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| | President Davis had urged Bragg and Smith to cooperate, and Bragg ranked Smith, but there was no unified command structure; Smith would report directly to Davis and would only fall under Bragg's command when Bragg's and Smith's forces combined. | | President Davis had urged Bragg and Smith to cooperate, and Bragg ranked Smith, but there was no unified command structure; Smith would report directly to Davis and would only fall under Bragg's command when Bragg's and Smith's forces combined. |
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| − | When Bragg advanced in August 1862 he enjoyed initial success, capturing 4,000 Union soldiers at Mumfordville and cutting Buell's line of supply; yet when Buell's army arrived in the vicinity, Bragg's supply situation turned out to be even worse. Meanwhile Smith had deviated from the plan and, instead of joining Bragg, had advanced deep into central Kentucky. Thus, Bragg moved from Mumfordville towards Smith in central Kentucky, with Buell in pursuit. | + | When Bragg advanced in August 1862 he enjoyed initial success, capturing 4,000 Union soldiers at Mumfordville and cutting Buell's line of supply; yet when Buell's army arrived in the vicinity, Bragg's supply situation turned out to be even worse. Meanwhile, Smith had deviated from the plan and, instead of joining Bragg, had advanced deep into central Kentucky. Thus, Bragg moved from Mumfordville towards Smith in central Kentucky, with Buell in pursuit. |
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| | By early October Bragg was close to Smith's army and Kentucky's capital of Frankfort, where Richard Harris was to be installed as Confederate governor of Kentucky. The inauguration took place at Frankfort on October 4. Bragg decided to attend and left his own army under the command of Leonidas Polk. | | By early October Bragg was close to Smith's army and Kentucky's capital of Frankfort, where Richard Harris was to be installed as Confederate governor of Kentucky. The inauguration took place at Frankfort on October 4. Bragg decided to attend and left his own army under the command of Leonidas Polk. |
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| | Bragg had been deceived by a Union detachment which he took for Buell's main effort. He therefore ordered Polk to attack what Bragg assumed to be a small Union force at Perryville and then hurry to Frankfort to unite Bragg's army with Smith's for a combined effort against Buell. On October 8, Polk failed to attack until Bragg himself arrived, took command and started the Battle of Perryville. Bragg misjudged the Union position and was unaware of the location of several nearby Union corps, but Union passivity allowed Bragg to concentrate his entire army against a single corps, resulting in a tactical victory. | | Bragg had been deceived by a Union detachment which he took for Buell's main effort. He therefore ordered Polk to attack what Bragg assumed to be a small Union force at Perryville and then hurry to Frankfort to unite Bragg's army with Smith's for a combined effort against Buell. On October 8, Polk failed to attack until Bragg himself arrived, took command and started the Battle of Perryville. Bragg misjudged the Union position and was unaware of the location of several nearby Union corps, but Union passivity allowed Bragg to concentrate his entire army against a single corps, resulting in a tactical victory. |
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| − | Smith urged Bragg to renew the fight with their combined armies. But by then Bragg's hope for Kentucky recruits had proved idle, his supply situation became worse, and he had received reports of the defeats of his detachments under Price and Van Dorn at Corinth and of the failure of [[Robert E. Lee]]'s [[Maryland]] campaign at [[Battle of Antietam|Antietam]]. Therefore Bragg believed that an isolated victory would provide few benefits, while a defeat or even too long a stay in Kentucky might endanger his entire army. Thus, he retreated towards Knoxville. | + | Smith urged Bragg to renew the fight with their combined armies. But by then Bragg's hope for Kentucky recruits had proved idle, his supply situation became worse, and he had received reports of the defeats of his detachments under Price and Van Dorn at Corinth and of the failure of [[Robert E. Lee]]'s [[Maryland]] campaign at [[Battle of Antietam|Antietam]]. Therefore, Bragg believed that an isolated victory would provide few benefits, while a defeat or even too long a stay in Kentucky might endanger his entire army. Thus, he retreated towards Knoxville. |
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| | This retread sapped Confederate morale and led to dissension among Bragg's subordinates, many of whom (especially those from Kentucky, but also Polk and Hardee) blamed Bragg for the campaign's failure. Bragg was recalled to the Confederate capital of Richmond, [[Virginia]], where he explained his conduct and was retained in command. | | This retread sapped Confederate morale and led to dissension among Bragg's subordinates, many of whom (especially those from Kentucky, but also Polk and Hardee) blamed Bragg for the campaign's failure. Bragg was recalled to the Confederate capital of Richmond, [[Virginia]], where he explained his conduct and was retained in command. |
