Changes

Coal miners in the United States and indeed in most countries were the most radical of all workers and their support was critical for Communism.  The brief history of the National Miners Union (NMU) during 1928-31 sheds light on the role of the CPUSA in the Pennsylvania anthracite [[coal mining]] industry and on the polarized views of the CPUSA as either a functionary of Soviet and Communist International (Comintern) policy, or as a progressive response to regional and local interests. The NMU provided a militant alternative to the American Federation of Labor ([[AFL]]) and United Mine Workers of America ([[UMW]]), but failed to meet the CPUSA goal of defeating the AFL and UMW and taking control of the union movement. Although theoretically supporting revolutionary goals, NMU activists rejected them as impossible and impractical and focused on immediate issues such as working conditions, wages, benefits, and social reform. The NMU's failure to take control of strikes, the rise of labor violence, internal dissension, police harassment, press hostility, and nationwide anti-Communist attitudes contributed to the demise of the red union.<ref>Walter T. Howard, "The National Miners Union: Communists and Miners in the Pennsylvania Anthracite, 1928-1931." ''Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography'' 2001 125(1-2): 91-124. 0031-4587</ref>  

Coal miners in the United States and indeed in most countries were the most radical of all workers and their support was critical for Communism.  The brief history of the National Miners Union (NMU) during 1928-31 sheds light on the role of the CPUSA in the Pennsylvania anthracite [[coal mining]] industry and on the polarized views of the CPUSA as either a functionary of Soviet and Communist International (Comintern) policy, or as a progressive response to regional and local interests. The NMU provided a militant alternative to the American Federation of Labor ([[AFL]]) and United Mine Workers of America ([[UMW]]), but failed to meet the CPUSA goal of defeating the AFL and UMW and taking control of the union movement. Although theoretically supporting revolutionary goals, NMU activists rejected them as impossible and impractical and focused on immediate issues such as working conditions, wages, benefits, and social reform. The NMU's failure to take control of strikes, the rise of labor violence, internal dissension, police harassment, press hostility, and nationwide anti-Communist attitudes contributed to the demise of the red union.<ref>Walter T. Howard, "The National Miners Union: Communists and Miners in the Pennsylvania Anthracite, 1928-1931." ''Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography'' 2001 125(1-2): 91-124. 0031-4587</ref>  

The American Federation of Labor ([[AFL]]) demonstrated its respectability and Americanism by articulating a strong patriotism and fervent anticommunism. From 1917 onward, the AFL used such groups as the American Alliance for Labor and Democracy and the [[National Civic Federation]] to circulate its views. Moreover, it cooperated covertly with the [[American Legion]] (a society for veterans of World War I) and the [[Federal Bureau of Investigation]], energetically investigating and purging itself of communist labor activists. Beginning in 1935 the anticommunist campaign of the AFL was stepped up in response to the Comintern's Popular Front strategy and the rivalry with the Congress of Industrial Organizations, which was heavily infiltrated by Communists. This use of anticommunism moved the AFL to the right. Whereas during the 1920s it had presented itself as a bulwark against Bolshevism, during the [[Cold War]] after 1947 it characterized itself as a defense for free enterprise and strongly opposed the [[Soviet Union]]. After the CIO expelled its Communists in the late 1940s, the two union coalitions merged together and redoubled their international activities to fight Communism.

The American Federation of Labor ([[AFL]]) demonstrated its respectability and Americanism by articulating a strong patriotism and fervent anticommunism. From 1917 onward, the AFL used such groups as the American Alliance for Labor and Democracy and the [[National Civic Federation]] to circulate its views. Moreover, it cooperated covertly with the [[American Legion]] (a society for veterans of World War I) and the [[Federal Bureau of Investigation]], energetically investigating and purging itself of communist labor activists. Beginning in 1935 the anticommunist campaign of the AFL was stepped up in response to the Comintern's Popular Front strategy and the rivalry with the Congress of Industrial Organizations, which was heavily infiltrated by Communists. This use of anticommunism moved the AFL to the right. Whereas during the 1920s it had presented itself as a bulwark against Bolshevism, during the [[Cold War]] after 1947 it characterized itself as a defense for free enterprise and strongly opposed the [[Soviet Union]]. After the CIO expelled its Communists in the late 1940s, the two union coalitions merged and redoubled their international activities to fight Communism.

