Changes

When its gasoline supply ran dry in 1944, it was reduced to anti-aircraft flak roles, and many of its men were sent to infantry units.  By 1944 it operated 39,000 flak batteries staffed with a million people in uniform, both men and women.

When its gasoline supply ran dry in 1944, it was reduced to anti-aircraft flak roles, and many of its men were sent to infantry units.  By 1944 it operated 39,000 flak batteries staffed with a million people in uniform, both men and women.

The Luftwaffe lacked the bomber forces for strategic bombing, because it did not think such bombing was worth it.  They did attempt some startegic bombing in the east.  Their one success was destroying an airbase at Poltava, Russia, which housed 43 new B-17 bombers and a million tons of aviation fuel.<ref>Richard J. Evans, ''The Third Reich at War'' (2009) 436-7</ref>

The Luftwaffe lacked the bomber forces for strategic bombing, because it did not think such bombing was worth it.  They did attempt some strategic bombing in the east.  Their one success was destroying an airbase at Poltava, Russia, which housed 43 new B-17 bombers and a million tons of aviation fuel.<ref>Richard J. Evans, ''The Third Reich at War'' (2009) 436-7</ref>

==Beginnings==

==Beginnings==

In the 1930s Hans von Seeckt and senior army leadership, using World War I as a guide, advocated an independent air force designed for aggressive support of the army on the battlefield, and air-to-air warfare to gain air supremacy. Developed and written by airmen and army officers and published as "Conduct of the Air War" in 1935, the Luftwaffe's operational doctrine was battle-tested in the Spanish Civil War.<ref>James S. Corum, "From Biplanes to Blitzkrieg: the Development of German Air Doctrine Between the Wars." ''War in History'' 1996 3(1): 85-101. Issn: 0968-3445</ref>  

In the 1930s Hans von Seeckt and senior army leadership, using World War I as a guide, advocated an independent air force designed for aggressive support of the army on the battlefield, and air-to-air warfare to gain air supremacy. Developed and written by airmen and army officers and published as "Conduct of the Air War" in 1935, the Luftwaffe's operational doctrine was battle-tested in the Spanish Civil War.<ref>James S. Corum, "From Biplanes to Blitzkrieg: the Development of German Air Doctrine Between the Wars." ''War in History'' 1996 3(1): 85-101. Issn: 0968-3445</ref>  

The [[Spanish Civil War]] (1936–38) was the most intensive experience of combat for the Luftwaffe before World War II. Germany sent its "Kondor Legion" to test out its "blitzkrieg" doctrine using the [[Junkers Ju-87]] Stuka dive bomber, of which 5800 were built.  Theorists completely redesigned their air superiority fighter tactics, and discovered new techniques for high-speed dogfight tactics and tactical air support for ground forces.  The Spanish Civil War had a tremendous impact on all aspects of Luftwaffe combat doctrine, giving it technique, doctrine and self confidence that Britain and France lacked.<ref>Christopher C. Locksley, ''Condor over Spain: the Civil War, Combat Experience and the Development of Luftwaffe Airpower Doctrine." ''Civil Wars'' 1999 2(1): 69-99. Issn: 1369-8249</ref>

The [[Spanish Civil War]] (1936–38) was the most intensive experience of combat for the Luftwaffe before World War II. Germany sent its "Kondor Legion" to test out its "blitzkrieg" doctrine using the [[Junkers Ju-87]] Stuka dive bomber, of which 5800 were built.  Theorists completely redesigned their air superiority fighter tactics, and discovered new techniques for high-speed dogfight tactics and tactical air support for ground forces.  The Spanish Civil War had a tremendous impact on all aspects of Luftwaffe combat doctrine, giving it technique, doctrine and self-confidence that Britain and France lacked.<ref>Christopher C. Locksley, ''Condor over Spain: the Civil War, Combat Experience and the Development of Luftwaffe Airpower Doctrine." ''Civil Wars'' 1999 2(1): 69-99. Issn: 1369-8249</ref>

