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'''Hirohito''' (29 April 1901 – 7 January 1989), known in Japan as the '''Shōwa emperor''', was the 124^th [[emperor]] of [[Japan]] in the [[List of japanese emperors|traditional count]] of order of succession, who reigned for 62 years from 25 December 1926, until his death, making his reign, the Shōwa [[Japanese_dates#The Era System|era]], the longest of any [[Japanese]] Emperor. During his reign, he was the symbolic leader of his nation through prosperity (1926-29), the Great Depression (1929-41), victory and defeat in [[World War 2#Far Eastern Theatre|World War II]] (1941-45), the American Occupation (1945-50), and the rapid recovery of Japan to become an economic superpower (1950-86). He had significant decision-making power only in 1944-45, and made the decision to surrender in August 1945.

'''Hirohito''' (29 April 1901 – 7 January 1989), known in Japan as the '''Shōwa emperor''', was the 124th [[emperor]] of [[Japan]] in the [[List of japanese emperors|traditional count]] of order of succession, who reigned for 62 years from 25 December 1926, until his death, making his reign, the Shōwa [[Japanese dates#The Era System|era]], the longest of any [[Japanese]] Emperor. During his reign, he was the symbolic leader of his nation through prosperity (1926–29), the Great Depression (1929–41), victory and defeat in [[World War 2#Far Eastern Theatre|World War II]] (1941–45), the American Occupation (1945–50), and the rapid recovery of Japan to become an economic superpower (1950–86). He had significant decision-making power only in 1944-45, and made the decision to surrender in August 1945.

==The emperor's name==

==The emperor's name==

In 1915, Kimmochi Saionju, the former prime minister of Japan, tutored him whereupon he attended a special institute for the crown prince (''Tôgû-gogakumonsho'') until 1921. After his graduation in 1914 from the Peers' School, the Crown Prince's Institute was opened for his higher education, which required seven years; five sons of peers were his classmates. Upon his graduation in 1921 he became the first imperial prince ever to tour Europe, March to September 1921, to see how constitutional monarchy worked  in Britain, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Italy. The public discovered Hirohito had surprisingly democratic qualities, an eager intelligence, and a shy, quiet manner (the last partly ascribed to his self-consciousness and myopic eyesight). The crown prince returned from his tour to find his father failing rapidly in health, and in November 1921 Hirohito was entrusted with the affairs of government as prince regent.  

In 1915, Kimmochi Saionju, the former prime minister of Japan, tutored him whereupon he attended a special institute for the crown prince (''Tôgû-gogakumonsho'') until 1921. After his graduation in 1914 from the Peers' School, the Crown Prince's Institute was opened for his higher education, which required seven years; five sons of peers were his classmates. Upon his graduation in 1921 he became the first imperial prince ever to tour Europe, March to September 1921, to see how constitutional monarchy worked  in Britain, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Italy. The public discovered Hirohito had surprisingly democratic qualities, an eager intelligence, and a shy, quiet manner (the last partly ascribed to his self-consciousness and myopic eyesight). The crown prince returned from his tour to find his father failing rapidly in health, and in November 1921 Hirohito was entrusted with the affairs of government as prince regent.  

On 26 January, 1924, Prince Hirohito married Princess Nagako Kuni, a distant cousin, who was to become the future Empress Kōjun. Together, they had seven children:

On 26 January 1924, Prince Hirohito married Princess Nagako Kuni, a distant cousin, who was to become the future Empress Kōjun. Together, they had seven children:

* Princess Shigeko (9 December 1925 – 23 July 1961)

* Princess Shigeko (9 December 1925 – 23 July 1961)

* Princess Sachiko (10 September 1927 – 8 March 1928)

* Princess Sachiko (10 September 1927 – 8 March 1928)

* Princess Takako (born 3 March 1939)

* Princess Takako (born 3 March 1939)

Although he was only the fifth child born to the royal couple, as the eldest male, Crown Prince [[Akihito]] would succeed Emperor Shōwa to become the current Emperor of Japan since January 7th, 1989.

Although he was only the fifth child born to the royal couple, as the eldest male, Crown Prince [[Akihito]] would succeed Emperor Shōwa to become the current Emperor of Japan since January 7, 1989.

==Ascent to Power==

==Ascent to Power==

Prince Hirohito became heir apparent upon the death of his grandfather, Emperor Meiji, on 30 July 1912. At the same time his father became the 123^rd Emperor, Taishō Tennō (大正天皇), thus ushering in the Taishō (大正) era. Prince Hirohito was invested as Crown Prince (''Kōtaishi'' 皇太子) on 2 November 1916.  He was appointed as Regent of Japan on 29 November 1921, ruling in place of his father, who was suffering from a debilitating mental illness, as a result of childhood meningitis and rumoured lead poisoning.

Prince Hirohito became heir apparent upon the death of his grandfather, Emperor Meiji, on 30 July 1912. At the same time his father became the 123rd Emperor, Taishō Tennō (大正天皇), thus ushering in the Taishō (大正) era. Prince Hirohito was invested as Crown Prince (''Kōtaishi'' 皇太子) on 2 November 1916.  He was appointed as Regent of Japan on 29 November 1921, ruling in place of his father, who was suffering from a debilitating mental illness, as a result of childhood meningitis and rumoured lead poisoning.

