Changes

McCarthy’s superb sense of timing and his media instincts kept his partisan attacks on the front page every day; his willingness to do battle in the hustings with Democratic opponents across the country strengthened his base in the Republican party. His religion and ethnicity, refreshed with highly visible friendships with leading Irish Catholics, especially the Kennedy family, bolstered his standing among Democrats.  According to Gallup, McCarthy’s popularity crested in January 1954, when he was endorsed by all voters 50-29 (with 21 having no opinion).  His core support came from Republicans and Catholics who had not attended college.  

McCarthy’s superb sense of timing and his media instincts kept his partisan attacks on the front page every day; his willingness to do battle in the hustings with Democratic opponents across the country strengthened his base in the Republican party. His religion and ethnicity, refreshed with highly visible friendships with leading Irish Catholics, especially the Kennedy family, bolstered his standing among Democrats.  According to Gallup, McCarthy’s popularity crested in January 1954, when he was endorsed by all voters 50-29 (with 21 having no opinion).  His core support came from Republicans and Catholics who had not attended college.  

McCarthy, however, failed to create any sort of grass roots organization.  He had no organizational skills; he did not effectively use his talented staffers (such as [[Robert Kennedy]]).  He was a loner who lurched from issue to issue, misled by the enormous media publicity into believing that a one-man crusade was possible in a an increasingly well-educated complex society honeycombed with local, regional and national organizations.  By operating within the Republican party apparatus he lost the opportunity to create an independent grass roots political crusade in the style of [[Theodore Roosevelt|Teddy Roosevelt]], [[Huey Long]], or [[Ross Perot]]. He never launched his own magazine or radio show or formed alliances with publishers who agreed with him.   

McCarthy, however, failed to create any sort of grass roots organization.  He had no organizational skills; he did not effectively use his talented staffers (such as [[Robert Kennedy]]).  He was a loner who lurched from issue to issue, misled by the enormous media publicity into believing that a one-man crusade was possible in an increasingly well-educated complex society honeycombed with local, regional and national organizations.  By operating within the Republican party apparatus he lost the opportunity to create an independent grass roots political crusade in the style of [[Theodore Roosevelt|Teddy Roosevelt]], [[Huey Long]], or [[Ross Perot]]. He never launched his own magazine or radio show or formed alliances with publishers who agreed with him.   

McCarthy’s strained relations with Senate colleagues created a trapdoor. It was sprung after many Republicans realized that he had shifted the attack away from the Democrats.  What use was his slogan “20 Years of Treason” once Eisenhower was in office? McCarthy’s answer was “21 Years of Treason!”  Eisenhower’s supporters could no longer tolerate such a loose cannon, and as McCarthy unwisely shifted his attacks to Eisenhower’s beloved Army, his cause was doomed.  While many Americans distrusted [[Ivy League]], striped pants diplomats, soldiers were held in high regard; McCarthy’s charges of subversion were flimsy (one Communist dentist had been automatically promoted); he sabotaged his own reputation by finagling favors for an aide who had been drafted.  The televised hearings proved fatal to an ill-prepared bully. After the Democrats regained control of Congress in the 1954 elections, the censure motion carried, 67-22.  McCarthy’s appeal, so widespread yet superficial, evaporated overnight and the Senator faded into the shadows.

McCarthy’s strained relations with Senate colleagues created a trapdoor. It was sprung after many Republicans realized that he had shifted the attack away from the Democrats.  What use was his slogan “20 Years of Treason” once Eisenhower was in office? McCarthy’s answer was “21 Years of Treason!”  Eisenhower’s supporters could no longer tolerate such a loose cannon, and as McCarthy unwisely shifted his attacks to Eisenhower’s beloved Army, his cause was doomed.  While many Americans distrusted [[Ivy League]], striped pants diplomats, soldiers were held in high regard; McCarthy’s charges of subversion were flimsy (one Communist dentist had been automatically promoted); he sabotaged his own reputation by finagling favors for an aide who had been drafted.  The televised hearings proved fatal to an ill-prepared bully. After the Democrats regained control of Congress in the 1954 elections, the censure motion carried, 67-22.  McCarthy’s appeal, so widespread yet superficial, evaporated overnight and the Senator faded into the shadows.

McCarthy compiled a list of 57 security risks and publicly named [[John S. Service]], Gustavo Duran, [[Mary Jane Keeney]], Harlow Shapley, and [[H. Julian Wadleigh]] <ref>Alexander Vassiliev, Notes on A. Gorsky’s Report to Savchenko S.R., 23 December 1949.</ref> as being on the list.<ref>Reeves, Thomas C. (1997). ''The life and Times of Joe McCarthy: A Biography''. Madison Books. pgs. 222-238. ISBN 1-56833-101-0.</ref>  These names came from the "Lee List" of unresolved State Department security cases compiled by the earlier investigators for the House Appropriation Committee in 1947.  Robert E. Lee was the committee’s lead investigator and supervised preparation of the list.<ref>U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, State Department Employee Loyalty Investigations (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1950).</ref>

McCarthy compiled a list of 57 security risks and publicly named [[John S. Service]], Gustavo Duran, [[Mary Jane Keeney]], Harlow Shapley, and [[H. Julian Wadleigh]] <ref>Alexander Vassiliev, Notes on A. Gorsky’s Report to Savchenko S.R., 23 December 1949.</ref> as being on the list.<ref>Reeves, Thomas C. (1997). ''The life and Times of Joe McCarthy: A Biography''. Madison Books. pgs. 222-238. ISBN 1-56833-101-0.</ref>  These names came from the "Lee List" of unresolved State Department security cases compiled by the earlier investigators for the House Appropriation Committee in 1947.  Robert E. Lee was the committee’s lead investigator and supervised preparation of the list.<ref>U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, State Department Employee Loyalty Investigations (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1950).</ref>

In a six hour speech on the Senate floor on February 20, 1950 in which McCarthy was constantly interrupted by hostile senators; four of whom — Scott Lucas (61 times), Brien McMahon (27 times), Garrett Withers (22 times), and Herbert Lehman (13 times) — interrupted him a total of 123 times, McCarthy raised the issue of some eighty individuals who had worked in the [[State Department]], or wartime agencies such as the [[Office of War Information]] (OWI) and the [[Board of Economic Warfare]] (BEW).

In a six-hour speech on the Senate floor on February 20, 1950 in which McCarthy was constantly interrupted by hostile senators; four of whom — Scott Lucas (61 times), Brien McMahon (27 times), Garrett Withers (22 times), and Herbert Lehman (13 times) — interrupted him a total of 123 times, McCarthy raised the issue of some eighty individuals who had worked in the [[State Department]], or wartime agencies such as the [[Office of War Information]] (OWI) and the [[Board of Economic Warfare]] (BEW).

McCarthy sought to avoid naming names publicly when possible, using numbered cases instead of names in public session. He preferred to name his suspects only in executive session, in order to protect those who might have been erroneously identified by the FBI, State Department Security, Army counterintelligence, etc. "[I]t would be improper to make the names public until the appropriate Senate committee can meet in executive session and get them," explained McCarthy. "If we should label one man a Communist when he is not a Communist I think it would be too bad."

McCarthy sought to avoid naming names publicly when possible, using numbered cases instead of names in public session. He preferred to name his suspects only in executive session, in order to protect those who might have been erroneously identified by the FBI, State Department Security, Army counterintelligence, etc. "[I]t would be improper to make the names public until the appropriate Senate committee can meet in executive session and get them," explained McCarthy. "If we should label one man a Communist when he is not a Communist I think it would be too bad."

  | title = [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster116.pdf Vol. 116, pg. 100] pdf

  | title = [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster116.pdf Vol. 116, pg. 100] pdf

  | publisher = U. S. Government,}}

  | publisher = U. S. Government,}}

Robert Barnett contacts with [[Donald Wheeler]] formerly of [[OSS]]; Robert Barnett also served in OSS).</ref>  

Robert Barnett contacts with [[Donald Wheeler]] formerly of [[OSS]]; Robert Barnett also served in OSS.</ref>  

* [[Esther Brunauer]], U.S. State Department; McCarthy's Case #47 and Lee list #55;<ref>

* [[Esther Brunauer]], U.S. State Department; McCarthy's Case #47 and Lee list #55;<ref>

Presented by McCarthy as Case Number 47 and Number 55 on the Lee list. She belonged to a number of [[Communist front]] organizations, including chairman of a meeting of the American Friends of the Soviet Union where the main speaker was a well known Communist and writer for the ''Daily Worker''. "Brunauer was a signer of a call to the annual meeting of the [[American Youth Congress]] which was publicly known to be completely dominated by the Communist Party. She admitted that her husband had Communist connections and had been a member of the [[Young Communist League]]." Brunauer was suspended by the State Department in 1951 pending adjudication of security proceedings against her. On June 16, 1952, she was discharged by the State Department as a security risk. See ''McCarthy & His Enemies, The Record And Its Meaning'' for greater detail on this case.

