Changes

Jefferson said, no war, but he did order all British ships out of American waters.  He was convinced that the United States had the power to coerce the European powers by economic methods rather than war. In December 1807, Jefferson asked Congress for an embargo which would prohibit all American ships from departing for a foreign port. Trading vessels were now required to post a bond of guarantee equal to  the value of both the ship itself and its cargo, in order to insure compliance with the law.<ref>Malone, p. 461</ref>  Secretary of the Treasury [[Albert Gallatin]] objected because of the administrative nightmare of trying to enforce such a profoundly unpopular policy. "As to the hope that it may...induce England to treat us better," wrote Gallatin to Jefferson shortly after the bill had become law, "I think is entirely groundless...government prohibitions do always more mischief then had been calculated; and it is not without hesitation that a statesman should hazard to regulate the concerns of individuals as if he could do better than themselves"<ref>Gallatin to Jefferson, Dec. 1807, in Gallatin (1879) 2:368 [http://books.google.com/books?id=xnUsAAAAMAAJ&printsec=toc&dq=inauthor:gallatin&num=30&sig=M8LZzp5Q7_KwNywJouiRe9LiPfE#PPA368,M1 online edition]</ref>

Jefferson said, no war, but he did order all British ships out of American waters.  He was convinced that the United States had the power to coerce the European powers by economic methods rather than war. In December 1807, Jefferson asked Congress for an embargo which would prohibit all American ships from departing for a foreign port. Trading vessels were now required to post a bond of guarantee equal to  the value of both the ship itself and its cargo, in order to insure compliance with the law.<ref>Malone, p. 461</ref>  Secretary of the Treasury [[Albert Gallatin]] objected because of the administrative nightmare of trying to enforce such a profoundly unpopular policy. "As to the hope that it may...induce England to treat us better," wrote Gallatin to Jefferson shortly after the bill had become law, "I think is entirely groundless...government prohibitions do always more mischief then had been calculated; and it is not without hesitation that a statesman should hazard to regulate the concerns of individuals as if he could do better than themselves"<ref>Gallatin to Jefferson, Dec. 1807, in Gallatin (1879) 2:368 [http://books.google.com/books?id=xnUsAAAAMAAJ&printsec=toc&dq=inauthor:gallatin&num=30&sig=M8LZzp5Q7_KwNywJouiRe9LiPfE#PPA368,M1 online edition]</ref>

The Embargo quickly became law and ordered the end of all American foreign trade, to all countries. Foreign ships could still come to American ports but Congress added a nonimportation act which blocked entry to many British goods. Very stringent enforcement laws were passed to ensure that vessels engaged in the coastal trade would not secretly sail for foreign ports. In January 1808 Congress closed a loophole that coasting vessels, and fishing and whaling boats had not been required to post bonds guaranteeing that they would not sail for foreign ports. <ref>McDonald p. 147</ref> War loomed, but Congress refused Jefferson's request to increase the army to 30,000 troops from 2,800.  

The Embargo quickly became law and ordered the end of all American foreign trade, to all countries. Foreign ships could still come to American ports but Congress added a nonimportation act which blocked entry to many British goods. Very stringent enforcement laws were passed to ensure that vessels engaged in the coastal trade would not secretly sail for foreign ports. In January 1808 Congress closed a loophole that coasting vessels, and fishing and whaling boats had not been required to post bonds guaranteeing that they would not sail for foreign ports.<ref>McDonald p. 147</ref> War loomed, but Congress refused Jefferson's request to increase the army to 30,000 troops from 2,800.  

Despite vigorous enforcement by the federal government they were only partially successful. American ships that were already at seas continued to trade abroad throughout the Embargo period (they did not come back to the U.S.), and smuggling flourished along the Canadian border.

Despite vigorous enforcement by the federal government they were only partially successful. American ships that were already at seas continued to trade abroad throughout the Embargo period (they did not come back to the U.S.), and smuggling flourished along the Canadian border.

The Embargo, which lasted from December 1807 to March 1809, for the most part effectively ended American overseas trade. All coastal areas suffered. In commercial New England and the Middle Atlantic states ships were uselessly tied up at the wharves, and sailors and wharf workers were unemployed. In the farming regions, especially in the South, the lucrative export market ended for tobacco, cotton, grain, fish, cattle and horses.  The scarcity of European goods gave a stimulus for new American factories in the northeast. New Englanders protested bitterly that their prosperity was ruined by Jefferson's Embargo. The Federalist Party, which had been rapidly losing support, now found increased strength.  