==Reign as Emperor==

==Reign as Emperor==

===World War II===

===World War II===

During the invasion of [[Manchuria]] (in 1931) and the war against China (1937-45), Japan took over other countries by force. By  the late 1930s, Hirohito moved squarely into the camp of the 'renovationist' group who were tending toward an ever expanding war in China.  However, he opposed going to war with the United States in 1941, not out of pacifist tendencies but because he had a realistic concern about a probable Japanese defeat. He pressed for talks with Washington and welcomed the neutrality agreement with [[Moscow]] in April 1941 as a means of avoiding a recurrence of dangerous border clashes with the [[Soviet Union]]. He strongly opposed joining [[Germany]] in its war against the Soviets in June 1941, and helped replace the hawkish foreign minister.<ref> Stephen S. Large, ''Emperor Hirohito and Showa Japan'' (1992) p. 103-8.</ref> Yet because his power was so circumscribed by the decision-making structure of the government, and he had no answer to the American oil embargo, by late summer 1941 he became fatalistic about going to war.  He had little role in the replacement of Prime Minister Konoe by the war cabinet of General [[Hideki Tojo|Hideki Tōjō]] (1884-1948), who demanded war. Hirohito continued to oppose going to war until the last minute, but pressure from his military bureaucracy forced his hand and Tōjō had his way and the attack was made on [[Pearl Harbor]].<ref>Noriko Kawamura, "Emperor Hirohito and Japan's Decision to Go to War with the United States: Reexamined." ''Diplomatic History'' 2007 31(1): 51-79. </ref>

During the invasion of [[Manchuria]] (in 1931) and the war against China (1937–45), Japan took over other countries by force. By  the late 1930s, Hirohito moved squarely into the camp of the 'renovationist' group who were tending toward an ever expanding war in China.  However, he opposed going to war with the United States in 1941, not out of pacifist tendencies but because he had a realistic concern about a probable Japanese defeat. He pressed for talks with Washington and welcomed the neutrality agreement with [[Moscow]] in April 1941 as a means of avoiding a recurrence of dangerous border clashes with the [[Soviet Union]]. He strongly opposed joining [[Germany]] in its war against the Soviets in June 1941, and helped replace the hawkish foreign minister.<ref>Stephen S. Large, ''Emperor Hirohito and Showa Japan'' (1992) p. 103-8.</ref> Yet because his power was so circumscribed by the decision-making structure of the government, and he had no answer to the American oil embargo, by late summer 1941 he became fatalistic about going to war.  He had little role in the replacement of Prime Minister Konoe by the war cabinet of General [[Hideki Tojo|Hideki Tōjō]] (1884-1948), who demanded war. Hirohito continued to oppose going to war until the last minute, but pressure from his military bureaucracy forced his hand and Tōjō had his way and the attack was made on [[Pearl Harbor]].<ref>Noriko Kawamura, "Emperor Hirohito and Japan's Decision to Go to War with the United States: Reexamined." ''Diplomatic History'' 2007 31(1): 51-79.</ref>

The emperor played an increasingly influential role in the war; in eleven major episodes he was deeply involved in supervising the actual conduct of war operations. Hirohito pressured the High Command to order an early attack on the [[Philippines]] in 1941-42, including the fortified [[Bataan]] peninsula. He secured the deployment of army air power in the [[Guadalcanal]] campaign. Following Japan's withdrawal from Guadalcanal he demanded a new offensive in [[New Guinea]], which was duly carried out but failed badly. Unhappy with the navy's conduct of the war, he criticized its withdrawal from the central [[Solomon Islands]] and demanded naval battles against the Americans for the losses they had inflicted in the Aleutians. The battles were disasters. Finally, it was at his insistence that plans were drafted for the recapture of [[Saipan]] and, later, for an offensive in the battle of [[Okinawa]].<ref> Herbert Bix, "Emperor Hirohito's war," ''History Today,'' (Dec 1991), Vol. 41, Issue 12</ref>  

The emperor played an increasingly influential role in the war; in eleven major episodes he was deeply involved in supervising the actual conduct of war operations. Hirohito pressured the High Command to order an early attack on the [[Philippines]] in 1941-42, including the fortified [[Bataan]] peninsula. He secured the deployment of army air power in the [[Guadalcanal]] campaign. Following Japan's withdrawal from Guadalcanal he demanded a new offensive in [[New Guinea]], which was duly carried out but failed badly. Unhappy with the navy's conduct of the war, he criticized its withdrawal from the central [[Solomon Islands]] and demanded naval battles against the Americans for the losses they had inflicted in the Aleutians. The battles were disasters. Finally, it was at his insistence that plans were drafted for the recapture of [[Saipan]] and, later, for an offensive in the battle of [[Okinawa]].<ref>Herbert Bix, "Emperor Hirohito's war," ''History Today,'' (Dec 1991), Vol. 41, Issue 12</ref>  

He became publicly visible trying to maintain military and civilian morale as the  islands came under heavy air attack in 1944-45 and food shortages mounted. With the Army and Navy bitterly feuding, he settled disputes over the allocation of resources, and helped plan military offenses.<ref> Herbert P. Bix "Japan's Delayed Surrender: a Reinterpretation." ''Diplomatic History'' 1995 19(2): 197-225. in [[Ebsco]]</ref>  

