Changes

:The United States, delighting in her resources, feeling that she no longer had within herself sufficient scope for her energies, wishing to help those who were in misery or bondage the world over, yielded in her turn to that taste for intervention in which the instinct for domination cloaked itself.<ref>''The War Memoirs of Charles de Gaulle,''(1959) vol. 2, p. 88</ref>

:The United States, delighting in her resources, feeling that she no longer had within herself sufficient scope for her energies, wishing to help those who were in misery or bondage the world over, yielded in her turn to that taste for intervention in which the instinct for domination cloaked itself.<ref>''The War Memoirs of Charles de Gaulle,''(1959) vol. 2, p. 88</ref>

It turn [[Franklin D. Roosevelt]] distrusted him. De Gaulle removed French forces from the planned invasion of Normandy in June 1944. He was not at D-Day and was excluded from all the top-level conferences.  The Allies, however, finally gave his regime de jure recognition and allowed his armies to enter France and to be the first to enter Paris after the Germans fled in August 1944. French armies, 1.3 million strong, under de Gaulle as provisional president, thereupon fought alongside the Allies.  As a result France was given an occupation zone in Germany, and a permanent seat on the [[United Nations]] Security Council, with a veto.

It turn [[Franklin D. Roosevelt]] distrusted him. De Gaulle removed French forces from the planned invasion of Normandy in June 1944. He was not at D-Day and was excluded from all the top-level conferences.  The Allies, however, finally gave his regime de jure recognition and allowed his armies to enter France and to be the first to enter Paris after the Germans fled in August 1944. French armies, 1.3 million strong, under de Gaulle as provisional president, thereupon fought alongside the Allies.  As a result, France was given an occupation zone in Germany, and a permanent seat on the [[United Nations]] Security Council, with a veto.

==Fourth Republic: 1945-1958==

==Fourth Republic: 1945-1958==

For four years France had fought a civil war in Algeria against the FLN, which demanded independence.  The Frenchmen who lived in Algeria, their allies among the Arabs, and powerful elements of the military inside France, rejected the FLN and demanded that Algeria remain integrated into France. They insisted so vehemently they were prepared to overthrow the government in Paris if it wavered.  

For four years France had fought a civil war in Algeria against the FLN, which demanded independence.  The Frenchmen who lived in Algeria, their allies among the Arabs, and powerful elements of the military inside France, rejected the FLN and demanded that Algeria remain integrated into France. They insisted so vehemently they were prepared to overthrow the government in Paris if it wavered.  

In May, 1958, Frenchmen in Algeria revolted, throwing France into turmoil that verged on civil war. Rebels comprised young nationalists, supported by the large planters, army officers, and other proponents of integration of the Muslim population with France, feared a new government in Paris would make concessions to the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN). The rebels proclaimed a committee of public safety; the revolt spread to Corsica. In Paris the National Assembly voted emergency powers to newly elected Premier Pierre Pflimlin. However only de Gaulle could solve the crisis, for he had the support of the navy, the police, and such prominent politicians as Socialist Guy Mollet and Moderate Republican chief Georges Bidault. Pflimlin resigned and President René Coty summoned de Gaulle as prime minister. The National Assembly, under threat that parachutists would seize Paris if it refused, voted 329-224 to invest de Gaulle with extraordinary powers for six months beginning June 1, 1958; the National Assembly then went home and de Gaulle took charge. When a new constitution took effect, he became the president of the Fifth Republic.

In May, 1958, Frenchmen in Algeria revolted, throwing France into turmoil that verged on civil war. Rebels comprised young nationalists, supported by the large planters, army officers, and other proponents of integration of the Muslim population with France, feared a new government in Paris would make concessions to the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN). The rebels proclaimed a committee of public safety; the revolt spread to Corsica. In Paris the National Assembly voted emergency powers to newly elected Premier Pierre Pflimlin. However, only de Gaulle could solve the crisis, for he had the support of the navy, the police, and such prominent politicians as Socialist Guy Mollet and Moderate Republican chief Georges Bidault. Pflimlin resigned and President René Coty summoned de Gaulle as prime minister. The National Assembly, under threat that parachutists would seize Paris if it refused, voted 329-224 to invest de Gaulle with extraordinary powers for six months beginning June 1, 1958; the National Assembly then went home and de Gaulle took charge. When a new constitution took effect, he became the president of the Fifth Republic.

