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'''Kenya''', a former British colony in East Africa is famous for its majestic wildlife. The Republic of Kenya with a growing population of 38 million, shares borders with [[Ethiopia]], [[Somalia]], [[Tanzania]], [[Uganda]] and [[Sudan]]. Its coastline borders the [[Indian Ocean]]. Peace had prevailed since an uprising in the former British colony in the 1950s. A political crisis exploded into violence in early 2008, with a resolution finally reached in mid-April. Kenya faces herculean challenges, as the poor nation must deal with a fast-growing population, exploding slums and and diminishing available land. During the crisis Kenya's infrastructure suffered severe damage with countless houses, shops, businesses, factories and schools burned out, and the lucrative safari tourist business almost shut down. The crisis ignited long-standing ethnic grievances, which violently split the nation along ethnic lines.<ref>Jeffrey Gettleman, "Unity Cabinet Formed in Kenya, Ending Deadlock," [http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/14/world/africa/14kenya.html?_r=1&hp&oref=slogin  ''New York Times'' April 14, 2008]</ref>

'''Kenya''', a former British colony in East Africa is famous for its majestic wildlife. The Republic of Kenya with a growing population of 38 million, shares borders with [[Ethiopia]], [[Somalia]], [[Tanzania]], [[Uganda]] and [[Sudan]]. Its coastline borders the [[Indian Ocean]]. Peace had prevailed since an uprising in the former British colony in the 1950s. A political crisis exploded into violence in early 2008, with a resolution finally reached in mid-April. Kenya faces herculean challenges, as the poor nation must deal with a fast-growing population, exploding slums and diminishing available land. During the crisis Kenya's infrastructure suffered severe damage with countless houses, shops, businesses, factories and schools burned out, and the lucrative safari tourist business almost shut down. The crisis ignited long-standing ethnic grievances, which violently split the nation along ethnic lines.<ref>Jeffrey Gettleman, "Unity Cabinet Formed in Kenya, Ending Deadlock," [http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/14/world/africa/14kenya.html?_r=1&hp&oref=slogin  ''New York Times'' April 14, 2008]</ref>

==Economy==

==Economy==

Immediately following independence Kenya enjoyed a period of economic growth, mainly due to public investment and high levels of foreign investment. From the mid 1970s to 1993, her economic performance declined as a direct result in the downturn in the international agriculture market, poor credit and higher oil prices. In the mid 1990s, Kenya began a economic liberalisation effort in tandem with the [[International Monetary Fund]] and the [[World Bank]]. This allowed a sharp increase in economic fortunes despite setbacks in the early 21st century. However, the IMF suspended Kenya's Enhanced Structural Adjustment Program due to the government's failure to maintain reforms and curb corruption.<ref>[https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ke.html See]</ref> Over the following few years efforts at reform were top priority in order to get the IMF back on board.  Recent efforts at the highest level has been to combat corruption in government which is believed to be widespread from the local level to the very highest level of government.

Immediately following independence Kenya enjoyed a period of economic growth, mainly due to public investment and high levels of foreign investment. From the mid 1970s to 1993, her economic performance declined as a direct result in the downturn in the international agriculture market, poor credit and higher oil prices. In the mid 1990s, Kenya began an economic liberalisation effort in tandem with the [[International Monetary Fund]] and the [[World Bank]]. This allowed a sharp increase in economic fortunes despite setbacks in the early 21st century. However, the IMF suspended Kenya's Enhanced Structural Adjustment Program due to the government's failure to maintain reforms and curb corruption.<ref>[https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ke.html See]</ref> Over the following few years efforts at reform were top priority in order to get the IMF back on board.  Recent efforts at the highest level has been to combat corruption in government which is believed to be widespread from the local level to the very highest level of government.