===Strategic doctrine===

===Strategic doctrine===

===French despair===

===French despair===

The French air force intelligence section was relatively well informed on the growth of the Luftwaffe, which, in their view, was the most important of the three services of the German armed forces and which could call upon virtually unlimited resources. The new German pursuit planes and bombers were considered the best in the world; German aircraft production was estimated at one thousand per month at the time of the Munich crisis. Thus, German aerial superiority was the main argument against protecting Czechoslovakia from Nazi aggression. The subsequent French rearmament program greatly increased aircraft production, but it failed to keep pace with German increases. Guy La Chambre, the French air minister, optimistically informed the government that the air force was capable of dealing with the Luftwaffe. On the other hand, General Joseph Vuillemin, air force chief of staff, described the French air force as far inferior and consistently opposed war with Germany. Nevertheless, the Daladier government, believing that the rearmament program would soon take off and relying on British determination to stop Hitler, rejected any new policy of appeasement.  The reorganization of the air force had not been completed when the war broke out and the German aircraft industry was able to achieve a spectacular increase in production due to the development of machine tools more efficient than those used in French factories.  Even so the Germans were not so far ahead in 1940 in quantity or quality of aircraft.  They were far ahead in morale, self-confidence and useful doctrine; France lost the aerial battle of 1940 in the minds of the leaders of its air force.<ref>Peter Jackson,  "La Perception de la Puissance Aerienne Allemande et Son Influence sur la Politique Exterieure Française Pendant les Crises Internationales de 1938 a 1939," [The Perception of German Air Power and its Influence on French Foreign Policy During the International Crises of 1938-39]. ''Revue Historique des Armées'' 1994 (4): 76-87. Issn: 0035-3299; Faris R. Kirkland, "French Air Strength in May 1940." ''Air Power History'' 1993 40(1): 22-34. Issn: 1044-016x</ref>

The French air force intelligence section was relatively well informed on the growth of the Luftwaffe, which, in their view, was the most important of the three services of the German armed forces and which could call upon virtually unlimited resources. The new German pursuit planes and bombers were considered the best in the world; German aircraft production was estimated at one thousand per month at the time of the Munich crisis. Thus, German aerial superiority was the main argument against protecting Czechoslovakia from Nazi aggression. The subsequent French rearmament program greatly increased aircraft production, but it failed to keep pace with German increases. Guy La Chambre, the French air minister, optimistically informed the government that the air force was capable of dealing with the Luftwaffe. On the other hand, General Joseph Vuillemin, air force chief of staff, described the French air force as far inferior and consistently opposed war with Germany. Nevertheless, the Daladier government, believing that the rearmament program would soon take off and relying on British determination to stop Hitler, rejected any new policy of appeasement.  The reorganization of the air force had not been completed when the war broke out and the German aircraft industry was able to achieve a spectacular increase in production due to the development of machine tools more efficient than those used in French factories.  Even so, the Germans were not so far ahead in 1940 in quantity or quality of aircraft.  They were far ahead in morale, self-confidence and useful doctrine; France lost the aerial battle of 1940 in the minds of the leaders of its air force.<ref>Peter Jackson,  "La Perception de la Puissance Aerienne Allemande et Son Influence sur la Politique Exterieure Française Pendant les Crises Internationales de 1938 a 1939," [The Perception of German Air Power and its Influence on French Foreign Policy During the International Crises of 1938-39]. ''Revue Historique des Armées'' 1994 (4): 76-87. Issn: 0035-3299; Faris R. Kirkland, "French Air Strength in May 1940." ''Air Power History'' 1993 40(1): 22-34. Issn: 1044-016x</ref>

[[Image:luftwaffebombing.jpg]]

[[Image:luftwaffebombing.jpg]]

In July 1942, north of Norway, an attack by the Luftwaffe sank two ships, and convoy PQ-17, sailing from Iceland to Archangel, Russia, was ordered to scatter by the British Admiralty. It mistakenly thought the German battleship ''Tirpitz'' was about to intercept the convoy. Twenty-two more ships were sunk by the well-coordinated attack of German air forces.<ref>Harold J. McCormick, "Convoy Catastrophe: the Destruction of PQ-17 to North Russia in July, 1942." ''Sea History'' 1992 (62): 14-16. Issn: 0146-9312</ref>

In July 1942, north of Norway, an attack by the Luftwaffe sank two ships, and convoy PQ-17, sailing from Iceland to Archangel, Russia, was ordered to scatter by the British Admiralty. It mistakenly thought the German battleship ''Tirpitz'' was about to intercept the convoy. Twenty-two more ships were sunk by the well-coordinated attack of German air forces.<ref>Harold J. McCormick, "Convoy Catastrophe: the Destruction of PQ-17 to North Russia in July, 1942." ''Sea History'' 1992 (62): 14-16. Issn: 0146-9312</ref>

After 1942 the Soviets completely restructured their air force around mobile air armies.  By 1942-3 Soviet air power challenged the Luftwaffe for air supremacy in the Stalingrad, Kuban, and Kursk campaigns. Frontal aviation's 17 air armies were complemented by a long-range air army in 1944, by which time the Soviets had air superiority, though it lacked long range bombers.  As a result the Soviets had more planes and more gasoline. The Russian front became a meatgrinder for the Luftwaffe; it was systematically worn down.