====Interpretations====

====Interpretations====

These uprisings provided the long-awaited chance to supporters of Général de Gaulle, who sought a new regime in which the executive power would be strengthened. Underlying the views of Gaullists such as Jacques Soustelle, Michel Debré, and Jacques Chaban-Delmas was a faith in French grandeur, a new nationalism which transformed itself into a desire for order and maintenance of the French Empire. These interests momentarily coincided with those of the Algerian rebels who feared Anglo-American mediation of the Algerian rebellion.  

These uprisings provided the long-awaited chance to supporters of Général de Gaulle, who sought a new regime in which the executive power would be strengthened. Underlying the views of Gaullists such as Jacques Soustelle, Michel Debré, and Jacques Chaban-Delmas was a faith in French grandeur, a new nationalism which transformed itself into a desire for order and maintenance of the French Empire. These interests momentarily coincided with those of the Algerian rebels who feared Anglo-American mediation of the Algerian rebellion.  

Gaullists have seen this critical episode as the result of the preplanned statesmanship of de Gaulle. Their "grand design" thesis includes three key arguments.  First is the claim that de Gaulle decided to give up Algeria because he concluded that keeping in the face of a widespread popular anti-French revolt was too costly economically and against France's ideal policy of a focus on Europe. Second, Gaullists argue his general objective ending the Algerian burden was planned well before his return to power in 1958. Third they claim that what seemed an erratic, slow, and indecisive progress toward Algerian independence was in reality de Gaulle's well-orchestrated, consistent, and deceptive policy calculated to overcome the sentiments of the French people toward Algeria.<ref>Gil Meriam, "A 'Grand Design'? Charles de Gaulle and the End of the Algerian War," ''Armed Forces & Society''(1999); De Gaulle, ''Memoirs of Hope'' (1971) p. 84; Philip G. Cerny, ''The Politics of Grandeur'' (1980), pp 61, 145; Bernard Ledwidge, ''De Gaulle'' (1982), pp 244-45, 257; Philip M. Williams, ''Politics and Society in de Gaulle's Republic'' (1971), p. 28.</ref>

Gaullists have seen this critical episode as the result of the preplanned statesmanship of de Gaulle. Their "grand design" thesis includes three key arguments.  First is the claim that de Gaulle decided to give up Algeria because he concluded that keeping in the face of a widespread popular anti-French revolt was too costly economically and against France's ideal policy of a focus on Europe. Second, Gaullists argue his general objective ending the Algerian burden was planned well before his return to power in 1958. Third they claim that what seemed an erratic, slow, and indecisive progress toward Algerian independence was in reality de Gaulle's well-orchestrated, consistent, and deceptive policy calculated to overcome the sentiments of the French people toward Algeria.<ref>Gil Meriam, "A 'Grand Design'? Charles de Gaulle and the End of the Algerian War," ''Armed Forces & Society''(1999); De Gaulle, ''Memoirs of Hope'' (1971) p. 84; Philip G. Cerny, ''The Politics of Grandeur'' (1980), pp 61, 145; Bernard Ledwidge, ''De Gaulle'' (1982), pp 244-45, 257; Philip M. Williams, ''Politics and Society in de Gaulle's Republic'' (1971), p. 28.</ref>

Other historians argue that the Général had no long-term plan, and probably did not want independence for Algeria. Thus French scholars Raoul Girardet and Jacques Julliard argue de Gaulle's Algerian policy was a set of unanticipated concessions imposed by events.  They have an alternative "juggler" thesis that does not attribute harmony or continuity to de Gaulle's policy, nor does it try to explain the lack of discernible consistency in the policy by attributing cunning Machiavelism to de Gaulle. Instead it considers the policy as the result of an erratic improvisation.<ref>Gil Merom, "A 'Grand Design'? Charles de Gaulle and the End of the Algerian War," ''Armed Forces & Society''(1999)</ref>  Merom says Algeria was not doomed by the economic realities because the cost was tolerable—between 50% to 60% of the defense budget, or 10% to 15% percent of the total budget in Paris. White the French indeed hads a severe budget crisis verging on bankruptcy, Algeria was only a small part of it.  More important was spending on infrastructure renovation, industrial and agricultural modernization, nuclear energy, and expansion of education, and welfare entitlements. On the other hand military spending was helping the economy. Two years into de Gaulle's new regime, the financial crisis was over and the economy was in fine shape, notes Merom.