After independence, Kenya promoted rapid economic growth through public investment, encouragement of smallholder agricultural production, and incentives for private (often foreign) industrial investment. Gross domestic product (GDP) grew at an annual average of 6.6% from 1963 to 1973. Agricultural production grew by 4.7% annually during the same period, stimulated by redistributing estates, diffusing new crop strains, and opening new areas to cultivation. After experiencing moderately high growth rates during the 1960s and 1970s, Kenya's economic performance during the last two decades has been far below its potential. The economy grew by an annual average of only 1.5% between 1997 and 2002, which was below the population growth estimated at 2.5% per annum, leading to a decline in per capita incomes. The decline in economic performance in the last two decades was largely due to inappropriate agricultural policies, inadequate credit, and poor international terms of trade contributing to the decline in agriculture. Kenya's inward-looking policy of import substitution and rising oil prices made Kenya's manufacturing sector uncompetitive. The government began a massive intrusion in the private sector. Lack of export incentives, tight import controls, and foreign exchange controls made the domestic environment for investment even less attractive.  

After independence, Kenya promoted rapid economic growth through public investment, encouragement of smallholder agricultural production, and incentives for private (often foreign) industrial investment. Gross domestic product (GDP) grew at an annual average of 6.6% from 1963 to 1973. Agricultural production grew by 4.7% annually during the same period, stimulated by redistributing estates, diffusing new crop strains, and opening new areas to cultivation. After experiencing moderately high growth rates during the 1960s and 1970s, Kenya's economic performance during the last two decades has been far below its potential. The economy grew by an annual average of only 1.5% between 1997 and 2002, which was below the population growth estimated at 2.5% per annum, leading to a decline in per capita incomes. The decline in economic performance in the last two decades was largely due to inappropriate agricultural policies, inadequate credit, and poor international terms of trade contributing to the decline in agriculture. Kenya's inward-looking policy of import substitution and rising oil prices made Kenya's manufacturing sector uncompetitive. The government began a massive intrusion in the private sector. Lack of export incentives, tight import controls, and foreign exchange controls made the domestic environment for investment even less attractive.  

Net foreign direct investment (FDI) was negative from 2000-2003, but started trickling back in 2004, as demonstrated by an increase in the number of enterprises operating in Export Processing Zones (EPZs) from 66 to 74 between 2003 and 2004. The value of total investments increased from Ksh18.7 billion (U.S. $247.3 million) in 2005 to Ksh20.1 billion (over U.S. $278.3 million) in 2006. Following the end of the Multifiber Arrangement (MFA) textile agreement in January 2005, several textile and apparel factories closed, leaving 68 EPZ enterprises. In 2006, this number increased to 70 EPZ enterprises.  

Net foreign direct investment (FDI) was negative from 2000-2003, but started trickling back in 2004, as demonstrated by an increase in the number of enterprises operating in Export Processing Zones (EPZs) from 66 to 74 between 2003 and 2004. The value of total investments increased from Ksh18.7 billion (U.S. $247.3 million) in 2005 to Ksh20.1 billion (over U.S. $278.3 million) in 2006. Following the end of the Multifiber Arrangement (MFA) textile agreement in January 2005, several textile and apparel factories closed, leaving 68 EPZ enterprises. In 2006, this number increased to 70 EPZ enterprises.  

===Recovery after 2002===

===Recovery after 2002===

The economy began to recover after 2002, registering 2.8% growth in 2003, 4.3% in 2004, 5.8% in 2005, and 6.1% in 2006. Under the leadership of President Kibaki, who took over on December 30, 2002, the Government of Kenya began an ambitious economic reform program and resumed its cooperation with the World Bank and the IMF. The National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) government enacted the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act and Public Officers Ethics Act in May 2003 aimed at fighting graft in public offices. There was some movement to reduce corruption in 2003, but the government did not sustain that momentum. Other reforms especially in the judiciary, public procurement etc, led to the unlocking of donor aid and a renewed hope of economic revival.  