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| | ===Middle Tennessee=== | | ===Middle Tennessee=== |
| − | From Knoxville, Bragg moved his army west through Chattanooga to the vicinity of Murfreesboro, Tennesse, and took up a defensive position along Stones River. By Novermber 20, Smith's army permanently became a part of Bragg's command, which was officially renamed the Army of Tennessee. In December, Bragg was ordered by President Davis to detach a division of 7,500 men to Mississippi. Bragg reorganized his army into two corps under Polk and Hardee, while Smith was transferred to the Trans-Mississippi Department. Also under Bragg's command were cavalry units under Joseph Wheeler, John Hunt Morgan and [[Nathan Bedford Forrest]]. Morgan and Forrest were dispatched on strategic raids and did not participate in the upcoming campaign. | + | From Knoxville, Bragg moved his army west through Chattanooga to the vicinity of Murfreesboro, Tennessee, and took up a defensive position along Stones River. By November 20, Smith's army permanently became a part of Bragg's command, which was officially renamed the Army of Tennessee. In December, Bragg was ordered by President Davis to detach a division of 7,500 men to Mississippi. Bragg reorganized his army into two corps under Polk and Hardee, while Smith was transferred to the Trans-Mississippi Department. Also under Bragg's command were cavalry units under Joseph Wheeler, John Hunt Morgan and [[Nathan Bedford Forrest]]. Morgan and Forrest were dispatched on strategic raids and did not participate in the upcoming campaign. |
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| | Meanwhile, [[Abraham Lincoln]] had tired with Buell's slowness and relieved him for William S. Rosecrans who was tasket with liberating East Tennessee, where pro-Union sentiment was strong. Rosecrans was a perfectionist and, despite increasing pressure from Washington, did not begin his move until December 26, using the delay to train and equip his forces and secure abundant supplies. | | Meanwhile, [[Abraham Lincoln]] had tired with Buell's slowness and relieved him for William S. Rosecrans who was tasket with liberating East Tennessee, where pro-Union sentiment was strong. Rosecrans was a perfectionist and, despite increasing pressure from Washington, did not begin his move until December 26, using the delay to train and equip his forces and secure abundant supplies. |
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| | On June 26, Bragg had caught up with events and ordered Polk to advance to the north of the hills and attack Rosecrans from behind, while Hardee would threaten the Union front. But Polk objected and claimed he could not cover the required distance in time; thus the planned counterattack was canceled. Worse, Hardee, who had lost all confidence in Bragg and considered victory under Bragg's leadership impossible, decided to save the army from defeat by retreating without awaiting Bragg's orders. Bragg was forced to order a general retreat towards Tullahoma on June 27. On July 1 Polk, who had become concerned for the army's communications after a Union raid by mounted infantry, urged Bragg to retreat from the Tullahoma position. Hardee was no encouragement, and so Bragg decided to retreat further south towards Chattanooga. Rosecrans had planned to assault the Confederate fortifications at Tullahoma on July 2; such frontal attacks usually were costly failures, but due to his retreat Bragg missed the opportunity. On July 4, the Confederate army crossed the Tennessee River. | | On June 26, Bragg had caught up with events and ordered Polk to advance to the north of the hills and attack Rosecrans from behind, while Hardee would threaten the Union front. But Polk objected and claimed he could not cover the required distance in time; thus the planned counterattack was canceled. Worse, Hardee, who had lost all confidence in Bragg and considered victory under Bragg's leadership impossible, decided to save the army from defeat by retreating without awaiting Bragg's orders. Bragg was forced to order a general retreat towards Tullahoma on June 27. On July 1 Polk, who had become concerned for the army's communications after a Union raid by mounted infantry, urged Bragg to retreat from the Tullahoma position. Hardee was no encouragement, and so Bragg decided to retreat further south towards Chattanooga. Rosecrans had planned to assault the Confederate fortifications at Tullahoma on July 2; such frontal attacks usually were costly failures, but due to his retreat Bragg missed the opportunity. On July 4, the Confederate army crossed the Tennessee River. |