Other historians argue that the Général had no long-term plan, and probably did not want independence for Algeria. Thus French scholars Raoul Girardet and Jacques Julliard argue de Gaulle's Algerian policy was a set of unanticipated concessions imposed by events.  They have an alternative "juggler" thesis that does not attribute harmony or continuity to de Gaulle's policy, nor does it try to explain the lack of discernible consistency in the policy by attributing cunning Machiavelism to de Gaulle. Instead it considers the policy as the result of an erratic improvisation.<ref>Gil Merom, "A 'Grand Design'? Charles de Gaulle and the End of the Algerian War," ''Armed Forces & Society''(1999)</ref>  Merom says Algeria was not doomed by the economic realities because the cost was tolerable—between 50% to 60% of the defense budget, or 10% to 15% percent of the total budget in Paris. White the French indeed hads a severe budget crisis verging on bankruptcy, Algeria was only a small part of it.  More important was spending on infrastructure renovation, industrial and agricultural modernization, nuclear energy, and expansion of education, and welfare entitlements. On the other hand, military spending was helping the economy. Two years into de Gaulle's new regime, the financial crisis was over and the economy was in fine shape, notes Merom.

Merom says the second argument, that de Gaulle's policy was slow, gradual, and deceptive because he had to overcome a strong public sentiment in favor of keeping Algeria, is likewise invalid according to public opinion polls. They show opinion was evenly split; indeed, over 40% of the French people were alienated from core ideas of the old policy of no-recognition, no-negotiations, and no-compromise with the Arab rebels of the FLN. De Gaulle's policy of negotiation had a firm grounding in public opinion, though not a clear majority.

Merom says the second argument, that de Gaulle's policy was slow, gradual, and deceptive because he had to overcome a strong public sentiment in favor of keeping Algeria, is likewise invalid according to public opinion polls. They show opinion was evenly split; indeed, over 40% of the French people were alienated from core ideas of the old policy of no-recognition, no-negotiations, and no-compromise with the Arab rebels of the FLN. De Gaulle's policy of negotiation had a firm grounding in public opinion, though not a clear majority.

De Gaulle forced a serious clash with Britain regarding the NATO alliance. By opposing British attempts to incorporate Europe in a broader transatlantic economic, political, and military alliance, de Gaulle hoped to create a chance for France to become what she ceased to be since Waterloo; the first in the world through driving a wedge between Europe, on one hand, and Britain and the United States on the other. Initially successful in isolating Britain, particularly through France's veto power over the European Economic Community (EEC), de Gaulle sought to further his country's status through a critique of, and withdrawal from, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The move backfired, however, allowing British foreign policy to isolate France and de Gaulle, hold NATO together, and eventually led to British inclusion in the EEC by other European members to counter France's disruptive behavior.  In 1967, as in 1961-63, the French were determined to preserve their position of leadership within the EEC, and this was the reason for de Gaulle's second veto of Britain's application for membership. French diplomacy was based on the need to preserve the Community of Six while barring Britain. Although France succeeded in excluding Britain in the short term, in the longer term the French had to adjust their stance on enlargement in order to retain influence. Leadership within the community was the foundation of France's international status.<ref>James Ellison, "Separated by the Atlantic: the British and De Gaulle, 1958-1967." ''Diplomacy & Statecraft'' 2006 17(4): 853-870. Issn: 0959-2296 Fulltext: [[Ebsco]]; Helen Parr, "Saving the Community: the French Response to Britain's Second EEC Application in 1967." ''Cold War History'' 2006 6(4): 425-454. Issn: 1468-2745 Fulltext: [[Ebsco]]</ref>

