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| | ==Overview== | | ==Overview== |
| − | "[[Operation Enduring Freedom]]" easily defeated the Taliban in late 2001 and it seemed the war was over quickly. But the Taliban regrouped, especially in the southern provinces, with sanctuaries inside neighboring [[Pakistan]] in remote areas where the government of Pakistan had little authority. By 2003 the insurgency in the south was in operation, funded by [[opium]] production. Important factors for the return of insurgency include the initial mistakes made in 2001; radical Islamic support from Pakistan; weaknesses of the [[Hamid Karzai]] government, especially its feeble and corrupt national army and police; the question of legitimacy and offenses to traditional tribal and [[Islam]]ic values and beliefs; and, finally, the extent to which NATO forces became part of the problem by angering the tribes. The insurgency controlled numerous areas and engaged in terror attacks on civilians and guerrilla warfare against American and NATO forces. [[Al-Qaeda]] terrorists--the only [[Arab]]s in Afghanistan--had been welcomed by the Taliban in 1999 and built there bases there. They have been largely destroyed or fled to Pakistan, according to the U.S. Army, having fewer than 100 people left in Afghanistan. | + | "[[Operation Enduring Freedom]]" easily defeated the Taliban in late 2001 and it seemed the war was over quickly. But the Taliban regrouped, especially in the southern provinces, with sanctuaries inside neighboring [[Pakistan]] in remote areas where the government of Pakistan had little authority. By 2003 the insurgency in the south was in operation, funded by [[opium]] production. Important factors for the return of insurgency include the initial mistakes made in 2001; radical Islamic support from Pakistan; weaknesses of the [[Hamid Karzai]] government, especially its feeble and corrupt national army and police; the question of legitimacy and offenses to traditional tribal and [[Islam]]ic values and beliefs; and, finally, the extent to which NATO forces became part of the problem by angering the tribes. The insurgency controlled numerous areas and engaged in terror attacks on civilians and guerrilla warfare against American and NATO forces. [[Al-Qaeda]] terrorists—the only [[Arab]]s in Afghanistan—had been welcomed by the Taliban in 1999 and built there bases there. They have been largely destroyed or fled to Pakistan, according to the U.S. Army, having fewer than 100 people left in Afghanistan. |
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| | [[File:Mcchrystal.jpg|thumb|250px|General [[Stanley McChrystal]].]] | | [[File:Mcchrystal.jpg|thumb|250px|General [[Stanley McChrystal]].]] |
| − | In Aug. 2009, General [[Stanley A. McChrystal]], the top U.S. and NATO commander in Afghanistan, said the Afghan government was riddled with corruption and NATO was being undermined by tactics that alienate civilians. He called the Taliban insurgency "a muscular and sophisticated enemy" that uses modern propaganda and systematically reaches into Afghanistan's prisons to recruit members and even plan operations. McChrystal alerted Washington that he urgently needs more forces within the next year; without them, he warned, the eight-year conflict "will likely result in failure."<ref> Bob Woodward, "McChrystal: More Forces or 'Mission Failure'' [http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/20/AR200909200920.html ''Washington Post'' Sept 21, 2009] </ref> | + | In Aug. 2009, General [[Stanley A. McChrystal]], the top U.S. and NATO commander in Afghanistan, said the Afghan government was riddled with corruption and NATO was being undermined by tactics that alienate civilians. He called the Taliban insurgency "a muscular and sophisticated enemy" that uses modern propaganda and systematically reaches into Afghanistan's prisons to recruit members and even plan operations. McChrystal alerted Washington that he urgently needs more forces within the next year; without them, he warned, the eight-year conflict "will likely result in failure."<ref>Bob Woodward, "McChrystal: More Forces or 'Mission Failure'' [http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/20/AR200909200920.html ''Washington Post'' Sept 21, 2009]</ref> |
| − | American policy was increasing set by Defense Secretary [[Robert Gates]], originally appointed by President [[George W. Bush|Bush]] in 2006 and reappointed by President Obama in 2009. Gates fired the commander General David McKiernan in May, 2009, replacing him with McChrystal. [[File:Afg-2009.jpg|thumb|350px|Obama plan to add 30,000 troops in early 2010]] Gates insisted on dropping the old strategy of hunting down insurgents and instead adopting a counterinsurgency strategy that focused on protecting local civilians and training Afghan soldiers and police to take over the job. Gates convinced Obama, who ordered 30,000 more troops to Afghanistan in Dec. 2009, with a deadline of 18 months, at which time a transition to Afghan responsibility would begin. Liberals thought Obama and Gates were making a big mistake--heading into another quagmire