Changes

Sherman's March was essentially a raid: the invaders did not intend to occupy the state, and as soon as they had departed the rebels reclaimed their ruined land. The March rankled for a century in the Southern psyche not so much because of the physical destruction it caused (less than 1% of southern wealth), but because of the studied insult to the honor of the white South. While there were very few instances of rape or mayhem, the Yankees delighted in demonstrating that Southerners were unable to defend their own homes, their property, their slaves, or their families. Sherman understood that the March would be "fatal to the possibility of a Southern independence; they may stand the fall of Richmond, but not of all Georgia."  

Sherman's March was essentially a raid: the invaders did not intend to occupy the state, and as soon as they had departed the rebels reclaimed their ruined land. The March rankled for a century in the Southern psyche not so much because of the physical destruction it caused (less than 1% of southern wealth), but because of the studied insult to the honor of the white South. While there were very few instances of rape or mayhem, the Yankees delighted in demonstrating that Southerners were unable to defend their own homes, their property, their slaves, or their families. Sherman understood that the March would be "fatal to the possibility of a Southern independence; they may stand the fall of Richmond, but not of all Georgia."  

==Sherman’s strategy==

==Sherman’s strategy==

Sherman, copying Grant’s 1863 [[Vicksburg Campaign]], decided to cut loose from his railroad. With but 60 locomotives and 600 freight cars, it was hard pressed to provide the 130 ten-ton carloads of freight needed every day. He sent a third of his force back to Thomas to hold Tennessee, and stripped the brigades down to the bare essentials; the men each carried a five day supply of hardtack. Better food would be acquired along the way. The famous "March from Atlanta to the Sea" represented a new kind of warfare. Apart from a few ineffective militia units, Sherman encountered no serious opposition. He lived off the country, which because of the transportation breakdowns was bursting with food that could not be moved. His army consumed what it needed, and destroyed the rest. Advancing in two fronts, each 10 to 30 miles wide, Sherman cut a swath through 200 miles of one of the South's richest agricultural districts.  

Sherman, copying Grant’s 1863 [[Vicksburg Campaign]], decided to cut loose from his railroad. With but 60 locomotives and 600 freight cars, it was hard pressed to provide the 130 ten-ton carloads of freight needed every day. He sent a third of his force back to Thomas to hold Tennessee, and stripped the brigades down to the bare essentials; the men each carried a five-day supply of hardtack. Better food would be acquired along the way. The famous "March from Atlanta to the Sea" represented a new kind of warfare. Apart from a few ineffective militia units, Sherman encountered no serious opposition. He lived off the country, which because of the transportation breakdowns was bursting with food that could not be moved. His army consumed what it needed, and destroyed the rest. Advancing in two fronts, each 10 to 30 miles wide, Sherman cut a swath through 200 miles of one of the South's richest agricultural districts.  

Confederates had discussed using the “Fabian” tactic of scorched earth, last used by the Russians against Napoleon in 1812—destroy everything first, so Sherman would starve. That was impossible because Sherman, not tied to a supply line, could head in any direction he pleased. "Having alternatives, I can take so eccentric a course that no general can guess my objectives." He used statistical data provided by the census to select the fattest counties to despoil. In 26 days his soldiers wreaked $100 million worth of damage, proving conclusively that, as Sherman famously said, "War is Hell."   

Confederates had discussed using the “Fabian” tactic of scorched earth, last used by the Russians against Napoleon in 1812—destroy everything first, so Sherman would starve. That was impossible because Sherman, not tied to a supply line, could head in any direction he pleased. "Having alternatives, I can take so eccentric a course that no general can guess my objectives." He used statistical data provided by the census to select the fattest counties to despoil. In 26 days his soldiers wreaked $100 million worth of damage, proving conclusively that, as Sherman famously said, "War is Hell."