De Gaulle forced a serious clash with Britain regarding the NATO alliance. By opposing British attempts to incorporate Europe in a broader transatlantic economic, political, and military alliance, de Gaulle hoped to create a chance for France to become what she ceased to be since Waterloo; the first in the world through driving a wedge between Europe, on one hand, and Britain and the United States on the other. Initially successful in isolating Britain, particularly through France's veto power over the European Economic Community (EEC), de Gaulle sought to further his country's status through a critique of, and withdrawal from, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The move backfired, however, allowing British foreign policy to isolate France and de Gaulle, hold NATO together, and eventually led to British inclusion in the EEC by other European members to counter France's disruptive behavior.  In 1967, as in 1961-63, the French were determined to preserve their position of leadership within the EEC, and this was the reason for de Gaulle's second veto of Britain's application for membership. French diplomacy was based on the need to preserve the Community of Six while barring Britain. Although France succeeded in excluding Britain in the short term, in the longer term the French had to adjust their stance on enlargement in order to retain influence. Leadership within the community was the foundation of France's international status.<ref>James Ellison, "Separated by the Atlantic: the British and De Gaulle, 1958-1967." ''Diplomacy & Statecraft'' 2006 17(4): 853-870. Issn: 0959-2296 Fulltext: [[Ebsco]]; Helen Parr, "Saving the Community: the French Response to Britain's Second EEC Application in 1967." ''Cold War History'' 2006 6(4): 425-454. Issn: 1468-2745 Fulltext: [[Ebsco]]</ref>

In 1966 de Gaulle's decision to withdraw French forces from NATO (but to remain nominally a member) paradoxically reinforced the cohesion of NATO, leaving the U.S. wholly dominant in the organization.  Meanwhile he rebuilt the French army, restoring morale giving it a new and modern role in the economy and foreign affairs.

In 1966 de Gaulle's decision to withdraw French forces from NATO (but to remain nominally a member) paradoxically reinforced the cohesion of NATO, leaving the U.S. wholly dominant in the organization.  Meanwhile, he rebuilt the French army, restoring morale giving it a new and modern role in the economy and foreign affairs.

His continued deprecations of American involvement in Vietnam and his outspoken support of French-Canadian separatists in Quebec alienated opinion in the U.S. and canada.  

His continued deprecations of American involvement in Vietnam and his outspoken support of French-Canadian separatists in Quebec alienated opinion in the U.S. and Canada.  

===Departure===

===Departure===

De Gaulle was reelected president for seven years by a small margin in 1965, and in 1967 elections his allies won a slimmest majority in the National Assembly.  Then, in May 1968, opposition to De Gaulle suddenly crystallized. It was an age of wortldwide student demonstrations, nowhere more serious than in France.<ref>Jeremi Suri,  ''Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Detente'' (2003); Stanley Hoffmann, "Confrontation in May 1968," '' Decline or Renewal? France since the 1930s'' (1974) pp 145-86.</ref> Student demonstrations against the government and labor union strikes coalesced to produce a nationwide strike and unrest that very nearly brought the government down. At a critical point the Général disappeared for 24 hours. He was not hiding; rather he was negotiating for army support to retake Paris in case the rebels seized the city. With the army's backing, de Gaulle confidently returned, rallied the conservative middle class, and called immediate elections. Taking a vigorous part in the campaign, De Gaulle defined the issue as a choice between himself and the Communists. Repelled by the violence and disorder, the French electorate returned the Gaullists to power with a large majority in the assembly.  

De Gaulle was reelected president for seven years by a small margin in 1965, and in 1967 elections his allies won a slimmest majority in the National Assembly.  Then, in May 1968, opposition to De Gaulle suddenly crystallized. It was an age of wortldwide student demonstrations, nowhere more serious than in France.<ref>Jeremi Suri,  ''Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Detente'' (2003); Stanley Hoffmann, "Confrontation in May 1968," '' Decline or Renewal? France since the 1930s'' (1974) pp 145-86.</ref> Student demonstrations against the government and labor union strikes coalesced to produce a nationwide strike and unrest that very nearly brought the government down. At a critical point the Général disappeared for 24 hours. He was not hiding; rather he was negotiating for army support to retake Paris in case the rebels seized the city. With the army's backing, de Gaulle confidently returned, rallied the conservative middle class, and called immediate elections. Taking a vigorous part in the campaign, De Gaulle defined the issue as a choice between himself and the Communists. Repelled by the violence and disorder, the French electorate returned the Gaullists to power with a large majority in the assembly.  

