Changes

[[Mary Van Kleeck]] espoused the official Soviet version in 1938 of the [[Great purge]] in IPR's ''Pacific Affairs''. Owen Lattimore defended the [[show trial]]s in Moscow in the same publication as "an evidence of democracy."<ref>''Pacific Affairs'', September, 1938.</ref>  

[[Mary Van Kleeck]] espoused the official Soviet version in 1938 of the [[Great purge]] in IPR's ''Pacific Affairs''. Owen Lattimore defended the [[show trial]]s in Moscow in the same publication as "an evidence of democracy."<ref>''Pacific Affairs'', September, 1938.</ref>  

In July of 1938 IPR had a grant of $90,000 from the Rockefeller Foundation to make a study. Carter was managing it. Lattimore wrote to Carter, “I think you were pretty cagey to turn over so much of the China section of the inquiry to Asiaticus, Han-seng and Chi. They will bring out the essential [[radical]] aspects, but can be depended upon to do it with the right touch!” Lattimore went on to say "my hunch is that it will pay to keep behind the official Chinese Communist position, "  and  "as for the USSR—back their international policy in general, but without using their slogans, and above all without giving them or anybody else the impression of subservience."<ref>United States Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security Hearings, July 26, 1951.</ref> Carter appointed the three persons named by Lattimore to the study commission and defended his decision to knowingly employ Soviet communists by claiming the Soviet Union was an American ally. A [[U.S. Senate Internal Security Subcommittee]] questioner needed to point out to Carter that this particular case occurred in 1940, when the Soviet Union, by virtue of the [[Communazi Peace pact]], was not an ally of the United States, but an ally of [[Hitler]].<ref>United States Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security Hearings, July 25, 1951.</ref>

In July 1938 IPR had a grant of $90,000 from the Rockefeller Foundation to make a study. Carter was managing it. Lattimore wrote to Carter, “I think you were pretty cagey to turn over so much of the China section of the inquiry to Asiaticus, Han-seng and Chi. They will bring out the essential [[radical]] aspects, but can be depended upon to do it with the right touch!” Lattimore went on to say "my hunch is that it will pay to keep behind the official Chinese Communist position, "  and  "as for the USSR—back their international policy in general, but without using their slogans, and above all without giving them or anybody else the impression of subservience."<ref>United States Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security Hearings, July 26, 1951.</ref> Carter appointed the three persons named by Lattimore to the study commission and defended his decision to knowingly employ Soviet communists by claiming the Soviet Union was an American ally. A [[U.S. Senate Internal Security Subcommittee]] questioner needed to point out to Carter that this particular case occurred in 1940, when the Soviet Union, by virtue of the [[Communazi Peace pact]], was not an ally of the United States, but an ally of [[Hitler]].<ref>United States Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security Hearings, July 25, 1951.</ref>

In 1948, ex-Communist [[Louis F. Budenz]], former managing editor of the Communist Party (CP) organ ''[[The Daily Worker]]'', told Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents that the CP had "very great influence" in the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR) and "at times controlled its policy."<ref>FBI report: "Institute of Pacific Relations, Internal Security - C," [http://Ultra-Secret.info/PDFs/IPR04.pdf FBI file: Institute of Pacific Relations, Section 4], p. 5 (PDF p. 7)</ref> In 1950, General Alexander Barmine, former Soviet chargé d'affaires of the Soviet Legation at Athens, told Bureau agents that prior to Barmine's 1937 defection, General Ian Berzin, head of Soviet Military Intelligence (GRU), told him that IPR was a Soviet intelligence network in China. Barmine also stated that in 1937, General Walter Krivitsky, former head of Soviet Military Intelligence in Western Europe, told him in Paris that the IPR was a "cover" for GRU in the United States.<ref>J. Edgar Hoover to James M. McInerney, "Institute of Pacific Relations, Espionage - R," April 10, 1950, [http://Ultra-Secret.info/PDFs/IPR04.pdf FBI file: Institute of Pacific Relations, Section 4], PDF p. 150</ref> Krivitsky's widow, Anonina Thomas, told FBI agents that she had been told in Moscow that sometime prior to 1937, IPR was cover for GRU agents in the US.<ref>Memorandum: "Institute of Pacific Relations, Espionage - R," Belmont to Ladd, June 26, 1950 [http://education-research.org/PDFs/IPR33.01.pdf FBI file: Institute of Pacific Relations, Section 33], PDF p. 14</ref> Ex-Communist Freda Utley, a former researcher at Moscow's Institute of World Economy and Politics (which would become the Soviet Council of the IPR), told Bureau investigators that it was her impression that the IPR was governed by Soviet policies, and that when officials of the American Council of IPR visited Moscow in the 1930s, it was to receive orders on IPR policies. She added her opinion that the Far Eastern section of the U.S. Department of State was influenced and guided by the policies and representations of the IPR.<ref>FBI teletype, [http://Ultra-Secret.info/PDFs/IPR05.pdf FBI file: Institute of Pacific Relations, Section 5], PDF p. 6</ref> Former Communist underground courier Elizabeth Bentley testified that her Party superior, veteran NKVD "handler" Jacob Golos, told her to stay away from the IPR because it was "as red as a rose, and you shouldn't touch it with a 10-foot pole."<ref>Senate Internal Security Committee, Hearings on the Institute of Pacific Relations, p. 437</ref>

