| | :Although it is true that we have observed that our determinations as to the scope of official immunity are made in the light of the "common-law tradition," 5 Malley, supra, at 342, we have never suggested that the precise contours of official immunity can and should be slavishly derived from the often arcane rules of the common law. That notion is plainly contradicted by ''[[Harlow]]'', where the Court completely reformulated qualified immunity along principles not at all embodied in the common law, replacing the inquiry into subjective malice so frequently required at common law with an objective inquiry into the legal reasonableness of the official action. ''See [[Harlow]]'', 457 U.S., at 815-820. As we noted before, ''[[Harlow]]'' clearly expressed the understanding that the general principle of qualified immunity it established would be applied "across the board." | | :Although it is true that we have observed that our determinations as to the scope of official immunity are made in the light of the "common-law tradition," 5 Malley, supra, at 342, we have never suggested that the precise contours of official immunity can and should be slavishly derived from the often arcane rules of the common law. That notion is plainly contradicted by ''[[Harlow]]'', where the Court completely reformulated qualified immunity along principles not at all embodied in the common law, replacing the inquiry into subjective malice so frequently required at common law with an objective inquiry into the legal reasonableness of the official action. ''See [[Harlow]]'', 457 U.S., at 815-820. As we noted before, ''[[Harlow]]'' clearly expressed the understanding that the general principle of qualified immunity it established would be applied "across the board." |