He became publicly visible trying to maintain military and civilian morale as the  islands came under heavy air attack in 1944-45 and food shortages mounted. With the Army and Navy bitterly feuding, he settled disputes over the allocation of resources, and helped plan military offenses.<ref>Herbert P. Bix "Japan's Delayed Surrender: a Reinterpretation." ''Diplomatic History'' 1995 19(2): 197-225. in [[Ebsco]]</ref>  

====Surrender====

====Surrender====

Hirohito's main adviser was Kido Koichi (1889-1977), who as the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal was the manager who controlled the information flow between the emperor and other officials, thereby helping to overthrow the Tōjō cabinet in 1944 and convincing the emperor to sue for peace.  In April 1945 he helped bring in an elderly new prime minister Kantarō Suzuki (1868-1948), who was told to hold the armed services in line while peace initiatives were set in motion.  [[Germany]] surrendered on May 8 and the imperial palace was burned down during an air raid on 25 May, underscoring the urgency, but Hirohito supported a quixotic effort to have the Soviet Union mediate a peace, unaware that it planned to declare war on Japan. The issue of an American guarantee of Hirohito's continuation as emperor prevented the prompt acceptance of the Allies' Potsdam terms, and led to two atomic bombs and the Soviet declaration of war in early August. The extreme national emergency now made it possible for the emperor to intervene effectively on behalf of surrender; he told foreign minister Tōgō that  "since we could no longer continue the struggle, now that a weapon of this devastating power was used against us, we should not let slip the opportunity [for peace] by engaging in attempts to gain more favorable conditions." Hirohito unexpectedly spoke out at a deadlocked conference on August 9, saying "the time has come when we must bear the unbearable....[so I] give my sanction to the proposal to accept the Allied Proclamation." The military continued to stall even as their military position in Manchuria collapsed, The emperor lined up more supporters and on August 14 he forced the government to agree to surrender. His radio broadcast on August 15 calling on all Japanese to surrender was immediately  accepted by the people and the military (though a few die hards tried and failed to stop the broadcast, and many senior army officers committed suicide.) Hirohito had ended the war, rescued his throne, and saved the lives of millions of Japanese.  The "Greater East Asia War," as the Japanese called it, resulted in 1,675,000 Japanese army deaths, 429,000 navy deaths, and more than 300,000 civilian deaths in Japan, not to mention millions of enemy soldiers and civilians killed.<ref>Herbert P. Bix, "Japan's Delayed Surrender: a Reinterpretation." ''Diplomatic History'' 1995 19(2): 197-225; Stephen S. Large, ''Emperor Hirohito and Showa Japan'' (1992) pp. 121-30.</ref>   

Hirohito's main adviser was Kido Koichi (1889-1977), who as the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal was the manager who controlled the information flow between the emperor and other officials, thereby helping to overthrow the Tōjō cabinet in 1944 and convincing the emperor to sue for peace.  In April 1945 he helped bring in an elderly new prime minister Kantarō Suzuki (1868-1948), who was told to hold the armed services in line while peace initiatives were set in motion.  [[Germany]] surrendered on May 8 and the imperial palace was burned down during an air raid on 25 May, underscoring the urgency, but Hirohito supported a quixotic effort to have the Soviet Union mediate a peace, unaware that it planned to declare war on Japan. The issue of an American guarantee of Hirohito's continuation as emperor prevented the prompt acceptance of the Allies' Potsdam terms, and led to two atomic bombs and the Soviet declaration of war in early August. The extreme national emergency now made it possible for the emperor to intervene effectively on behalf of surrender; he told foreign minister Tōgō that  "since we could no longer continue the struggle, now that a weapon of this devastating power was used against us, we should not let slip the opportunity [for peace] by engaging in attempts to gain more favorable conditions." Hirohito unexpectedly spoke out at a deadlocked conference on August 9, saying "the time has come when we must bear the unbearable....[so I] give my sanction to the proposal to accept the Allied Proclamation." The military continued to stall even as their military position in Manchuria collapsed, The emperor lined up more supporters and on August 14 he forced the government to agree to surrender. His radio broadcast on August 15 calling on all Japanese to surrender was immediately  accepted by the people and the military (though a few die hards tried and failed to stop the broadcast, and many senior army officers committed suicide.) Hirohito had ended the war, rescued his throne, and saved the lives of millions of Japanese.  The "Greater East Asia War," as the Japanese called it, resulted in 1,675,000 Japanese army deaths, 429,000 navy deaths, and more than 300,000 civilian deaths in Japan, not to mention millions of enemy soldiers and civilians killed.<ref>Herbert P. Bix, "Japan's Delayed Surrender: a Reinterpretation." ''Diplomatic History'' 1995 19(2): 197-225; Stephen S. Large, ''Emperor Hirohito and Showa Japan'' (1992) pp. 121-30.</ref>   

