Changes

At 49 minutes after take-off, the pilot was reporting to be on course and at Bethel, "007, Bethel at forty-niner." But, in reality, they were far off course.  For at 50 minutes after take-off, U.S. Air Force radar at King Salmon, Alaska had tracked KAL 007 at a full 12.6 nautical miles north of where it should have been (Bethel)--exceeding by more than six times, its permissible "leeway" drift from the course set by the INS.

At 49 minutes after take-off, the pilot was reporting to be on course and at Bethel, "007, Bethel at forty-niner." But, in reality, they were far off course.  For at 50 minutes after take-off, U.S. Air Force radar at King Salmon, Alaska had tracked KAL 007 at a full 12.6 nautical miles north of where it should have been (Bethel)--exceeding by more than six times, its permissible "leeway" drift from the course set by the INS.

The pilots could also have been apprised of their being off course by their [[Horizontal Situation Indicator]] (HSI), one in front of each pilot. The HSI, whose primary function was to show the aircraft's position with respect to the horizon, would also have shown that the aircraft was more than 8 miles deviated, as at 12.6 miles deviated, the indicator needle would be pegged all the way to the side to its 8 mile indication limitation. This not being noticed, was one of the indications to the ICAO analysts that the flight crew of KAL 007 displayed a "lack of [[situational awareness]] and flight deck coordination".

The pilots could also have been apprised of their being off course by their [[Horizontal Situation Indicator]] (HSI), one in front of each pilot. The HSI, whose primary function was to show the aircraft's position with respect to the horizon, would also have shown that the aircraft was more than 8 miles deviated, as at 12.6 miles deviated, the indicator needle would be pegged all the way to the side to its 8-mile indication limitation. This not being noticed, was one of the indications to the ICAO analysts that the flight crew of KAL 007 displayed a "lack of [[situational awareness]] and flight deck coordination".

   

   

*(In order for the INS (calibrated to [[true north]]) to capture the autopilot and keep it on the desired track, the autopilot had to be set to "INS."  The [[Digital Flight Data Recorder]] (DFDR) shows that the INS never captured the autopilot.  KAL 007 flew at a "constant magnetic heading" of 245 or 246 degrees for the entire flight.  If the INS had captured the autopilot, the magnetic heading would not have been ''constant '' but would have changed with each leg of the desired track since the waypoints were not in a straight line)

*(In order for the INS (calibrated to [[true north]]) to capture the autopilot and keep it on the desired track, the autopilot had to be set to "INS."  The [[Digital Flight Data Recorder]] (DFDR) shows that the INS never captured the autopilot.  KAL 007 flew at a "constant magnetic heading" of 245 or 246 degrees for the entire flight.  If the INS had captured the autopilot, the magnetic heading would not have been ''constant '' but would have changed with each leg of the desired track since the waypoints were not in a straight line)