Changes

==Air power==

==Air power==

A major lesson learned in Operation Torch was the most effective use of air power as a an offensive weapon.<ref>Michael Bechthold, "A Question of Success: Tactical Air Doctrine and Practice in North Africa, 1942-43," ''The Journal of Military History,'' Vol. 68, No. 3 (Jul., 2004), pp. 821-85 [http://www.jstor.org/stable/3396729  in JSTOR]</ref>  One of Ike's corps commanders, General Lloyd Fredendall, had control of most of the air power and used his planes as a "combat air patrol" that circled endlessly over his front lines ready to defend against Luftwaffe attackers. Like most infantrymen, Fredendall assumed that all assets should be used to assist the ground forces. (More concerned with defense than attack, Fredendall was soon replaced by Patton.) Likewise the Luftwaffe made the mistake of dividing up its air assets, and failed to gain control of the air or to cut Allied supplies. The RAF in North Africa, under General [[Arthur Tedder]], concentrated its air power and defeated the Luftwaffe. The RAF had an excellent training program (using bases in Canada), maintained very high aircrew morale, and inculcated a fighting spirit. Senior officers monitored battles by radar, and directed planes by radio to where they were most needed. The RAF's success convinced Eisenhower that its system maximized the effectiveness of tactical air power; Ike became a true believer. The point was that air power had to be consolidated at the highest level, and had to operate almost autonomously. Brigade, division and corps commanders lost control of air assets (except for a few unarmed little "grasshoppers," used to spot artillery; the AAF wanted no part of that subservient role.) With one airman in overall charge, air assets could be concentrated for maximum offensive capability, not frittered away in ineffective "penny packets." Eisenhower—a tanker in 1918 who had theorized on the best way to concentrate armor—recognized the analogy. Split up among infantry in supporting roles tanks were wasted; concentrated in a powerful force they could dictate the terms of battle.

A major lesson learned in Operation Torch was the most effective use of air power as an offensive weapon.<ref>Michael Bechthold, "A Question of Success: Tactical Air Doctrine and Practice in North Africa, 1942-43," ''The Journal of Military History,'' Vol. 68, No. 3 (Jul., 2004), pp. 821-85 [http://www.jstor.org/stable/3396729  in JSTOR]</ref>  One of Ike's corps commanders, General Lloyd Fredendall, had control of most of the air power and used his planes as a "combat air patrol" that circled endlessly over his front lines ready to defend against Luftwaffe attackers. Like most infantrymen, Fredendall assumed that all assets should be used to assist the ground forces. (More concerned with defense than attack, Fredendall was soon replaced by Patton.) Likewise the Luftwaffe made the mistake of dividing up its air assets, and failed to gain control of the air or to cut Allied supplies. The RAF in North Africa, under General [[Arthur Tedder]], concentrated its air power and defeated the Luftwaffe. The RAF had an excellent training program (using bases in Canada), maintained very high aircrew morale, and inculcated a fighting spirit. Senior officers monitored battles by radar, and directed planes by radio to where they were most needed. The RAF's success convinced Eisenhower that its system maximized the effectiveness of tactical air power; Ike became a true believer. The point was that air power had to be consolidated at the highest level, and had to operate almost autonomously. Brigade, division and corps commanders lost control of air assets (except for a few unarmed little "grasshoppers," used to spot artillery; the AAF wanted no part of that subservient role.) With one airman in overall charge, air assets could be concentrated for maximum offensive capability, not frittered away in ineffective "penny packets." Eisenhower—a tanker in 1918 who had theorized on the best way to concentrate armor—recognized the analogy. Split up among infantry in supporting roles tanks were wasted; concentrated in a powerful force they could dictate the terms of battle.