The unionization of the Ford Motor Company's giant River Rouge complex inaugurated a brief era during which workers held much of the power to determine the pace and staffing of production. Their shop-floor power was sustained by a dense system of stewards and committeemen, the "abdication" of the foremen, who formed their own independent trade union, and by the growth of Communist Party influence in the new United Automobile Workers (UAW) Local 600. But in a protracted struggle after World War II, Ford management recaptured much of its lost authority. The company negotiated a more favorable UAW contract in 1946, smashed the foremen's union in 1947, and began a decentralization/automation program that shifted jobs and production away from the more militant units of the Rouge complex in the early 1950s. Corporate efforts to rewin control of the shop floor were aided by the UAW national leadership, which focused its energies on company-wide monetary and fringe benefit contract improvements, and by the eruption of Cold War political conflicts within Local 600, which discredited Communist-led militancy and facilitated the accommodation of the local to the UAW's more orthodox brand of unionism in the late 1950s.<ref>See William Andrew, "Factionalism and Anti-Communism: Ford Local 600." ''Labor History'' 20 (1979): 227-55; Nelson Lichtenstein,  "Auto Worker Militancy and the Structure of Factory Life, 1937-1955." Journal ofAmerican History 67 (September 1980): 335-53 [http://www.jstor.org/stable/1890412  in JSTOR]</ref>

The unionization of the Ford Motor Company's giant River Rouge complex inaugurated a brief era during which workers held much of the power to determine the pace and staffing of production. Their shop-floor power was sustained by a dense system of stewards and committeemen, the "abdication" of the foremen, who formed their own independent trade union, and by the growth of Communist Party influence in the new United Automobile Workers (UAW) Local 600. But in a protracted struggle after World War II, Ford management recaptured much of its lost authority. The company negotiated a more favorable UAW contract in 1946, smashed the foremen's union in 1947, and began a decentralization/automation program that shifted jobs and production away from the more militant units of the Rouge complex in the early 1950s. Corporate efforts to rewin control of the shop floor were aided by the UAW national leadership, which focused its energies on company-wide monetary and fringe benefit contract improvements, and by the eruption of Cold War political conflicts within Local 600, which discredited Communist-led militancy and facilitated the accommodation of the local to the UAW's more orthodox brand of unionism in the late 1950s.<ref>See William Andrew, "Factionalism and Anti-Communism: Ford Local 600." ''Labor History'' 20 (1979): 227-55; Nelson Lichtenstein,  "Auto Worker Militancy and the Structure of Factory Life, 1937-1955." Journal ofAmerican History 67 (September 1980): 335-53 [http://www.jstor.org/stable/1890412  in JSTOR]</ref>

President Truman's Executive Order 9835 of 22 March 1947 tightened protections against subversive infiltration of the US Government, defining disloyalty as membership on a list of subversive organizations maintained by the Attorney General.

President Truman's Executive Order 9835 of 22 March 1947 tightened protections against subversive infiltration of the US Government, defining disloyalty as membership on a list of subversive organizations maintained by the Attorney General.

Truman’s denunciations of the charges against [[Alger Hiss]], Harry Dexter White, and others, all of whom appear under code names in decrypted messages translated before Truman left office,  suggest that Truman was never briefed on the Venona program, or if he was briefed, did not grasp its significance. Truman insisted Republicans trumped up the loyalty issue, and that wartime espionage had been insignificant and well contained by counteritelligence agencies.

Truman’s denunciations of the charges against Alger Hiss, Harry Dexter White, and others, all of whom appear under code names in decrypted messages translated before Truman left office,  suggest that Truman was never briefed on the Venona program, or if he was briefed, did not grasp its significance. Truman insisted Republicans trumped up the loyalty issue, and that wartime espionage had been insignificant and well contained by counteritelligence agencies.

