Changes

'''Intelligence''' and '''Counterintelligence''' actually are two entirely different fields.  Many writings on the subject of [[espionage]] jumble the two together as the same thing; but they are different specialties, with different objectives, and a different mindset required of those working in the field. Like the offense and defense on a [[football]] team, the two fields have different approaches and different terminology.

'''Intelligence''' and '''Counterintelligence''' actually are two entirely different fields.  Many writings on the subject of [[espionage]] jumble the two together as the same thing; but they are different specialties, with different objectives, and a different mindset required of those working in the field. Like the offense and defense on a [[football]] team, the two fields have different approaches and different terminology.

What can be learned from a successful espionage operation usually comes from counterespionage files, which may give a distorted or opaque view.  For example, what is known about the [[Communist_Party_of_the_United_States_of_America|CPUSA's]] [[History_of_Soviet_espionage_in_the_United_States#Secret_apparatus|secret apparatus]], which operated a very large and successful organization in the United States from about 1921 to 1945, comes largely from [[FBI]] and [[Arlington Hall|SIS]] counterintelligence files. These files are fragmentary.  While counterintelligence agents successfully identified perhaps a third of CPUSA and Soviet operatives between 1945 and 1950, only personal memoirs of the intelligence operatives in question, or successful testimony if it can be believed, or a peek into Soviet and [[Comintern]] archives, gives us a clue as to what the entire organization's mission was and how they set about it for two and a half decades.  The FBI counterintelligence files typically contain only three weeks of direct surveillance on the subjects' activities, and those under surveillance  learned their operation had been compromised and broke their usual pattern of conduct.

What can be learned from a successful espionage operation usually comes from counterespionage files, which may give a distorted or opaque view.  For example, what is known about the [[Communist Party of the United States of America|CPUSA's]] [[History of Soviet espionage in the United States#Secret apparatus|secret apparatus]], which operated a very large and successful organization in the United States from about 1921 to 1945, comes largely from [[FBI]] and [[Arlington Hall|SIS]] counterintelligence files. These files are fragmentary.  While counterintelligence agents successfully identified perhaps a third of CPUSA and Soviet operatives between 1945 and 1950, only personal memoirs of the intelligence operatives in question, or successful testimony if it can be believed, or a peek into Soviet and [[Comintern]] archives, gives us a clue as to what the entire organization's mission was and how they set about it for two and a half decades.  The FBI counterintelligence files typically contain only three weeks of direct surveillance on the subjects' activities, and those under surveillance  learned their operation had been compromised and broke their usual pattern of conduct.

==Counterintelligence==

==Counterintelligence==

The objective of [[counterintelligence]] (CI) is to identify an intelligence operative.  However, the intelligence operative's objective is not simply to evade detection; he has a more important mission to perform, and avoiding counterintelligence detection is just part of performing that mission.  Once the identification has been made by counterintelligence, the operative is not just arrested, tried, and carted off to jail as in other crimes; a decision must be made, and he usually is temporarilly left in place so as not to tip off how he came to be identified, which would have the effect of compromising other counterintelligence operations.  

The objective of [[counterintelligence]] (CI) is to identify an intelligence operative.  However, the intelligence operative's objective is not simply to evade detection; he has a more important mission to perform, and avoiding counterintelligence detection is just part of performing that mission.  Once the identification has been made by counterintelligence, the operative is not just arrested, tried, and carted off to jail as in other crimes; a decision must be made, and he usually is temporarilly left in place so as not to tip off how he came to be identified, which would have the effect of compromising other counterintelligence operations.  

Nonetheless, an identified operative must be cut off from access to further secure information, without letting him know that his [[Cover_(intelligence)|cover]] is blown, then fed an elaborate stream of credible [[disinformation]].  Then an assessment must be made as to the extent of the damage and what information has been compromised.  Eventually, the mole and his handlers will realize their operation has been compromised because of the useless disinformation being passed; but this step buys time for the difficult process of "walking the dog backwards" to determine what has been compromised within the target organization.  That is the point at which an arrest is usually made.  Sometimes, however, the process of feeding disinformation can be useful, so a discovered agent may be left in place for years.

Nonetheless, an identified operative must be cut off from access to further secure information, without letting him know that his [[Cover (intelligence)|cover]] is blown, then fed an elaborate stream of credible [[disinformation]].  Then an assessment must be made as to the extent of the damage and what information has been compromised.  Eventually, the mole and his handlers will realize their operation has been compromised because of the useless disinformation being passed; but this step buys time for the difficult process of "walking the dog backwards" to determine what has been compromised within the target organization.  That is the point at which an arrest is usually made.  Sometimes, however, the process of feeding disinformation can be useful, so a discovered agent may be left in place for years.

