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| | ==KAL 007: Its Deviated flight until Attack== | | ==KAL 007: Its Deviated flight until Attack== |
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| − | Delayed one hour because of strong tail winds, KAL 007 departed Anchorage International Airport at 13:00 GMT (4:00 a.m. Alaskan time). It was the practice of Korean Airlines to sometimes delay a flight so that it would not arrive at Kimpo Airport in Seoul, Korea prior to 6:00 a.m., as customs and passenger handling personnel began their operations at that time. Climbing, the jumbo jet turned left, seeking its assigned route J501, which would soon take it onto the northernmost of five 50-mile wide passenger plane air corridors that bridge the Alaskan and Japanese coasts. These five corridors are called the NOPAC (North Pacific) routes. KAL 007’s particular corridor, Romeo 20, passed just 17 1/2 miles from Soviet airspace off the Kamchatka coast. | + | Delayed one hour because of strong tail winds, KAL 007 departed Anchorage International Airport at 13:00 GMT (4:00 a.m. Alaskan time). It was the practice of Korean Airlines to sometimes delay a flight so that it would not arrive at Kimpo Airport in Seoul, Korea prior to 6:00 a.m., as customs and passenger handling personnel began their operations at that time. Climbing, the jumbo jet turned left, seeking its assigned route J501, which would soon take it onto the northernmost of five 50-mile wide passenger plane air corridors that bridge the Alaskan and Japanese coasts. These five corridors are called the NOPAC (North Pacific) routes. KAL 007’s particular corridor, Romeo 20, passed just 17 1/2 miles from Soviet airspace off the Kamchatka coast. |
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| | Though the Boeing 747 was capable of being navigated by Long Range Navigation (LORAN)—a less up-to-date system relying on navigational guidance aids external to the aircraft—its principal method of navigation was the Inertial Navigation System (INS). The INS consisted of three independent, self-contained, but electronically linked units guiding the aircraft according to nine “waypoint” coordinates, some of which were “punched” into the units prior to flight. If more than nine were required, number 10 (and subsequent) coordinates were entered during the flight, replacing waypoint entries overflown and vacated. Korean Airlines received its computerized flight plan from an independent supplier company, Continental Air Service. This plan would designate the following nine waypoints for KAL 007’s route from Anchorage, Alaska, to Seoul, South Korea—BET (Bethel), NABIE, NEEVA, NIPPI, NOKKA, NOHO, IFH (Inkfish), MXT (Matsushima), and GTC (Niigata). Each INS unit (two of which were actually used for navigation, the third being a reserve) utilized gyroscopes and accelerometers which minutely and continuously (seven times per second) adjusted (through the automatic pilot) the aircraft in flight in conformity with these coordinates, taking into account changing wind, velocity, weight, and other conditions. | | Though the Boeing 747 was capable of being navigated by Long Range Navigation (LORAN)—a less up-to-date system relying on navigational guidance aids external to the aircraft—its principal method of navigation was the Inertial Navigation System (INS). The INS consisted of three independent, self-contained, but electronically linked units guiding the aircraft according to nine “waypoint” coordinates, some of which were “punched” into the units prior to flight. If more than nine were required, number 10 (and subsequent) coordinates were entered during the flight, replacing waypoint entries overflown and vacated. Korean Airlines received its computerized flight plan from an independent supplier company, Continental Air Service. This plan would designate the following nine waypoints for KAL 007’s route from Anchorage, Alaska, to Seoul, South Korea—BET (Bethel), NABIE, NEEVA, NIPPI, NOKKA, NOHO, IFH (Inkfish), MXT (Matsushima), and GTC (Niigata). Each INS unit (two of which were actually used for navigation, the third being a reserve) utilized gyroscopes and accelerometers which minutely and continuously (seven times per second) adjusted (through the automatic pilot) the aircraft in flight in conformity with these coordinates, taking into account changing wind, velocity, weight, and other conditions. |
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| | And so KAL 007 continued its night journey, ever increasing its deviation—60 nautical miles off course at waypoint NABIE, 100 nautical miles off course at waypoint NUKKS, and 160 nautical miles off course at waypoint NEEVA—until it penetrated Kamchatka’s borders. | | And so KAL 007 continued its night journey, ever increasing its deviation—60 nautical miles off course at waypoint NABIE, 100 nautical miles off course at waypoint NUKKS, and 160 nautical miles off course at waypoint NEEVA—until it penetrated Kamchatka’s borders. |
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| − | At 15:51 GMT, according to Soviet sources, KAL 007 “bumped” the Soviet buffer zone of Kamchatka Peninsula. The buffer zone was generally considered to extend 200 km. from Kamchatka’s coast and is technically known as a Flight Information Region (FIR). Within that region, aircraft would be queried by Soviet interceptors emitting a signal to the unidentified aircraft. An apparatus called a transponder would squawk back, among other things, the aircraft’s four-digit code, identifying the plane—if it were a Soviet plane. A non-Soviet block plane would not respond, but this in itself registered a negative identification. The pilots of the intruding aircraft would be unaware of the Soviet query. This system is similar to the U. S. military’s Identification Friend or Foe (IFF). | + | At 15:51 GMT, according to Soviet sources, KAL 007 “bumped” the Soviet buffer zone of Kamchatka Peninsula. The buffer zone was generally considered to extend 200 km. from Kamchatka’s coast and is technically known as a Flight Information Region (FIR). Within that region, aircraft would be queried by Soviet interceptors emitting a signal to the unidentified aircraft. An apparatus called a transponder would squawk back, among other things, the aircraft’s four-digit code, identifying the plane—if it were a Soviet plane. A non-Soviet block plane would not respond, but this in itself registered a negative identification. The pilots of the intruding aircraft would be unaware of the Soviet query. This system is similar to the U. S. military’s Identification Friend or Foe (IFF). |