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| − | At Tullahoma Rosecrans paused and refitted his army, assembling enough supplies for an extended campaign south of the Tennessee. He resumed the offensive in August, when he sent his army in several colums across the Cumberland Plateau towards the Tennessee river. | + | At Tullahoma Rosecrans paused and refitted his army, assembling enough supplies for an extended campaign south of the Tennessee. He resumed the offensive in August, when he sent his army in several columns across the Cumberland Plateau towards the Tennessee river. |
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| | Again Bragg was deceived by a feint of Rosecrans and believed that Rosecrans planned to cross the Tennessee River above Chattanooga when Rosecrans really assembled most of his army downriver. By September 4, most of Rosecrans' army had crossed the Tennessee unopposed. By then, the Confederate high command had become concerned about Bragg's situations, and reinforcements from Mississippi and a detachment from Lee's Army of Northern Virginia under [[James Longstreet]] were dispatched to Bragg. | | Again Bragg was deceived by a feint of Rosecrans and believed that Rosecrans planned to cross the Tennessee River above Chattanooga when Rosecrans really assembled most of his army downriver. By September 4, most of Rosecrans' army had crossed the Tennessee unopposed. By then, the Confederate high command had become concerned about Bragg's situations, and reinforcements from Mississippi and a detachment from Lee's Army of Northern Virginia under [[James Longstreet]] were dispatched to Bragg. |
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| | When Rosecrans became aware of Bragg's presence, he hastily began to concentrate his forces, marching north towards Chattanooga. Bragg also marched north on parallel roads, east of Rosecrans. On September 13 he once more tried to strike at a separated part of Rosecrans' army but was hampered by his subordinates when Polk failed to attack as ordered. | | When Rosecrans became aware of Bragg's presence, he hastily began to concentrate his forces, marching north towards Chattanooga. Bragg also marched north on parallel roads, east of Rosecrans. On September 13 he once more tried to strike at a separated part of Rosecrans' army but was hampered by his subordinates when Polk failed to attack as ordered. |
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| − | By September 17, the Union corps were concentrated and no longer prone to defeat in detail. But Bragg's reinforcements from Mississippia and Virginia were closeby, and Bragg decided to try and get north of Rosecrans, cut him off from Chattanooga and again drive him south into McLemore's Cove. Skirmishing began on September 18 when the Confederates crossed Chickamauga Creek. On September 19, battle was joined when Union and Confederate columns blundered into each other in the heavily wooded terrain. The Union left flank extended farther north than Bragg believed. Fighting was confused. Both sides sent massive reinforcements, but neither had a clear idea of the enemy's position. Thus, a series of attacks and counterattacks amounted to a push-and-shove match without a clear victor. | + | By September 17, the Union corps were concentrated and no longer prone to defeat in detail. But Bragg's reinforcements from Mississippia and Virginia were close by, and Bragg decided to try and get north of Rosecrans, cut him off from Chattanooga and again drive him south into McLemore's Cove. Skirmishing began on September 18 when the Confederates crossed Chickamauga Creek. On September 19, battle was joined when Union and Confederate columns blundered into each other in the heavily wooded terrain. The Union left flank extended farther north than Bragg believed. Fighting was confused. Both sides sent massive reinforcements, but neither had a clear idea of the enemy's position. Thus, a series of attacks and counterattacks amounted to a push-and-shove match without a clear victor. |
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| | Bragg still planned to push Rosecrans south to cut him off from his supply base at Chattanooga. On the evening of September 19, Longstreet arrived on the battlefield. His presence compelled Bragg to reorganize his army into two wings, the right under Polk and the left under Longstreet. Polk was ordered to renew combat on September 20 with a "day-dawn" attack on the Union's northern flank. Combat was to be extended down the line ''en echelon'': When the northernmost Union units crumbled, the next in line would be attacked both in front and in flank until it gave way, and so on. | | Bragg still planned to push Rosecrans south to cut him off from his supply base at Chattanooga. On the evening of September 19, Longstreet arrived on the battlefield. His presence compelled Bragg to reorganize his army into two wings, the right under Polk and the left under Longstreet. Polk was ordered to renew combat on September 20 with a "day-dawn" attack on the Union's northern flank. Combat was to be extended down the line ''en echelon'': When the northernmost Union units crumbled, the next in line would be attacked both in front and in flank until it gave way, and so on. |