Presented by McCarthy as Case Number 47 and Number 55 on the Lee list. She belonged to a number of [[Communist front]] organizations, including chairman of a meeting of the American Friends of the Soviet Union where the main speaker was a well known Communist and writer for the ''Daily Worker''. "Brunauer was a signer of a call to the annual meeting of the [[American Youth Congress]] which was publicly known to be completely dominated by the Communist Party. She admitted that her husband had Communist connections and had been a member of the [[Young Communist League]]." Brunauer was suspended by the State Department in 1951 pending adjudication of security proceedings against her. On June 16, 1952, she was discharged by the State Department as a security risk. See ''McCarthy & His Enemies, The Record And Its Meaning'' for greater detail on this case.

  | isbn = 0-89526-472-2}})</ref>

  | isbn = 0-89526-472-2}})</ref>

* [[John Paton Davies]], U.S. State Department, Policy Planning Committee;<ref>

* [[John Paton Davies]], U.S. State Department, Policy Planning Committee;<ref>

McCarthy stated that, "Both [John Stewart] Service and Davies spent considerable time in China as State Department officials. In their recommendations to Washington both followed the Communist Party line. For example, on November 7, 1944, Davies submitted a memorandum to the State Department outing that the Communist Party in China was 'a modern dynamic popular government.' At the same time he referred to the anti-Communists as 'feudal.' 'The Communists are in China to stay. And China's destiny is not Chiang's but theirs,' said Davies. On December 12, 1944 he urged that we supply the Chinese Communists with arms — a proposal which [[Dean Acheson]] two years later requested Congress to approve." In 1944, Ambassador to China, [[Patrick J. Hurley]], accused Davies of working behind his back to support the Communists. According to Hurley, "Davies had one day flown off to Yenan to tell [[Mao Zedong|Mao TseTung]], the Communist leader, that Hurley, our Ambassador (an anti-Communist), did not represent the American viewpoint." According to ''The China Story'' by [[Freda Utley]], Davies was a great fan of Communist operative [[Agnes Smedley]] who operated in China. Utley states, "Davies was also a great admirer of [[Agnes Smedley]], whom he called one of 'the pure in heart.' He used to invite us all to excellent dinners at the American consulate, at which he expressed both his admiration and affection for Agnes. Together with [[Edgar Snow]] and other journalists I knew in Hankow, he [Davies] became one of the most potent influences in the Department [of State] furthering the cause of the Chinese Communists." The [[United States Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security|McCarran Committee]] had found that Davies had "testified falsely before the subcommittee in denying that he recommended the Central Intelligence Agency employ, utilize and rely upon certain individuals having Communist associations and connections. This matter was...substantial in import." Despite the enormous evidence of Davies' support of the Communists, the State Department cleared him of being a security/loyalty risk. Eventually, in 1954, under political pressure from McCarthy and Senator [[Patrick McCarran]], Secretary of State [[John Foster Dulles]] asked Davies to resign. When he refused, on 5 November 1954, Dulles terminated his employment, stating that Davies had "demonstrated a lack of judgment, discretion and reliability."

McCarthy stated that, "Both [John Stewart] Service and Davies spent considerable time in China as State Department officials. In their recommendations to Washington both followed the Communist Party line. For example, on November 7, 1944, Davies submitted a memorandum to the State Department outing that the Communist Party in China was 'a modern dynamic popular government.' At the same time he referred to the anti-Communists as 'feudal.' 'The Communists are in China to stay. And China's destiny is not Chiang's but theirs,' said Davies. On December 12, 1944 he urged that we supply the Chinese Communists with arms — a proposal which Dean Acheson two years later requested Congress to approve." In 1944, Ambassador to China, [[Patrick J. Hurley]], accused Davies of working behind his back to support the Communists. According to Hurley, "Davies had one day flown off to Yenan to tell [[Mao Zedong|Mao TseTung]], the Communist leader, that Hurley, our Ambassador (an anti-Communist), did not represent the American viewpoint." According to ''The China Story'' by [[Freda Utley]], Davies was a great fan of Communist operative [[Agnes Smedley]] who operated in China. Utley states, "Davies was also a great admirer of [[Agnes Smedley]], whom he called one of 'the pure in heart.' He used to invite us all to excellent dinners at the American consulate, at which he expressed both his admiration and affection for Agnes. Together with [[Edgar Snow]] and other journalists I knew in Hankow, he [Davies] became one of the most potent influences in the Department [of State] furthering the cause of the Chinese Communists." The [[United States Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security|McCarran Committee]] had found that Davies had "testified falsely before the subcommittee in denying that he recommended the Central Intelligence Agency employ, utilize and rely upon certain individuals having Communist associations and connections. This matter was...substantial in import." Despite the enormous evidence of Davies' support of the Communists, the State Department cleared him of being a security/loyalty risk. Eventually, in 1954, under political pressure from McCarthy and Senator [[Patrick McCarran]], Secretary of State [[John Foster Dulles]] asked Davies to resign. When he refused, on 5 November 1954, Dulles terminated his employment, stating that Davies had "demonstrated a lack of judgment, discretion and reliability."

({{cite book

({{cite book

  | last = Buckley, Jr., William F. and Bozell, L. Brent

  | last = Buckley, Jr., William F. and Bozell, L. Brent

  | date = October 10, 1946

  | date = October 10, 1946

  | title = http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster076.pdf [Vol. 76, pgs. 9 and 126] pdf

  | title = http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster076.pdf [Vol. 76, pgs. 9 and 126] pdf

  | publisher = U. S. Government}}; (heavily redacted). Memorandum discuss inquiry from the U.S. Statement as to the participation of [[Alger Hiss]], Gustavo Duran and others in the [[Amerasia]] case. Fitch recommends replying to the State Dept. by referring to the detailed memoranda on Hiss and Duran which was previously submitted and a summary memo transmitted to General Holmes, to Fred Lyon's attention on May 29, 1945 in connection with [[Philip Jaffe]] and the Amerasia case (pg. 9).  Statement that memos on Alger Hiss and Gustavo Duran will follow. Hiss memo is included, but that on Duran is not (pg. 126).</ref>  

  | publisher = U. S. Government}}; (heavily redacted). Memorandum discuss inquiry from the U.S. Statement as to the participation of Alger Hiss, Gustavo Duran and others in the [[Amerasia]] case. Fitch recommends replying to the State Dept. by referring to the detailed memoranda on Hiss and Duran which was previously submitted and a summary memo transmitted to General Holmes, to Fred Lyon's attention on May 29, 1945 in connection with [[Philip Jaffe]] and the Amerasia case (pg. 9).  Statement that memos on Alger Hiss and Gustavo Duran will follow. Hiss memo is included, but that on Duran is not (pg. 126).</ref>  

* [[Arpad Erdos]], U.S. State Department;<ref>

* [[Arpad Erdos]], U.S. State Department;<ref>

Just like [[Gertrude Cameron]], [[Nelson Chipchin]], [[John Tipton Fishburn]], [[Stella Gordon]], [[Myron Victor Hunt]], [[Esther Less Kopelewich]], [[Franz Leopold Neumann]], [[Robert Ross]], [[Sylvia Schimmel]], and [[Frances M. Tuchser]] on August 9, 1951, Senator McCarthy listed Erdos as being one of the individuals that he had given to the [[Tydings Committee]] a year earlier. McCarthy submitted to the Senate, Erdos, as yet another example of a clear security risk who was currently in the loyalty-security channels in the State Department. There was no explanation from the State Department as to why Erdos remained in loyalty-security channels for such a lengthy period of time. In the meantime, Erdos, like Cameron, Fishburn, Chipchin, Gordon, Hunt, Kopelewich, Ross, Schimmel, Tuchser, and Neumann, was able to carry on his activities despite concerns about his loyalty and security clearance.

Just like [[Gertrude Cameron]], [[Nelson Chipchin]], John Tipton Fishburn, [[Stella Gordon]], [[Myron Victor Hunt]], [[Esther Less Kopelewich]], Franz Leopold Neumann, [[Robert Ross]], [[Sylvia Schimmel]], and [[Frances M. Tuchser]] on August 9, 1951, Senator McCarthy listed Erdos as being one of the individuals that he had given to the Tydings Committee a year earlier. McCarthy submitted to the Senate, Erdos, as yet another example of a clear security risk who was currently in the loyalty-security channels in the State Department. There was no explanation from the State Department as to why Erdos remained in loyalty-security channels for such a lengthy period of time. In the meantime, Erdos, like Cameron, Fishburn, Chipchin, Gordon, Hunt, Kopelewich, Ross, Schimmel, Tuchser, and Neumann, was able to carry on his activities despite concerns about his loyalty and security clearance.

