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| | Then came the 400,000 warriors, called "samurai", in numerous grades and degrees. A few upper samurai were eligible for high office; most were foot soldiers (ashigaru) with minor duties. The samurai were affiliated with senior lords in a well-established chain of command. The shogun had 17,000 samurai retainers; the daimyo each had hundreds. Most lived in modest homes near their lord's headquarters, and lived off of hereditary rights and stipends. Together these high status groups comprised Japan's ruling class making up about 6% of the total population. | | Then came the 400,000 warriors, called "samurai", in numerous grades and degrees. A few upper samurai were eligible for high office; most were foot soldiers (ashigaru) with minor duties. The samurai were affiliated with senior lords in a well-established chain of command. The shogun had 17,000 samurai retainers; the daimyo each had hundreds. Most lived in modest homes near their lord's headquarters, and lived off of hereditary rights and stipends. Together these high status groups comprised Japan's ruling class making up about 6% of the total population. |
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| − | Lower orders divided into two main segments--the peasants--80% of the population--whose high prestige as producers was undercut by their burden as the chief source of taxes. They were illiterate and lived in villages controlled by appointed officials who kept the peace and collected taxes. | + | Lower orders divided into two main segments—the peasants—80% of the population—whose high prestige as producers was undercut by their burden as the chief source of taxes. They were illiterate and lived in villages controlled by appointed officials who kept the peace and collected taxes. |
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| − | Near the bottom of the prestige scale--but much higher up in terms of income and life style--were the merchants and artisans of the towns and cities. They had no political power, and even rich merchants found it difficult to rise in the world in a society in which place and standing were fixed at birth. Finally came the entertainers, prostitutes, day laborers and servants, and the thieves, beggars and hereditary outcasts.<ref> Totman (2000) 225-30</ref> | + | Near the bottom of the prestige scale—but much higher up in terms of income and life style—were the merchants and artisans of the towns and cities. They had no political power, and even rich merchants found it difficult to rise in the world in a society in which place and standing were fixed at birth. Finally came the entertainers, prostitutes, day laborers and servants, and the thieves, beggars and hereditary outcasts.<ref>Totman (2000) 225-30</ref> |
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| | ===Economy=== | | ===Economy=== |
| − | The Tokugawa era brought peace, and that brought prosperity to a nation of 31 million, 80% of them rice farmers. Rice production increased steadily, but population remained stable. Rice paddies grew from 1.6 million chō in 1600 to 3 million by 1720.<ref> One chō, or chobu, equals 2.45 acres.</ref> Improved technology helped farmers control the all-important flow of water to their paddies. The daimyo's operated several hundred castle towns, which became loci of domestic trade. Large-scale rice markets developed, centered on Edo and Osaka. Merchants invented credit instruments to transfer money, and currency came into common use. In the cities and towns, guilds of merchants and artisans met the growing demand for goods and services.<ref> Totman (2000) ch 11</ref> | + | The Tokugawa era brought peace, and that brought prosperity to a nation of 31 million, 80% of them rice farmers. Rice production increased steadily, but population remained stable. Rice paddies grew from 1.6 million chō in 1600 to 3 million by 1720.<ref>One chō, or chobu, equals 2.45 acres.</ref> Improved technology helped farmers control the all-important flow of water to their paddies. The daimyo's operated several hundred castle towns, which became loci of domestic trade. Large-scale rice markets developed, centered on Edo and Osaka. Merchants invented credit instruments to transfer money, and currency came into common use. In the cities and towns, guilds of merchants and artisans met the growing demand for goods and services.<ref>Totman (2000) ch 11</ref> |