like [[Vietnam War|Vietnam]]. However liberal Democrats in Congress will not try to block Obama's proposals. Most conservatives, on the other hand, see victory in Afghanistan as a vital national goal and approve the new strategy, while voicing objections to the 18 month deadline. | + | American policy was increasing set by Defense Secretary [[Robert Gates]], originally appointed by President [[George W. Bush|Bush]] in 2006 and reappointed by President Obama in 2009. Gates fired the commander General David McKiernan in May, 2009, replacing him with McChrystal. [[File:Afg-2009.jpg|thumb|350px|Obama plan to add 30,000 troops in early 2010]] Gates insisted on dropping the old strategy of hunting down insurgents and instead adopting a counterinsurgency strategy that focused on protecting local civilians and training Afghan soldiers and police to take over the job. Gates convinced Obama, who ordered 30,000 more troops to Afghanistan in Dec. 2009, with a deadline of 18 months, at which time a transition to Afghan responsibility would begin. Liberals thought Obama and Gates were making a big mistake—heading into another quagmire like [[Vietnam War|Vietnam]]. However liberal Democrats in Congress will not try to block Obama's proposals. Most conservatives, on the other hand, see victory in Afghanistan as a vital national goal and approve the new strategy, while voicing objections to the 18 month deadline. |
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| | [[File:Af-UStroops.jpg|thumb|340px]] | | [[File:Af-UStroops.jpg|thumb|340px]] |
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| | Following the Taliban's repeated refusal to expel bin Laden and his group and end its support for international terrorism, NATO, under U.S. command began a [[Operation Enduring Freedom|military campaign]] on October 7, 2001, targeting terrorist facilities and various Taliban military and political assets within Afghanistan. Under pressure from U.S. military and anti-Taliban forces, the Taliban disintegrated rapidly, and [[Kabul]] fell on November 13, 2001. | | Following the Taliban's repeated refusal to expel bin Laden and his group and end its support for international terrorism, NATO, under U.S. command began a [[Operation Enduring Freedom|military campaign]] on October 7, 2001, targeting terrorist facilities and various Taliban military and political assets within Afghanistan. Under pressure from U.S. military and anti-Taliban forces, the Taliban disintegrated rapidly, and [[Kabul]] fell on November 13, 2001. |
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| − | ==New government== | + | ==New government== |
| − | Afghan factions opposed to the Taliban met at a United Nations-sponsored conference in [[Bonn]], Germany in December 2001 and agreed to restore stability and governance to Afghanistan--creating an interim government and establishing a process to move toward a permanent government. Under the "Bonn Agreement," an Afghan Interim Authority was formed and took office in Kabul on December 22, 2001 with Hamid Karzai as Chairman. The Interim Authority held power for approximately 6 months while preparing for a nationwide "Loya Jirga" (Grand Council) in mid-June 2002 that decided on the structure of a Transitional Authority. The Transitional Authority, headed by President [[Hamid Karzai]], renamed the government as the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan (TISA). One of the TISA's primary achievements was the drafting of a constitution that was ratified by a Constitutional Loya Jirga on January 4, 2004 | + | Afghan factions opposed to the Taliban met at a United Nations-sponsored conference in [[Bonn]], Germany in December 2001 and agreed to restore stability and governance to Afghanistan—creating an interim government and establishing a process to move toward a permanent government. Under the "Bonn Agreement," an Afghan Interim Authority was formed and took office in Kabul on December 22, 2001 with Hamid Karzai as Chairman. The Interim Authority held power for approximately 6 months while preparing for a nationwide "Loya Jirga" (Grand Council) in mid-June 2002 that decided on the structure of a Transitional Authority. The Transitional Authority, headed by President [[Hamid Karzai]], renamed the government as the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan (TISA). One of the TISA's primary achievements was the drafting of a constitution that was ratified by a Constitutional Loya Jirga on January 4, 2004 |
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| | ==U.S. Army== | | ==U.S. Army== |
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| | The rebels in the southern provinces come from the Pashtuns tribes, which form 44% of the population. Only a minority of Pashtuns support the rebels. The Taliban have a significant presence in many Pashtun villages, as well as a sanctuary in neighboring Pakistan. The number of armed insurgents has grown from 3,000 in 2006 to 15,000- 20,000 in 2009. They are locals who know the hiding places in the extremely difficult terrain, and receive protection support from some Pashtun tribes. | | The rebels in the southern provinces come from the Pashtuns tribes, which form 44% of the population. Only a minority of Pashtuns support the rebels. The Taliban have a significant presence in many Pashtun villages, as well as a sanctuary in neighboring Pakistan. The number of armed insurgents has grown from 3,000 in 2006 to 15,000- 20,000 in 2009. They are locals who know the hiding places in the extremely difficult terrain, and receive protection support from some Pashtun tribes. |