Asada (1998) microscopically reexamines Japan's decision-making process, focusing closely on the days between the Hiroshima bomb and surrender in August 1945. An increasingly powerful "peace party" saw in the bomb the external pressure that could be used as leverage to counter the army leaders who clamored for the decisive homeland battle, and who were preparing civilians to fight invaders with wooden spears. To such leaders as Kido Koichi, Foreign Minister Togo Shigenori, and [[Navy]] Minister Yonai Mitsumasa, the bomb was of major help in their efforts to end the war, but the army remained intransigent. Hirohito sided with Togo: Only his "sacred decision" could enable the badly divided government finally to accept the [[Potsdam Declaration]] that called for immediate surrender but left the status of the emperor ambiguous. The shock of the atomic bomb enabled military leaders to accept surrender without loss of face; they thought of it as a scientific rather than a military defeat. Asada concludes that the bomb, rather than Soviet entry into the [[Pacific]] War, was the decisive and necessary factor in Japan's surrender.<ref> Sadao Asada, "The Shock of the Atomic Bomb and Japan's Decision to Surrender: a Reconsideration." ''Pacific Historical Review'' 1998 67(4): 477-512. [http://www.jstor.org/stable/3641184  in Jstor]</ref>

Asada (1998) microscopically reexamines Japan's decision-making process, focusing closely on the days between the Hiroshima bomb and surrender in August 1945. An increasingly powerful "peace party" saw in the bomb the external pressure that could be used as leverage to counter the army leaders who clamored for the decisive homeland battle, and who were preparing civilians to fight invaders with wooden spears. To such leaders as Kido Koichi, Foreign Minister Togo Shigenori, and [[Navy]] Minister Yonai Mitsumasa, the bomb was of major help in their efforts to end the war, but the army remained intransigent. Hirohito sided with Togo: Only his "sacred decision" could enable the badly divided government finally to accept the [[Potsdam Declaration]] that called for immediate surrender but left the status of the emperor ambiguous. The shock of the atomic bomb enabled military leaders to accept surrender without loss of face; they thought of it as a scientific rather than a military defeat. Asada concludes that the bomb, rather than Soviet entry into the [[Pacific]] War, was the decisive and necessary factor in Japan's surrender.<ref>Sadao Asada, "The Shock of the Atomic Bomb and Japan's Decision to Surrender: a Reconsideration." ''Pacific Historical Review'' 1998 67(4): 477-512. [http://www.jstor.org/stable/3641184  in Jstor]</ref>

===Weakness===

===Weakness===

Although he attempted to encourage cooperation with Britain and the USA, the increasing belligerence of his ministers, which had resulted in the Cabinet meeting on 4 September 1941, to discuss the objectives of the Imperial GHQ, seemed to wear him down and he gave his grudging approval for their suggestions. The objectives as mentioned included "a free hand to continue with the conquest of China and Southeast Asia", "no increase in US or British military forces in the region", and "cooperation by the West in the acquisition of goods needed by our Empire."

Although he attempted to encourage cooperation with Britain and the USA, the increasing belligerence of his ministers, which had resulted in the Cabinet meeting on 4 September 1941, to discuss the objectives of the Imperial GHQ, seemed to wear him down and he gave his grudging approval for their suggestions. The objectives as mentioned included "a free hand to continue with the conquest of China and Southeast Asia", "no increase in US or British military forces in the region", and "cooperation by the West in the acquisition of goods needed by our Empire."

As the obvious preparations for war continued, the then civilian Prime Minister, Fumimaro Konoe, resigned, having found himself increasingly isolated amongst the military hard-liners. The army and the navy recommended Prince Higashikuni, one of the Emperor's uncles, as a replacement. However, the Emperor rejected this, saying after the war that if a member of the Imperial house were Prime Minister at the time Japan went to war, the Imperial house would carry the responsibility and this he did not want. <ref>Terasaki Hidenari, Shōwa tennô dokuhakuroku, Bungei Shûnjusha, 1991</ref>

As the obvious preparations for war continued, the then civilian Prime Minister, Fumimaro Konoe, resigned, having found himself increasingly isolated amongst the military hard-liners. The army and the navy recommended Prince Higashikuni, one of the Emperor's uncles, as a replacement. However, the Emperor rejected this, saying after the war that if a member of the Imperial house were Prime Minister at the time Japan went to war, the Imperial house would carry the responsibility and this he did not want.<ref>Terasaki Hidenari, Shōwa tennô dokuhakuroku, Bungei Shûnjusha, 1991</ref>

Instead, he appointed the hard-line General [[Hideki Tojo|Hideki Tōjō]], who was known for his devotion to the imperial institution and asked him to review of what had already been sanctioned by the Imperial conferences. Based on the feedback from Tōjō, Emperor Shōwa gave his reluctant consent to the war, which culminated in the attack on [[Pearl Harbor]] on 7 December 1941 and the simultaneous invasion of [[Malaysia]].

Instead, he appointed the hard-line General [[Hideki Tojo|Hideki Tōjō]], who was known for his devotion to the imperial institution and asked him to review of what had already been sanctioned by the Imperial conferences. Based on the feedback from Tōjō, Emperor Shōwa gave his reluctant consent to the war, which culminated in the attack on [[Pearl Harbor]] on 7 December 1941 and the simultaneous invasion of [[Malaysia]].