The economy began to recover after 2002, registering 2.8% growth in 2003, 4.3% in 2004, 5.8% in 2005, and 6.1% in 2006. Under the leadership of President Kibaki, who took over on December 30, 2002, the Government of Kenya began an ambitious economic reform program and resumed its cooperation with the World Bank and the IMF. The National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) government enacted the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act and Public Officers Ethics Act in May 2003 aimed at fighting graft in public offices. There was some movement to reduce corruption in 2003, but the government did not sustain that momentum. Other reforms especially in the judiciary, public procurement etc., led to the unlocking of donor aid and a renewed hope of economic revival.  

In November 2003, following the signing into law of key anti-corruption legislation and other reforms by the new government, donors reengaged as the IMF approved a three-year $250 million Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility and donors committed $4.2 billion in support over 4 years. In December 2004, the IMF approved Kenya's Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) arrangement equivalent to U.S. $252.8 million to support the government's economic and governance reforms. However, the government's ability to stimulate economic demand through fiscal and monetary policy remains fairly limited while the pace at which the government is pursuing reforms in other key areas remains slow. Although the Privatization Law was enacted in 2005, modest steps have been made on privatizing of parastatals apart from Kenya Electricity Generating Company (KenGen) and the concessioning of Kenya Railways, while civil service reform is limited despite the government's assertion that reforms would be undertaken. Accelerating growth to achieve Kenya's potential and reduce the poverty that afflicts more than 56% of its population will require continued de-regulation of business, improved delivery of government services, addressing structural reforms, massive investment in new infrastructure (especially roads), reduction of chronic insecurity caused by crime, and improved economic governance generally.  

In November 2003, following the signing into law of key anti-corruption legislation and other reforms by the new government, donors reengaged as the IMF approved a three-year $250 million Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility and donors committed $4.2 billion in support over 4 years. In December 2004, the IMF approved Kenya's Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) arrangement equivalent to U.S. $252.8 million to support the government's economic and governance reforms. However, the government's ability to stimulate economic demand through fiscal and monetary policy remains fairly limited while the pace at which the government is pursuing reforms in other key areas remains slow. Although the Privatization Law was enacted in 2005, modest steps have been made on privatizing of parastatals apart from Kenya Electricity Generating Company (KenGen) and the concessioning of Kenya Railways, while civil service reform is limited despite the government's assertion that reforms would be undertaken. Accelerating growth to achieve Kenya's potential and reduce the poverty that afflicts more than 56% of its population will require continued de-regulation of business, improved delivery of government services, addressing structural reforms, massive investment in new infrastructure (especially roads), reduction of chronic insecurity caused by crime, and improved economic governance generally.  

===Tourism===

===Tourism===

As in most developing countries, the service sector of the Kenyan economy is underdeveloped. Kenya does attract wealthy foreign tourists attracted by its beaches and wildlife. The stunning variety of wildlife in the country is protected in [[Tsavo National Park]] (8,034 sq mi/20,808 sq km) in the southeast of the country.  

As in most developing countries, the service sector of the Kenyan economy is underdeveloped. Kenya does attract wealthy foreign tourists attracted by its beaches and wildlife. The stunning variety of wildlife in the country is protected in [[Tsavo National Park]] (8,034 sq mi/20,808 km²) in the southeast of the country.  

Tourism is now Kenya's largest foreign exchange earning sector, followed by flowers, tea and coffee. In 2006 tourism generated $803 million, up from $699 million the previous year. Africa is Kenya's largest export market, followed by the European Union (EU). Kenya benefits significantly from the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). Although Congress renewed the AGOA third-country fabric provision in December 2006 to provide more time to develop local cotton and fabric production that meets the buyers' rigorous standards, its apparel industry is struggling to hold its ground against Asian competition. Kenya's main exports to the U.S. are AGOA-program garments, but it continues to run a trade deficit with the U.S.  