Occassionally attempts are made to "turn" a mole; that is, gain his cooperation without exposing to his controllers that his cover has been blown.  Turning a mole can make him an unwilling agent of either side, either to continue the feed of disinformation, or being coerced at threat of imprisonment to betray his compatriot organization.  In the famous case of [[Arkady Schevchenko]], a Soviet [[Diplomacy|diplomat]] to the [[United Nations]] who asked to [[defector|defect]], rather than accept his defection the CIA required he remain in place and engage in espionage.  Schevchenko was a professional diplomat, not a spy, and he found the stressful work nerve-wracking.

Occassionally attempts are made to "turn" a mole; that is, gain his cooperation without exposing to his controllers that his cover has been blown.  Turning a mole can make him an unwilling agent of either side, either to continue the feed of disinformation, or being coerced at threat of imprisonment to betray his compatriot organization.  In the famous case of [[Arkady Schevchenko]], a Soviet [[Diplomacy|diplomat]] to the [[United Nations]] who asked to [[defector|defect]], rather than accept his defection the CIA required he remain in place and engage in espionage.  Schevchenko was a professional diplomat, not a spy, and he found the stressful work nerve-wracking.

===MICE===

===MICE===

The concept of "[[Motives_for_spying#Motivations|MICE]]" was originated by American counterintelligence in an effort to understand what motivates a person to be willing to betray their own country.  It can be regarded as one of America's contributions to the art and science of the business, now that both intelligence and counterintelligence agencies worldwide rely upon this simple [[mnemonic]], to spot potential recruits or identify potential agents in the service of a foreign organization.  The concept is simple: it is either [[Money]], [[Ideology]], [[Coercion]], or Excitement, that causes a person to be willing to betray their friends and neighbours, or their whole country, and go into the service of a foreign espionage organization.  Sometimes "intrigue" is substituted for ideology, or "[[ego]]" for excitment, but the end result is the same.  It is claimed that no one has produced a better summary of traitors' motivations.

The concept of "[[Motives for spying#Motivations|MICE]]" was originated by American counterintelligence in an effort to understand what motivates a person to be willing to betray their own country.  It can be regarded as one of America's contributions to the art and science of the business, now that both intelligence and counterintelligence agencies worldwide rely upon this simple [[mnemonic]], to spot potential recruits or identify potential agents in the service of a foreign organization.  The concept is simple: it is either [[Money]], [[Ideology]], [[Coercion]], or Excitement, that causes a person to be willing to betray their friends and neighbours, or their whole country, and go into the service of a foreign espionage organization.  Sometimes "intrigue" is substituted for ideology, or "[[ego]]" for excitment, but the end result is the same.  It is claimed that no one has produced a better summary of traitors' motivations.

Individuals who are motivated to betray their country for money, out of greed, tend to be persons who feel life has cheated them out of their just rewards, so they have no qualms about being fairly compensated, in their own eyes, for their worth.  At the same they can get back at the society which has misunderstood and not appreciated their talents. When [[Aldrich Ames]] bought an $80,000 Jaguar, there was not the slightest pretence of hiding the fruit of his labors.

Individuals who are motivated to betray their country for money, out of greed, tend to be persons who feel life has cheated them out of their just rewards, so they have no qualms about being fairly compensated, in their own eyes, for their worth.  At the same they can get back at the society which has misunderstood and not appreciated their talents. When [[Aldrich Ames]] bought an $80,000 Jaguar, there was not the slightest pretence of hiding the fruit of his labors.

===Training===

===Training===

 

After recruitment, agents are given the training required to conduct espionage activities safely and effectively.  CIA training often includes various [[tradecraft]] such as clandestine communications, elicitation, surveillance and countersurveillance, photographic and audio recording, concealment device construction, demolitions, use of small arms, all depending on the persons fitness and skills.

After recruitment, agents are given the training required to conduct espionage activities safely and effectively.  CIA training often includes various [[tradecraft]] such as clandestine communications, elicitation, surveillance and countersurveillance, photographic and audio recording, concealment device construction, demolitions, use of small arms, all depending on the persons fitness and skills.

Walk-in sources, who without solicitation make the first contact with HUMINT  personnel.

Walk-in sources, who without solicitation make the first contact with HUMINT  personnel.

== External link ==

== External links ==

 

*[http://www.csus.edu/indiv/c/carrollt/Site/Welcome_files/Gov't%20139G%20class%20notes%20Fall%202006%20-%2024%20Oct.pdf  ''Human Intelligence: From Sleepers to Walk-ins''], Thomas Patrick Carroll, Syllabus, 5 September 2006 - 24 October 2006 -- many good definitions with historic examples and timely discussion of problems; in outline form.  

*[http://www.csus.edu/indiv/c/carrollt/Site/Welcome_files/Gov't%20139G%20class%20notes%20Fall%202006%20-%2024%20Oct.pdf  ''Human Intelligence: From Sleepers to Walk-ins''], Thomas Patrick Carroll, Syllabus, 5 September 2006 - 24 October 2006—many good definitions with historic examples and timely discussion of problems; in outline form.  

[[Category:Espionage]]

[[Category:Espionage]]

[[Category : Glossaries]]

[[Category:Glossaries]]