===American Occupation and new status===

===American Occupation and new status===

The State Department in Washington, not General [[Douglas MacArthur]] made the decision to retain Hirohito and the imperial institution; the decision evolved by 1944 out of a wartime assumption that the emperor was not personally guilty but was essential for American plans for postwar Japan.<ref> American planning for the postwar world began in 1939. Joseph Ballantine and George H. Blakeslee, directors of the State Department's Far East unit, were influential planners along with historian Hugh Borton and especially [[Joseph Grew]], who had been the US ambassador in Tokyo for ten years. </ref> Rather than a flash of inspiration from the supreme commander, American policy toward the emperor represented a confluence of motivations that crystallized in the early days of the occupation.<ref> MacArthur in early 1946 warned Washington that a war crimes indictment of Hirohito "will unquestionably cause a tremendous convulsion among the Japanese people, the repercussions of which cannot be overestimated. He is a symbol which unites all Japanese. Destroy him and the nation will disintegrate." Guerrillas would take to the hills and "a minimum of a million troops would be required . . . for an indefinite number of years" to stop the rebellion. Tōjō was put on trial instead and hung. Quoted in Tetsuya Kataoka, [http://books.google.com/books?id=iuUynl48h4EC&pg=PA37&dq=%22destroy+him+and+the+nation+will+disintegrate%22&sig=uLW4WXjpM4fAZioeVx7C0eNDk34 ''The Price of a Constitution: The Origin of Japan's Postwar Politics'' (1991) p.  37 online]</ref>  MacArthur agreed with the policy and orchestrated dramatic public displays, as well as real changes, that made it clear a new era had arrived and that militarism and emperor worship had ended.<ref> Hal Brands, "Who Saved the Emperor? The Macarthur Myth and U.S. Policy Toward Hirohito and the Japanese Imperial Institution, 1942-1946." ''Pacific Historical Review'' 2006 75(2): 271-305. Issn: 0030-8684 Fulltext: [[Ebsco]]</ref>

The State Department in Washington, not General [[Douglas MacArthur]] made the decision to retain Hirohito and the imperial institution; the decision evolved by 1944 out of a wartime assumption that the emperor was not personally guilty but was essential for American plans for postwar Japan.<ref>American planning for the postwar world began in 1939. Joseph Ballantine and George H. Blakeslee, directors of the State Department's Far East unit, were influential planners along with historian Hugh Borton and especially [[Joseph Grew]], who had been the US ambassador in Tokyo for ten years.</ref> Rather than a flash of inspiration from the supreme commander, American policy toward the emperor represented a confluence of motivations that crystallized in the early days of the occupation.<ref>MacArthur in early 1946 warned Washington that a war crimes indictment of Hirohito "will unquestionably cause a tremendous convulsion among the Japanese people, the repercussions of which cannot be overestimated. He is a symbol which unites all Japanese. Destroy him and the nation will disintegrate." Guerrillas would take to the hills and "a minimum of a million troops would be required . . . for an indefinite number of years" to stop the rebellion. Tōjō was put on trial instead and hung. Quoted in Tetsuya Kataoka, [http://books.google.com/books?id=iuUynl48h4EC&pg=PA37&dq=%22destroy+him+and+the+nation+will+disintegrate%22&sig=uLW4WXjpM4fAZioeVx7C0eNDk34 ''The Price of a Constitution: The Origin of Japan's Postwar Politics'' (1991) p.  37 online]</ref>  MacArthur agreed with the policy and orchestrated dramatic public displays, as well as real changes, that made it clear a new era had arrived and that militarism and emperor worship had ended.<ref>Hal Brands, "Who Saved the Emperor? The Macarthur Myth and U.S. Policy Toward Hirohito and the Japanese Imperial Institution, 1942-1946." ''Pacific Historical Review'' 2006 75(2): 271-305. Issn: 0030-8684 Fulltext: [[Ebsco]]</ref>

[[Image:General MacArthur and Emperor Hirohito.jpg|thumb|400px|MacArthur and Hirohito at their first meeting, Sept. 1945.  MacArthur asserts himself as the older, informal and dominant leader; Hirohito appears younger, formal, subservient, and very clearly not a god]]

[[Image:General MacArthur and Emperor Hirohito.jpg|thumb|400px|MacArthur and Hirohito at their first meeting, Sept. 1945.  MacArthur asserts himself as the older, informal and dominant leader; Hirohito appears younger, formal, subservient, and very clearly not a god]]

Hirohito moved rapidly to ensure surrender by all army units, and to demobilize his soldiers, a decision that facilitated the American Occupation and demonstrated his willingness to cooperate. The Americans responded by deciding not to control Japan directly (as they controlled Germany), but to keep the Imperial government in place and operate through it. In an interview with American newspapers, Hirohito said that he was not responsible for Pearl Harbor and did not intend a sneak attack, exactly the right message to help rehabilitate his image in the U.S. Hirohito and MacArthur got along well, which was a signal for all their subordinates to follow suite. The Americans did not give orders; they made suggestions which the Japanese quickly accepted.   

Hirohito moved rapidly to ensure surrender by all army units, and to demobilize his soldiers, a decision that facilitated the American Occupation and demonstrated his willingness to cooperate. The Americans responded by deciding not to control Japan directly (as they controlled Germany), but to keep the Imperial government in place and operate through it. In an interview with American newspapers, Hirohito said that he was not responsible for Pearl Harbor and did not intend a sneak attack, exactly the right message to help rehabilitate his image in the U.S. Hirohito and MacArthur got along well, which was a signal for all their subordinates to follow suite. The Americans did not give orders; they made suggestions which the Japanese quickly accepted.   