The Embargo, which lasted from December 1807 to March 1809, for the most part effectively ended American overseas trade. All coastal areas suffered. In commercial New England and the Middle Atlantic states ships were uselessly tied up at the wharves, and sailors and wharf workers were unemployed. In the farming regions, especially in the South, the lucrative export market ended for tobacco, cotton, grain, fish, cattle and horses.  The scarcity of European goods gave a stimulus for new American factories in the northeast. New Englanders protested bitterly that their prosperity was ruined by Jefferson's Embargo. The Federalist Party, which had been rapidly losing support, now found increased strength.  

On the Canadian border with New York and Vermont, the embargo laws were openly flouted. An increasingly frustrated Jefferson was resolved to use all his police powers to enforce the embargo to the letter against Americans.  In March 1808 Congress prohibited, for the first time, the export of all goods, either by land or by sea.<ref>McDonald p 144</ref> "The Enforcement Act," signed into law on 24 April 1808, was the last of the embargo acts. It decreed that port authorities were allowed to seize cargoes without a warrant, and to bring to trial any shipper or merchant who was thought to have merely contemplated violating the embargo.<ref> Levy, (1973) p. 107.</ref>

On the Canadian border with New York and Vermont, the embargo laws were openly flouted. An increasingly frustrated Jefferson was resolved to use all his police powers to enforce the embargo to the letter against Americans.  In March 1808 Congress prohibited, for the first time, the export of all goods, either by land or by sea.<ref>McDonald p 144</ref> "The Enforcement Act," signed into law on 24 April 1808, was the last of the embargo acts. It decreed that port authorities were allowed to seize cargoes without a warrant, and to bring to trial any shipper or merchant who was thought to have merely contemplated violating the embargo.<ref>Levy, (1973) p. 107.</ref>

The Embargo hurt the United States more than Britain or France. The British expanded their trade with South America, assisted by the absence of American competition (which had been removed by the embargo).  

The Embargo hurt the United States more than Britain or France. The British expanded their trade with South America, assisted by the absence of American competition (which had been removed by the embargo).  

A case study of Rhode Island shows the embargo devastated shipping-related industries, wrecked existing markets, and increased opposition to the [[Jeffersonian Republican party]]. Smuggling was widely endorsed by the public, which viewed the embargo as a violation of their rights. Public outcry continued, helping the Federalists regain control of the state government in 1808-09. The case is a rare example of US national foreign policy  altering local patterns of political allegiance.

A case study of Rhode Island shows the embargo devastated shipping-related industries, wrecked existing markets, and increased opposition to the [[Jeffersonian Republican party]]. Smuggling was widely endorsed by the public, which viewed the embargo as a violation of their rights. Public outcry continued, helping the Federalists regain control of the state government in 1808-09. The case is a rare example of US national foreign policy  altering local patterns of political allegiance.

Despite its unpopular nature, the Embargo Act did have some limited, unintended benefits, especially as it drove capital and labor into New England textile and other manufacturing industries, lessening America's reliance on the British.<ref>Strum (1994)</ref>  In Vermont, the embargo was doomed to failure on the Lake Champlain-Richelieu River water route because of Vermont's dependence on a Canadian outlet for produce. At St. John, Lower Canada, £140,000 worth of goods smuggled by water were recorded there in 1808 - a 31% increase over 1807. Shipments of ashes (used to make soap) nearly doubled to £54,000, but lumber dropped 23% to £11,200. Manufactured goods, which had expanded to £50,000 since Jay's Treaty of 1795, fell over 20%, especially articles made near Tidewater. Newspapers and manuscripts recorded more lake activity than usual, despite the theoretical reduction in shipping that should accompany an embargo.  The smuggling was not restricted to water routes, as herds were readily drove across the uncontrollable land border. Southbound commerce gained two-thirds overall, but furs dropped a third. Customs officials maintained a stance of vigorous enforcement throughout and Gallatin's Enforcement Act (1809) was a party issue. Many Vermonters preferred the embargo's exciting game of revenuers versus smugglers, bringing high profits, versus mundane, low-profit normal trade.<ref> Muller (1970)</ref>

Despite its unpopular nature, the Embargo Act did have some limited, unintended benefits, especially as it drove capital and labor into New England textile and other manufacturing industries, lessening America's reliance on the British.<ref>Strum (1994)</ref>  In Vermont, the embargo was doomed to failure on the Lake Champlain-Richelieu River water route because of Vermont's dependence on a Canadian outlet for produce. At St. John, Lower Canada, £140,000 worth of goods smuggled by water were recorded there in 1808 - a 31% increase over 1807. Shipments of ashes (used to make soap) nearly doubled to £54,000, but lumber dropped 23% to £11,200. Manufactured goods, which had expanded to £50,000 since Jay's Treaty of 1795, fell over 20%, especially articles made near Tidewater. Newspapers and manuscripts recorded more lake activity than usual, despite the theoretical reduction in shipping that should accompany an embargo.  The smuggling was not restricted to water routes, as herds were readily drove across the uncontrollable land border. Southbound commerce gained two-thirds overall, but furs dropped a third. Customs officials maintained a stance of vigorous enforcement throughout and Gallatin's Enforcement Act (1809) was a party issue. Many Vermonters preferred the embargo's exciting game of revenuers versus smugglers, bringing high profits, versus mundane, low-profit normal trade.<ref>Muller (1970)</ref>