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| − | The Afghans have a 2500 year tradition of strongly distrusting --and fighting--armed outsiders. | + | The Afghans have a 2500 year tradition of strongly distrusting—and fighting—armed outsiders. |
| | [[File:Af-war2.jpg|thumb|300px|The insurgent strongholds are in red; illegal sales of opium accounts for half the cash income of Afghanistan; it produced both by insurgents and by local tribal leaders]] | | [[File:Af-war2.jpg|thumb|300px|The insurgent strongholds are in red; illegal sales of opium accounts for half the cash income of Afghanistan; it produced both by insurgents and by local tribal leaders]] |
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| | ==Debate 2009== | | ==Debate 2009== |
| − | The [[Obama Administration]] has made the war a high priority; indeed Obama sharply criticized the war in Iraq because for so long, he said, it diverted resources and attention from Afghanistan. In September 2009, the Pentagon pushed back against liberal Democrats who oppose sending additional combat troops to Afghanistan, telling Congress that success would probably require more fighting forces, and certainly much more time. Washington is debating the new report by Gen. McChrystal, the senior American and NATO commander in Afghanistan, who believes a properly resourced counterinsurgency war means more forces, more time and more commitment to the protection of the Afghan people and to the development of a strong Afghan government capable of defending its own country.<ref> Thom Shanker, [http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/16/world/asia/16mullen.html?_r=1&th&emc=th "Military Chief Suggests Need to Enlarge U.S. Afghan Force," ''New York Times'' Sept. 16, 2009]</ref> Some 4,000 more American trainers will arrive by November, bringing the American troop level to 68,000. | + | The [[Obama Administration]] has made the war a high priority; indeed Obama sharply criticized the war in Iraq because for so long, he said, it diverted resources and attention from Afghanistan. In September 2009, the Pentagon pushed back against liberal Democrats who oppose sending additional combat troops to Afghanistan, telling Congress that success would probably require more fighting forces, and certainly much more time. Washington is debating the new report by Gen. McChrystal, the senior American and NATO commander in Afghanistan, who believes a properly resourced counterinsurgency war means more forces, more time and more commitment to the protection of the Afghan people and to the development of a strong Afghan government capable of defending its own country.<ref>Thom Shanker, [http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/16/world/asia/16mullen.html?_r=1&th&emc=th "Military Chief Suggests Need to Enlarge U.S. Afghan Force," ''New York Times'' Sept. 16, 2009]</ref> Some 4,000 more American trainers will arrive by November, bringing the American troop level to 68,000. |
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| | ===International role=== | | ===International role=== |
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| | More than 108,000 NATO troops are serving in Afghanistan in September 2009: 64,500 from the United States, 9,000 from Britain and 34,500 from other nations. In all, 1,386 troops have been killed. NATO deaths include 830 Americans, 214 British, and 130 Canadians; 22 other countries that have sent forces to Afghanistan have suffered deaths among their troops. | | More than 108,000 NATO troops are serving in Afghanistan in September 2009: 64,500 from the United States, 9,000 from Britain and 34,500 from other nations. In all, 1,386 troops have been killed. NATO deaths include 830 Americans, 214 British, and 130 Canadians; 22 other countries that have sent forces to Afghanistan have suffered deaths among their troops. |
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| − | Debates are underway in many countries regarding how long the troops should stay. The Dutch, with 1,770 solders there, have yet to decide whether they will pull out in 2010 or redeploy from the country’s perilous south. A debate is also under way in France, which has 3,160 troops engaged. Germany has 4,000 troops based in the Kunduz region. Poland, which has 2,000 troops deployed, seems determined to keep them there despite the sour mood back home. Spain has announced it will send 220 more troops, for a total of 1,000.