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| | [[Image:Zimmermanntelegram.jpg|right|300px|thumb|The Zimmermann Telegram]] | | [[Image:Zimmermanntelegram.jpg|right|300px|thumb|The Zimmermann Telegram]] |
| − | The '''Zimmermann Telegram''' was a proposal by Germany to Mexico in January 1917 to join [[Germany]] in a war against the United States. The telegram was intercepted by British spies and given to the press by President [[Woodrow Wilson]], outraging American public opinion and providing a "casus bellum" (a formal cause for war) and was one of several reasons for Congress to declare war on Germany on April 6, 1917, bringing the U.S. into [[World War I]].<ref>The main reason for war was the actual German attacks on American ships.</ref> Relations between the U.S. and [[Mexico]] were very bad and there was a risk of war between the two. The telegram was sent by German Foreign Minister [[Arthur Zimmermann]] to the German ambassador to Mexico on January 19th, 1917, who carried the proposal to the Mexican government. Mexico realized the proposal would make it a satellite of Germany and would lead to quick defeat by the vastly more powerful U.S., so it wisely ignored the message and remained neutral in the World War. The Zimmermann Telegram (spelled with two n's) is considered one of the worst blunders in diplomatic history. | + | The '''Zimmermann Telegram''' was a proposal by Germany to Mexico in January 1917 to join [[Germany]] in a war against the United States. The telegram was intercepted by British spies and given to the press by President [[Woodrow Wilson]], outraging American public opinion and providing a "casus bellum" (a formal cause for war) and was one of several reasons for Congress to declare war on Germany on April 6, 1917, bringing the U.S. into [[World War I]].<ref>The main reason for war was the actual German attacks on American ships.</ref> Relations between the U.S. and [[Mexico]] were very bad and there was a risk of war between the two. The telegram was sent by German Foreign Minister [[Arthur Zimmermann]] to the German ambassador to Mexico on January 19, 1917, who carried the proposal to the Mexican government. Mexico realized the proposal would make it a satellite of Germany and would lead to quick defeat by the vastly more powerful U.S., so it wisely ignored the message and remained neutral in the World War. The Zimmermann Telegram (spelled with two n's) is considered one of the worst blunders in diplomatic history. |
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| | ==Prelude== | | ==Prelude== |
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| | ==The telegram== | | ==The telegram== |
| | [[Image:NYT1Mar1917.jpg|250px|right|thumb|''New York Times'', March 1, 1917]] | | [[Image:NYT1Mar1917.jpg|250px|right|thumb|''New York Times'', March 1, 1917]] |
| − | In January of 1917, British cryptographers deciphered a telegram from the German foreign ministry to the German Minister to Mexico, von Eckhardt, offering return of Texas, New Mexico and Arizona to Mexico in return for joining the German war effort: | + | In January 1917, British cryptographers deciphered a telegram from the German foreign ministry to the German Minister to Mexico, von Eckhardt, offering return of Texas, New Mexico and Arizona to Mexico in return for joining the German war effort: |
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| | :''We intend to begin on the first of February unrestricted submarine warfare. We shall endeavor in spite of this to keep the United States of America neutral. In the event of this not succeeding, we make Mexico a proposal or alliance on the following basis: make war together, make peace together, generous financial support and an understanding on our part that Mexico is to reconquer the lost territory in Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona. The settlement in detail is left to you. You will inform the President of the above most secretly as soon as the outbreak of war with the United States of America is certain and add the suggestion that he should, on his own initiative, invite Japan to immediate adherence and at the same time mediate between Japan and ourselves. Please call the President’s attention to the fact that the ruthless employment of our submarines now offers the prospect of compelling England in a few months to make peace.”'' | | :''We intend to begin on the first of February unrestricted submarine warfare. We shall endeavor in spite of this to keep the United States of America neutral. In the event of this not succeeding, we make Mexico a proposal or alliance on the following basis: make war together, make peace together, generous financial support and an understanding on our part that Mexico is to reconquer the lost territory in Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona. The settlement in detail is left to you. You will inform the President of the above most secretly as soon as the outbreak of war with the United States of America is certain and add the suggestion that he should, on his own initiative, invite Japan to immediate adherence and at the same time mediate between Japan and ourselves. Please call the President’s attention to the fact that the ruthless employment of our submarines now offers the prospect of compelling England in a few months to make peace.”'' |