Hirohito met with MacArthur in a highly publicized visit on September 27, a few days after his arrival as Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP). The photograph showed MacArthur to be older, informal and dominant, and Hirohito to be younger, subservient, and very clearly not a god.<ref> On the photograph see [http://www.pdfdownload.org/pdf2html/pdf2html.php?url=http%3A%2F%2Fchnm.gmu.edu%2Floudountah%2Factivities%2Fpdf%2FMacArthurHirohito.pdf&images=yes primary source activities]</ref> The Japanese government told newspapers not to publish the humiliating photograph. MacArthur intervened and ended the system of police surveillance and thought control in Japan, allowing for the first time criticism of the emperor. The photograph was published, the government resigned and a new government took over the task of cooperating smoothly with MacArthur's general headquarters, the GHQ.  A series of decrees in October, 1945, liberated women, freed the labor unions, democratized education, and broke up the old business monopolies. The military organization was closed down and the Shinto religion was disestablished. Hirohito cooperated with these radical reforms and the transition to a liberalized Japan went smoothly.<ref> See Herbert P. Bix, "Inventing the 'Symbol Monarchy' in Japan, 1945-52," ''Journal of Japanese Studies,''  Vol. 21, No. 2 (Summer, 1995), pp. 319-363 [http://www.jstor.org/stable/133011 in JSTOR]</ref>

Hirohito met with MacArthur in a highly publicized visit on September 27, a few days after his arrival as Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP). The photograph showed MacArthur to be older, informal and dominant, and Hirohito to be younger, subservient, and very clearly not a god.<ref>On the photograph see [http://www.pdfdownload.org/pdf2html/pdf2html.php?url=http%3A%2F%2Fchnm.gmu.edu%2Floudountah%2Factivities%2Fpdf%2FMacArthurHirohito.pdf&images=yes primary source activities]</ref> The Japanese government told newspapers not to publish the humiliating photograph. MacArthur intervened and ended the system of police surveillance and thought control in Japan, allowing for the first time criticism of the emperor. The photograph was published, the government resigned and a new government took over the task of cooperating smoothly with MacArthur's general headquarters, the GHQ.  A series of decrees in October, 1945, liberated women, freed the labor unions, democratized education, and broke up the old business monopolies. The military organization was closed down and the Shinto religion was disestablished. Hirohito cooperated with these radical reforms and the transition to a liberalized Japan went smoothly.<ref>See Herbert P. Bix, "Inventing the 'Symbol Monarchy' in Japan, 1945-52," ''Journal of Japanese Studies,''  Vol. 21, No. 2 (Summer, 1995), pp. 319-363 [http://www.jstor.org/stable/133011 in JSTOR]</ref>

The Occupation demanded the emperor make a formal repudiation of the traditional claim that he was an incarnate divinity (''arahitogami''). On 1 January 1946, he made a formal statement where he explained that the role of the emperor in Japan had changed. He explained that the ties between himself and the Japanese people had always involved "mutual trust and affection.” He went on to say, "These ties do not depend upon mere legends and myths. They are not predicated on the false conception that the Emperor is divine and that the Japanese people are superior to other races." <ref>http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/2WWhirohito.htm</ref>

The Occupation demanded the emperor make a formal repudiation of the traditional claim that he was an incarnate divinity (''arahitogami''). On 1 January 1946, he made a formal statement where he explained that the role of the emperor in Japan had changed. He explained that the ties between himself and the Japanese people had always involved "mutual trust and affection.” He went on to say, "These ties do not depend upon mere legends and myths. They are not predicated on the false conception that the Emperor is divine and that the Japanese people are superior to other races." <ref>http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/2WWhirohito.htm</ref>

On January 1, 1946, just ten years after his imperial title had been changed to "Dai Nippon Teikoku Tenno," meaning "Imperial Son of Heaven in Mighty Japan," Hirohito reversed course and disclaimed his divinity in a statement to his people. The Japanese saw it as a turning point in their history.  American newspapers hailed him as the leader of reform in Japan--a gross exaggeration that worked well for him and GHQ.  Hirohito got across to the Japanese people another message as well: that the monarchy had always been compatible with democracy and the current democratiaation of Japanese society marked a continuation of ideals inscribed in the Five Article 'Charter Oath' of the Meiji Restoration.

On January 1, 1946, just ten years after his imperial title had been changed to "Dai Nippon Teikoku Tenno," meaning "Imperial Son of Heaven in Mighty Japan," Hirohito reversed course and disclaimed his divinity in a statement to his people. The Japanese saw it as a turning point in their history.  American newspapers hailed him as the leader of reform in Japan—a gross exaggeration that worked well for him and GHQ.  Hirohito got across to the Japanese people another message as well: that the monarchy had always been compatible with democracy and the current democratiaation of Japanese society marked a continuation of ideals inscribed in the Five Article 'Charter Oath' of the Meiji Restoration.

==After the War==

==After the War==

Following longstanding tradition, on his death everyone in Japan immediately stopped using the name Hirohito and referred to him as the Shōwa Emperor, and his reign as the Shōwa Period. Outside Japan, he is still usually known as Hirohito.