The New England merchants who evaded the embargo were imaginative, daring, and versatile. Gordinier (2001) examines how the merchants of New London, Connecticut, organized and managed the cargoes purchased and sold, and the vessels used during the years before, during, and after the embargo. Trade routes and cargoes, both foreign and domestic, along with the vessel types, and the ways their ownership and management were organized show the merchants of southeastern Connecticut evinced versatility in the face of crisis.

The New England merchants who evaded the embargo were imaginative, daring, and versatile. Gordinier (2001) examines how the merchants of New London, Connecticut, organized and managed the cargoes purchased and sold, and the vessels used during the years before, during, and after the embargo. Trade routes and cargoes, both foreign and domestic, along with the vessel types, and the ways their ownership and management were organized show the merchants of southeastern Connecticut evinced versatility in the face of crisis.

* Burt, Alfred L. ''The United States, Great Britain, and British North America from the Revolution to the Establishment of Peace after the War of 1812''. [http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=750041 (1940), detailed history by Canadian scholar; online]

* Burt, Alfred L. ''The United States, Great Britain, and British North America from the Revolution to the Establishment of Peace after the War of 1812''. [http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=750041 (1940), detailed history by Canadian scholar; online]

* Daniels, G. W. "American Cotton Trade with Liverpool under the Embargo and Non-intercourse Acts." ''American Historical Review'' 1916 21(2): 276-287. Issn: 0002-8762 [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8762(191601)21%3A2%3C276%3AACTWLU%3E2.0.CO%3B2-9 online at Jstor]

* Daniels, G. W. "American Cotton Trade with Liverpool under the Embargo and Non-intercourse Acts." ''American Historical Review'' 1916 21(2): 276-287. Issn: 0002-8762 [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8762(191601)21%3A2%3C276%3AACTWLU%3E2.0.CO%3B2-9 online at Jstor]

* Frankel, Jeffrey A. "The 1807-1809 Embargo Against Great Britain," ''The Journal of Economic History,'' Vol. 42, No. 2 (Jun., 1982), pp. 291-308 [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-0507(198206)42%3A2%3C291%3AT1EAGB%3E2.0.CO%3B2-0 online at JSTOR]

* Frankel, Jeffrey A. "The 1807-1809 Embargo Against Great Britain," ''The Journal of Economic History,'' Vol. 42, No. 2 (Jun., 1982), pp.&nbsp;291–308 [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-0507(198206)42%3A2%3C291%3AT1EAGB%3E2.0.CO%3B2-0 online at JSTOR]

* Gallatin, Albert. ''The Writings  of Albert Gallatin'', ed. Henry Adams, (1879) [http://books.google.com/books?id=xnUsAAAAMAAJ&printsec=toc&dq=inauthor:gallatin&num=30&sig=M8LZzp5Q7_KwNywJouiRe9LiPfE#PPR5,M1 online edition at Google]

* Gallatin, Albert. ''The Writings  of Albert Gallatin'', ed. Henry Adams, (1879) [http://books.google.com/books?id=xnUsAAAAMAAJ&printsec=toc&dq=inauthor:gallatin&num=30&sig=M8LZzp5Q7_KwNywJouiRe9LiPfE#PPR5,M1 online edition at Google]

* Gordinier, Glenn Stine.  "Versatility in Crisis: The Merchants of the New London Customs District Respond to the Embargo of 1807-1809."  PhD dissertation U. of Connecticut 2001. 333 pp.  DAI 2001 62(2): 739-A. DA3004842  

* Gordinier, Glenn Stine.  "Versatility in Crisis: The Merchants of the New London Customs District Respond to the Embargo of 1807-1809."  PhD dissertation U. of Connecticut 2001. 333 pp.  DAI 2001 62(2): 739-A. DA3004842  

<references/>

<references/>

[[category:Early National U.S.]]

[[Category:Early National U.S.]]

[[category:Democratic Party]]

[[Category:Democratic Party]]

[[category:Diplomacy]]

[[Category:Diplomacy]]

[[category:Economic History]]

[[Category:Economic History]]

[[Category:War of 1812]]

[[Category:War of 1812]]