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| − | The merchants benefited enormously, especially those with official patronage. The samurai, forbidden to engage in farming or business but allowed to borrow money, borrowed too much. The bakufu and daimyos raised taxes on farmers, but did not tax business, so they too fell into debt. By 1750 rising taxes incited peasant unrest and even revolt. The nation had to deal somehow with samurai impoverishment and treasury deficits. The financial troubles of the samurai undermined their loyalties to the system, and the empty treasury threaten the whole system of government. One solution was reactionary--with prohibitions on spending for luxuries. Other solutions were modernizing, with the goal of increasing agrarian productivity. The eighth Tokugawa shogun, Yoshimune (in office 1716-1745) had considerable success, though much of his work had to be done again between 1787 and 1793 by the shogun's chief councilor Matsudaira Sadanobu (1759-1829). Others shoguns debased the coinage to pay debts, which caused inflation. | + | The merchants benefited enormously, especially those with official patronage. The samurai, forbidden to engage in farming or business but allowed to borrow money, borrowed too much. The bakufu and daimyos raised taxes on farmers, but did not tax business, so they too fell into debt. By 1750 rising taxes incited peasant unrest and even revolt. The nation had to deal somehow with samurai impoverishment and treasury deficits. The financial troubles of the samurai undermined their loyalties to the system, and the empty treasury threaten the whole system of government. One solution was reactionary—with prohibitions on spending for luxuries. Other solutions were modernizing, with the goal of increasing agrarian productivity. The eighth Tokugawa shogun, Yoshimune (in office 1716-1745) had considerable success, though much of his work had to be done again between 1787 and 1793 by the shogun's chief councilor Matsudaira Sadanobu (1759-1829). Others shoguns debased the coinage to pay debts, which caused inflation. |
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| | By 1800 the commercialization of the economy grew rapidly, bringing more and more remote villages into the national economy. Rich farmers appeared who switched from rice to high-profit commercial crops and engaged in local money-lending, trade, and small-scale manufacturing. Some wealthy merchants sought higher social status by using money to marry into the samurai class. | | By 1800 the commercialization of the economy grew rapidly, bringing more and more remote villages into the national economy. Rich farmers appeared who switched from rice to high-profit commercial crops and engaged in local money-lending, trade, and small-scale manufacturing. Some wealthy merchants sought higher social status by using money to marry into the samurai class. |
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| − | A few domains, notably Chōsū and Satsuma, used innovative methods to restore their finances, but most sunk further into debt. The financial crisis provoked a reactionary solution near the end of the "Tempo era" (1830-1843) promulgated by the chief counselor Mizuno Tadakuni. He raised taxes, denounced luxuries and tried to impede the growth of business; he failed and it appeared to many that the continued existence of the entire Tokugawa system was in jeopardy.<ref>McClain (2002) pp 128-29 </ref> | + | A few domains, notably Chōsū and Satsuma, used innovative methods to restore their finances, but most sunk further into debt. The financial crisis provoked a reactionary solution near the end of the "Tempo era" (1830-1843) promulgated by the chief counselor Mizuno Tadakuni. He raised taxes, denounced luxuries and tried to impede the growth of business; he failed and it appeared to many that the continued existence of the entire Tokugawa system was in jeopardy.<ref>McClain (2002) pp 128-29</ref> |
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| | ===Edo/Tokyo === | | ===Edo/Tokyo === |
| | [[Image:Edo period architecture.jpg|thumb|290px|left|View of a Kabuki Theater, 1770.]] | | [[Image:Edo period architecture.jpg|thumb|290px|left|View of a Kabuki Theater, 1770.]] |