Following longstanding tradition, on his death everyone in Japan immediately stopped using the name Hirohito and referred to him as the Shōwa Emperor, and his reign as the Shōwa Period. Outside Japan, he is still usually known as Hirohito.

Hirohito was violently hated and loathed outside Japan during the war, and was often depicted as a subhuman monster and head of an evil empire.<ref> Kiyoko Takeda, ''The Dual-Image of the Japanese Emperor'' (1988) examines British, Australian, Canadian and Chinese images of Hirohito. </ref>  Brands (2006) examines the shift in American public opinion regarding him after the surrender.  In June 1945 three out of four Americans wanted him tried as a war criminal; only 7% thought he should be allowed to stay in power. The media attacked anyone thought to be mildly disposed to Hirohito. MacArthur, however, found Hirohito's compliance with the occupation valuable in bringing democratic government to Japan. Hirohito became "humanized" in the American media; stories about his family began to appear, he was photographed in Western dress, and he renounced imperial divinity. News stories out of occupied Japan were censored or slanted to stress reconciliation rather than vengeance, and by June 1946 Americans were accepting the story of Hirohito as a pawn of Japan's military leaders and at the same time were coming to see the Japanese people as willing to accept American political and cultural influences.<ref> Hal Brands, "The Emperor's New Clothes: American Views of Hirohito after World War II". ''Historian'' 2006 68(1): 1-28. </ref>

Hirohito was violently hated and loathed outside Japan during the war, and was often depicted as a subhuman monster and head of an evil empire.<ref>Kiyoko Takeda, ''The Dual-Image of the Japanese Emperor'' (1988) examines British, Australian, Canadian and Chinese images of Hirohito.</ref>  Brands (2006) examines the shift in American public opinion regarding him after the surrender.  In June 1945 three out of four Americans wanted him tried as a war criminal; only 7% thought he should be allowed to stay in power. The media attacked anyone thought to be mildly disposed to Hirohito. MacArthur, however, found Hirohito's compliance with the occupation valuable in bringing democratic government to Japan. Hirohito became "humanized" in the American media; stories about his family began to appear, he was photographed in Western dress, and he renounced imperial divinity. News stories out of occupied Japan were censored or slanted to stress reconciliation rather than vengeance, and by June 1946 Americans were accepting the story of Hirohito as a pawn of Japan's military leaders and at the same time were coming to see the Japanese people as willing to accept American political and cultural influences.<ref>Hal Brands, "The Emperor's New Clothes: American Views of Hirohito after World War II". ''Historian'' 2006 68(1): 1-28.</ref>

Inside Japan following his death discussions of the emperor's image and his role as a symbol of his times focused largely on the issue of his responsibility for World War II according to Finnish historian Olavi K. Fält. One side of his dual image, that of a constitutional monarch, represented the favorable, democratic connotations that had arisen since the war, while the view that he had been responsible for Japan's involvement in the war represented the postwar critical image that he had acquired. The interpretation of these images and of his symbolic significance is complicated still further by the question of what was meant by "responsibility". The ''Japan Times'' explained how the foreign media interpreted this predominantly in legal and constitutional terms, while for many Japanese it was mostly an emotional matter that was quite separate from anything that he as a person might actually have done. It was a question of symbolic authority such as is vested in the head of a family, a company, or a nation. The dichotomous nature of the Shōwa emperor's image, as possibly responsible for the course of events that led Japan into the war and at the same time as a symbol of unity, representing peace and democracy, would seem - in the light of the articles in the press - to have been understood as synonymous with the spirit of the times. In this sense he was a symbol of his age: whatever the symbol of the emperor was, the same could be said of the times in which he reigned. Although there was much discussion of his responsibility for the war, one might still ask whether this was really the most serious problem in practice. Was it not more important to resolve the issue of his responsibility as the head of the nation? As the emperor was felt to be a symbol of his age, should he not have automatically borne responsibility for the war in the eyes of the majority of Japanese people, or even served in an essential sense as the symbol of the whole nation's guilt with respect to the war?

Inside Japan following his death discussions of the emperor's image and his role as a symbol of his times focused largely on the issue of his responsibility for World War II according to Finnish historian Olavi K. Fält. One side of his dual image, that of a constitutional monarch, represented the favorable, democratic connotations that had arisen since the war, while the view that he had been responsible for Japan's involvement in the war represented the postwar critical image that he had acquired. The interpretation of these images and of his symbolic significance is complicated still further by the question of what was meant by "responsibility". The ''Japan Times'' explained how the foreign media interpreted this predominantly in legal and constitutional terms, while for many Japanese it was mostly an emotional matter that was quite separate from anything that he as a person might actually have done. It was a question of symbolic authority such as is vested in the head of a family, a company, or a nation. The dichotomous nature of the Shōwa emperor's image, as possibly responsible for the course of events that led Japan into the war and at the same time as a symbol of unity, representing peace and democracy, would seem - in the light of the articles in the press - to have been understood as synonymous with the spirit of the times. In this sense he was a symbol of his age: whatever the symbol of the emperor was, the same could be said of the times in which he reigned. Although there was much discussion of his responsibility for the war, one might still ask whether this was really the most serious problem in practice. Was it not more important to resolve the issue of his responsibility as the head of the nation? As the emperor was felt to be a symbol of his age, should he not have automatically borne responsibility for the war in the eyes of the majority of Japanese people, or even served in an essential sense as the symbol of the whole nation's guilt with respect to the war?

