Changes

"Don't worry about me," Elizabeth Lewis Knight assured her mother, "for this is an experience of a lifetime. There are many nurses [who] would give anything if they could be here."<ref>Schaffer, ''America in the Great War'' p. 183</ref>  

"Don't worry about me," Elizabeth Lewis Knight assured her mother, "for this is an experience of a lifetime. There are many nurses [who] would give anything if they could be here."<ref>Schaffer, ''America in the Great War'' p. 183</ref>  

The doughboys were a cross section of the entire population of young men; they served an average of 12 months. Half went to Europe, staying an average of 5.5 months. Only 34% of the enlisted men were assigned to combat specialties. This was the first industrial war, and the Army's "tail" was twice as long as its "teeth." One third of the men were assigned as laborers or service workers (including 80% of the blacks); 22% were mechanics and craftsmen; 12% held clerical or technical jobs. Col. [[George Patton]] observed, "It is remarkable how much easier these [drafted] men are to teach than the old soldiers we used to have. They had no brains at all. These men have plenty." Women enthusiastically volunteered for the Army and Navy Nurse Corps, and thousands served in hospitals in France (none of which were near the combat zone, though a few were raided by plane or hit by artillery.) 16,000 civilian American women served in France in non-combat support roles; they were were under the command of the AEF but not officially part of ir. The Navy and the Marines enlisted 11,000 women as clerks (coded "Yeoman-Female," they were nicknamed "yeomanettes"); they handled much of the paperwork and telephone traffic in France. Thousands of civilians (especially college youth) served overseas as volunteer ambulance drivers and Red Cross social workers.<ref>Thousands of women volunteered for military service in World War II. The Red Cross sent thousands of civilians to every theater, but all the ambulance drivers were enlisted men in the Medical Corps.</ref>

The doughboys were a cross section of the entire population of young men; they served an average of 12 months. Half went to Europe, staying an average of 5.5 months. Only 34% of the enlisted men were assigned to combat specialties. This was the first industrial war, and the Army's "tail" was twice as long as its "teeth." One third of the men were assigned as laborers or service workers (including 80% of the blacks); 22% were mechanics and craftsmen; 12% held clerical or technical jobs. Col. [[George Patton]] observed, "It is remarkable how much easier these [drafted] men are to teach than the old soldiers we used to have. They had no brains at all. These men have plenty." Women enthusiastically volunteered for the Army and Navy Nurse Corps, and thousands served in hospitals in France (none of which were near the combat zone, though a few were raided by plane or hit by artillery.) 16,000 civilian American women served in France in non-combat support roles; they were under the command of the AEF but not officially part of ir. The Navy and the Marines enlisted 11,000 women as clerks (coded "Yeoman-Female," they were nicknamed "yeomanettes"); they handled much of the paperwork and telephone traffic in France. Thousands of civilians (especially college youth) served overseas as volunteer ambulance drivers and Red Cross social workers.<ref>Thousands of women volunteered for military service in World War II. The Red Cross sent thousands of civilians to every theater, but all the ambulance drivers were enlisted men in the Medical Corps.</ref>

===Creating 200,000 Officers===

===Creating 200,000 Officers===

In strategic terms, the purpose of merchant shipping was to deliver so many tons of cargo per month. Convoys cut the flow of cargo in several ways.<ref>see Paul G. Halpern, ''A Naval History of World War I'' (1994) ch 11</ref> The ports could load only so many ships a day; loaded ships had to wait for the last ship to be loaded before sailing. The convoy moved at the speed of the slowest ship, and some ships lacked the navigational skills to stay in formation. The need to synchronize movement well in advance precluded merchants ships from adjusting quickly to particularized opportunities to move cargo from here to there.  

In strategic terms, the purpose of merchant shipping was to deliver so many tons of cargo per month. Convoys cut the flow of cargo in several ways.<ref>see Paul G. Halpern, ''A Naval History of World War I'' (1994) ch 11</ref> The ports could load only so many ships a day; loaded ships had to wait for the last ship to be loaded before sailing. The convoy moved at the speed of the slowest ship, and some ships lacked the navigational skills to stay in formation. The need to synchronize movement well in advance precluded merchants ships from adjusting quickly to particularized opportunities to move cargo from here to there.  

The only advantage to convoys was that they got through. A single convoy of 30 ships was almost as hard for a U-boat to locate than a single ship. Therefore a convoy system meant there were far fewer targets that got spotted, and then they had armed escorts that could fight back. The Royal Navy, however, wanted to hoard its destroyers to protect its precious battleships. It made a strong argument using a paper-stone-scissors analogy. Submarines could sneak up on a big battleship and sink it with a torpedo, but the torpedo would probably miss a small destroyer. They could circle and sink subs with a new defensive weapon, the depth charges (drums of TNT set off by water pressure at a certain depth.) Finally the battleships with their heavy guns could sink destroyers from far away, but were too clumsy to circle and sink subs. A complete battle fleet therefore had to have a mix of all three ships, and to detach destroyers for convoy duty would gravely weaken the fleet. The admirals who wanted to hoard their destroyers for the battle fleet were wrong, and were overruled in 1917. Single merchant ships could not survive a year. The life expectancy of a cargo ship traveling alone on the north Atlantic run, including time in port, was nine months. In 1917, 1,300 British ships were lost to subs, and another 840 were attacked and escaped. By contrast the convoy losses were strikingly small: of 16,600 ships convoyed in 1917- 18, only 102 were torpedoed.<ref>Halpern, ''A Naval History of World War I'' (1994) p. 365</ref> The supplies they brought into Britain and France were desperately needed by the armies at the front, and by the civilians at home. It was therefore necessary to assign destroyers to escort convoys. While this involved vast amounts of busywork that distracted the fighting sailors who wanted to blast away at German battleships or aggressively hunt down U-boats, it was the proper way to win a war.  

