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On the morning of 19 June, Bell steamed with the reassembled TF 58 in a zone of operations centered on a point some 90 miles generally west of Rota Island, waiting for enemy naval air to contest the Marianas invasion. The air battle opened just before 0600 when picket destroyers screening Vice Admiral Willis A. "Ching" Lee's battleship group shot down a Guam-based "[[Mitsubishi Zero|Zeke]]" that attempted a bomb run on the task group. About 90 minutes later, fighters from one of Bell's carriers, Belleau Wood, investigating bogeys reported over Orote Field on Guam, mixed it up with a swarm of enemy aircraft taking off from the field. By the time reinforcements--more fighters from Bell's TG 58.1, joined by a few from TG 58.2's Cabot--reached the scene, the Japanese planes were gone. Some fell to the guns of the initial group of fighters, while the rest landed and hid themselves in concealed revetments.

On the morning of 19 June, Bell steamed with the reassembled TF 58 in a zone of operations centered on a point some 90 miles generally west of Rota Island, waiting for enemy naval air to contest the Marianas invasion. The air battle opened just before 0600 when picket destroyers screening Vice Admiral Willis A. "Ching" Lee's battleship group shot down a Guam-based "[[Mitsubishi Zero|Zeke]]" that attempted a bomb run on the task group. About 90 minutes later, fighters from one of Bell's carriers, Belleau Wood, investigating bogeys reported over Orote Field on Guam, mixed it up with a swarm of enemy aircraft taking off from the field. By the time reinforcements—more fighters from Bell's TG 58.1, joined by a few from TG 58.2's Cabot—reached the scene, the Japanese planes were gone. Some fell to the guns of the initial group of fighters, while the rest landed and hid themselves in concealed revetments.

Ignorant of the magnitude of their losses in carrier air on the 19th because inadequate communications facilities in cruiser Haguro--the temporary flagship after Taiho sank--hindered the receipt and analysis of information, the Japanese planned to renew the attack on the 20th. Both sides spent most of the next day engaged in search missions trying to pinpoint each other's location. Neither succeeded until late afternoon on the 20th. The Americans found the Japanese just before 1645, but the Japanese searches did not locate the Americans until an hour and a half later. By that time, the Japanese command staff had transferred to carrier Zuikaku where better communications facilities enabled it to develop an accurate picture of the appalling losses that Japanese carrier air sustained on the 19th and order the obligatory retirement. Thus, though the Battle of the Philippine Sea really reached its climax in a matter of hours, the delay in the Japanese retreat invited a protracted stern-chase pursuit that caused the battle's denouement to drag on for two more days.

Ignorant of the magnitude of their losses in carrier air on the 19th because inadequate communications facilities in cruiser Haguro—the temporary flagship after Taiho sank—hindered the receipt and analysis of information, the Japanese planned to renew the attack on the 20th. Both sides spent most of the next day engaged in search missions trying to pinpoint each other's location. Neither succeeded until late afternoon on the 20th. The Americans found the Japanese just before 1645, but the Japanese searches did not locate the Americans until an hour and a half later. By that time, the Japanese command staff had transferred to carrier Zuikaku where better communications facilities enabled it to develop an accurate picture of the appalling losses that Japanese carrier air sustained on the 19th and order the obligatory retirement. Thus, though the Battle of the Philippine Sea really reached its climax in a matter of hours, the delay in the Japanese retreat invited a protracted stern-chase pursuit that caused the battle's denouement to drag on for two more days.

While TF 38.1 steamed away form the Philippines, great events were brewing in the waters of the archipelago. Japanese Admiral Soemu Toyoda, Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet, activated [[Battle of Leyte Gulf|Sho-Go-1]], a scheme for bringing about a decisive naval action off Leyte. The Japanese strategy called for Vice Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa's carriers to lure TF 38 north of Luzon and away from the Leyte beachhead. Then--with the American fleet carriers out of the way--heavy Japanese surface ships were to debouch into Leyte Gulf from two directions: from the south through Surigao Strait and from the north through the San Bernardino Strait and around the island of Samar. During much of the 24th, planes from those parts of TF 38 still in Philippine waters pounded Vice Admiral Takeo Kurita's powerful Force "A," or Center Force, as it steamed across the Sibuyan Sea toward San Bernardino Strait. When nightfall brought a halt to their attacks, the American aircraft had sunk battleship Musashi and had damaged several other Japanese warships. Moreover, the pilots reported to Admiral Halsey that Kurita's force had reversed course and was moving away from San Bernardino Strait.

While TF 38.1 steamed away form the Philippines, great events were brewing in the waters of the archipelago. Japanese Admiral Soemu Toyoda, Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet, activated [[Battle of Leyte Gulf|Sho-Go-1]], a scheme for bringing about a decisive naval action off Leyte. The Japanese strategy called for Vice Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa's carriers to lure TF 38 north of Luzon and away from the Leyte beachhead. Then—with the American fleet carriers out of the way—heavy Japanese surface ships were to debouch into Leyte Gulf from two directions: from the south through Surigao Strait and from the north through the San Bernardino Strait and around the island of Samar. During much of the 24th, planes from those parts of TF 38 still in Philippine waters pounded Vice Admiral Takeo Kurita's powerful Force "A," or Center Force, as it steamed across the Sibuyan Sea toward San Bernardino Strait. When nightfall brought a halt to their attacks, the American aircraft had sunk battleship Musashi and had damaged several other Japanese warships. Moreover, the pilots reported to Admiral Halsey that Kurita's force had reversed course and was moving away from San Bernardino Strait.

