Changes

==Dreadnought==

==Dreadnought==

[[Image:H63596.jpg|right|200px|thumb|HMS ''Dreadnought'']]

[[Image:H63596.jpg|right|200px|thumb|HMS ''Dreadnought'']]

The decisive event in the history of the battleship was the launching of the ''Dreadnought'' by the British Royal Navy in 1906. Powered by turbines, the ships had no cluttered array of small-caliber weapons and concentrated all firepower around 13.5-inch guns. It had much better armor and speed than any competitor--it rendered obsolete all other navies and started a new naval arms race. In a departure from Britain's previous reactive response to innovation in naval technology, Admiral [[John Fisher]]'s (1841-1920) dreadnought policy introduced radically new capital ship designs, despite the technical risks inherent in their all-big-gun armament and turbine propulsion. Yet, early in 1905, Britain's strategic position was strong and improving further: only America was, rather slowly, working toward a small all-big-gun battleship, while Germany would not consider designs with more than four 11-inch guns until after news of ''Dreadnought'' was received. Fisher's policy had some successes, but some historians argue it was risky, insufficiently considered, based on inaccurate intelligence, and unnecessary.<ref>John Brooks, "'Dreadnought:' Blunder, or Stroke of Genius?" ''War in History'' 2007 14(2): 157-178, argues for blunder; in [[EBSCO]]  

The decisive event in the history of the battleship was the launching of the ''Dreadnought'' by the British Royal Navy in 1906. Powered by turbines, the ships had no cluttered array of small-caliber weapons and concentrated all firepower around 13.5-inch guns. It had much better armor and speed than any competitor—it rendered obsolete all other navies and started a new naval arms race. In a departure from Britain's previous reactive response to innovation in naval technology, Admiral [[John Fisher]]'s (1841-1920) dreadnought policy introduced radically new capital ship designs, despite the technical risks inherent in their all-big-gun armament and turbine propulsion. Yet, early in 1905, Britain's strategic position was strong and improving further: only America was, rather slowly, working toward a small all-big-gun battleship, while Germany would not consider designs with more than four 11-inch guns until after news of ''Dreadnought'' was received. Fisher's policy had some successes, but some historians argue it was risky, insufficiently considered, based on inaccurate intelligence, and unnecessary.<ref>John Brooks, "'Dreadnought:' Blunder, or Stroke of Genius?" ''War in History'' 2007 14(2): 157-178, argues for blunder; in [[EBSCO]]  

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==Interwar==

==Interwar==

At the [[Washington Naval Conference]] in 1921, Britain, France, Italy, Japan, and the United States established a ten-year moratorium on the construction of battleships as well as a limitation on the building and sale of other types of vessels. The primary purpose of the conference was to restrict competition among the Great Powers in the production of large warships. The moratorium was successful but it was not renewed in 1931, and all the Great Powers began a new battleship race, this time with Germany participating too.  President [[Herbert Hoover]], a pacifist, would not allow naval construction as a means to fight the [[Great Depression]]. President [[Franklin D. Roosevelt]] reversed course and used recovery money (from the [[PWA]]) to build 17 new battleships, and many other warships.<ref> William M. Mcbride, "The Unstable Dynamics of a Strategic Technology: Disarmament, Unemployment, and the Interwar Battleship." ''Technology & Culture'' 1997 38(2): 386-423 </ref>

At the [[Washington Naval Conference]] in 1921, Britain, France, Italy, Japan, and the United States established a ten-year moratorium on the construction of battleships as well as a limitation on the building and sale of other types of vessels. The primary purpose of the conference was to restrict competition among the Great Powers in the production of large warships. The moratorium was successful but it was not renewed in 1931, and all the Great Powers began a new battleship race, this time with Germany participating too.  President [[Herbert Hoover]], a pacifist, would not allow naval construction as a means to fight the [[Great Depression]]. President [[Franklin D. Roosevelt]] reversed course and used recovery money (from the [[PWA]]) to build 17 new battleships, and many other warships.<ref>William M. Mcbride, "The Unstable Dynamics of a Strategic Technology: Disarmament, Unemployment, and the Interwar Battleship." ''Technology & Culture'' 1997 38(2): 386-423</ref>

    

    

==World War II==

==World War II==

The Royal Navy sank the Italian fleet in Nov. 1940 at the Battle of Taranto using warplanes  from [[aircraft carrier]]s.  The Japanese took note and at the [[Battle of Pearl Harbor]] (Dec. 7. 1941), sank nearly the entire American battleship fleet using carrier planes. Immediately the carrier replaced the battleship as the capital ship of sea-power. The era of big-gun battles between fleets at 30,000 yards was (almost) over.

The Royal Navy sank the Italian fleet in Nov. 1940 at the Battle of Taranto using warplanes  from [[aircraft carrier]]s.  The Japanese took note and at the [[Battle of Pearl Harbor]] (Dec. 7. 1941), sank nearly the entire American battleship fleet using carrier planes. Immediately the carrier replaced the battleship as the capital ship of sea-power. The era of big-gun battles between fleets at 30,000 yards was (almost) over.