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| | Rosecrans had become aware of the threat to his northern flank, which was commanded by Thomas. He sent heavy reinforcements north and prepared to fight while shifting more and more of his army in that direction. | | Rosecrans had become aware of the threat to his northern flank, which was commanded by Thomas. He sent heavy reinforcements north and prepared to fight while shifting more and more of his army in that direction. |
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| − | Meanwhile, Confederate orders had been delayed. Polk's wing was not ready by daybreak, and the northernmost Confederate corps commander was not informed that he was to attack until 6 a.m. Attack was delayed even further because the Confederate troops were not properly aligned, had not had breakfast and had not scouted the Union position. The attack finally began by 9:30, but in the meantime the Union forces in that sector had received further reinforcements, and they had constructed field fortifications. Thus, the attack failed, and the entire Confederate right wing was fought to a standstill by noon. Meanwhile the left wing under Longstreet attacked. Due to mistaken orders, a gap in the Union line had been created just at the point of attack. Several Confederate divisions exploited this gap and began to unravel the Union's line to both sides, routing all opposition. The entire southern half of the Union army, including Rosecrans himself, was put to flight, but because the northern half under Thomas had held, they could retreat north towards Chattanooga. | + | Meanwhile, Confederate orders had been delayed. Polk's wing was not ready by daybreak, and the northernmost Confederate corps commander was not informed that he was to attack until 6 a.m. Attack was delayed even further because the Confederate troops were not properly aligned, had not had breakfast and had not scouted the Union position. The attack finally began by 9:30, but in the meantime the Union forces in that sector had received further reinforcements, and they had constructed field fortifications. Thus, the attack failed, and the entire Confederate right wing was fought to a standstill by noon. Meanwhile, the left wing under Longstreet attacked. Due to mistaken orders, a gap in the Union line had been created just at the point of attack. Several Confederate divisions exploited this gap and began to unravel the Union's line to both sides, routing all opposition. The entire southern half of the Union army, including Rosecrans himself, was put to flight, but because the northern half under Thomas had held, they could retreat north towards Chattanooga. |
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| | Thomas' four divisions retreated after dark. Bragg did not mount a vigorous pursuit; he had not realized the magnitude of his victory, and his own army, parts of which had arrived by rail without their wagon trains, needed some reorganization. When the Union army had retreated to Chattanooga, Bragg followed, but lacked the capacity to cross the Tennessee River. Thus, Bragg decided to besiege the Union forces whose supply situation was dire. | | Thomas' four divisions retreated after dark. Bragg did not mount a vigorous pursuit; he had not realized the magnitude of his victory, and his own army, parts of which had arrived by rail without their wagon trains, needed some reorganization. When the Union army had retreated to Chattanooga, Bragg followed, but lacked the capacity to cross the Tennessee River. Thus, Bragg decided to besiege the Union forces whose supply situation was dire. |
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| − | On September 29, Bragg rid himself of some of his unreliable subordinates. He relieved Polk and Thomas C. Hindman, the division commander that had failed to attack at McLemore's Cove. On October 4, twelve of Bragg's senior subordinates sent a petition to President Davis to have Bragg removed. Davis inspected the Army of Tennessee in person , and Bragg offered to resign, but Davis retained Bragg in command. Bragg retaliated by dismissing some more of his subordinates and by reorganizing his divisions to break up cliques. | + | On September 29, Bragg rid himself of some of his unreliable subordinates. He relieved Polk and Thomas C. Hindman, the division commander that had failed to attack at McLemore's Cove. On October 4, twelve of Bragg's senior subordinates sent a petition to President Davis to have Bragg removed. Davis inspected the Army of Tennessee in person, and Bragg offered to resign, but Davis retained Bragg in command. Bragg retaliated by dismissing some more of his subordinates and by reorganizing his divisions to break up cliques. |