The only advantage to convoys was that they got through. A single convoy of 30 ships was almost as hard for a U-boat to locate than a single ship. Therefore, a convoy system meant there were far fewer targets that got spotted, and then they had armed escorts that could fight back. The Royal Navy, however, wanted to hoard its destroyers to protect its precious battleships. It made a strong argument using a paper-stone-scissors analogy. Submarines could sneak up on a big battleship and sink it with a torpedo, but the torpedo would probably miss a small destroyer. They could circle and sink subs with a new defensive weapon, the depth charges (drums of TNT set off by water pressure at a certain depth.) Finally the battleships with their heavy guns could sink destroyers from far away, but were too clumsy to circle and sink subs. A complete battle fleet therefore had to have a mix of all three ships, and to detach destroyers for convoy duty would gravely weaken the fleet. The admirals who wanted to hoard their destroyers for the battle fleet were wrong, and were overruled in 1917. Single merchant ships could not survive a year. The life expectancy of a cargo ship traveling alone on the north Atlantic run, including time in port, was nine months. In 1917, 1,300 British ships were lost to subs, and another 840 were attacked and escaped. By contrast the convoy losses were strikingly small: of 16,600 ships convoyed in 1917- 18, only 102 were torpedoed.<ref>Halpern, ''A Naval History of World War I'' (1994) p. 365</ref> The supplies they brought into Britain and France were desperately needed by the armies at the front, and by the civilians at home. It was therefore necessary to assign destroyers to escort convoys. While this involved vast amounts of busywork that distracted the fighting sailors who wanted to blast away at German battleships or aggressively hunt down U-boats, it was the proper way to win a war.  

A new way to fight uboats was by airplanes. The Navy began an aviation program, sending rickety biplanes out on over 20,000 anti-submarine missions. They sank no subs but did begin a tradition that would come to dominate the Navy.<ref>Halpern, ''A Naval History of World War I'' (1994) pp. 425-6</ref> Sims did get the American destroyers, which were used to escort US troop ships. British destroyers protected the merchant convoys and aggressively sought out U-boats. Berlin's response to the Allied measures was simply to build more U-boats. They would have been a much greater threat if they had used "wolf- pack" tactics (sending groups of uboats against the convoys) or had threatened the escorts with their powerful surface fleet. As it happened, Germany's U-boats were neutralized and its battle fleet stayed in harbor. The troopships did get through; accidents and torpedo attacks killed only 1300 sailors and 700 troops.<ref>Halpern, ''A Naval History of World War I'' (1994) pp. 420-1, 427, 436-7.</ref>

A new way to fight uboats was by airplanes. The Navy began an aviation program, sending rickety biplanes out on over 20,000 anti-submarine missions. They sank no subs but did begin a tradition that would come to dominate the Navy.<ref>Halpern, ''A Naval History of World War I'' (1994) pp. 425-6</ref> Sims did get the American destroyers, which were used to escort US troop ships. British destroyers protected the merchant convoys and aggressively sought out U-boats. Berlin's response to the Allied measures was simply to build more U-boats. They would have been a much greater threat if they had used "wolf- pack" tactics (sending groups of uboats against the convoys) or had threatened the escorts with their powerful surface fleet. As it happened, Germany's U-boats were neutralized and its battle fleet stayed in harbor. The troopships did get through; accidents and torpedo attacks killed only 1300 sailors and 700 troops.<ref>Halpern, ''A Naval History of World War I'' (1994) pp. 420-1, 427, 436-7.</ref>

==Return==

==Return==

By the end of August 1919 the last American division had embarked for home, leaving only a small force in occupied Germany, and on Sept. 1, 1919, Pershing and his staff sailed for the United States for ticket tape parades and a a rousing appreciation for the nation's heroes, but few veterans benefits.<ref>The veterans were angry for years and finally forced Congress to pass generous Bonus Bills in 1924 and 1936. see Thomas B. Littlewood, ''Soldiers Back Home: The American Legion in Illinois, 1919-1939'' (2004)[http://www.questia.com/read/105249503?title=Soldiers%20Back%20Home%3a%20%20The%20American%20Legion%20in%20Illinois%2c%201919-1939 online edition]. In 1944, Congress set up the G.I. Bill, with generous benefits for World War II veterans.</ref>

By the end of August 1919 the last American division had embarked for home, leaving only a small force in occupied Germany, and on Sept. 1, 1919, Pershing and his staff sailed for the United States for ticket tape parades and a rousing appreciation for the nation's heroes, but few veterans benefits.<ref>The veterans were angry for years and finally forced Congress to pass generous Bonus Bills in 1924 and 1936. see Thomas B. Littlewood, ''Soldiers Back Home: The American Legion in Illinois, 1919-1939'' (2004)[http://www.questia.com/read/105249503?title=Soldiers%20Back%20Home%3a%20%20The%20American%20Legion%20in%20Illinois%2c%201919-1939 online edition]. In 1944, Congress set up the G.I. Bill, with generous benefits for World War II veterans.</ref>

==Bibliography==

==Bibliography==

* Ayres, Leonard P. ''The War With Germany: A Statistical Summary'' (1919); [http://net.lib.byu.edu/estu/wwi/memoir/docs/statistics/statstc.htm online edition]

* Ayres, Leonard P. ''The War With Germany: A Statistical Summary'' (1919); [http://net.lib.byu.edu/estu/wwi/memoir/docs/statistics/statstc.htm online edition]