* Bix, Herbert P. ''Hirohito And The Making Of Modern Japan'' (2000), 816pp, the highly influential standard scholarly biography  [http://www.amazon.com/Hirohito-Making-Modern-Japan-Herbert/dp/006019314X excerpt and text search]

* Bix, Herbert P. ''Hirohito And The Making Of Modern Japan'' (2000), 816pp, the highly influential standard scholarly biography  [http://www.amazon.com/Hirohito-Making-Modern-Japan-Herbert/dp/006019314X excerpt and text search]

* Bix, Herbert P. "Japan's Delayed Surrender: a Reinterpretation." ''Diplomatic History'' 1995 19(2): 197-225. Issn: 0145-2096 Fulltext: [[Ebsco]]

* Bix, Herbert P. "Japan's Delayed Surrender: a Reinterpretation." ''Diplomatic History'' 1995 19(2): 197-225. Issn: 0145-2096 Fulltext: [[Ebsco]]

* Bix, Herbert P. "Inventing the 'Symbol Monarchy' in Japan, 1945-52," ''Journal of Japanese Studies,''  Vol. 21, No. 2 (Summer, 1995), pp. 319-363 [http://www.jstor.org/stable/133011 in JSTOR]

* Bix, Herbert P. "Inventing the 'Symbol Monarchy' in Japan, 1945-52," ''Journal of Japanese Studies,''  Vol. 21, No. 2 (Summer, 1995), pp.&nbsp;319–363 [http://www.jstor.org/stable/133011 in JSTOR]

* Bix, Herbert. "Emperor Hirohito's War." ''History Today'' 1991 41(dec): 12-19. Issn: 0018-2753 Fulltext: [[Ebsco]]

* Bix, Herbert. "Emperor Hirohito's War." ''History Today'' 1991 41(dec): 12-19. Issn: 0018-2753 Fulltext: [[Ebsco]]

* Bix, Herbert. "Emperor Hirohito's war," ''History Today,'' (Dec 1991), Vol. 41, Issue 12, in [[Ebsco]]

* Bix, Herbert. "Emperor Hirohito's war," ''History Today,'' (Dec 1991), Vol. 41, Issue 12, in [[Ebsco]]

===Historiography===

===Historiography===

* Bix, Herbert. "Emperor Hirohito's War." ''History Today'' (Dec. 1991) 41: 12-19. Issn: 0018-2753 Fulltext: [[Ebsco]] discusses new Japanese sources that opened after the emperor's death in 1989

* Bix, Herbert. "Emperor Hirohito's War." ''History Today'' (Dec. 1991) 41: 12-19. Issn: 0018-2753 Fulltext: [[Ebsco]] discusses new Japanese sources that opened after the emperor's death in 1989

* Gordon, David M. "The China-Japan War, 1931-1945," ''The Journal of Military History'' 70#1 (January 2006) pp. 137-182, historiographical overview in [[Project Muse]]

* Gordon, David M. "The China-Japan War, 1931-1945," ''The Journal of Military History'' 70#1 (January 2006) pp.&nbsp;137–182, historiographical overview in [[Project Muse]]

* Harootunian, Harry. "Hirohito Redux." ''Critical Asian Studies'' 2001 33(4): 609-636. Issn: 1467-2715 Fulltext: [[Ebsco]], focused on Bix (2000)

* Harootunian, Harry. "Hirohito Redux." ''Critical Asian Studies'' 2001 33(4): 609-636. Issn: 1467-2715 Fulltext: [[Ebsco]], focused on Bix (2000)

* Large, Stephen S. "Emperor Hirohito and Early Showa Japan." ''Nipponica'' 1991 46(3): 349-368. Issn: 0027-0741 [http://www.jstor.org/pss/2385212 in Jstor]

* Large, Stephen S. "Emperor Hirohito and Early Showa Japan." ''Nipponica'' 1991 46(3): 349-368. Issn: 0027-0741 [http://www.jstor.org/pss/2385212 in Jstor]

===Not recommended===

===Not recommended===

*  Bergamini, David. '''Japan's Imperial Conspiracy. '' (1971) contends that Hirohito led his nation into WW2 and intimidated opponents by conniving in religious frauds, blackmails, and assassinations. This book has very negative reviews from scholars who say Bergamini falsified his evidence. See [[http://www.jstor.org/pss/311667 for the consensus]

*  Bergamini, David. '''Japan's Imperial Conspiracy. '' (1971) contends that Hirohito led his nation into WW2 and intimidated opponents by conniving in religious frauds, blackmails, and assassinations. This book has very negative reviews from scholars who say Bergamini falsified his evidence. See [http://www.jstor.org/pss/311667 for the consensus]

===Japanese books===

===Japanese books===

{{Reflist}}

{{Reflist}}

[[category:Japanese Emperors]]

[[Category:Japanese Emperors]]

[[category:World War II]]

[[Category:World War II]]

[[Category:Featured articles]]

[[Category:Featured articles]]

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