({{cite book

({{cite book

  | last = Buckley, Jr., William F. and Bozell, L. Brent

  | last = Buckley, Jr., William F. and Bozell, L. Brent

  | title = Page 9707

  | title = Page 9707

  | publisher = U. S. Government Printing Office}})</ref><ref>FBI Silvermaster file [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster064.pdf Vol. 64, pg. 240] pdf. Brief background on Herbert Fierst.</ref><ref>FBI Silvermaster file [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster077.pdf Vol. 77, pg. 202] pdf, September 1946.</ref>

  | publisher = U. S. Government Printing Office}})</ref><ref>FBI Silvermaster file [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster064.pdf Vol. 64, pg. 240] pdf. Brief background on Herbert Fierst.</ref><ref>FBI Silvermaster file [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster077.pdf Vol. 77, pg. 202] pdf, September 1946.</ref>

* [[John Tipton Fishburn]], U.S. State Department; Lee list #106;<ref>Just like [[Arpad Erdos]], [[Gertrude Cameron]], [[Nelson Chipchin]], [[Stella Gordon]], [[Myron Victor Hunt]], [[Esther Less Kopelewich]], [[Franz Leopold Neumann]], [[Robert Ross]], [[Sylvia Schimmel]], [[Frances M. Tuchser]] on August 9, 1951, Senator McCarthy listed Fishburn as being one of the individuals that he had given to the [[Tydings Committee]] a year earlier. McCarthy submitted to the Senate, Fishburn, as yet another example of a clear security risk who was currently in the loyalty-security channels in the State Department. There was no explanation from the State Department as to why Fishburn remained in loyalty-security channels for such a lengthy period of time. In the meantime, Fishburn, like Cameron, Chipchin, Erdos, Gordon, Hunt, Kopelewich, Ross, Schimmel, Tuchser, and Neumann, was able to carry on his activities despite concerns about his loyalty and security clearance.

* John Tipton Fishburn, U.S. State Department; Lee list #106;<ref>Just like Arpad Erdos, Gertrude Cameron, Nelson Chipchin, Stella Gordon, Myron Victor Hunt, Esther Less Kopelewich, Franz Leopold Neumann, Robert Ross, Sylvia Schimmel, Frances M. Tuchser on August 9, 1951, Senator McCarthy listed Fishburn as being one of the individuals that he had given to the Tydings Committee a year earlier. McCarthy submitted to the Senate, Fishburn, as yet another example of a clear security risk who was currently in the loyalty-security channels in the State Department. There was no explanation from the State Department as to why Fishburn remained in loyalty-security channels for such a lengthy period of time. In the meantime, Fishburn, like Cameron, Chipchin, Erdos, Gordon, Hunt, Kopelewich, Ross, Schimmel, Tuchser, and Neumann, was able to carry on his activities despite concerns about his loyalty and security clearance.

({{cite book

({{cite book

  | last = Buckley, Jr., William F. and Bozell, L. Brent

  | last = Buckley, Jr., William F. and Bozell, L. Brent

  | isbn = 0-87968-308-2}})</ref>

  | isbn = 0-87968-308-2}})</ref>

* [[Theodore Geiger]], U.S. State Department;<ref>

* [[Theodore Geiger]], U.S. State Department;<ref>

During the [[Tydings Committee]] hearings, Robert Morris, the Chief Counsel for the Minority, stated that Geiger was engaged in espionage activities as part of a Communist Party cell operating in the U.S. Morris offered to provide several witnesses who were also in Geiger's Communist Party cell however the Chairman of the [[Tydings Committee]], [[Millard Tydings]] declined to hear the testimony. On July 25, 1950, Senator McCarthy told the Senate about this case and that the witnesses to Geiger's Communist Party cell where willing to testify but that [[Millard Tydings]] refused the opportunity to expose a known Communist working for the State Department.

During the Tydings Committee hearings, Robert Morris, the Chief Counsel for the Minority, stated that Geiger was engaged in espionage activities as part of a Communist Party cell operating in the U.S. Morris offered to provide several witnesses who were also in Geiger's Communist Party cell however the Chairman of the Tydings Committee, [[Millard Tydings]] declined to hear the testimony. On July 25, 1950, Senator McCarthy told the Senate about this case and that the witnesses to Geiger's Communist Party cell where willing to testify but that [[Millard Tydings]] refused the opportunity to expose a known Communist working for the State Department.

({{cite book

({{cite book

  | last = Buckley, Jr., William F. and Bozell, L. Brent

  | last = Buckley, Jr., William F. and Bozell, L. Brent

  | title = Page 1091

  | title = Page 1091

  | publisher = U. S. Government Printing Office}})</ref>

  | publisher = U. S. Government Printing Office}})</ref>

* [[Stella Gordon]], U.S. State Department; McCarthy's Case #40 and Lee list #45<ref>

* Stella Gordon, U.S. State Department; McCarthy's Case #40 and Lee list #45<ref>

Just like [[Arpad Erdos]], [[Gertrude Cameron]], [[Nelson Chipchin]], [[John Tipton Fishburn]], [[Myron Victor Hunt]], [[Esther Less Kopelewich]], [[Franz Leopold Neumann]], [[Robert Ross]], [[Sylvia Schimmel]], [[Frances M. Tuchser]] on August 9, 1951, Senator McCarthy listed Gordon as being one of the individuals that he had given to the [[Tydings Committee]] a year earlier. McCarthy submitted to the Senate, Gordon, as yet another example of a clear security risk who was currently in the loyalty-security channels in the State Department. There was no explanation from the State Department as to why Gordon remained in loyalty-security channels for such a lengthy period of time. In the meantime, Gordon, like Cameron, Fishburn, Chipchin, Erdos, Hunt, Kopelewich, Ross, Schimmel, Tuchser, and Neumann, was able to carry on her activities despite concerns about her loyalty and security clearance.

Just like Arpad Erdos, Gertrude Cameron, Nelson Chipchin, John Tipton Fishburn, Myron Victor Hunt, Esther Less Kopelewich, Franz Leopold Neumann, Robert Ross, Sylvia Schimmel, Frances M. Tuchser on August 9, 1951, Senator McCarthy listed Gordon as being one of the individuals that he had given to the Tydings Committee a year earlier. McCarthy submitted to the Senate, Gordon, as yet another example of a clear security risk who was currently in the loyalty-security channels in the State Department. There was no explanation from the State Department as to why Gordon remained in loyalty-security channels for such a lengthy period of time. In the meantime, Gordon, like Cameron, Fishburn, Chipchin, Erdos, Hunt, Kopelewich, Ross, Schimmel, Tuchser, and Neumann, was able to carry on her activities despite concerns about her loyalty and security clearance.

({{cite book

({{cite book

  | last = Buckley, Jr., William F. and Bozell, L. Brent

  | last = Buckley, Jr., William F. and Bozell, L. Brent

  | title = Page 9707

  | title = Page 9707

  | publisher = U. S. Government Printing Office}})</ref>

  | publisher = U. S. Government Printing Office}})</ref>

* [[Myron Victor Hunt]], U.S. State Department; McCarthy's Case #65 and Lee list #79;<ref>

* Myron Victor Hunt, U.S. State Department; McCarthy's Case #65 and Lee list #79;<ref>

Just like [[Arpad Erdos]], [[Gertrude Cameron]], [[Nelson Chipchin]], [[John Tipton Fishburn]], [[Stella Gordon]], [[Esther Less Kopelewich]], [[Franz Leopold Neumann]], [[Robert Ross]], [[Sylvia Schimmel]], [[Frances M. Tuchser]] on August 9, 1951, Senator McCarthy listed Hunt as being one of the individuals that he had given to the [[Tydings Committee]] a year earlier. McCarthy submitted to the Senate, Hunt, as yet another example of a clear security risk who was currently in the loyalty-security channels in the State Department. There was no explanation from the State Department as to why Hunt remained in loyalty-security channels for such a lengthy period of time. In the meantime, Hunt, like Cameron, Fishburn, Chipchin, Erdos, Gordon, Kopelewich, Ross, Schimmel, Tuchser, and Neumann, was able to carry on his activities despite concerns about his loyalty and security clearance.

Just like Arpad Erdos, Gertrude Cameron, Nelson Chipchin, John Tipton Fishburn, Stella Gordon, Esther Less Kopelewich, Franz Leopold Neumann, Robert Ross, Sylvia Schimmel, Frances M. Tuchser on August 9, 1951, Senator McCarthy listed Hunt as being one of the individuals that he had given to the Tydings Committee a year earlier. McCarthy submitted to the Senate, Hunt, as yet another example of a clear security risk who was currently in the loyalty-security channels in the State Department. There was no explanation from the State Department as to why Hunt remained in loyalty-security channels for such a lengthy period of time. In the meantime, Hunt, like Cameron, Fishburn, Chipchin, Erdos, Gordon, Kopelewich, Ross, Schimmel, Tuchser, and Neumann, was able to carry on his activities despite concerns about his loyalty and security clearance.