<ref> Judy Dempsey and Ian Austen, "Many Allies of U.S. Share Pain of Afghan War’s Toll" [http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/16/world/asia/16iht-deaths.html ''New York Times'' Sept. 16 2009]</ref> | + | Debates are underway in many countries regarding how long the troops should stay. The Dutch, with 1,770 solders there, have yet to decide whether they will pull out in 2010 or redeploy from the country’s perilous south. A debate is also under way in France, which has 3,160 troops engaged. Germany has 4,000 troops based in the Kunduz region. Poland, which has 2,000 troops deployed, seems determined to keep them there despite the sour mood back home. Spain has announced it will send 220 more troops, for a total of 1,000.<ref>Judy Dempsey and Ian Austen, "Many Allies of U.S. Share Pain of Afghan War’s Toll" [http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/16/world/asia/16iht-deaths.html ''New York Times'' Sept. 16 2009]</ref> |
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| | [[File:Afg-US1.jpg|thumb|320px|left|American Chinook helicopters from 101st Aviation Regiment depart from Forward Operating Base Ramrod in Kandahar]] | | [[File:Afg-US1.jpg|thumb|320px|left|American Chinook helicopters from 101st Aviation Regiment depart from Forward Operating Base Ramrod in Kandahar]] |
| | ===Weaknesses of the government=== | | ===Weaknesses of the government=== |
| − | The pro-Karzai Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazara [[Shiite]]s and Uzbeks that form the ruling coalition are not united, and the government they dominate is extremely weak and poverty-stricken. The Afghan government controls only 30% of the country. The country is resource-poor -- there is no oil--and the only rich resource is [[opium]] poppies. There is no educated base for a competent bureaucracy, and the army is little more than an amateur collection of tribal militias. 90% of the soldiers are illiterate, making them very hard to train to modern standards. | + | The pro-Karzai Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazara [[Shiite]]s and Uzbeks that form the ruling coalition are not united, and the government they dominate is extremely weak and poverty-stricken. The Afghan government controls only 30% of the country. The country is resource-poor—there is no oil—and the only rich resource is [[opium]] poppies. There is no educated base for a competent bureaucracy, and the army is little more than an amateur collection of tribal militias. 90% of the soldiers are illiterate, making them very hard to train to modern standards. |
| | [[File:Afghan3.jpg|thumb|420px|Location of US and NATO combat brigades]] | | [[File:Afghan3.jpg|thumb|420px|Location of US and NATO combat brigades]] |
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| | * Rashid, Ahmed. ''Descent into Chaos: The U.S. and the Disaster in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia'' (2009), blames Bush for a weak response to the need for force. [http://www.amazon.com/Descent-into-Chaos-Disaster-Afghanistan/dp/014311557X/ref=ntt_at_ep_dpt_1 excerpt and text search] | | * Rashid, Ahmed. ''Descent into Chaos: The U.S. and the Disaster in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia'' (2009), blames Bush for a weak response to the need for force. [http://www.amazon.com/Descent-into-Chaos-Disaster-Afghanistan/dp/014311557X/ref=ntt_at_ep_dpt_1 excerpt and text search] |
| | * Office of the Chief of Military History, U.S. Army. ''The United States Army in Afghanistan: Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (October 2001-March 2003)'' [http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/Afghanistan/Operation%20Enduring%20Freedom.htm online], 44pp; brief official history | | * Office of the Chief of Military History, U.S. Army. ''The United States Army in Afghanistan: Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (October 2001-March 2003)'' [http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/Afghanistan/Operation%20Enduring%20Freedom.htm online], 44pp; brief official history |
| − | * United States Special Operations Command. ''History: 1987-2007'' (2007) [http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/socom/2007history.pdf online], pp 87-112 on Afghanistan. | + | * United States Special Operations Command. ''History: 1987-2007'' (2007) [http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/socom/2007history.pdf online], pp 87–112 on Afghanistan. |
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| | == See also == | | == See also == |
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| | * [http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/afghanistan/index.html news articles from ''New York Times''] | | * [http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/afghanistan/index.html news articles from ''New York Times''] |
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| − | ====references==== | + | ====References==== |
| | <references/> | | <references/> |
| − | [[category:Terrorism]] | + | [[Category:Terrorism]] |
| | [[Category:Afghanistan]] | | [[Category:Afghanistan]] |
| | [[Category:Reagan Era]] | | [[Category:Reagan Era]] |
| | [[Category:Obama Presidency]] | | [[Category:Obama Presidency]] |
| | [[Category:Afghanistan War]] | | [[Category:Afghanistan War]] |