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Equally bitter was the fighting at sea. Japan's air forces hurled more than 4,000 sorties, many by [[Kamikaze]] suicide planes, at U.S. and British naval forces. The bulk of the kamikaze attacks was absorbed by radar picket destroyers stationed north of Okinawa. U.S. losses totaled 38 ships of all types sunk and 368 damaged with 4,900 sailors killed.  
 
Equally bitter was the fighting at sea. Japan's air forces hurled more than 4,000 sorties, many by [[Kamikaze]] suicide planes, at U.S. and British naval forces. The bulk of the kamikaze attacks was absorbed by radar picket destroyers stationed north of Okinawa. U.S. losses totaled 38 ships of all types sunk and 368 damaged with 4,900 sailors killed.  
 
==Results==
 
==Results==
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In contrast to Iwo Jima, where Japanese and American casualties were 1-1, on Okinawa they were 2-1. America's massive advantage in firepower, plus superior numbers, training, mobility and medical care proved decisive. The ratio would have been even more favorable except that Buckner was an aggressive general who wanted to destroy all the defenders, not just bottle them up in the remote southern part of the island. He therefore ordered a series of high-casualty frontal assaults that finally cleared Okinawa. Buckner's assaults worked, but not before they allowed Ushijima to inflict 75,000 casualties. Meanwhile the Navy saw much of its fleet damaged by Kamikazes. At the end, in mid-June, Ushijima committed hara-kiri and Buckner was killed by a shell at his forward observation position. Washington kept secret the heavy losses at Okinawa, playing up instead the easy victories in Germany and the Philippines. Since Okinawa was in Nimitz's theater, the Army planners ignored its lessons and assumed that MacArthur's much easier conquests were more typical of what an invasion of the home islands would be like. The GIs knew better. Exhausted and bloodied, they dreaded the prospect of fighting millions of Japanese hand to hand.  
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In contrast to Iwo Jima, where Japanese and American casualties were 1-1, on Okinawa they were 2-1. America's massive advantage in firepower, plus superior numbers, training, mobility and medical care proved decisive. The ratio would have been even more favorable except that Buckner was an aggressive general who wanted to destroy all the defenders, not just bottle them up in the remote southern part of the island. He therefore ordered a series of high-casualty frontal assaults that finally cleared Okinawa. Buckner's assaults worked, but not before they allowed Ushijima to inflict 75,000 casualties. Meanwhile, the Navy saw much of its fleet damaged by Kamikazes. At the end, in mid-June, Ushijima committed hara-kiri and Buckner was killed by a shell at his forward observation position. Washington kept secret the heavy losses at Okinawa, playing up instead the easy victories in Germany and the Philippines. Since Okinawa was in Nimitz's theater, the Army planners ignored its lessons and assumed that MacArthur's much easier conquests were more typical of what an invasion of the home islands would be like. The GIs knew better. Exhausted and bloodied, they dreaded the prospect of fighting millions of Japanese hand to hand.  
 
==Bibliography==
 
==Bibliography==
 
* Appleman, Roy Edgar, et al. ''Okinawa: the last battle'', (United States Army in World War II: The war in the Pacific) (1948), very thorough U.S. Army official history
 
* Appleman, Roy Edgar, et al. ''Okinawa: the last battle'', (United States Army in World War II: The war in the Pacific) (1948), very thorough U.S. Army official history
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