({{cite book

({{cite book

  | last = Buckley, Jr., William F. and Bozell, L. Brent

  | last = Buckley, Jr., William F. and Bozell, L. Brent

  | isbn = 0-87968-308-2}})</ref>

  | isbn = 0-87968-308-2}})</ref>

* [[Philip Jessup]], U.S. State Department, Assistant Director for the Naval School of Military Government and Administration at Columbia University in New York, Delegate to the U.N. in a number of different capacities, Ambassador-at-large, and Chairman of the Institute of Pacific Relations Research Advisory Committee; McCarthy's Case #15;<ref>

* [[Philip Jessup]], U.S. State Department, Assistant Director for the Naval School of Military Government and Administration at Columbia University in New York, Delegate to the U.N. in a number of different capacities, Ambassador-at-large, and Chairman of the Institute of Pacific Relations Research Advisory Committee; McCarthy's Case #15;<ref>

McCarthy's first comments regarding Jessup were made during the [[Tydings Committee]] hearings where McCarthy stated that Jessup had an unusual affinity for Communist causes. McCarthy was never allowed by the Tydings Committee to outline his case regarding Jessup but the committee did allow Jessup to fly in from Pakistan and give his defense against charges that McCarthy had not yet even made. Needless to say, the Tydings Committee cleared Jessup as they did with everyone that appeared before them. However, in two speeches on the floor of the Senate, McCarthy gave his evidence regarding Jessup's "unusual affinity for Communist causes". They are as follows:<br>

McCarthy's first comments regarding Jessup were made during the Tydings Committee hearings where McCarthy stated that Jessup had an unusual affinity for Communist causes. McCarthy was never allowed by the Tydings Committee to outline his case regarding Jessup but the committee did allow Jessup to fly in from Pakistan and give his defense against charges that McCarthy had not yet even made. Needless to say, the Tydings Committee cleared Jessup as they did with everyone that appeared before them. However, in two speeches on the floor of the Senate, McCarthy gave his evidence regarding Jessup's "unusual affinity for Communist causes". They are as follows:<br>

(1) That Jessup had been affiliated with five [[Communist front]] groups;

(1) That Jessup had been affiliated with five [[Communist front]] groups;

(2) That Jessup had been a leading light in the [[Institute of Pacific Relations]] (IPR) at a time that organization was reflecting the Communist Party line;

(2) That Jessup had been a leading light in the [[Institute of Pacific Relations]] (IPR) at a time that organization was reflecting the Communist Party line;

While it may be questionable that Jessup pioneered the smear campaign against Chiang Kai-Shek, it's clear that he aided in it. There's no doubt that every single one of these allegations was essentially correct. Solid evidence shows that Jessup was associated with four Communist front organizations. They are as follows:

While it may be questionable that Jessup pioneered the smear campaign against Chiang Kai-Shek, it's clear that he aided in it. There's no doubt that every single one of these allegations was essentially correct. Solid evidence shows that Jessup was associated with four Communist front organizations. They are as follows:

the [[American Russian Institute]], the [[National Emergency Conference]] (and its successor, the [[National Emergency Conference for Democratic Rights]]), the [[American Law Students Association]], and the [[American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations]]. According to the House Committee on Un-American Activities each of these organizations was cited as Communist front groups at the time of Jessup's association with them. Although the Tydings Committee did not allow McCarthy to present his evidence against Jessup, the Tydings Committee did refer to some of McCarthy's evidence that were made on the floor of the Senate. Of course, as usual, the Tydings Committee either ignored the significance of the evidence or downplayed it. It was up to the [[United States Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security|McCarran Committee]] a year later to do the real investigating and in discussing the IPR, it stated, "The IPR was a vehicle used by Communists to orientate American Far Eastern policy toward Communist objectives." The McCarran Committee Hearings clearly indicate that the IPR was more than just a Communist front organization in that there was an active Communist "cell" that put the services of the IPR at the disposal of "Communist imperialism". And that this was achieved by "manipulating" the IPR's policy-making officials.<br>

the [[American Russian Institute]], the [[National Emergency Conference]] (and its successor, the [[National Emergency Conference for Democratic Rights]]), the [[American Law Students Association]], and the [[American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations]]. According to the House Committee on Un-American Activities each of these organizations was cited as Communist front groups at the time of Jessup's association with them. Although the Tydings Committee did not allow McCarthy to present his evidence against Jessup, the Tydings Committee did refer to some of McCarthy's evidence that were made on the floor of the Senate. Of course, as usual, the Tydings Committee either ignored the significance of the evidence or downplayed it. It was up to the [[United States Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security|McCarran Committee]] a year later to do the real investigating and in discussing the IPR, it stated, "The IPR was a vehicle used by Communists to orientate American Far Eastern policy toward Communist objectives." The McCarran Committee Hearings clearly indicate that the IPR was more than just a Communist front organization in that there was an active Communist "cell" that put the services of the IPR at the disposal of "Communist imperialism". And that this was achieved by "manipulating" the IPR's policy-making officials.<br>

The McCarran Committee reported that ten of the thirty-three individuals whom Jessup recommended as delegates to the IPR Hot Springs Convention in January of 1945 have been named as members of the Communist Party. Jessup was well aware that Frederick Vanderbilt Field was a member of the Communist Party, and especially so when Field resigned from the IPR to devote full time to the [[Communist front]] organization, [[American Peace Mobilization]].<br>

The McCarran Committee reported that ten of the thirty-three individuals whom Jessup recommended as delegates to the IPR Hot Springs Convention in January of 1945 have been named as members of the Communist Party. Jessup was well aware that Frederick Vanderbilt Field was a member of the Communist Party, and especially so when Field resigned from the IPR to devote full time to the Communist front organization, [[American Peace Mobilization]].<br>

Jessup also presided over the State Department Policy Conference of October 1949 that was not only stocked with Jessup's pro-Communist associates but also, in the words of the McCarran Committee, which stated, "...the prevailing [majority] view at the conference advocated (a) the recognition of Communist China; (b) normal trade relations between the United States and Communist China; (c) encouragement of trade between Japan and Communist China; (d) economic assistance to Communist China; (e) recognition that Communist conquest in Asia was a natural and inevitable consequence of revolutionary ferment in Asia with its Communist nature being incidental." [[Harold Stassen]] and [[General Joseph Fortier]] have respectively testified that Jessup not only ignored advice to disregard the pro-Communist direction of the conference and that Jessup was in favor of recognizing Communist China. The above evidence clearly demonstrates that Jessup was at least a security risk and that the State Department Loyalty program failed to identify him as such.  

Jessup also presided over the State Department Policy Conference of October 1949 that was not only stocked with Jessup's pro-Communist associates but also, in the words of the McCarran Committee, which stated, "...the prevailing [majority] view at the conference advocated (a) the recognition of Communist China; (b) normal trade relations between the United States and Communist China; (c) encouragement of trade between Japan and Communist China; (d) economic assistance to Communist China; (e) recognition that Communist conquest in Asia was a natural and inevitable consequence of revolutionary ferment in Asia with its Communist nature being incidental." [[Harold Stassen]] and [[General Joseph Fortier]] have respectively testified that Jessup not only ignored advice to disregard the pro-Communist direction of the conference and that Jessup was in favor of recognizing Communist China. The above evidence clearly demonstrates that Jessup was at least a security risk and that the State Department Loyalty program failed to identify him as such.  

({{cite book

({{cite book

  | publisher = U. S. Government Printing Office}})</ref>

  | publisher = U. S. Government Printing Office}})</ref>

* [[Dorothy Kenyon]], New York City Municipal Court Judge, U.S. State Department appointee as American Delegate to the United Nations Commission on the Status of Women;<ref>

* [[Dorothy Kenyon]], New York City Municipal Court Judge, U.S. State Department appointee as American Delegate to the United Nations Commission on the Status of Women;<ref>

Dorothy Kenyon is considered one of McCarthy's "Nine Public Cases" that was presented to the [[Tydings Committee]]. Kenyon was McCarthy's first case and it took two days in order for McCarthy to present the evidence due to the constant interruptions by members of the Tyding's Committee. This prompted Senator Lodge to state that, "I think to interrupt the witness [McCarthy] every time and break up his continuity and destroy the flow of his argument, the way we are doing, is not the right procedure....For some reason that has not been made clear to me, whether it is to rattle or whether it is to confuse, I don't know, we have an entirely different procedure today...I am objecting to the constant interruption of the witness so that he never gets a fair shake."<br>

Dorothy Kenyon is considered one of McCarthy's "Nine Public Cases" that was presented to the Tydings Committee. Kenyon was McCarthy's first case and it took two days in order for McCarthy to present the evidence due to the constant interruptions by members of the Tyding's Committee. This prompted Senator Lodge to state that, "I think to interrupt the witness [McCarthy] every time and break up his continuity and destroy the flow of his argument, the way we are doing, is not the right procedure....For some reason that has not been made clear to me, whether it is to rattle or whether it is to confuse, I don't know, we have an entirely different procedure today...I am objecting to the constant interruption of the witness so that he never gets a fair shake."<br>

