy's removal of the Jupiters in Turkey, and his refusal to consult with any allies during the crisis, raised doubts in Germany about America's commitment to Berlin, led France to pull its forces out of NATO, and ruined a proposed multilateral nuclear force. The Europeans, increasingly prosperous, felt sufficiently well protected. They were annoyed when Washington wanted them to assume a larger fraction of defense costs, yet never consulted in critical emergencies. The Western alliance survived, but had been sorely wounded.  

Kennedy's removal of the Jupiters in Turkey, and his refusal to consult with any allies during the crisis, raised doubts in Germany about America's commitment to Berlin, led France to pull its forces out of NATO, and ruined a proposed multilateral nuclear force. The Europeans, increasingly prosperous, felt sufficiently well protected. They were annoyed when Washington wanted them to assume a larger fraction of defense costs, yet never consulted in critical emergencies. The Western alliance survived, but had been sorely wounded.  

As of 2009 the economic blockade of Cuba remains in effect.

As of 2009 the economic blockade of Cuba remains in effect.

The Cubans refer to the "October Crisis," while the Soviets called it "the Caribbean crisis." This naming highlights three different views: (1) The Cubans see this as one of many crises; (2) The Soviets view it as a confrontation that took place in the Caribbean (thus deemphasizing Cuba's importance); and (3) the United States perceives this as a multidimensional time bomb with international consequences including the future of Berlin.<ref>James G. Blight and Philip Brenner, ''Sad and Luminous Days: Cuba's Struggle with the Superpowers After the Missile Crisis'' (2002) pp. 247-8 </ref>

The Cubans refer to the "October Crisis," while the Soviets called it "the Caribbean crisis." This naming highlights three different views: (1) The Cubans see this as one of many crises; (2) The Soviets view it as a confrontation that took place in the Caribbean (thus deemphasizing Cuba's importance); and (3) the United States perceives this as a multidimensional time bomb with international consequences including the future of Berlin.<ref>James G. Blight and Philip Brenner, ''Sad and Luminous Days: Cuba's Struggle with the Superpowers After the Missile Crisis'' (2002) pp. 247-8</ref>

==Bibliography==

==Bibliography==

* Stern, Sheldon M.  ''The Week the World Stood Still: Inside the Secret Cuban Missile Crisis.'' (2005). 238 pp.  Focus on ExComm meetings [http://www.amazon.com/Week-World-Stood-Still-Stanford/dp/0804750777/ref=sr_1_4?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1211430494&sr=1-4 excerpt and text search]; also [http://www.questia.com/read/108141942?title=The%20Week%20the%20World%20Stood%20Still%3a%20%20Inside%20the%20Secret%20Cuban%20Missile%20Crisis online edition]

* Stern, Sheldon M.  ''The Week the World Stood Still: Inside the Secret Cuban Missile Crisis.'' (2005). 238 pp.  Focus on ExComm meetings [http://www.amazon.com/Week-World-Stood-Still-Stanford/dp/0804750777/ref=sr_1_4?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1211430494&sr=1-4 excerpt and text search]; also [http://www.questia.com/read/108141942?title=The%20Week%20the%20World%20Stood%20Still%3a%20%20Inside%20the%20Secret%20Cuban%20Missile%20Crisis online edition]

* Taubman,  William. ''Khrushchev: The Man and His Era'' (2003) [http://www.amazon.com/Khrushchev-Man-His-William-Taubman/dp/0393324842/ref=sr_1_2?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1211431069&sr=1-2 excerpt and text search]

* Taubman,  William. ''Khrushchev: The Man and His Era'' (2003) [http://www.amazon.com/Khrushchev-Man-His-William-Taubman/dp/0393324842/ref=sr_1_2?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1211431069&sr=1-2 excerpt and text search]

* Tierney, Dominic. "'Pearl Harbor in Reverse': Moral Analogies in the Cuban Missile Crisis," ''Journal of Cold War Studies'' - Volume 9, Number 3, Summer 2007, pp. 49-77 in [[Project Muse]]; JFK said at the time air strikes against would be morally analogous to the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor

* Tierney, Dominic. "'Pearl Harbor in Reverse': Moral Analogies in the Cuban Missile Crisis," ''Journal of Cold War Studies'' - Volume 9, Number 3, Summer 2007, pp.&nbsp;49–77 in [[Project Muse]]; JFK said at the time air strikes against would be morally analogous to the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor

* Weisbrot, Robert.  ''Maximum Danger: Kennedy, the Missiles, and the Crisis of American Confidence.'' (2001). 275 pp.   