In 1948, ex-Communist [[Louis F. Budenz]], former managing editor of the Communist Party (CP) organ ''[[The Daily Worker]]'', told Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents that the CP had "very great influence" in the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR) and "at times controlled its policy."<ref>FBI report: "Institute of Pacific Relations, Internal Security - C," [http://Ultra-Secret.info/PDFs/IPR04.pdf FBI file: Institute of Pacific Relations, Section 4], p. 5 (PDF p. 7)</ref> In 1950, General Alexander Barmine, former Soviet chargé d'affaires of the Soviet Legation at Athens, told Bureau agents that prior to Barmine's 1937 defection, General Ian Berzin, head of Soviet Military Intelligence (GRU), told him that IPR was a Soviet intelligence network in China. Barmine also stated that in 1937, General Walter Krivitsky, former head of Soviet Military Intelligence in Western Europe, told him in Paris that the IPR was a "cover" for GRU in the United States.<ref>J. Edgar Hoover to James M. McInerney, "Institute of Pacific Relations, Espionage - R," April 10, 1950, [http://Ultra-Secret.info/PDFs/IPR04.pdf FBI file: Institute of Pacific Relations, Section 4], PDF p. 150</ref> Krivitsky's widow, Anonina Thomas, told FBI agents that she had been told in Moscow that sometime prior to 1937, IPR was cover for GRU agents in the US.<ref>Memorandum: "Institute of Pacific Relations, Espionage - R," Belmont to Ladd, June 26, 1950 [http://education-research.org/PDFs/IPR33.01.pdf FBI file: Institute of Pacific Relations, Section 33], PDF p. 14</ref> Ex-Communist Freda Utley, a former researcher at Moscow's Institute of World Economy and Politics (which would become the Soviet Council of the IPR), told Bureau investigators that it was her impression that the IPR was governed by Soviet policies, and that when officials of the American Council of IPR visited Moscow in the 1930s, it was to receive orders on IPR policies. She added her opinion that the Far Eastern section of the U.S. Department of State was influenced and guided by the policies and representations of the IPR.<ref>FBI teletype, [http://Ultra-Secret.info/PDFs/IPR05.pdf FBI file: Institute of Pacific Relations, Section 5], PDF p. 6</ref> Former Communist underground courier Elizabeth Bentley testified that her Party superior, veteran NKVD "handler" Jacob Golos, told her to stay away from the IPR because it was "as red as a rose, and you shouldn't touch it with a 10-foot pole."<ref>Senate Internal Security Committee, Hearings on the Institute of Pacific Relations, p. 437</ref>

Lattimore recommended highly ''Challenge of Red China'', written by member of the [[Richard Sorge]] ring in Japan—[[Guenther Stein]]. Of [[Israel Epstein]]'s ''Unfinished Revolution in China'' Lattimore said: "When he pleads his case the arguments pile up like a wedge." When Lattimore resigned he was succeeded by [[Michael Greenberg]], a Communist Party member. Lattimore then became a member of the editorial board of another IPR organ, the notorious ''[[Amerasia]]'' magazine.  

Lattimore recommended highly ''Challenge of Red China'', written by member of the [[Richard Sorge]] ring in Japan—[[Guenther Stein]]. Of [[Israel Epstein]]'s ''Unfinished Revolution in China'' Lattimore said: "When he pleads his case the arguments pile up like a wedge." When Lattimore resigned he was succeeded by [[Michael Greenberg]], a Communist Party member. Lattimore then became a member of the editorial board of another IPR organ, the notorious ''[[Amerasia]]'' magazine.  