Despite the constant harassment, McCarthy's evidence included showing that Kenyon belonged to at least 24 Communist front organizations labeled as such in part by the [[United States Attorney General]], the [[House Un-American Activities Committee]], and other governmental committees. The documents presented by McCarthy included, official organization letterheads that listed Kenyon as a sponsor or as a member, official programs of organization sponsored dinners, and newspaper reports of open letters that Kenyon had signed that connected her with the organizations. Certainly, these were all documents that were easily accessible to the State Department should they have cared to look into Kenyon's political background.<br>

Despite the constant harassment, McCarthy's evidence included showing that Kenyon belonged to at least 24 Communist front organizations labeled as such in part by the [[United States Attorney General]], the [[House Un-American Activities Committee]], and other governmental committees. The documents presented by McCarthy included, official organization letterheads that listed Kenyon as a sponsor or as a member, official programs of organization sponsored dinners, and newspaper reports of open letters that Kenyon had signed that connected her with the organizations. Certainly, these were all documents that were easily accessible to the State Department should they have cared to look into Kenyon's political background.<br>

When Kenyon was asked by the Tydings Committee whether she had ever been interviewed by the State Department as to her affiliation to any Communist front organizations, she responded that she had never been asked. According to the security evaluation procedure of the State Department, Kenyon should have been asked about these affiliations but failed to do so. McCarthy had easily demonstrated from this first case that the screening process of the State Department was certainly lax and quite possibly purposefully ignoring easily identifiable security risks. However, the Tydings Committee instead ignored this evidence and set the precedent for the hearings that anyone that came before the committee was going to be given a positive evaluation no matter how strongly the evidence indicated the witness was a security risk.

When Kenyon was asked by the Tydings Committee whether she had ever been interviewed by the State Department as to her affiliation to any Communist front organizations, she responded that she had never been asked. According to the security evaluation procedure of the State Department, Kenyon should have been asked about these affiliations but failed to do so. McCarthy had easily demonstrated from this first case that the screening process of the State Department was certainly lax and quite possibly purposefully ignoring easily identifiable security risks. However, the Tydings Committee instead ignored this evidence and set the precedent for the hearings that anyone that came before the committee was going to be given a positive evaluation no matter how strongly the evidence indicated the witness was a security risk.

  | isbn = 0-87968-308-2}})</ref>

  | isbn = 0-87968-308-2}})</ref>

* [[Leon Hirsch Keyserling]], President [[Harry Truman]]'s Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers;<ref>

* [[Leon Hirsch Keyserling]], President [[Harry Truman]]'s Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers;<ref>

Keyserling had an extensive background of service in the U.S. government. He had helped to shift the emphasis of U.S. economic policy toward a more [[Socialist]]ic structure. Evidence in the form of sworn testimony submitted to the [[United States Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security|McCarran Committee]] indicated that he agreed with the principles of the Communist Party except for the idea that Communization of the U.S. could only be achieved through "bloody revolution" and he was against the idea of a separate political entity for Black people in the U.S. South. Other than those two details, Keyserling, a major official in the U.S. government, agreed with the Communization of the U.S. Less than a year after Senator McCarthy made this information public, Keyserling left U.S. government work for the private sector yet continued to act as a paid consultant to the U.S. Congress.

Keyserling had an extensive background of service in the U.S. government. He had helped to shift the emphasis of U.S. economic policy toward a more [[Socialist]]ic structure. Evidence in the form of sworn testimony submitted to the McCarran Committee indicated that he agreed with the principles of the Communist Party except for the idea that Communization of the U.S. could only be achieved through "bloody revolution" and he was against the idea of a separate political entity for Black people in the U.S. South. Other than those two details, Keyserling, a major official in the U.S. government, agreed with the Communization of the U.S. Less than a year after Senator McCarthy made this information public, Keyserling left U.S. government work for the private sector yet continued to act as a paid consultant to the U.S. Congress.

({{cite book

({{cite book

  | last = Buckley, Jr., William F. and Bozell, L. Brent

  | last = Buckley, Jr., William F. and Bozell, L. Brent

  | title = Page 4153

  | title = Page 4153

  | publisher = U. S. Government Printing Office}})</ref>

  | publisher = U. S. Government Printing Office}})</ref>

* [[Esther Less Kopelewich]], U.S. State Department; McCarthy's Case #24;<ref>

* Esther Less Kopelewich, U.S. State Department; McCarthy's Case #24;<ref>

Just like [[Arpad Erdos]], [[Gertrude Cameron]], [[Nelson Chipchin]], [[John Tipton Fishburn]], [[Stella Gordon]], [[Myron Victor Hunt]], [[Franz Leopold Neumann]], [[Robert Ross]], [[Sylvia Schimmel]], [[Frances M. Tuchser]] on August 9, 1951, Senator McCarthy listed Kopelewich as being one of the individuals that he had given to the [[Tydings Committee]] a year earlier. McCarthy submitted to the Senate, Kopelewich, as yet another example of a clear security risk who was currently in the loyalty-security channels in the State Department. There was no explanation from the State Department as to why Kopelewich remained in loyalty-security channels for such a lengthy period of time. In the meantime, Kopelewich, like Cameron, Fishburn, Chipchin, Erdos, Gordon, Hunt, Ross, Schimmel, Tuchser, and Neumann, was able to carry on her activities despite concerns about her loyalty and security clearance.

Just like Arpad Erdos, Gertrude Cameron, Nelson Chipchin, John Tipton Fishburn, Stella Gordon, Myron Victor Hunt, Franz Leopold Neumann, Robert Ross, Sylvia Schimmel, Frances M. Tuchser on August 9, 1951, Senator McCarthy listed Kopelewich as being one of the individuals that he had given to the Tydings Committee a year earlier. McCarthy submitted to the Senate, Kopelewich, as yet another example of a clear security risk who was currently in the loyalty-security channels in the State Department. There was no explanation from the State Department as to why Kopelewich remained in loyalty-security channels for such a lengthy period of time. In the meantime, Kopelewich, like Cameron, Fishburn, Chipchin, Erdos, Gordon, Hunt, Ross, Schimmel, Tuchser, and Neumann, was able to carry on her activities despite concerns about her loyalty and security clearance.

({{cite book

({{cite book

  | last = Buckley, Jr., William F. and Bozell, L. Brent

  | last = Buckley, Jr., William F. and Bozell, L. Brent

  | publisher = U. S. Government Printing Office}})</ref>

  | publisher = U. S. Government Printing Office}})</ref>

* [[Owen Lattimore]], Board member of the communist-dominated [[Institute of Pacific Relations]] (I.P.R) and editor the I.P.R.’s journal ''Pacific Affairs'';<ref>

* [[Owen Lattimore]], Board member of the communist-dominated [[Institute of Pacific Relations]] (I.P.R) and editor the I.P.R.’s journal ''Pacific Affairs'';<ref>

Identified by McCarthy as a Communist and under Party discipline. Former Communist Party member and head of the Buben group of spies, [[Louis Budenz]] corroborated McCarthy's claims and detailed how Lattimore had been of service to the Communist Party in the ''Amerasia'' case. Lattimore was also identified by former Soviet Army General [[Alexander Barmine]] as a member of Russian Military Intelligence ([[GRU]]). In a unanimous report, the [[United States Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security|McCarran Committee]] classified Lattimore as a "conscious articulate instrument of the Soviet conspiracy". Lattimore wrote a letter of introduction for [[Haakon Chevalier]] to [[KGB]] operative, [[Lauchlin Currie]]. Chevalier was attempting to obtain a Government job during this period of time. Chevalier is a known Soviet Secret Intelligence Service ([[NKVD]]) contact and was associated with numerous members of the Communist Party on the West Coast. Currie also recommended Lattimore to President Roosevelt to serve as a special advisor to [[Chiang Kai-shek]]. Indicted for committing perjury. In December 1952, Currie gave evidence in New York to a grand jury investigating Lattimore's role in the publication by [[Amerasia]] magazine of secret State Department documents. All evidence indicates that Lattimore was a security and a loyalty risk and served to guide U.S. foreign policy to the detriment of U.S national interests.

Identified by McCarthy as a Communist and under Party discipline. Former Communist Party member and head of the Buben group of spies, [[Louis Budenz]] corroborated McCarthy's claims and detailed how Lattimore had been of service to the Communist Party in the ''Amerasia'' case. Lattimore was also identified by former Soviet Army General [[Alexander Barmine]] as a member of Russian Military Intelligence ([[GRU]]). In a unanimous report, the McCarran Committee classified Lattimore as a "conscious articulate instrument of the Soviet conspiracy". Lattimore wrote a letter of introduction for [[Haakon Chevalier]] to [[KGB]] operative, [[Lauchlin Currie]]. Chevalier was attempting to obtain a Government job during this period of time. Chevalier is a known Soviet Secret Intelligence Service ([[NKVD]]) contact and was associated with numerous members of the Communist Party on the West Coast. Currie also recommended Lattimore to President Roosevelt to serve as a special advisor to [[Chiang Kai-shek]]. Indicted for committing perjury. In December 1952, Currie gave evidence in New York to a grand jury investigating Lattimore's role in the publication by [[Amerasia]] magazine of secret State Department documents. All evidence indicates that Lattimore was a security and a loyalty risk and served to guide U.S. foreign policy to the detriment of U.S national interests.