Tourism is now Kenya's largest foreign exchange earning sector, followed by flowers, tea and coffee. In 2006 tourism generated $803 million, up from $699 million the previous year. Africa is Kenya's largest export market, followed by the European Union (EU). Kenya benefits significantly from the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). Although Congress renewed the AGOA third-country fabric provision in December 2006 to provide more time to develop local cotton and fabric production that meets the buyers' rigorous standards, its apparel industry is struggling to hold its ground against Asian competition. Kenya's main exports to the U.S. are AGOA-program garments, but it continues to run a trade deficit with the U.S.  

In 1962 a KANU-KADU coalition government, including both Kenyatta and Ngala, was formed. The 1962 constitution established a bicameral legislature consisting of a 117-member House of Representatives and a 41-member Senate. The country was divided into 7 semi-autonomous regions, each with its own regional assembly. The quota principle of reserved seats for non-Africans was abandoned, and open elections were held in May 1963. KADU gained control of the assemblies in the Rift Valley, Coast, and Western regions. KANU won majorities in the Senate and House of Representatives, and in the assemblies in the Central, Eastern, and Nyanza regions.<ref>No assembly could be formed in the Northeast Region, because separatist Somalis had boycotted the elections, and its House and Senate seats also remained vacant.</ref>  Kenya now achieved internal self-government with Jomo Kenyatta as its first prime minister. The British and KANU agreed, over KADU protests, to constitutional changes in October 1963 strengthening the central government. Kenya became independent on Dec. 12, 1963. In 1964 Kenya became a republic, and constitutional changes further centralized the government.

In 1962 a KANU-KADU coalition government, including both Kenyatta and Ngala, was formed. The 1962 constitution established a bicameral legislature consisting of a 117-member House of Representatives and a 41-member Senate. The country was divided into 7 semi-autonomous regions, each with its own regional assembly. The quota principle of reserved seats for non-Africans was abandoned, and open elections were held in May 1963. KADU gained control of the assemblies in the Rift Valley, Coast, and Western regions. KANU won majorities in the Senate and House of Representatives, and in the assemblies in the Central, Eastern, and Nyanza regions.<ref>No assembly could be formed in the Northeast Region, because separatist Somalis had boycotted the elections, and its House and Senate seats also remained vacant.</ref>  Kenya now achieved internal self-government with Jomo Kenyatta as its first prime minister. The British and KANU agreed, over KADU protests, to constitutional changes in October 1963 strengthening the central government. Kenya became independent on Dec. 12, 1963. In 1964 Kenya became a republic, and constitutional changes further centralized the government.

The British government bought out the white settlers and they mostly left Kenya. The Indian minority dominated retail business in the cities and most towns, but was deeply distrusted by the Africans. As a result 120,000 of the 176,000 Indians kept their old British passports rather than become citizens of an independent Kenya; large numbers left Kenya, most of them headed to the UK.

The British government bought out the white settlers and they mostly left Kenya. The Indian minority dominated retail business in the cities and most towns, but was deeply distrusted by the Africans. As a result, 120,000 of the 176,000 Indians kept their old British passports rather than become citizens of an independent Kenya; large numbers left Kenya, most of them headed to the UK.

===Kenyatta regime: 1963-1978===

===Kenyatta regime: 1963-1978===

Obstructing the press both before and after the 1992 elections, Moi continually maintained that multiparty politics would only promote tribal conflict.  His own regime depended upon exploitation of inter-group hatreds.  Under Moi, the apparatus of clientage and control was underpinned by the system of powerful provincial commissioners, each with a bureaucratic hierarchy based on chiefs (and their police) that was more powerful than the elected members of parliament. Elected local councils lost most of their power, and the provincial bosses were answerable only to the central government, which in turn was dominated by the president. The emergence of mass opposition in 1990-91 and demands for constitutional reform were met by rallies against pluralism. The regime leaned on the support of the Kalenjin and incited the Maasai against the Kiyuku. Government politicians denounced the Kiyuku as traitors, obstructed their registration as voters, and threatened them with dispossession. In 1993 and after, mass evictions of Kiyuku took place, often with the direct involvement of army, police, and game rangers. Armed clashes and many casualties, including deaths, resulted.<ref>Jacqueline M. Klopp, "'Ethnic Clashes' and Winning Elections: the Case of Kenya's Electoral Despotism."  ''Canadian Journal of African Studies'' 2001 35(3): 473-517. Issn: 0008-3968 Fulltext: [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0008-3968(2001)35%3A3%3C473%3A%22CAWET%3E2.0.CO%3B2-2 in Jstor]</ref>