| − | Edo (Tokyo) had been a small settlement for 400 years but began to grow rapidly after 1603 when Shogun [[Ieyasu]] built a fortified city as the administrative center of the new [[Tokugawa]] Shogunate. Edo resembled the capital cities of Europe with military, political, and economic functions. The Tokugawa political system rested on both feudal and bureaucratic controls, so that Edo lacked a unitary administration. The typical urban social order was composed of samurai, unskilled workers and servants, artisans, and businessmen. The artisans and businessmen were organized in officially sanctioned guilds; their numbers grew rapidly as Tokyo grew and became a national trading center. Businessmen were excluded from government office, and in response they they created their own subculture of entertainment, making Edo a cultural as well as a political and economic center. With the Meiji Restoration, Tokyo's political, economic, and cultural functions simply continued as the new capital of imperial Japan. | + | Edo (Tokyo) had been a small settlement for 400 years but began to grow rapidly after 1603 when Shogun [[Ieyasu]] built a fortified city as the administrative center of the new [[Tokugawa]] Shogunate. Edo resembled the capital cities of Europe with military, political, and economic functions. The Tokugawa political system rested on both feudal and bureaucratic controls, so that Edo lacked a unitary administration. The typical urban social order was composed of samurai, unskilled workers and servants, artisans, and businessmen. The artisans and businessmen were organized in officially sanctioned guilds; their numbers grew rapidly as Tokyo grew and became a national trading center. Businessmen were excluded from government office, and in response they created their own subculture of entertainment, making Edo a cultural as well as a political and economic center. With the Meiji Restoration, Tokyo's political, economic, and cultural functions simply continued as the new capital of imperial Japan. |
| | {{Clear}} | | {{Clear}} |
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| | [[File:Japan42.jpg|thumb|Japan's Empire in 1942|320px]] | | [[File:Japan42.jpg|thumb|Japan's Empire in 1942|320px]] |
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| − | In a blitzkrieg operation Japan rapidly expanded at sea and land, capturing Singapore and the Philippines in early 1942, and threatening India and Australia. Meanwhile fighting in China itself largely came to standstill, and Japan remained on neutral terms with the Soviet Union. The U.S. Navy stopped Japanese expansion at two great naval battles in 1942, the [[Battle of the Coral Sea]] and the [[Battle of Midway]]. Japanese overextension resulted in defeat in the [[Guadalcanal Campaign]]. Japanese sea power was destroyed by the U.S. Navy in 1944 at the [[Battle of the Philippine Sea]] and the [[Battle of Leyte Gulf]]. The U.S. industrial economy was ten times larger than Japan's, and was manifest in warplanes and warships as two main thrusts approached Japan, one through the central Pacific and one through the Philippines. | + | In a blitzkrieg operation Japan rapidly expanded at sea and land, capturing Singapore and the Philippines in early 1942, and threatening India and Australia. Meanwhile, fighting in China itself largely came to standstill, and Japan remained on neutral terms with the Soviet Union. The U.S. Navy stopped Japanese expansion at two great naval battles in 1942, the [[Battle of the Coral Sea]] and the [[Battle of Midway]]. Japanese overextension resulted in defeat in the [[Guadalcanal Campaign]]. Japanese sea power was destroyed by the U.S. Navy in 1944 at the [[Battle of the Philippine Sea]] and the [[Battle of Leyte Gulf]]. The U.S. industrial economy was ten times larger than Japan's, and was manifest in warplanes and warships as two main thrusts approached Japan, one through the central Pacific and one through the Philippines. |
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| | Systematic destruction of Japan's industrial centers began in early 1945 with the [[B-29]] raids. The Emperor refused to surrender until shocked by two atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and Soviet entry into the war in August 1945. | | Systematic destruction of Japan's industrial centers began in early 1945 with the [[B-29]] raids. The Emperor refused to surrender until shocked by two atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and Soviet entry into the war in August 1945. |
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| | [[File:Abomb45.jpg|thumb|170px]] | | [[File:Abomb45.jpg|thumb|170px]] |