({{cite book

({{cite book

  | last = Buckley, Jr., William F. and Bozell, L. Brent

  | last = Buckley, Jr., William F. and Bozell, L. Brent

  | publisher = Truman Presidential Museum and Library

  | publisher = Truman Presidential Museum and Library

  | date = May 15, 1969

  | date = May 15, 1969

  | url = http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/nash15.htm}})</ref><ref>FBI Silvermaster file [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster058.pdf Vol. 58, pgs. 107 - 110] pdf.</ref><ref>[http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster065.pdf Vol. 65, pgs. 155 - 156] pdf. August 1946. Notes contact between Nash and [[Louise Bransten]] in January 1944. Bransten was the mistress of San Francisco [[KGB]] [[Rezident]] [[Grigory Kheifets]] who made initial contact with [[J. Robert Oppenheimer]] in the home of Bransten on December 6, 1941.</ref>

  | url = http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/nash15.htm}})</ref><ref>FBI Silvermaster file [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster058.pdf Vol. 58, pgs. 107 - 110] pdf.</ref><ref>[http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster065.pdf Vol. 65, pgs. 155 - 156] pdf. August 1946. Notes contact between Nash and [[Louise Bransten]] in January 1944. Bransten was the mistress of San Francisco KGB [[Rezident]] [[Grigory Kheifets]] who made initial contact with [[J. Robert Oppenheimer]] in the home of Bransten on December 6, 1941.</ref>

* [[Olga V. Osnatch]], U.S. State Department; McCarthy's Case #81 and Lee list #78;<ref>

* [[Olga V. Osnatch]], U.S. State Department; McCarthy's Case #81 and Lee list #78;<ref>

On August 9, 1951, Senator McCarthy listed Osnatch as his Case #81. At the time of McCarthy's original investigation, Osnatch was not yet a citizen of the United States. At the time of this speech, it was not clear if she had gotten her citizenship papers or not. McCarthy stated that, "She worked for the Russian Embassy in Turkey for 3 years. Then with the Russian Welfare Society, and so forth. One of the significant things here, of course, is that the Russians do not hire people in their embassies unless they are Communists." So, what McCarthy was making clear in this speech was that only committed Communists are employed with Soviet agencies. Why an assumed Communist was allowed to work for the U.S. government was yet another mystery that the Truman administration would not explain.

On August 9, 1951, Senator McCarthy listed Osnatch as his Case #81. At the time of McCarthy's original investigation, Osnatch was not yet a citizen of the United States. At the time of this speech, it was not clear if she had gotten her citizenship papers or not. McCarthy stated that, "She worked for the Russian Embassy in Turkey for 3 years. Then with the Russian Welfare Society, and so forth. One of the significant things here, of course, is that the Russians do not hire people in their embassies unless they are Communists." So, what McCarthy was making clear in this speech was that only committed Communists are employed with Soviet agencies. Why an assumed Communist was allowed to work for the U.S. government was yet another mystery that the Truman administration would not explain.

  | date = August 9, 1951

  | date = August 9, 1951

  | title = Page 9708

  | title = Page 9708

  | publisher = U. S. Government Printing Office}})</ref><ref>FBI Silvermaster file, [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster023.pdf "Underground Espionage Organization (NKVD) in Agencies of the United States Government"], Vol. 23, pgs. 55 - 272 pdf, February 21, 1946. Includes alphabetical index at end.  In the later part of February 1946, the [[FBI]] transmitted to Secretary of State [[George Marshall]]l a 194 page Report based upon Soviet defector [[Elizabeth Bentley]]'s deposition three months earlier entitled, "Underground Espionage Organization (NKVD) in Agencies of the United States Government."  Preliminary investigations and other information in Bureau files gave support and credence to the providential value of Bentley's serious allegations. Bentley had been assigned a covername by the FBI, "Gregory," and the highly secret investigation was referred to by investigators as "the Gregory Case."  State Department internal investigators provided a list of questions to the FBI for the confidential informant to answer. The Statement requested information about Philip and Alice Raine.  Bentley, who worked out of New York, responded the names were entirely unfamiliar (pg. Vol. 96, pg. 87).  Philip and Alicia Raine subsequently were developed as leads by FBI investigators in the Washington field office while surveilling the many contacts of [[Mary Jane Keeney]].</ref><ref>FBI Silvermaster file, Hoover letter to Secretary of State George Marshall, [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster096.pdf Vol. 96, pgs. 85 -90] pdf, March 10, 1946.</ref><ref>FBI Silvermaster file [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster077.pdf Vol. 77, pgs. 133, 135, 201] pdf, September 1946.</ref>

  | publisher = U. S. Government Printing Office}})</ref><ref>FBI Silvermaster file, [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster023.pdf "Underground Espionage Organization (NKVD) in Agencies of the United States Government"], Vol. 23, pgs. 55 - 272 pdf, February 21, 1946. Includes alphabetical index at end.  In the later part of February 1946, the [[FBI]] transmitted to Secretary of State [[George Marshall]]l a 194 page Report based upon Soviet defector Elizabeth Bentley's deposition three months earlier entitled, "Underground Espionage Organization (NKVD) in Agencies of the United States Government."  Preliminary investigations and other information in Bureau files gave support and credence to the providential value of Bentley's serious allegations. Bentley had been assigned a covername by the FBI, "Gregory," and the highly secret investigation was referred to by investigators as "the Gregory Case."  State Department internal investigators provided a list of questions to the FBI for the confidential informant to answer. The Statement requested information about Philip and Alice Raine.  Bentley, who worked out of New York, responded the names were entirely unfamiliar (pg. Vol. 96, pg. 87).  Philip and Alicia Raine subsequently were developed as leads by FBI investigators in the Washington field office while surveilling the many contacts of [[Mary Jane Keeney]].</ref><ref>FBI Silvermaster file, Hoover letter to Secretary of State George Marshall, [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster096.pdf Vol. 96, pgs. 85 -90] pdf, March 10, 1946.</ref><ref>FBI Silvermaster file [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster077.pdf Vol. 77, pgs. 133, 135, 201] pdf, September 1946.</ref>

* [[Robert Ross]], U.S. State Department; McCarthy's Case #32 and Lee list #30;<ref>

* Robert Ross, U.S. State Department; McCarthy's Case #32 and Lee list #30;<ref>

Just like [[Arpad Erdos]], [[Gertrude Cameron]], [[Nelson Chipchin]], [[John Tipton Fishburn]], [[Stella Gordon]], [[Myron Victor Hunt]], [[Franz Leopold Neumann]], [[Sylvia Schimmel]], [[Frances M. Tuchser]] on August 9, 1951, Senator McCarthy listed Ross as being one of the individuals that he had given to the [[Tydings Committee]] a year earlier. McCarthy submitted to the Senate, Ross, as yet another example of a clear security risk who was currently in the loyalty-security channels in the State Department. There was no explanation from the State Department as to why Ross remained in loyalty-security channels for such a lengthy period of time. In the meantime, Ross, like Cameron, Fishburn, Chipchin, Erdos, Gordon, Hunt, Neumann, Schimmel, and Tuchser, was able to carry on his activities despite concerns about his loyalty and security clearance.

Just like Arpad Erdos, Gertrude Cameron, Nelson Chipchin, John Tipton Fishburn, Stella Gordon, Myron Victor Hunt, Franz Leopold Neumann, Sylvia Schimmel, Frances M. Tuchser on August 9, 1951, Senator McCarthy listed Ross as being one of the individuals that he had given to the Tydings Committee a year earlier. McCarthy submitted to the Senate, Ross, as yet another example of a clear security risk who was currently in the loyalty-security channels in the State Department. There was no explanation from the State Department as to why Ross remained in loyalty-security channels for such a lengthy period of time. In the meantime, Ross, like Cameron, Fishburn, Chipchin, Erdos, Gordon, Hunt, Neumann, Schimmel, and Tuchser, was able to carry on his activities despite concerns about his loyalty and security clearance.

({{cite book

({{cite book

  | last = Buckley, Jr., William F. and Bozell, L. Brent

  | last = Buckley, Jr., William F. and Bozell, L. Brent

  | title = Page 9708

  | title = Page 9708

  | publisher = U. S. Government Printing Office}})</ref>

  | publisher = U. S. Government Printing Office}})</ref>

* [[Sylvia Schimmel]], U.S. State Department; McCarthy's Case #50 and Lee list #60;<ref>

* Sylvia Schimmel, U.S. State Department; McCarthy's Case #50 and Lee list #60;<ref>

Just like [[Arpad Erdos]], [[Gertrude Cameron]], [[Nelson Chipchin]], [[John Tipton Fishburn]], [[Stella Gordon]], [[Myron Victor Hunt]], [[Franz Leopold Neumann]], [[Frances M. Tuchser]] on August 9, 1951, Senator McCarthy listed Schimmel as being one of the individuals that he had given to the [[Tydings Committee]] a year earlier. McCarthy submitted to the Senate, Schimmel, as yet another example of a clear security risk who was currently in the loyalty-security channels in the State Department. There was no explanation from the State Department as to why Schimmel remained in loyalty-security channels for such a lengthy period of time. In the meantime, Ross, like Cameron, Fishburn, Chipchin, Erdos, Gordon, Hunt, Neumann, and Tuchser, was able to carry on her activities despite concerns about her loyalty and security clearance.