Meanwhile, late in the afternoon of the 24th--after Kurita's Center Force had turned away from San Bernardino Strait in apparent retreat--American scout planes located Ozawa's carrier force a bit less than 200 miles north of TF 38. This intelligence prompted Halsey to lead his own carriers north toward Ozawa. He did not recall Bell's TG 38.1 at this point, however, but allowed it to continue on course to Ulithi.

Meanwhile, late in the afternoon of the 24th—after Kurita's Center Force had turned away from San Bernardino Strait in apparent retreat—American scout planes located Ozawa's carrier force a bit less than 200 miles north of TF 38. This intelligence prompted Halsey to lead his own carriers north toward Ozawa. He did not recall Bell's TG 38.1 at this point, however, but allowed it to continue on course to Ulithi.

At 0645, lookouts on board "Taffy 3" ships spotted bursts of antiaircraft fire dirtying the northern sky. Center Force gunners had opened fire on an American antisubmarine patrol plane. Moments later, "Taffy 3" made radar and visual contact almost simultaneously on the advancing Japanese warships. Shortly before 0700, Kurita's guns opened fire on the hapless "baby flattops" and their comparatively tiny, but incredibly courageous, escorts. For more than two hours, the ships and planes of "Taffy 3"--aided by the aircraft from the other two escort-carrier groups to the south--fought back with guns, torpedoes, bombs, and consummate seamanship in what appeared to be an impossibly uneven struggle. Then, at 0911, Kurita--shaken by the loss of three heavy cruisers and convinced, as a result the tenacious resistance put up by the "jeep" carriers and their screens, that he had run headlong into TF 38 itself--broke off the action.

At 0645, lookouts on board "Taffy 3" ships spotted bursts of antiaircraft fire dirtying the northern sky. Center Force gunners had opened fire on an American antisubmarine patrol plane. Moments later, "Taffy 3" made radar and visual contact almost simultaneously on the advancing Japanese warships. Shortly before 0700, Kurita's guns opened fire on the hapless "baby flattops" and their comparatively tiny, but incredibly courageous, escorts. For more than two hours, the ships and planes of "Taffy 3"—aided by the aircraft from the other two escort-carrier groups to the south—fought back with guns, torpedoes, bombs, and consummate seamanship in what appeared to be an impossibly uneven struggle. Then, at 0911, Kurita—shaken by the loss of three heavy cruisers and convinced, as a result the tenacious resistance put up by the "jeep" carriers and their screens, that he had run headlong into TF 38 itself—broke off the action.

In the meantime, at 0848, Bell's TG 38.1--at the time refueling on its way to Ulithi--received orders to rush back to Philippine waters to help "Taffy 3" in its battle for survival. Bell and her colleagues in the task group raced toward Samar at flank speed until 1030 when they slowed their advance to turn into the wind so the carriers could launch aircraft for strikes on Kurita's ships still some 330 miles distant. While those raids wreaked little damage on Center Force, there is little doubt that they reinforced Kurita in his decision to retire from Leyte.

In the meantime, at 0848, Bell's TG 38.1--at the time refueling on its way to Ulithi—received orders to rush back to Philippine waters to help "Taffy 3" in its battle for survival. Bell and her colleagues in the task group raced toward Samar at flank speed until 1030 when they slowed their advance to turn into the wind so the carriers could launch aircraft for strikes on Kurita's ships still some 330 miles distant. While those raids wreaked little damage on Center Force, there is little doubt that they reinforced Kurita in his decision to retire from Leyte.

While those planes were in the air, Bell resumed the westward advance with TG 38.1 in an effort to lessen the distance of the planes' return flight and to reach an optimum position from which to launch additional strikes on the fleeing enemy at dawn. With the first light of the 26th, both TG 38.1 and TG 38.2--which Admiral Halsey had finally dispatched south--sent aloft their first strike of the day against Kurita. The second group of aircraft left the carriers a little over two hours later. These fliers sank light cruiser Noshiro and damaged, but did not sink, heavy cruiser Kumano. The two task groups mounted a third attack in the early afternoon, but it did not add to the score.

While those planes were in the air, Bell resumed the westward advance with TG 38.1 in an effort to lessen the distance of the planes' return flight and to reach an optimum position from which to launch additional strikes on the fleeing enemy at dawn. With the first light of the 26th, both TG 38.1 and TG 38.2--which Admiral Halsey had finally dispatched south—sent aloft their first strike of the day against Kurita. The second group of aircraft left the carriers a little over two hours later. These fliers sank light cruiser Noshiro and damaged, but did not sink, heavy cruiser Kumano. The two task groups mounted a third attack in the early afternoon, but it did not add to the score.

Bell (DD-587) earned 12 battle stars for her service during World War II.<ref>Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships [http://www.history.navy.mil/danfs/b4-list.htm]</ref>

Bell (DD-587) earned 12 battle stars for her service during World War II.<ref>[http://www.history.navy.mil/danfs/b4-list.htm Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships]</ref>

See also [[Bell-I]].

See also [[Bell-I]].