In 1944, Lattimore told Dr. [[Karl Wittfogel]] that the emperor of Japan should be removed and that as far as Korea was concerned "the best solution would be to let Russia take it over." At a State Department conference later he submitted a ten-point program which included recognizing the Chinese Communist government, turning over Formosa and Hong Kong to them and stating that no aid should be sent Chiang's forces.<ref> United States Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security Hearings, August 7 and October 1, 1951.</ref>

In 1944, Lattimore told Dr. [[Karl Wittfogel]] that the emperor of Japan should be removed and that as far as Korea was concerned "the best solution would be to let Russia take it over." At a State Department conference later he submitted a ten-point program which included recognizing the Chinese Communist government, turning over Formosa and Hong Kong to them and stating that no aid should be sent Chiang's forces.<ref>United States Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security Hearings, August 7 and October 1, 1951.</ref>

==Amerasia==

==Amerasia==

:''Main article: [[Amerasia]]''

{{Main|Amerasia}}

Frederick Vanderbilt Field testified that he had discussed with associates in the IPR the project of starting ''Amerasia'' in 1937. Amerasia was established with the full approval of the Institute leaders. This property belonged to Fredrick Field and Philip Jaffe, with Field holding the controlling interest. Field testified that he owned 50 per cent of the stock, while Jaffe owned 49 per cent. A good many of Field's associates in IPR were on the editorial board of ''Amerasia''. Field named Owen Lattimore, Kate Mitchell, Harriet Moore, T. A. Bisson, Benjamin Kizer, a trustee of the Institute, and Philip Jaffe, who also was a member of the Institute and a contributor to its periodical. [[Joseph Milton Bernstein]], a Soviet Military intelligence ([[GRU]]) contact between Soviet agents in the [[Office of Strategic Services]] and the [[Board of Economic Warfare]], was an employee. When Field made his effort to get into Army Intelligence, it was written on the letterhead of ''Amerasia'', showing Field as chairman of the editorial board with Owen Lattimore and William T. Stone as members of the board. There was no change in ownership of this magazine from 1937 to 1943, when Field resigned and Jaffe took over.<ref>United States Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security Hearings, July 25 and 26, 1951.</ref>

Frederick Vanderbilt Field testified that he had discussed with associates in the IPR the project of starting ''Amerasia'' in 1937. Amerasia was established with the full approval of the Institute leaders. This property belonged to Fredrick Field and Philip Jaffe, with Field holding the controlling interest. Field testified that he owned 50 per cent of the stock, while Jaffe owned 49 per cent. A good many of Field's associates in IPR were on the editorial board of ''Amerasia''. Field named Owen Lattimore, Kate Mitchell, Harriet Moore, T. A. Bisson, Benjamin Kizer, a trustee of the Institute, and Philip Jaffe, who also was a member of the Institute and a contributor to its periodical. [[Joseph Milton Bernstein]], a Soviet Military intelligence ([[GRU]]) contact between Soviet agents in the [[Office of Strategic Services]] and the [[Board of Economic Warfare]], was an employee. When Field made his effort to get into Army Intelligence, it was written on the letterhead of ''Amerasia'', showing Field as chairman of the editorial board with Owen Lattimore and William T. Stone as members of the board. There was no change in ownership of this magazine from 1937 to 1943, when Field resigned and Jaffe took over.<ref>United States Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security Hearings, July 25 and 26, 1951.</ref>

==U.S. Office of War Information uses IPR disinformation==

==U.S. Office of War Information uses IPR disinformation==

When, on June 15 1943, [[Owen Lattimore]] instructed [[Joseph Barnes]]<ref>[http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,791284,00.html ''Tongue-Tied''], [[Time magazine]], Feb. 07, 1944.</ref> to replace the non-Communist Chinese of the [[Office of War Information]] (OWI) with Communists, OWI did so. On July 14 [[Thomas A. Bisson]], in the Institute of Pacific Relations publication, ''Far Eastern Survey'', referred to Maoist forces as the "democratic China."  The [[disinformation]] was widely repeated among journalists and academics. In July and August 1943, the Chinese Communist forces -- in the midst of the war -- joined with the Japanese armies to inflict a serious defeat on the [[Kuomintang]] troops allied with the United States.<ref>[http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/6315/yaltabet.html ''The Yalta Betrayal''], Felix Wittmer, Caxton Printers, 1953, pg. 36.</ref>