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| − | Total Japanese military fatalities between 1937 and 1945 were 2.1 million; most came in the last year of the war. Starvation or malnutrition-related illness accounted for roughly 80 percent of Japanese military deaths in the Philippines, and 50 percent of military fatalities in China. The aerial bombing of a total of 65 Japanese cities appears to have taken a minimum of 400,000 and possibly closer to 600,000 civilian lives (over 100,000 in Tokyo alone, over 200,000 in Hiroshima and Nagasaki combined, and 80,000-150,000 civilian deaths in the battle of Okinawa). Civilian death among settlers who died attempting to return to Japan from Manchuria in the winter of 1945 were probably around 100,000.<ref> John Dower, "Lessons from Iwo Jima," ''Perspectives'' (Sept 2007) 45#6 pp 54-56 at [http://www.historians.org/perspectives/issues/2007/0709/index.cfm]</ref> | + | Total Japanese military fatalities between 1937 and 1945 were 2.1 million; most came in the last year of the war. Starvation or malnutrition-related illness accounted for roughly 80 percent of Japanese military deaths in the Philippines, and 50 percent of military fatalities in China. The aerial bombing of a total of 65 Japanese cities appears to have taken a minimum of 400,000 and possibly closer to 600,000 civilian lives (over 100,000 in Tokyo alone, over 200,000 in Hiroshima and Nagasaki combined, and 80,000-150,000 civilian deaths in the battle of Okinawa). Civilian death among settlers who died attempting to return to Japan from Manchuria in the winter of 1945 were probably around 100,000.<ref>John Dower, "Lessons from Iwo Jima," ''Perspectives'' (Sept 2007) 45#6 pp 54-56 at [http://www.historians.org/perspectives/issues/2007/0709/index.cfm]</ref> |
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| | ===U.S. occupation=== | | ===U.S. occupation=== |
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| | == Earthquake and Tsunami in 2011 == | | == Earthquake and Tsunami in 2011 == |
| | [[File:Japan quake sendai.jpg|left|200px]] | | [[File:Japan quake sendai.jpg|left|200px]] |
| − | A massive 8.9-magnitude earthquake and several powerful aftershocks struck the eastern coast of Japan on March 11, 2011 (12:46 a.m. in Washington), triggering a [[tsunami]] that devastated the coastline north of [[Tokyo]] with waves up to 10 meters (33 ft.) high. The earthquake epicenter was in the western Pacific Ocean, 130 kilometers east of [[Sendai]], [[Honshu]] island. The earthquake occurred along the subduction zone between two tectonic plates. | + | A massive 8.9-magnitude earthquake and several powerful aftershocks struck the eastern coast of Japan on March 11, 2011 (12:46 a.m. in Washington), triggering a [[tsunami]] that devastated the coastline north of [[Tokyo]] with waves up to 10 meters (33 ft.) high. The earthquake epicenter was in the western Pacific Ocean, 130 kilometers east of [[Sendai]], [[Honshu]] island. The earthquake occurred along the subduction zone between two tectonic plates. |
| | [[File:Japan radiation 2011.jpg|right|140px|Japanese radiation, 2011.]] | | [[File:Japan radiation 2011.jpg|right|140px|Japanese radiation, 2011.]] |
| − | The Japan Meteorological Agency said the earthquake was the strongest in the country's history; <ref>[http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/story/2011/03/11/ST2011031100651.html?sid=ST2011031100651 Japan Quake - Tsunami] </ref> the death toll is expected to top 10,000 people; Prime Minister Naoto Kan called it the nation's worst crisis since World War II. <ref>http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2011-03-13-japan-earthquake_N.htm </ref>. | + | The Japan Meteorological Agency said the earthquake was the strongest in the country's history;<ref>[http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/story/2011/03/11/ST2011031100651.html?sid=ST2011031100651 Japan Quake - Tsunami]</ref> the death toll is expected to top 10,000 people; Prime Minister Naoto Kan called it the nation's worst crisis since World War II.<ref>http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2011-03-13-japan-earthquake_N.htm</ref> |
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| − | The [[earthquake]] has caused three nuclear power plant cooling systems to fail and those affected reactors. Thousands of residents were evacuated. <ref>[http://www.foxnews.com/world/2011/03/11/japan-issues-emergency-nuke-plant-leak Radiation Levels Surge Outside Two Nuclear Plants in Japan.]</ref> | + | The [[earthquake]] has caused three nuclear power plant cooling systems to fail and those affected reactors. Thousands of residents were evacuated.<ref>[http://www.foxnews.com/world/2011/03/11/japan-issues-emergency-nuke-plant-leak Radiation Levels Surge Outside Two Nuclear Plants in Japan.]</ref> |