Obstructing the press both before and after the 1992 elections, Moi continually maintained that multiparty politics would only promote tribal conflict.  His own regime depended upon exploitation of inter-group hatreds.  Under Moi, the apparatus of clientage and control was underpinned by the system of powerful provincial commissioners, each with a bureaucratic hierarchy based on chiefs (and their police) that was more powerful than the elected members of parliament. Elected local councils lost most of their power, and the provincial bosses were answerable only to the central government, which in turn was dominated by the president. The emergence of mass opposition in 1990-91 and demands for constitutional reform were met by rallies against pluralism. The regime leaned on the support of the Kalenjin and incited the Maasai against the Kiyuku. Government politicians denounced the Kiyuku as traitors, obstructed their registration as voters, and threatened them with dispossession. In 1993 and after, mass evictions of Kiyuku took place, often with the direct involvement of army, police, and game rangers. Armed clashes and many casualties, including deaths, resulted.<ref>Jacqueline M. Klopp, "'Ethnic Clashes' and Winning Elections: the Case of Kenya's Electoral Despotism."  ''Canadian Journal of African Studies'' 2001 35(3): 473-517. Issn: 0008-3968 Fulltext: [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0008-3968(2001)35%3A3%3C473%3A%22CAWET%3E2.0.CO%3B2-2 in Jstor]</ref>

Moi ruled using a strategic mixture of ethnic favoritism, state repression, and marginalization of opposition forces. He utilized detention and torture, looted public finances, and appropriated land and and other property.  Moi sponsored irregular army units that attacked the Luo, Luhya, and Kikuyu communities, and he disclaimed responsibility by assigning the violence to ethnic clashes arising from a land dispute.<ref>Philip G. Roessler, "Donor-induced Democratization and the Privatization of State Violence in Kenya and Rwanda." ''Comparative Politics'' 2005 37(2): 207-227. Issn: 0010-4159</ref> Beginning in 1998, Moi engaged in a carefully calculated strategy to manage the presidential succession in his and his party's favor.  Faced with the challenge of a new, multiethnic political coalition, Moi shifted the axis of the 2002 electoral contest from ethnicity to the politics of generational conflict. The strategy backfired, ripping his party wide open and resulting in its humiliating defeat of his candidate, Kenyatta's son, in the December 2002 general elections.<ref>Jeffrey Steeves, "Presidential Succession in Kenya: the Transition from Moi to Kibaki." ''Commonwealth & Comparative Politics'' 2006 44(2): 211-233. Issn: 1466-2043 Fulltext: [[Ebsco]]; Peter Mwangi Kagwanja, "'Power to Uhuru': Youth Identity and Generational Politics in Kenya's 2002 Elections." ''African Affairs'' 2006 105(418): 51-75. Issn: 0001-9909 Fulltext: [[OUP]]</ref>