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| | The British had initially not shared the news of the Zimmermann Telegram with U.S. officials, because they did not want the Germans to discover that British code breakers had cracked the German code. However, following Germany’s resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare in February, the British decided to use the note to help sway American official and public opinion to join the war. The British finally forwarded the intercept to Wilson on February 24. The American press carried the story the following week. | | The British had initially not shared the news of the Zimmermann Telegram with U.S. officials, because they did not want the Germans to discover that British code breakers had cracked the German code. However, following Germany’s resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare in February, the British decided to use the note to help sway American official and public opinion to join the war. The British finally forwarded the intercept to Wilson on February 24. The American press carried the story the following week. |
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| − | Despite the shocking news of the Zimmermann Telegram, Wilson still hesitated to ask for a declaration of war. He waited until March 20 before convening a Cabinet meeting to broach the matter--almost a month after he had first seen the telegram. The precise reasons for Wilson’s decision to choose war in 1917 remain the subject of debate among historians, especially in light of his efforts to avoid war in 1915 after the sinking of the British passenger liners [[Lusitania|''Lusitania'']] and ''Arabic'', which had led to the deaths of 131 Americans. | + | Despite the shocking news of the Zimmermann Telegram, Wilson still hesitated to ask for a declaration of war. He waited until March 20 before convening a Cabinet meeting to broach the matter—almost a month after he had first seen the telegram. The precise reasons for Wilson’s decision to choose war in 1917 remain the subject of debate among historians, especially in light of his efforts to avoid war in 1915 after the sinking of the British passenger liners ''[[Lusitania]]'' and ''Arabic'', which had led to the deaths of 131 Americans. |
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| − | However, by 1917, the continued submarine attacks on American merchant and passenger ships, and the “Zimmermann Telegram’s” implied threat of a German attack on the United States, had served to sway American public opinion in support of a declaration of war. Furthermore, international law stipulated that the placing of U.S. naval personnel on civilian ships to protect them from German submarines already constituted an act of war against Germany. Finally, the Germans, by their actions, had demonstrated that they had no interest in seeking an end to the conflict (this included Zimmermann's own statement on March 29 confirming he sent it <ref> See [http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/zimmermann_speech.htm Zimmermann speech]</ref>). These reasons all contributed to President Wilson’s decision to ask Congress for a declaration of war against Germany. They also encouraged Congress to grant Wilson’s request and formally declare war on Germany. | + | However, by 1917, the continued submarine attacks on American merchant and passenger ships, and the “Zimmermann Telegram’s” implied threat of a German attack on the United States, had served to sway American public opinion in support of a declaration of war. Furthermore, international law stipulated that the placing of U.S. naval personnel on civilian ships to protect them from German submarines already constituted an act of war against Germany. Finally, the Germans, by their actions, had demonstrated that they had no interest in seeking an end to the conflict (this included Zimmermann's own statement on March 29 confirming he sent it <ref>See [http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/zimmermann_speech.htm Zimmermann speech]</ref>). These reasons all contributed to President Wilson’s decision to ask Congress for a declaration of war against Germany. They also encouraged Congress to grant Wilson’s request and formally declare war on Germany. |
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| | == Bibliography== | | == Bibliography== |
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| | <references/> | | <references/> |
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| − | [[category:World War I]] | + | [[Category:World War I]] |
| − | [[category:Mexican History]] | + | [[Category:Mexican History]] |
| − | [[category:Progressive Era]] | + | [[Category:Progressive Era]] |
| | [[Category:Diplomacy]] | | [[Category:Diplomacy]] |