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[[Image:Bigthree.jpg|right|thumb|The "Big Three" at Yalta]]
 
[[Image:Bigthree.jpg|right|thumb|The "Big Three" at Yalta]]
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The '''Yalta Conference''' was the meeting in [[February]] of 1945, the last year of [[World War II]], between [[President]] [[Franklin Roosevelt]], [[Union of Soviet Socialist Republics|Soviet]] Premier [[Joseph Stalin]] and [[Great Britain|British]] [[Prime Minister]] [[Winston Churchill]] (the big three) at [[Yalta]] on the [[Crimea]]n Peninsula in the USSR.  The conference was held at the Livadia Palace, a former summer home of the [[Tsar|Tsars]] in the Crimea. It opened [[February]] 4, 1945. the chief questions were:
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The '''Yalta Conference''' was the meeting in [[February]] of 1945, the last year of [[World War II]], between [[President]] [[Franklin Roosevelt]], [[Union of Soviet Socialist Republics|Soviet]] Premier [[Joseph Stalin]] and [[Great Britain|British]] [[Prime Minister]] [[Winston Churchill]] (the big three) at [[Yalta]] on the [[Crimea]]n Peninsula in the USSR.  The conference was held at the Livadia Palace, a former summer home of the [[Tsar]]s in the Crimea. It opened [[February]] 4, 1945. the chief questions were:
    
*(1) the adoption of the [[Dumbarton Oaks]] plan for the United Nations
 
*(1) the adoption of the [[Dumbarton Oaks]] plan for the United Nations
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==Sellout of China==
 
==Sellout of China==
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Roosevelt agreed that the Kurile Islands would be handed to [[Russia]], as well as southern Sakhalin Island, internationalization of the Port of Dairen ([[Dalian]]), the lease of Port Arthur (Lushun) as a naval base and joint operation of the Chinese Eastern Railway and South Manchuria Railway. <ref>Byrnes, op.cit., p. 32. pg. 43.</ref>
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Roosevelt agreed that the Kurile Islands would be handed to [[Russia]], as well as southern Sakhalin Island, internationalization of the Port of Dairen ([[Dalian]]), the lease of Port Arthur (Lushun) as a naval base and joint operation of the Chinese Eastern Railway and South Manchuria Railway.<ref>Byrnes, op.cit., p. 32. pg. 43.</ref>
    
==Japan asks for peace==
 
==Japan asks for peace==
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Nobel laureate [[Alexander Solzhenitsyn]] was a Captain in the [[Red Army]] only to be rewarded with a term in the Soviet [[Gulag]] for [[dissent]]ing from [[Socialist]] thought, remarked
 
Nobel laureate [[Alexander Solzhenitsyn]] was a Captain in the [[Red Army]] only to be rewarded with a term in the Soviet [[Gulag]] for [[dissent]]ing from [[Socialist]] thought, remarked
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{{Cquote|In their own countries Roosevelt and Churchill are honored as embodiments of statesmanlike wisdom. To us, in our Russian prison conversations, their consistent shortsightedness and stupidity stood out as astonishingly obvious. How could they, in their decline from 1941 to 1945, fail to secure any guarantees whatever of the independence of Eastern Europe? How could they give away broad regions of Saxony and Thuringia in exchange for the preposterous toy of a four-zone Berlin, their own future Achilles' heel? And what was the military or political sense in their surrendering to destruction at Stalin's hands hundreds of thousands of armed Soviet citizens determined not to surrender? They say it was the price they paid for Stalin's agreeing to enter the war against Japan. With the [[atom bomb]] already in their hands, they paid Stalin for not refusing to occupy Manchuria, for strengthening [[Mao Tse-tung]] in China, and for giving [[Kim Il Sung]] control of half Korea!  What bankruptcy of political thought!  And when subsequently, the Russians pushed out [[/World_War_II#War_in_Europe_1944|Mikolajczyk]], when [[Benes]] and [[Masaryk]] came to their ends, when [[Berlin Airlift|Berlin was blockaded]], and Budapest flamed and fell silent, and Korea went up in smoke, and Britain’s Conservatives [[Suez Crisis|fled Suez]], could one really beleive that those among them with the most accurate memories did not at least recall that episode of the [[Operation Keelhaul|Cossacks]]? <ref>''Gulag Archipelago'', Alexander Solzhenitsyn, 1956, Part I. Chap. 4., pg. 258 fn. 12</ref><ref>[http://www.fff.org/freedom/0495a.asp Repatriation — The Dark Side of World War II], Part 3
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{{Cquote|In their own countries Roosevelt and Churchill are honored as embodiments of statesmanlike wisdom. To us, in our Russian prison conversations, their consistent shortsightedness and stupidity stood out as astonishingly obvious. How could they, in their decline from 1941 to 1945, fail to secure any guarantees whatever of the independence of Eastern Europe? How could they give away broad regions of Saxony and Thuringia in exchange for the preposterous toy of a four-zone Berlin, their own future Achilles' heel? And what was the military or political sense in their surrendering to destruction at Stalin's hands hundreds of thousands of armed Soviet citizens determined not to surrender? They say it was the price they paid for Stalin's agreeing to enter the war against Japan. With the [[atom bomb]] already in their hands, they paid Stalin for not refusing to occupy Manchuria, for strengthening [[Mao Tse-tung]] in China, and for giving [[Kim Il Sung]] control of half Korea!  What bankruptcy of political thought!  And when subsequently, the Russians pushed out [[/World War II#War in Europe 1944|Mikolajczyk]], when [[Benes]] and [[Masaryk]] came to their ends, when [[Berlin Airlift|Berlin was blockaded]], and Budapest flamed and fell silent, and Korea went up in smoke, and Britain’s Conservatives [[Suez Crisis|fled Suez]], could one really beleive that those among them with the most accurate memories did not at least recall that episode of the [[Operation Keelhaul|Cossacks]]? <ref>''Gulag Archipelago'', Alexander Solzhenitsyn, 1956, Part I. Chap. 4., pg. 258 fn. 12</ref><ref>[http://www.fff.org/freedom/0495a.asp Repatriation — The Dark Side of World War II], Part 3
 
by Jacob G. Hornberger, April 1995. Retrieved from the Future of Freedom Foundation, August 21, 2007.</ref><ref>[http://nobsblog.blogspot.com/1999_04_18_archive.html#vlasov Andrei Andreyevich Vlasov], from Alexander Solzhenitsyn, ''The Gulag Archipeligo'', v.i, p. 252, fn. 8.</ref>}}
 
by Jacob G. Hornberger, April 1995. Retrieved from the Future of Freedom Foundation, August 21, 2007.</ref><ref>[http://nobsblog.blogspot.com/1999_04_18_archive.html#vlasov Andrei Andreyevich Vlasov], from Alexander Solzhenitsyn, ''The Gulag Archipeligo'', v.i, p. 252, fn. 8.</ref>}}
  
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