Moi ruled using a strategic mixture of ethnic favoritism, state repression, and marginalization of opposition forces. He utilized detention and torture, looted public finances, and appropriated land and other property.  Moi sponsored irregular army units that attacked the Luo, Luhya, and Kikuyu communities, and he disclaimed responsibility by assigning the violence to ethnic clashes arising from a land dispute.<ref>Philip G. Roessler, "Donor-induced Democratization and the Privatization of State Violence in Kenya and Rwanda." ''Comparative Politics'' 2005 37(2): 207-227. Issn: 0010-4159</ref> Beginning in 1998, Moi engaged in a carefully calculated strategy to manage the presidential succession in his and his party's favor.  Faced with the challenge of a new, multiethnic political coalition, Moi shifted the axis of the 2002 electoral contest from ethnicity to the politics of generational conflict. The strategy backfired, ripping his party wide open and resulting in its humiliating defeat of his candidate, Kenyatta's son, in the December 2002 general elections.<ref>Jeffrey Steeves, "Presidential Succession in Kenya: the Transition from Moi to Kibaki." ''Commonwealth & Comparative Politics'' 2006 44(2): 211-233. Issn: 1466-2043 Fulltext: [[Ebsco]]; Peter Mwangi Kagwanja, "'Power to Uhuru': Youth Identity and Generational Politics in Kenya's 2002 Elections." ''African Affairs'' 2006 105(418): 51-75. Issn: 0001-9909 Fulltext: [[OUP]]</ref>

===21st century===

===21st century===

On 27 December 2002 by 62% the voters overwhelmingly elected members of the National Rainbow Coalition (NaRC) to parliament and NaRC candidate [[Mwai Kibaki]] (1931- ) to the presidency. Voters rejected the Kenya African National Union's (KANU) presidential candidate, Uhuru Kenyatta, the handpicked candidate of outgoing president Moi. International and local observers reported the 2002 elections to be generally more fair and less violent than those of both 1992 and 1997. His strong showing allowed Kibaki to choose a strong cabinet, to seek international support, and to balance power within the NaRC.  

On 27 December 2002 by 62% the voters overwhelmingly elected members of the National Rainbow Coalition (NaRC) to parliament and NaRC candidate [[Mwai Kibaki]] (1931- ) to the presidency. Voters rejected the Kenya African National Union's (KANU) presidential candidate, Uhuru Kenyatta, the handpicked candidate of outgoing president Moi. International and local observers reported the 2002 elections to be generally more fair and less violent than those of both 1992 and 1997. His strong showing allowed Kibaki to choose a strong cabinet, to seek international support, and to balance power within the NaRC.  

    

    

====Luo====

====Luo====

The Luo population of the southwest had enjoyed an advantageous position during the late colonial and early independence periods of the 1950s, 1960s, and early 1970s, particularly in terms of the the prominence of its modern elite compared to those of other groups. However the Luo lost prominence due to the success of Kikuyu and related groups (Embu and Meru) in gaining and exercising political power during the Jomo Kenyatta era (1963-1978). While measurements of poverty and health by the early 2000s showed the Luo disadvantaged relative to other Kenyans, the growing presence of non-Luo in the professions reflected a dilution of Luo professionals due to the arrival of others rather than a absolute decline in the Luo numbers.<ref>Lesa Morrison, "The Nature of Decline: Distinguishing Myth from Reality in the Case of the Luo of Kenya." ''Journal of Modern African Studies'' 2007 45(1): 117-142. Issn: 0022-278x</ref>

The Luo population of the southwest had enjoyed an advantageous position during the late colonial and early independence periods of the 1950s, 1960s, and early 1970s, particularly in terms of the prominence of its modern elite compared to those of other groups. However the Luo lost prominence due to the success of Kikuyu and related groups (Embu and Meru) in gaining and exercising political power during the Jomo Kenyatta era (1963-1978). While measurements of poverty and health by the early 2000s showed the Luo disadvantaged relative to other Kenyans, the growing presence of non-Luo in the professions reflected a dilution of Luo professionals due to the arrival of others rather than an absolute decline in the Luo numbers.<ref>Lesa Morrison, "The Nature of Decline: Distinguishing Myth from Reality in the Case of the Luo of Kenya." ''Journal of Modern African Studies'' 2007 45(1): 117-142. Issn: 0022-278x</ref>

==Bibliography==

==Bibliography==