It was the belief of opponents of the CPUSA such as [[J. Edgar Hoover]], long-time director of the FBI, and [[Joseph McCarthy]] and other [[anticommunism|anticommunists]] that the CPUSA constituted an active conspiracy, was secretive, loyal to a foreign power, and dedicated to the clandestine infiltration of American cultural and political institutions.<ref>This is the "traditionalist" view of conservative scholars such as Harvey Klehr and John Earl Haynes.  Senator [[Daniel Patrick Moynihan]], Chairman of the Moynihan Commission on Government Secrecy wrote in 1997, "President Truman was almost willfully obtuse as regards American Communism."</ref>

It was the belief of opponents of the CPUSA such as [[J. Edgar Hoover]], long-time director of the FBI, and [[Joseph McCarthy]] and other [[anticommunism|anticommunists]] that the CPUSA constituted an active conspiracy, was secretive, loyal to a foreign power, and dedicated to the clandestine infiltration of American cultural and political institutions.<ref>This is the "traditionalist" view of conservative scholars such as Harvey Klehr and John Earl Haynes.  Senator [[Daniel Patrick Moynihan]], Chairman of the Moynihan Commission on Government Secrecy wrote in 1997, "President Truman was almost willfully obtuse as regards American Communism."</ref>

* Starobin, Joseph R. ''American Communism in Crisis, 1943-1957.'' (1972). 331 pp.

* Starobin, Joseph R. ''American Communism in Crisis, 1943-1957.'' (1972). 331 pp.

* Steinberg, Peter L. ''The Great "Red Menace": United States Prosecution of American Communists, 1947-1952.'' (1984). 311 pp. [http://www.questia.com/read/9607014?title=The%20Great%20%22Red%20Menace%22%3a%20United%20States%20Prosecution%20of%20American%20Communists%2c%201947-1952 online edition]

* Steinberg, Peter L. ''The Great "Red Menace": United States Prosecution of American Communists, 1947-1952.'' (1984). 311 pp. [http://www.questia.com/read/9607014?title=The%20Great%20%22Red%20Menace%22%3a%20United%20States%20Prosecution%20of%20American%20Communists%2c%201947-1952 online edition]

* Stepan-Norris, Judith , and Maurice Zeitlin. ''Left out: Reds and America's Industrial Unions'' (2003) [http://www.questia.com/read/105526078?title=Left%20out%3a%20%20Reds%20and%20America's%20Industrial%20Unions online edition]

* Stepan-Norris, Judith, and Maurice Zeitlin. ''Left out: Reds and America's Industrial Unions'' (2003) [http://www.questia.com/read/105526078?title=Left%20out%3a%20%20Reds%20and%20America's%20Industrial%20Unions online edition]

* Weinstein, Allen. ''Perjury: The Hiss-Chambers Case.'' (1978). 675 pp. by a leading conservative historian

* Weinstein, Allen. ''Perjury: The Hiss-Chambers Case.'' (1978). 675 pp. by a leading conservative historian

===Scholarly journal===

===Scholarly journal===

* [[Gun control]] - key element to create a police state

* [[Gun control]] - key element to create a police state

* [[Joel Barr]]

* [[Joel Barr]]

* [[Harry Gold]]

* [[Harry Gold]]

* [[David Greenglass]]

* [[David Greenglass]]

*[http://www.marxists.org/history/usa/eam/cpa/communistparty.html PARTY HISTORY.]

*[http://www.marxists.org/history/usa/eam/cpa/communistparty.html PARTY HISTORY.]

* [http://www.cpusa.org Communist Party of the USA home page]

* [http://www.cpusa.org Communist Party of the USA home page]

==References==

==References==

[[Category:Anti Second Amendment]]

[[Category:Anti Second Amendment]]

[[Category:Communist Party USA]]

[[Category:Communist Party USA]]