When, on June 15, 1943, [[Owen Lattimore]] instructed [[Joseph Barnes]]<ref>[http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,791284,00.html ''Tongue-Tied''], [[Time magazine]], Feb. 07, 1944.</ref> to replace the non-Communist Chinese of the [[Office of War Information]] (OWI) with Communists, OWI did so. On July 14 [[Thomas A. Bisson]], in the Institute of Pacific Relations publication, ''Far Eastern Survey'', referred to Maoist forces as the "democratic China."  The [[disinformation]] was widely repeated among journalists and academics. In July and August 1943, the Chinese Communist forces—in the midst of the war—joined with the Japanese armies to inflict a serious defeat on the [[Kuomintang]] troops allied with the United States.<ref>[http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/6315/yaltabet.html ''The Yalta Betrayal''], Felix Wittmer, Caxton Printers, 1953, pg. 36.</ref>

During [[World War II]] an IPR resource packet was adopted by 1300 [[public school]] systems, and the [[War Department]] purchased over three quarters of a million IPR pamphlets for instructing military personnel.<ref>Anthony Kubek, ''How the Far East Was Lost'', Chicago 1963, pgs. 350-351.</ref>

During [[World War II]] an IPR resource packet was adopted by 1300 [[public school]] systems, and the [[War Department]] purchased over three quarters of a million IPR pamphlets for instructing military personnel.<ref>Anthony Kubek, ''How the Far East Was Lost'', Chicago 1963, pgs. 350-351.</ref>

:''"The IPR itself was like specialized political flypaper in its attractive power for Communists. . . . British Communists like [[Michael Greenberg]], Elsie Fairfax-Cholmeley or Anthony Jenkinson; Chinese Communists like Chi Chao-ting, Chen Han-seng, Chu Tong, Y.Y. Hsu; German Communists like Hans Moeller (Asiaticus) or Guenther Stein; Japanese Communists (and espionage agents) like Saionji and Ozaki (Hozumi); United States Communists like James S. Allen, Frederick V. Field, William M. Mandel, Harriet Moore, [[Lawrence Rosinger]], and Alger Hiss.

:''"The IPR itself was like specialized political flypaper in its attractive power for Communists. . . . British Communists like [[Michael Greenberg]], Elsie Fairfax-Cholmeley or Anthony Jenkinson; Chinese Communists like Chi Chao-ting, Chen Han-seng, Chu Tong, Y.Y. Hsu; German Communists like Hans Moeller (Asiaticus) or Guenther Stein; Japanese Communists (and espionage agents) like Saionji and Ozaki (Hozumi); United States Communists like James S. Allen, Frederick V. Field, William M. Mandel, Harriet Moore, [[Lawrence Rosinger]], and Alger Hiss.

:''"Indeed, the difficulty with the IPR from the Communist point of view was that it was too stuffed with Communists, too compromised by its Communist connections. [[Elizabeth Bentley]] testified that her superior in the [[CPUSA#Secret_apparatus|Soviet espionage apparatus]], [[Jacob Golos]], warned her away from the IPR because ‘it was as red as a rose, and you shouldn’t touch it with a 10-foot pole.’ "

:''"Indeed, the difficulty with the IPR from the Communist point of view was that it was too stuffed with Communists, too compromised by its Communist connections. [[Elizabeth Bentley]] testified that her superior in the [[CPUSA#Secret apparatus|Soviet espionage apparatus]], [[Jacob Golos]], warned her away from the IPR because ‘it was as red as a rose, and you shouldn’t touch it with a 10-foot pole.’ "

:''"The IPR has been considered by the American Communist Party and by Soviet officials as an instrument of Communist policy, propaganda and [[military intelligence]]. The IPR disseminated and sought to popularize false information including information originating from Soviet and Communist sources. . . . Members of the small core of officials and staff members who controlled IPR were either Communist or pro-Communist. . . . Over a period of years, John Carter Vincent was the principal fulcrum of IPR pressure and influence in the State Department. . . . The IPR was a vehicle used by the Communists to orientate American far eastern policies toward Communist objectives. . ."<ref>U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Report on the Institute of Pacific Relations, Washington 1952.</ref>

:''"The IPR has been considered by the American Communist Party and by Soviet officials as an instrument of Communist policy, propaganda and [[military intelligence]]. The IPR disseminated and sought to popularize false information including information originating from Soviet and Communist sources. . . . Members of the small core of officials and staff members who controlled IPR were either Communist or pro-Communist. . . . Over a period of years, John Carter Vincent was the principal fulcrum of IPR pressure and influence in the State Department. . . . The IPR was a vehicle used by the Communists to orientate American far eastern policies toward Communist objectives. . ."<ref>U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Report on the Institute of Pacific Relations, Washington 1952.</ref>