* Weisbrot, Robert.  ''Maximum Danger: Kennedy, the Missiles, and the Crisis of American Confidence.'' (2001). 275 pp.   

===Historiography===

===Historiography===

*  Allison, Graham. "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis." ''The American Political Science Review,'' Vol. 63, No. 3 (Sep., 1969), pp. 689-718, famous political science article uses three models, the rational actor (the state is treated like an individual), organizational behavior model (the agencies involved have their own procedures), government politics (result comes after negotiations among actors) [http://www.jstor.org/pss/1954423 in JSTOR]

*  Allison, Graham. "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis." ''The American Political Science Review,'' Vol. 63, No. 3 (Sep., 1969), pp.&nbsp;689–718, famous political science article uses three models, the rational actor (the state is treated like an individual), organizational behavior model (the agencies involved have their own procedures), government politics (result comes after negotiations among actors) [http://www.jstor.org/pss/1954423 in JSTOR]

*  Allison, Graham, and Philip Zelikow. ''Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis,'' (2nd ed. (1999), 440pp

*  Allison, Graham, and Philip Zelikow. ''Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis,'' (2nd ed. (1999), 440pp

*  Chang, Laurence, and Peter Kornbluh. "Introduction" to Chang and Kornbluh, eds. ''Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962: A National Security Archive Documents Reader'' (1998)  [http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/declass.htm Introduction online  

*  Chang, Laurence, and Peter Kornbluh. "Introduction" to Chang and Kornbluh, eds. ''Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962: A National Security Archive Documents Reader'' (1998)  [http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/declass.htm Introduction online  

* Garthoff, Raymond L. "Foreign Intelligence and the Historiography of the Cold War," ''Journal of Cold War Studies'' - Volume 6, Number 2, Spring 2004, pp. 21-56 in [[Project Muse]]

* Garthoff, Raymond L. "Foreign Intelligence and the Historiography of the Cold War," ''Journal of Cold War Studies'' - Volume 6, Number 2, Spring 2004, pp.&nbsp;21–56 in [[Project Muse]]

* Jones, John A., and  Virginia H. Jones. "Five Perspectives on the Cuban Missile Crisis," ''Rhetoric & Public Affairs'' 8.1 (2005) 133-144 in [[Project Muse]]

* Jones, John A., and  Virginia H. Jones. "Five Perspectives on the Cuban Missile Crisis," ''Rhetoric & Public Affairs'' 8.1 (2005) 133-144 in [[Project Muse]]

*  Lebow, Richard Ned. "Domestic Politics and the Cuban Missile Crisis: The Traditional and Revisionist Interpretations Reevaluated," ''Diplomatic History,'' Vol. 14, No. 4 (Fall 1990), pp. 471–492 [http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/119998683/abstract?CRETRY=1&SRETRY=0 online]

*  Lebow, Richard Ned. "Domestic Politics and the Cuban Missile Crisis: The Traditional and Revisionist Interpretations Reevaluated," ''Diplomatic History,'' Vol. 14, No. 4 (Fall 1990), pp.&nbsp;471–492 [http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/119998683/abstract?CRETRY=1&SRETRY=0 online]

===Primary sources===

===Primary sources===

[[Category:Cold War]]

[[Category:Cold War]]

[[Category:1960s]]

[[Category:1960s]]

[[category:diplomacy]]

[[Category:Diplomacy]]

[[category:Cuba]]

[[Category:Cuba]]

[[category:Soviet Union]]

[[Category:Soviet Union]]

[[Category : Nuclear Target Structures]]

[[Category:Nuclear Target Structures]]