After 1942 the Soviets completely restructured their air force around mobile air armies.  By 1942-3 Soviet air power challenged the Luftwaffe for air supremacy in the Stalingrad, Kuban, and Kursk campaigns. Frontal aviation's 17 air armies were complemented by a long-range air army in 1944, by which time the Soviets had air superiority, though it lacked long range bombers.  As a result, the Soviets had more planes and more gasoline. The Russian front became a meatgrinder for the Luftwaffe; it was systematically worn down.

===Failure of Cooperation===

===Failure of Cooperation===

The success of early blitzkriegs blinded the Germans to the necessity of planning for a protracted air war, so they lacked the planes, fuel supplies, and trained airmen. By 1944 their pilots had far less flying experience than the Allies, and were more and more helpless in the sky. Furthermore, the Luftwaffe was unable to solve its growing logistics problems; when its fuel supply ran dry in 1944 it was doomed.  Increasingly the Luftwaffe concentrated on ground-based anti-aircraft operations, which involved hundreds of thousands of women soldiers. The major cities were ringed with high power guns; including 423 around Vienna. Often they were built on high flak towers that had unobstructed views.  The British bombers flew at night and the Germans used searchlights (staffed by women) to track their location, direction and speed so the guns, which shot ahead of the bombers, could throw up a barrage of shells that might hit the planes.  The Germans never had a proximity fuze so their shells seldom exploded at the right moment.<ref>Note that the searchlights were not there to blind pilots; when four searchlights converged on one plane, then  analog mechanical calculators were used to estimate exactly where the plane--two or three miles high-- would be when the shells reached that height. Edward B. Westermann, ''Flak: German Anti-Aircraft Defenses, 1914-1945'' (2005); Horst Boog, "Luftwaffe and Logistics in the Second World War." ''Aerospace Historian'' 1988 35(2): 103-110. Issn: 0001-9364</ref>

The success of early blitzkriegs blinded the Germans to the necessity of planning for a protracted air war, so they lacked the planes, fuel supplies, and trained airmen. By 1944 their pilots had far less flying experience than the Allies, and were more and more helpless in the sky. Furthermore, the Luftwaffe was unable to solve its growing logistics problems; when its fuel supply ran dry in 1944 it was doomed.  Increasingly the Luftwaffe concentrated on ground-based anti-aircraft operations, which involved hundreds of thousands of women soldiers. The major cities were ringed with high power guns; including 423 around Vienna. Often they were built on high flak towers that had unobstructed views.  The British bombers flew at night and the Germans used searchlights (staffed by women) to track their location, direction and speed so the guns, which shot ahead of the bombers, could throw up a barrage of shells that might hit the planes.  The Germans never had a proximity fuze so their shells seldom exploded at the right moment.<ref>Note that the searchlights were not there to blind pilots; when four searchlights converged on one plane, then  analog mechanical calculators were used to estimate exactly where the plane--two or three miles high-- would be when the shells reached that height. Edward B. Westermann, ''Flak: German Anti-Aircraft Defenses, 1914-1945'' (2005); Horst Boog, "Luftwaffe and Logistics in the Second World War." ''Aerospace Historian'' 1988 35(2): 103-110. Issn: 0001-9364</ref>

Surplus airmen and ground crews were reorganized into 21 Luftwaffe  field divisions; they came under army control in late 1943, as Göring was losing power.  They were generally of mediocre quality and were chewed up on the the Eastern Front; few men returned.

Surplus airmen and ground crews were reorganized into 21 Luftwaffe  field divisions; they came under army control in late 1943, as Göring was losing power.  They were generally of mediocre quality and were chewed up on the Eastern Front; few men returned.

Despite intensified Allied bombing, Germany achieved its highest plane production at the end of 1944 (a total of 12,329 aircraft), but their quality was inferior to Allied warplanes. The production of aviation gasoline (itself of much lower octane than Allied gasoline)  allowed for a daily consumption of 6,000 tons of flight fuel in 1944; the fuel production crisis in 1945 brought this to 76 tons. On 30 April 1945 the Luftwaffe flew its last 96 actions.

Despite intensified Allied bombing, Germany achieved its highest plane production at the end of 1944 (a total of 12,329 aircraft), but their quality was inferior to Allied warplanes. The production of aviation gasoline (itself of much lower octane than Allied gasoline)  allowed for a daily consumption of 6,000 tons of flight fuel in 1944; the fuel production crisis in 1945 brought this to 76 tons. On 30 April 1945 the Luftwaffe flew its last 96 actions.