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| | After the earthquake and tsunami, entire towns in Japan are impossible to reach. But search and rescue teams are fanning out in what will be a lengthy, complex endeavor. | | After the earthquake and tsunami, entire towns in Japan are impossible to reach. But search and rescue teams are fanning out in what will be a lengthy, complex endeavor. |
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| | * Jansen, Marius B., ed. ''The Cambridge History of Japan. Vol. 5: The Nineteenth Century.'' (1989). 828 pp. [http://www.amazon.com/gp/reader/0521484057/ref=sib_dp_pt/103-4827826-5463040#reader-link excerpt and text search] | | * Jansen, Marius B., ed. ''The Cambridge History of Japan. Vol. 5: The Nineteenth Century.'' (1989). 828 pp. [http://www.amazon.com/gp/reader/0521484057/ref=sib_dp_pt/103-4827826-5463040#reader-link excerpt and text search] |
| | * Sansom, Sir George B. ''A History of Japan,'' 3 vols. 1963, in dense, sophisticated prose [http://www.amazon.com/History-Japan-1334-George-Sansom/dp/0804705232/ref=pd_bbs_sr_6/103-4827826-5463040?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1188272252&sr=8-6 excerpts and search vol 1 to 1334], [http://www.amazon.com/History-Japan-1334-1615-George-Sansom/dp/0804705259/ref=pd_bbs_10/103-4827826-5463040?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1188272252&sr=8-10 excerpts and search vol 2 to 1615] [http://www.amazon.com/History-Japan-1615-1867-George-Sansom/dp/0804705275/ref=pd_bbs_11/103-4827826-5463040?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1188272252&sr=8-11 excerpts and search vol 3 to 1867] | | * Sansom, Sir George B. ''A History of Japan,'' 3 vols. 1963, in dense, sophisticated prose [http://www.amazon.com/History-Japan-1334-George-Sansom/dp/0804705232/ref=pd_bbs_sr_6/103-4827826-5463040?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1188272252&sr=8-6 excerpts and search vol 1 to 1334], [http://www.amazon.com/History-Japan-1334-1615-George-Sansom/dp/0804705259/ref=pd_bbs_10/103-4827826-5463040?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1188272252&sr=8-10 excerpts and search vol 2 to 1615] [http://www.amazon.com/History-Japan-1615-1867-George-Sansom/dp/0804705275/ref=pd_bbs_11/103-4827826-5463040?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1188272252&sr=8-11 excerpts and search vol 3 to 1867] |
| − | * Totman, Conrad. "Tokugawa Peasants: Win, Lose, or Draw?" ''Monumenta Nipponica'', Vol. 41, No. 4. (Winter, 1986), pp. 457-476. in English; [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0027-0741%28198624%2941%3A4%3C457%3ATPWLOD%3E2.0.CO%3B2-K in JSTOR] | + | * Totman, Conrad. "Tokugawa Peasants: Win, Lose, or Draw?" ''Monumenta Nipponica'', Vol. 41, No. 4. (Winter, 1986), pp. 457–476. in English; [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0027-0741%28198624%2941%3A4%3C457%3ATPWLOD%3E2.0.CO%3B2-K in JSTOR] |
| | * Wilson, George M. ''Patriots and Redeemers in Japan: Motives in the Meiji Restoration.'' (1992). 201 pp. | | * Wilson, George M. ''Patriots and Redeemers in Japan: Motives in the Meiji Restoration.'' (1992). 201 pp. |
| | * Yamamura Kozo, ed. ''Cambridge History of Japan, Vol. III. Medieval Japan.'' (1990). | | * Yamamura Kozo, ed. ''Cambridge History of Japan, Vol. III. Medieval Japan.'' (1990). |
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| | * Huffman, James L. ed. ''Modern Japan: A History in Documents'' (2004) | | * Huffman, James L. ed. ''Modern Japan: A History in Documents'' (2004) |
| | * Tsunoda, Ryusaku, W. T. de Bary, and Donald Keene, eds. ''Sources of Japanese Tradition.'' 1958. | | * Tsunoda, Ryusaku, W. T. de Bary, and Donald Keene, eds. ''Sources of Japanese Tradition.'' 1958. |
| − | * Yoshida, Shigeru. ''The Yoshida Memoirs: The Story of Japan in Crisis'' 1961, on Occupation, 1945-51 [http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=34588784 online edition] | + | * Yoshida, Shigeru. ''The Yoshida Memoirs: The Story of Japan in Crisis'' 1961, on Occupation, 1945–51 [http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=34588784 online edition] |
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| | ====notes==== | | ====notes==== |
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| | [[Category:Japanese History]] | | [[Category:Japanese History]] |
| | [[Category:Japan]] | | [[Category:Japan]] |
| − | [[category:Asian History]] | + | [[Category:Asian History]] |