Just like Arpad Erdos, Gertrude Cameron, Nelson Chipchin, John Tipton Fishburn, Stella Gordon, Myron Victor Hunt, Franz Leopold Neumann, Frances M. Tuchser on August 9, 1951, Senator McCarthy listed Schimmel as being one of the individuals that he had given to the Tydings Committee a year earlier. McCarthy submitted to the Senate, Schimmel, as yet another example of a clear security risk who was currently in the loyalty-security channels in the State Department. There was no explanation from the State Department as to why Schimmel remained in loyalty-security channels for such a lengthy period of time. In the meantime, Ross, like Cameron, Fishburn, Chipchin, Erdos, Gordon, Hunt, Neumann, and Tuchser, was able to carry on her activities despite concerns about her loyalty and security clearance.

({{cite book

({{cite book

  | last = Buckley, Jr., William F. and Bozell, L. Brent

  | last = Buckley, Jr., William F. and Bozell, L. Brent

  | date = August 9, 1951

  | date = August 9, 1951

  | title = Page 9708

  | title = Page 9708

  | publisher = U. S. Government Printing Office}})</ref><ref>FBI Silvermaster file [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster061.pdf Vol. 61, pgs. 74 -79] pdf; Hottel to the Director, "Just Lunning," July 18, 1947.  Discussion between [[Mary Jane Keeney]] and Sylvia Schimmel about Just Lunning, who would become Schimmel’s supervisor at the State Department. Sylvia Schimmel complained to Just Lunning she was not being given meaningful work at the State Dept. due to Schimmel's work for the Political Action Committee. Just Lunning had links to William T. Stone, [[V. Frank Coe]], Philip Dunaway, David Wahl, [[Donald Wheeler]], [[Allan Rosenberg]], Bowen Smith, and [[Edward Fitzgerald]]. Mary Jane Keeney had innumerable contacts in the [[CPUSA]] underground espionage apparatus which included [[Greg Silvermaster]], [[Helen Silvermaster]], [[Sergey Kurnakov]], [[Joseph Bernstein]], [[Frederick Field]], [[Maurice Halperin]], [[Haakon Chevalier]], [[Richard Bransten]], [[Laurence Todd]], [[William Ullman]], and [[Robert Miller]]. Much of the Silvermaster file is devoted to surveillance reports on them.  Mary Jane Keeney had served in the occupation of Berlin while at this time her husband, [[Philip Keeney]] was serving in Japan. Mary Jane Keeney was seeking to join him there. The FBI and State Department officials were moving to prevent this, and to have Philip recalled from his position with the occupation forces.  Mary Jane Keeney had turned to Sylvia Schimmel for assistance with her passport problems.</ref><ref>FBI Silvermaster file [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster065.pdf Vol. 65, pg. 51] pdf.</ref><ref>FBI Silvermaster file [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster096.pdf Vol. 96, pg. 78] pdf.</ref>

  | publisher = U. S. Government Printing Office}})</ref><ref>FBI Silvermaster file [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster061.pdf Vol. 61, pgs. 74 -79] pdf; Hottel to the Director, "Just Lunning," July 18, 1947.  Discussion between Mary Jane Keeney and Sylvia Schimmel about Just Lunning, who would become Schimmel’s supervisor at the State Department. Sylvia Schimmel complained to Just Lunning she was not being given meaningful work at the State Dept. due to Schimmel's work for the Political Action Committee. Just Lunning had links to William T. Stone, [[V. Frank Coe]], Philip Dunaway, David Wahl, [[Donald Wheeler]], [[Allan Rosenberg]], Bowen Smith, and [[Edward Fitzgerald]]. Mary Jane Keeney had innumerable contacts in the [[CPUSA]] underground espionage apparatus which included [[Greg Silvermaster]], [[Helen Silvermaster]], [[Sergey Kurnakov]], [[Joseph Bernstein]], [[Frederick Field]], [[Maurice Halperin]], [[Haakon Chevalier]], [[Richard Bransten]], [[Laurence Todd]], [[William Ullman]], and [[Robert Miller]]. Much of the Silvermaster file is devoted to surveillance reports on them.  Mary Jane Keeney had served in the occupation of Berlin while at this time her husband, [[Philip Keeney]] was serving in Japan. Mary Jane Keeney was seeking to join him there. The FBI and State Department officials were moving to prevent this, and to have Philip recalled from his position with the occupation forces.  Mary Jane Keeney had turned to Sylvia Schimmel for assistance with her passport problems.</ref><ref>FBI Silvermaster file [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster065.pdf Vol. 65, pg. 51] pdf.</ref><ref>FBI Silvermaster file [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster096.pdf Vol. 96, pg. 78] pdf.</ref>

* [[Frederick Schumann]], contracted by U.S. State Department as lecturer; Professor at Williams College; not on Lee list;<ref>

* [[Frederick Schumann]], contracted by U.S. State Department as lecturer; Professor at Williams College; not on Lee list;<ref>

Schumann was a consultant for the State Department but not as an employee. His job was to lecture and train State Department employees who were subsequently to be placed in sensitive posts. In this capacity, out of 57 instructors, only three, Schumann, Edward Acheson (Dean's brother), and Communist [[Owen Lattimore]] were not government officials. According to the [[House Committee on Un-American Activities]], Schumann was a member of over 50 Communist front organizations. In 1932, Schuman supported the Communist Party ticket for President. Schumann wrote a pro-Soviet book titled, ''Soviet Politics at Home and Abroad'' that appeared just before the State Department enlisted him for his help in helping out orient the Foreign Service officers. While Schumann declined an invitation to the [[Tydings Committee]] in order to address charges against him, the Committee, as with other cases, showed no interest in determining why pro-Soviet lecturers were being utilized by the State Department and who was doing the hiring.

Schumann was a consultant for the State Department but not as an employee. His job was to lecture and train State Department employees who were subsequently to be placed in sensitive posts. In this capacity, out of 57 instructors, only three, Schumann, Edward Acheson (Dean's brother), and Communist [[Owen Lattimore]] were not government officials. According to the [[House Committee on Un-American Activities]], Schumann was a member of over 50 Communist front organizations. In 1932, Schuman supported the Communist Party ticket for President. Schumann wrote a pro-Soviet book titled, ''Soviet Politics at Home and Abroad'' that appeared just before the State Department enlisted him for his help in helping out orient the Foreign Service officers. While Schumann declined an invitation to the Tydings Committee in order to address charges against him, the Committee, as with other cases, showed no interest in determining why pro-Soviet lecturers were being utilized by the State Department and who was doing the hiring.

({{cite book

({{cite book

  | last = Buckley, Jr., William F. and Bozell, L. Brent

  | last = Buckley, Jr., William F. and Bozell, L. Brent

  | isbn = 0-80782-245-0}})</ref>

  | isbn = 0-80782-245-0}})</ref>

* [[Harlow Shapley]], U.S. State Department appointee to UNESCO, Chairman of the National Council of Arts, Sciences, and Professions;<ref>

* [[Harlow Shapley]], U.S. State Department appointee to UNESCO, Chairman of the National Council of Arts, Sciences, and Professions;<ref>

Shapley joined at least six [[Communist front]] groups during the period of 1939-1941. By the time McCarthy had presented Shapley's case to the [[Tydings Committee]], Shapley was a member of at least 21 Communist front organizations, eight of them listed on the Attorney General's list. McCarthy's documentation clearly showed that Shapley remained associated with at least ten of these groups even after they were exposed and officially cited as subversive by multiple legislative investigating committees. In March 1949, at the "Waldorf Peace Conference", Shapley was Chairman of the National Council of Arts, Sciences, and Professions, of which even President Truman denounced as a "tool for Russia and a sounding board for Communist propaganda". Even so, Secretary of State Dean Achesson appointed Shapley as a representative of the U.S. and the U.S. State Department at UNESCO.<br>

Shapley joined at least six Communist front groups during the period of 1939-1941. By the time McCarthy had presented Shapley's case to the Tydings Committee, Shapley was a member of at least 21 Communist front organizations, eight of them listed on the Attorney General's list. McCarthy's documentation clearly showed that Shapley remained associated with at least ten of these groups even after they were exposed and officially cited as subversive by multiple legislative investigating committees. In March 1949, at the "Waldorf Peace Conference", Shapley was Chairman of the National Council of Arts, Sciences, and Professions, of which even President Truman denounced as a "tool for Russia and a sounding board for Communist propaganda". Even so, Secretary of State Dean Achesson appointed Shapley as a representative of the U.S. and the U.S. State Department at UNESCO.<br>

So, despite even Truman's concerns, the State Department appointed yet another clear security risk. As Buckley states in his book, "...a Rider to the Appropriations Act forbade the paying of funds to a person actively affiliated with any organization on the Attorney General's list. And Shapley, according to the evidence before the Tydings Committee, clearly was such a person." As usual, the Tydings Committee ignored the facts and only made mention of Shapley's limited association with the State Department. Once again, McCarthy proved his case but was brushed aside by the Tydings Committee.