Within months after the Pearl Harbor the battleship component of the US Pacific Fleet was back stronger than ever and capable of fighting the Japanese in the South Pacific. But the battleship fleet, designated Task Force One, went largely unused. Initially, logistical problems played a large role in the failure to commit the battleships, but by late November 1942 considerations of operational capability and survivability were more important. Admiral [[William Halsey]], the South Pacific theater commander, believed the battleships were a liability, while Admiral [[Chester Nimitz]], commander of the Pacific Fleet, believed the benefit to be gained from using them was not worth the risk of losing them and their personnel in battle. As a result, the battleships were relegated to shore bombardment, but for combat were replaced by bombs delivered by air, and torpedoes (delivered by airplane, submarine, or destroyer) as the chief offensive weapons of naval warfare. The last battleship ever was built in 1945.<ref>David C. Fuquea, "Task Force One: the Wasted Assets of the United States Pacific Battleship Fleet, 1942." ''Journal of Military History'' 1997 61(4): 707-734. </ref>

Within months after the Pearl Harbor the battleship component of the US Pacific Fleet was back stronger than ever and capable of fighting the Japanese in the South Pacific. But the battleship fleet, designated Task Force One, went largely unused. Initially, logistical problems played a large role in the failure to commit the battleships, but by late November 1942 considerations of operational capability and survivability were more important. Admiral [[William Halsey]], the South Pacific theater commander, believed the battleships were a liability, while Admiral [[Chester Nimitz]], commander of the Pacific Fleet, believed the benefit to be gained from using them was not worth the risk of losing them and their personnel in battle. As a result, the battleships were relegated to shore bombardment, but for combat were replaced by bombs delivered by air, and torpedoes (delivered by airplane, submarine, or destroyer) as the chief offensive weapons of naval warfare. The last battleship ever was built in 1945.<ref>David C. Fuquea, "Task Force One: the Wasted Assets of the United States Pacific Battleship Fleet, 1942." ''Journal of Military History'' 1997 61(4): 707-734.</ref>

* Garcia Y Robertson, Rodrigo. "Failure of the Heavy Gun at Sea, 1898-1922." ''Technology and Culture'' 1987 28(3): 539-557. Issn: 0040-165x Fulltext: [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0040-165X(198707)28%3A3%3C539%3AFOTHGA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-7 in Jstor]

* Garcia Y Robertson, Rodrigo. "Failure of the Heavy Gun at Sea, 1898-1922." ''Technology and Culture'' 1987 28(3): 539-557. Issn: 0040-165x Fulltext: [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0040-165X(198707)28%3A3%3C539%3AFOTHGA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-7 in Jstor]

* Hodges, Peter. ''The Big Gun: Battleship Main Armament 1860-1945'', (1981), highly detailed coverage

* Hodges, Peter. ''The Big Gun: Battleship Main Armament 1860-1945'', (1981), highly detailed coverage

* Hone, Trent. "The Evolution of Fleet Tactical Doctrine in the U.S. Navy, 1922-1941," ''The Journal of Military History'' - Volume 67, Number 4, October 2003, pp. 1107-1148 in [[Project Muse]]

* Hone, Trent. "The Evolution of Fleet Tactical Doctrine in the U.S. Navy, 1922-1941," ''The Journal of Military History'' - Volume 67, Number 4, October 2003, pp.&nbsp;1107-1148 in [[Project Muse]]

* Hore, Peter. ''Battleships of World War II: An illustrated history and country-by-country directory of warships, including battlecruisers and pocket battleships, that ... Jersey, Iowa, Bismarck, Yamato, Richelieu'' (2008)

* Hore, Peter. ''Battleships of World War II: An illustrated history and country-by-country directory of warships, including battlecruisers and pocket battleships, that ... Jersey, Iowa, Bismarck, Yamato, Richelieu'' (2008)

* Hore, Peter. ''Battleships of World War I: A Fully Illustrated Country-By-Country Directory Of Dreadnoughts, Including Armoured Cruisers, Battlecruisers And Battleships From 1906-1918'' (2007)

* Hore, Peter. ''Battleships of World War I: A Fully Illustrated Country-By-Country Directory Of Dreadnoughts, Including Armoured Cruisers, Battlecruisers And Battleships From 1906-1918'' (2007)

* Morison, Samuel Loring, and Norman Polmar. ''The American Battleship'' (2003) [http://www.amazon.com/American-Battleship-Samuel-Loring-Morison/dp/0760309892/ref=sr_1_9?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1229182991&sr=1-9 excerpt and text search]

* Morison, Samuel Loring, and Norman Polmar. ''The American Battleship'' (2003) [http://www.amazon.com/American-Battleship-Samuel-Loring-Morison/dp/0760309892/ref=sr_1_9?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1229182991&sr=1-9 excerpt and text search]

* Muir, Malcolm. ''The Iowa Class Battleships: Iowa, New Jersey, Missouri & Wisconsin'' (1991)

* Muir, Malcolm. ''The Iowa Class Battleships: Iowa, New Jersey, Missouri & Wisconsin'' (1991)

* Mulligan, Timothy. "Ship-of-the-Line or Atlantic Raider? Battleship Bismarck Between Design Limitations and Naval Strategy," ''The Journal of Military History'' 69#4 October 2005, pp. 1013-1044 in [[Project Muse]]

* Mulligan, Timothy. "Ship-of-the-Line or Atlantic Raider? Battleship Bismarck Between Design Limitations and Naval Strategy," ''The Journal of Military History'' 69#4 October 2005, pp.&nbsp;1013-1044 in [[Project Muse]]

* Parkes, Oscar ''British Battleships: 'Warrior' 1860 to 'Vanguard' 1950 - A History of Design, Construction and Armament'' (1990) Naval Institute, Annapolis

* Parkes, Oscar ''British Battleships: 'Warrior' 1860 to 'Vanguard' 1950 - A History of Design, Construction and Armament'' (1990) Naval Institute, Annapolis

* Sondhaus, Lawrence. ''Naval Warfare, 1815-1914'' (2001) [http://www.questia.com/read/109459237 online edition]

* Sondhaus, Lawrence. ''Naval Warfare, 1815-1914'' (2001) [http://www.questia.com/read/109459237 online edition]

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[[category:warships]]

[[Category:Warships]]

[[Category:Battleships]]

[[Category:Battleships]]