| − | Some Soviet support aircraft sent aloft with the [[Sukhoi Su-15|Su-15]] that downed KAL 007 were unable to locate the stricken jumbo jet, neither in the air during its twelve minute plus post-detonation flight, nor on the water. See 18:29:13, 18:29:54, and 18:38:37 of [[KAL 007: Timeline of Interception and Shootdown]]. But others, or these afterwards, were able to make visual contact with KAL 007. According to the Republican Staff Study, “sensitive special intelligence” (NSA electronic intercepts) revealed the following: About four hours after the shoot-down, Soviet Air Defense command posts were reporting that Soviet pilots were saying that a civilian passenger plane had been shot down instead of a U.S. RC-135 reconnaissance plane, and they (the command posts) were expressing regret, both that they had not downed the RC-135 and that now the Americans would accuse them of killing Americans. | + | Some Soviet support aircraft sent aloft with the [[Sukhoi Su-15|Su-15]] that downed KAL 007 were unable to locate the stricken jumbo jet, neither in the air during its twelve-minute plus post-detonation flight, nor on the water. See 18:29:13, 18:29:54, and 18:38:37 of [[KAL 007: Timeline of Interception and Shootdown]]. But others, or these afterwards, were able to make visual contact with KAL 007. According to the Republican Staff Study, “sensitive special intelligence” (NSA electronic intercepts) revealed the following: About four hours after the shoot-down, Soviet Air Defense command posts were reporting that Soviet pilots were saying that a civilian passenger plane had been shot down instead of a U.S. RC-135 reconnaissance plane, and they (the command posts) were expressing regret, both that they had not downed the RC-135 and that now the Americans would accuse them of killing Americans. |