De Gaulle's  political philosophy, with its use of concepts such as élan, will, instinct, heroism, and participation, reflected the influences of Charles Péguy (1873-1914), Maurice Barrès (1862-1923), and Henri Bergson (1859-1941). Portier (1997) finds that de Gaulle's central principles derived from his religious devotion to Catholicism. Some scholars have suggested that De Gaulle modeled his authoritarian approach on the political theories of [[Machiavelli]], [[Maurras]], and [[Napoleon]], yet the French president's regard for the sovereignty of the state undermines all such theories. A close comparison of the papal encyclicals of Paul VI, [[Pius XI]], John XXIII, and [[Pius XII]] with De Gaulle's own writings reveals the statesman's close alliance with the political position of the Vatican. Portier concludes that Gaullism is not a rigid authoritarianism; rather it is a profound concern for social justice, a belief in the primacy of central authority in conjunction with intermediary legislative bodies, and respect for popular consensus.<ref>Philippe Portier, "Le General De Gaulle et Le Catholicisme: Pour Une Autre Interpretation De La Pensee Gaullienne," [General De Gaulle and Catholicism: Regarding Another Interpretation of Gaullist Thought]. ''Revue Historique'' 1997 297(2): 533-562. Issn: 0035-3264</ref>

De Gaulle's  political philosophy, with its use of concepts such as élan, will, instinct, heroism, and participation, reflected the influences of Charles Péguy (1873-1914), Maurice Barrès (1862-1923), and Henri Bergson (1859-1941). Portier (1997) finds that de Gaulle's central principles derived from his religious devotion to Catholicism. Some scholars have suggested that De Gaulle modeled his authoritarian approach on the political theories of [[Machiavelli]], [[Maurras]], and [[Napoleon]], yet the French president's regard for the sovereignty of the state undermines all such theories. A close comparison of the papal encyclicals of Paul VI, [[Pius XI]], John XXIII, and [[Pius XII]] with De Gaulle's own writings reveals the statesman's close alliance with the political position of the Vatican. Portier concludes that Gaullism is not a rigid authoritarianism; rather it is a profound concern for social justice, a belief in the primacy of central authority in conjunction with intermediary legislative bodies, and respect for popular consensus.<ref>Philippe Portier, "Le General De Gaulle et Le Catholicisme: Pour Une Autre Interpretation De La Pensee Gaullienne," [General De Gaulle and Catholicism: Regarding Another Interpretation of Gaullist Thought]. ''Revue Historique'' 1997 297(2): 533-562. Issn: 0035-3264</ref>

Kuisel (1992) asks whether de Gaulle was "Anti-American," and answers yes, for the Général consistently and mightily struggled to upend an international order built by and for America. He attacked America's arrogance of power and led his nation toward a less cooperative posture toward Washington. Indeed he incited expressions of anti-Americanism among the French and deep down he shared a stereotype common among French intellectuals of American society as soulless, materialist, and ahistorical.<ref>Richard F. Kuisel, "Was De Gaulle Anti-American?" ''Tocqueville Review'' 1992 13(1): 21-32. Issn: 0730-479x</ref>

Kuisel (1992) asks whether de Gaulle was "Anti-American," and answers yes, for the Général consistently and mightily struggled to upend an international order built by and for America. He attacked America's arrogance of power and led his nation toward a less cooperative posture toward Washington. Indeed, he incited expressions of anti-Americanism among the French and deep down he shared a stereotype common among French intellectuals of American society as soulless, materialist, and ahistorical.<ref>Richard F. Kuisel, "Was De Gaulle Anti-American?" ''Tocqueville Review'' 1992 13(1): 21-32. Issn: 0730-479x</ref>

==Notable Quotes==

==Notable Quotes==

:''Faced with crisis, the man of character falls back on himself. He imposes his own stamp of action, takes responsibility for it, makes it his own.'' <ref>[http://www.quotatio.com/g/gaulle-charles-de-faced-with-crisis-the-man-of-character-070486.html] Quotatio - Charles De Gaulle</ref>

:''Faced with crisis, the man of character falls back on himself. He imposes his own stamp of action, takes responsibility for it, makes it his own.'' <ref>[http://www.quotatio.com/g/gaulle-charles-de-faced-with-crisis-the-man-of-character-070486.html] Quotatio - Charles De Gaulle</ref>