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| | Meanwhile, the Union high command was rushing reinforcements towards Chattanooga. [[Joseph Hooker]]'s corps of the Army of the Potomac was dispatched immediately after the battle of Chickamauga. [[Ulysses S. Grant]] was ordered to send 20,000 men under [[William T. Sherman]], and on September 29, Grant was ordered to Chattanooga himself as supreme commander of all Union forces between the Appalachies and the Mississippi, with authority to relieve Rosecrans and appoint Thomas in his stead. Grant arrived on October 23 and immediately began to improve the supply situation which had become desperate. Bragg became aware of Hooker's corps arriving in the vicinity of his left flank and ordered Longstreet to strengthen that position, but his order was ignored. When Union forces crossed the Tennessee to open a new supply line, Bragg ordered Longstreet to counterattack, but Longstreet delayed and instead chose to launch a night attack on Hooker's troops, resulting in the Battle of Wauhatchie. Confederate forces were insufficient, and despite some initial surprise, they failed to achieve anything. | | Meanwhile, the Union high command was rushing reinforcements towards Chattanooga. [[Joseph Hooker]]'s corps of the Army of the Potomac was dispatched immediately after the battle of Chickamauga. [[Ulysses S. Grant]] was ordered to send 20,000 men under [[William T. Sherman]], and on September 29, Grant was ordered to Chattanooga himself as supreme commander of all Union forces between the Appalachies and the Mississippi, with authority to relieve Rosecrans and appoint Thomas in his stead. Grant arrived on October 23 and immediately began to improve the supply situation which had become desperate. Bragg became aware of Hooker's corps arriving in the vicinity of his left flank and ordered Longstreet to strengthen that position, but his order was ignored. When Union forces crossed the Tennessee to open a new supply line, Bragg ordered Longstreet to counterattack, but Longstreet delayed and instead chose to launch a night attack on Hooker's troops, resulting in the Battle of Wauhatchie. Confederate forces were insufficient, and despite some initial surprise, they failed to achieve anything. |
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| | Bragg, disgusted by Longstreet's performance, detached Longstreet's corps on November 5 to deal with the Union forces under [[Ambrose Burnside]] at Knoxville, thus ridding himself of another disappointing subordinate but also weakening his army by about 5,000 men. | | Bragg, disgusted by Longstreet's performance, detached Longstreet's corps on November 5 to deal with the Union forces under [[Ambrose Burnside]] at Knoxville, thus ridding himself of another disappointing subordinate but also weakening his army by about 5,000 men. |
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| − | Meanwhile, the Union supply situation had improved , Sherman's troops had arrived in the vicinity, and Grant began to plan a battle to drive off Bragg's army. Bragg had taken positions on Lookout Mountain southwest of Chattanooga, and on Missionary Ridge to the southeast. The Union attack began in the west, with Hooker attacking the Confederates on Lookout Mountain in the Battle Above the Clouds on November 24. Bragg withdrew his forces in the night. | + | Meanwhile, the Union supply situation had improved, Sherman's troops had arrived in the vicinity, and Grant began to plan a battle to drive off Bragg's army. Bragg had taken positions on Lookout Mountain southwest of Chattanooga, and on Missionary Ridge to the southeast. The Union attack began in the west, with Hooker attacking the Confederates on Lookout Mountain in the Battle Above the Clouds on November 24. Bragg withdrew his forces in the night. |
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| | On November 25, Grant had planned a double envelopment: Sherman was to attack the Confederate right, Hooker, whose forces were separated from the Confederates by Chattanooga Creek, to attack the left. Thomas was to hold the center, attacking only when the Confederate troops began to crumble. Hooker was supposed to be just a diversion; the attack by Sherman's fresh divisions was the main effort. But determined Confederate resistance stalled Sherman's attacks along Missionary Ridge. Thus, Grant ordered Thomas to advance. Neither Grant not Thomas expected a frontal assault to be successful, but Thomas' troops rushed forward, driving the Confederates from their positions, overrunning Missionary Ridge and putting the Confederate army to flight. Bragg attempted to personally rally his army, but was unsuccessful. | | On November 25, Grant had planned a double envelopment: Sherman was to attack the Confederate right, Hooker, whose forces were separated from the Confederates by Chattanooga Creek, to attack the left. Thomas was to hold the center, attacking only when the Confederate troops began to crumble. Hooker was supposed to be just a diversion; the attack by Sherman's fresh divisions was the main effort. But determined Confederate resistance stalled Sherman's attacks along Missionary Ridge. Thus, Grant ordered Thomas to advance. Neither Grant not Thomas expected a frontal assault to be successful, but Thomas' troops rushed forward, driving the Confederates from their positions, overrunning Missionary Ridge and putting the Confederate army to flight. Bragg attempted to personally rally his army, but was unsuccessful. |