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| − | The 200 km. buffer zone is counterpart to the United States’ Aerospace Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), but the 100 km. radius of the buffer zone nearest to Soviet territory had the additional designation of Air Defense Zone. Heightened surveillance measures would be taken against any non-Soviet aircraft entering the Air Defense Zone. | + | The 200 km. buffer zone is counterpart to the United States’ Aerospace Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), but the 100 km. radius of the buffer zone nearest to Soviet territory had the additional designation of Air Defense Zone. Heightened surveillance measures would be taken against any non-Soviet aircraft entering the Air Defense Zone. |
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| | ==The "Worst of Nights"== | | ==The "Worst of Nights"== |
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| | It was possible, then, that United States intelligence agencies, poised that night to receive all that the Soviets emitted, were in position to follow KAL 007’s incursion into the Soviet buffer zone off Kamchatka. The RC-135 Rivet Joint might well have seen Kamchatka’s radar positions “light up” one after another and would have heard the chatter at dozens of command posts. James Bamford, author of The Puzzle Palace and an expert on the operations of the United States National Security Agency explains: | | It was possible, then, that United States intelligence agencies, poised that night to receive all that the Soviets emitted, were in position to follow KAL 007’s incursion into the Soviet buffer zone off Kamchatka. The RC-135 Rivet Joint might well have seen Kamchatka’s radar positions “light up” one after another and would have heard the chatter at dozens of command posts. James Bamford, author of The Puzzle Palace and an expert on the operations of the United States National Security Agency explains: |
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| − | “The RC-135 is designed for one purpose—it’s designed for eavesdropping...There’s almost no way that the aircraft could not have picked up the indications of Soviet activity: Soviet fighters taking off, Soviet defense stations going into higher states of readiness, higher states of alert.”(As quoted by David Pearson, KAL 007: The Coverup, p. 156) | + | “The RC-135 is designed for one purpose—it’s designed for eavesdropping...There’s almost no way that the aircraft could not have picked up the indications of Soviet activity: Soviet fighters taking off, Soviet defense stations going into higher states of readiness, higher states of alert.”(As quoted by David Pearson, KAL 007: The Coverup, p. 156) |
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| | Possibly, Cobra Ball’s radar (as well as Rivet Joint’s) could have acquired KAL 007 in its flight traversing the RC-135’s area of detection. The Soviet Union would contend that not only was there an RC-135 in proximity to KAL 007 as the passenger plane neared the coast of Kamchatka, but that their proximity to each other was premeditated for United States intelligence-gathering purposes. | | Possibly, Cobra Ball’s radar (as well as Rivet Joint’s) could have acquired KAL 007 in its flight traversing the RC-135’s area of detection. The Soviet Union would contend that not only was there an RC-135 in proximity to KAL 007 as the passenger plane neared the coast of Kamchatka, but that their proximity to each other was premeditated for United States intelligence-gathering purposes. |
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| | '''Kornukov:''' | | '''Kornukov:''' |
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| − | No answer, Roger. Be ready to fire, the target is 45-50 km from the State border. Officer in charge at the command post, please, for report. | + | No answer, Roger. Be ready to fire, the target is 45–50 km from the State border. Officer in charge at the command post, please, for report. |
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| | '''Titovnin:''' | | '''Titovnin:''' |
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| | '''Kornukov''': (6:14) | | '''Kornukov''': (6:14) |
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| − | Comrade General, Kornukov, good morning. I am reporting the situation. Target 60- 65 is over Terpenie Bay tracking 240, 30 km from the State border, the fighter from Sokol is 6 km away. Locked on, orders were given to arm weapons. The target is not responding, to identify, he cannot identify it visually because it is still dark, but he is still | + | Comrade General, Kornukov, good morning. I am reporting the situation. Target 60- 65 is over Terpenie Bay tracking 240, 30 km from the State border, the fighter from Sokol is 6 km away. Locked on, orders were given to arm weapons. The target is not responding, to identify, he cannot identify it visually because it is still dark, but he is still |
| | locked on. | | locked on. |
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| | Okay, Roger, understood, so bring in 163 in behind Osipovich to guarantee destruction. | | Okay, Roger, understood, so bring in 163 in behind Osipovich to guarantee destruction. |
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| − | ==See Also== | + | ==See also== |
| | *[[Korean Airlines Flight 007]] | | *[[Korean Airlines Flight 007]] |
| | *[[How KAL 007 was Lost]] | | *[[How KAL 007 was Lost]] |