So, despite even Truman's concerns, the State Department appointed yet another clear security risk. As Buckley states in his book, "...a Rider to the Appropriations Act forbade the paying of funds to a person actively affiliated with any organization on the Attorney General's list. And Shapley, according to the evidence before the Tydings Committee, clearly was such a person." As usual, the Tydings Committee ignored the facts and only made mention of Shapley's limited association with the State Department. Once again, McCarthy proved his case but was brushed aside by the Tydings Committee.

({{cite book

({{cite book

  | publisher = Regnery Publishing Inc.

  | publisher = Regnery Publishing Inc.

  | isbn = 0-89526-472-2}})</ref>

  | isbn = 0-89526-472-2}})</ref>

* [[Frances M. Tuchser]], U.S. State Department; McCarthy's Case #6 and Lee list #6;<ref>

* Frances M. Tuchser, U.S. State Department; McCarthy's Case #6 and Lee list #6;<ref>

Just like [[Arpad Erdos]], [[Gertrude Cameron]], [[Nelson Chipchin]], [[John Tipton Fishburn]], [[Stella Gordon]], [[Myron Victor Hunt]], and [[Franz Leopold Neumann]], on August 9, 1951, Senator McCarthy listed Tuchser as being one of the individuals that he had given to the [[Tydings Committee]] a year earlier. McCarthy submitted to the Senate, Tuchser, as yet another example of a clear security risk who was currently in the loyalty-security channels in the State Department. There was no explanation from the State Department as to why Tuchser remained in loyalty-security channels for such a lengthy period of time. In the meantime, Tuchser, like Cameron, Fishburn, Chipchin, Erdos, Gordon, Hunt, and Neumann, was able to carry on her activities despite concerns about her loyalty and security clearance.

Just like Arpad Erdos, Gertrude Cameron, Nelson Chipchin, John Tipton Fishburn, Stella Gordon, Myron Victor Hunt, and Franz Leopold Neumann, on August 9, 1951, Senator McCarthy listed Tuchser as being one of the individuals that he had given to the Tydings Committee a year earlier. McCarthy submitted to the Senate, Tuchser, as yet another example of a clear security risk who was currently in the loyalty-security channels in the State Department. There was no explanation from the State Department as to why Tuchser remained in loyalty-security channels for such a lengthy period of time. In the meantime, Tuchser, like Cameron, Fishburn, Chipchin, Erdos, Gordon, Hunt, and Neumann, was able to carry on her activities despite concerns about her loyalty and security clearance.

({{cite book

({{cite book

  | last = Buckley, Jr., William F. and Bozell, L. Brent

  | last = Buckley, Jr., William F. and Bozell, L. Brent

  | publisher = U. S. Government Printing Office}})</ref>

  | publisher = U. S. Government Printing Office}})</ref>

* [[John Carter Vincent]], U.S. State Department; McCarthy's Case #2 and Lee list #52;<ref>

* [[John Carter Vincent]], U.S. State Department; McCarthy's Case #2 and Lee list #52;<ref>

One of McCarthy's numbered cases given to the [[Tydings Committee]]. During his tenure as chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs, Vincent played an important role in hastening Mao's conquest of China. The [[United States Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security|McCarran Committee]] concluded that "over a period of years, John Carter Vincent was the principal fulcrum of [[Institute of Pacific Relations|IPR]] pressures and influence in the State Department." [[Louis F. Budenz]] testified in the summer of 1951 that Vincent was a member of the Communist Party. In December 1952, the Civil Service Loyalty Review Board found reasonable doubt regarding Vincent's loyalty. In 1953, [[John Foster Dulles|Secretary Dulles]] requested Vincent's resignation.

One of McCarthy's numbered cases given to the Tydings Committee. During his tenure as chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs, Vincent played an important role in hastening Mao's conquest of China. The McCarran Committee concluded that "over a period of years, John Carter Vincent was the principal fulcrum of [[Institute of Pacific Relations|IPR]] pressures and influence in the State Department." [[Louis F. Budenz]] testified in the summer of 1951 that Vincent was a member of the Communist Party. In December 1952, the Civil Service Loyalty Review Board found reasonable doubt regarding Vincent's loyalty. In 1953, [[John Foster Dulles|Secretary Dulles]] requested Vincent's resignation.

({{cite book

({{cite book

  | last = Buckley, Jr., William F. and Bozell, L. Brent

  | last = Buckley, Jr., William F. and Bozell, L. Brent

  | isbn = 0-89526-472-2}})</ref>

  | isbn = 0-89526-472-2}})</ref>

* [[David Zablodowsky]], U.S. State Department & Director of the United Nations Publishing Division. McCarthy's Case #103;<ref>

* [[David Zablodowsky]], U.S. State Department & Director of the United Nations Publishing Division. McCarthy's Case #103;<ref>

Zablodowsky was McCarthy's Case Number 103. Zablodowsky worked in the State Department and later as Director of the United Nations Publishing Division. He admitted to being a member of an espionage ring in 1936 after [[Whittaker Chambers]], on October 23, 1952, gave testimony before the [[United States Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security|McCarran Committee]] regarding Zablodowsky's activities.  

Zablodowsky was McCarthy's Case Number 103. Zablodowsky worked in the State Department and later as Director of the United Nations Publishing Division. He admitted to being a member of an espionage ring in 1936 after [[Whittaker Chambers]], on October 23, 1952, gave testimony before the McCarran Committee regarding Zablodowsky's activities.  

({{cite book

({{cite book

  | last = Buckley, Jr., William F. and Bozell, L. Brent

  | last = Buckley, Jr., William F. and Bozell, L. Brent

::"You're going to prove [Sen. Joseph] McCarthy was right, because all he was saying is that the system was loaded with Communists. And he was right. ... I'm worried about the kind of book you're going to write and about cleaning up McCarthy. The problem is that everybody said he was a liar; you're saying he was right. ... I agree that the Party was a force in the country."<ref>Brennan, Phil (April 23, 2003). [http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2003/4/22/225916.shtml ''The Left’s Lies That Never Die'']. NewsMax.com. Retrieved on 2007-06-20.</ref>

::"You're going to prove [Sen. Joseph] McCarthy was right, because all he was saying is that the system was loaded with Communists. And he was right. ... I'm worried about the kind of book you're going to write and about cleaning up McCarthy. The problem is that everybody said he was a liar; you're saying he was right. ... I agree that the Party was a force in the country."<ref>Brennan, Phil (April 23, 2003). [http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2003/4/22/225916.shtml ''The Left’s Lies That Never Die'']. NewsMax.com. Retrieved on 2007-06-20.</ref>

Both Albert Bernstein and Sylvia Bernstein, Carl's mother, had both been Communists since the 1940's. Albert Bernstein was a Union activist, while Sylvia Bernstein was a secretary for the War Department in the 1930's and, during the [[Clinton Administration]], volunteered in the White House, answering letters that were addressed to [[Hillary Clinton]]. During the 1950's, Sylvia Bernstein invoked the Fifth Amendment to avoid revealing her party ties to Congress but worked openly in assisting convicted spies [[Julius Rosenberg]] and Ethel Rosenberg, who were executed in 1953 for espionage.

Both Albert Bernstein and Sylvia Bernstein, Carl's mother, had both been Communists since the 1940s. Albert Bernstein was a Union activist, while Sylvia Bernstein was a secretary for the War Department in the 1930s and, during the [[Clinton Administration]], volunteered in the White House, answering letters that were addressed to [[Hillary Clinton]]. During the 1950s, Sylvia Bernstein invoked the Fifth Amendment to avoid revealing her party ties to Congress but worked openly in assisting convicted spies [[Julius Rosenberg]] and Ethel Rosenberg, who were executed in 1953 for espionage.

It should be pointed out how many people followed McCarthy on his crusade, and that many pro-Americans still do.  The majority of the sources that discredited Senator McCarthy originated from a large assault by the liberal media that managed to sway the majority of Americans against him at that time.

It should be pointed out how many people followed McCarthy on his crusade, and that many pro-Americans still do.  The majority of the sources that discredited Senator McCarthy originated from a large assault by the liberal media that managed to sway the majority of Americans against him at that time.

* [[David Greenglass]]

* [[David Greenglass]]

* [[Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations]]

* [[Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations]]

* [[Amerasia]]

* [[Amerasia]]

* [[William Henry Taylor]]

* [[William Henry Taylor]]