The fundamental assumption of air power doctrine was that the air war was just as important as the ground war. Indeed, the main function of the sea and ground forces, insisted the air enthusiasts, was to seize forward air bases. ''Field Manual 100-20,'' issued in July 1943, became the airman's bible for the rest of the war, and taught the doctrine of equality of air and land warfare. The idea of combined arms operations (air, land, sea) strongly appealed to Eisenhower and MacArthur. Eisenhower invaded only after he was certain of air supremacy, and he made the establishment of forward air bases his first priority. MacArthur's leaps reflected the same doctrine. In each theater the senior ground command post had an attached air command post. Requests from the front lines went all the way to the top, where the air commander decided whether to act, when and how. This slowed down response time—it might take 48 hours to arrange a strike—and involved rejecting numerous requests from the infantry for a little help here, or a little intervention there.

The fundamental assumption of air power doctrine was that the air war was just as important as the ground war. Indeed, the main function of the sea and ground forces, insisted the air enthusiasts, was to seize forward air bases. ''Field Manual 100-20,'' issued in July 1943, became the airman's bible for the rest of the war, and taught the doctrine of equality of air and land warfare. The idea of combined arms operations (air, land, sea) strongly appealed to Eisenhower and MacArthur. Eisenhower invaded only after he was certain of air supremacy, and he made the establishment of forward air bases his first priority. MacArthur's leaps reflected the same doctrine. In each theater the senior ground command post had an attached air command post. Requests from the front lines went all the way to the top, where the air commander decided whether to act, when and how. This slowed down response time—it might take 48 hours to arrange a strike—and involved rejecting numerous requests from the infantry for a little help here, or a little intervention there.

North Africa helped shake down the American command system, made combat veterans out of recent civilians, taught the knack of complex amphibious landings, taught Americans how to use their air power, and reaffirmed the vital importance of logistics. Laymen speak of strategy; generals speak of logistics. The Americans in Tunisia needed 300 tons of supplies a day—a point brought home when the first train to arrive at Beja with vitally needed food brought 18 tons of peanut butter and two cases of pineapple juice. American soldiers had learned the importance of terrain, of combined arms, of aggressive patrolling, of stealth, of massed armor. They now knew what it was like to be bombed, shelled, and machine-gunned and fight on.

North Africa helped shake down the American command system, made combat veterans out of recent civilians, taught the knack of complex amphibious landings, taught Americans how to use their air power, and reaffirmed the vital importance of logistics. Laymen speak of strategy; generals speak of logistics. The Americans in Tunisia needed 300 tons of supplies a day—a point brought home when the first train to arrive at Beja with vitally needed food brought 18 tons of peanut butter and two cases of pineapple juice. American soldiers had learned the importance of terrain, of combined arms, of aggressive patrolling, of stealth, of massed armor. They now knew what it was like to be bombed, shelled, and machine-gunned and fight on.

The spirit of Allied cooperation was fairly good. Eisenhower said his staffers could call each other bastards, but if they cursed a "British bastard" they would be sent home immediately. Even so one of his top generals, Omar Bradley, thought the British were amateur strategists (because they lacked the sort of staff schools that Bradley himself had commanded at Fort Benning.) Alexander and Montgomery, on the other hand, decided that their Brits were better fighters than the inept GIs, and they themselves were superior practical strategists.  

The spirit of Allied cooperation was fairly good. Eisenhower said his staffers could call each other bastards, but if they cursed a "British bastard" they would be sent home immediately. Even so, one of his top generals, Omar Bradley, thought the British were amateur strategists (because they lacked the sort of staff schools that Bradley himself had commanded at Fort Benning.) Alexander and Montgomery, on the other hand, decided that their Brits were better fighters than the inept GIs, and they themselves were superior practical strategists.  

* Levine, Alan J. ''The War Against Rommel’s Supply Lines, 1942-1943.'' (1999).  

* Levine, Alan J. ''The War Against Rommel’s Supply Lines, 1942-1943.'' (1999).  

* Kelly, Orr. '' Meeting the Fox: The Allied Invasion of Africa, from Operation Torch to Kasserine Pass to Victory in Tunisia'' (2002) [http://www.amazon.com/Meeting-Fox-Invasion-Operation-Kasserine/dp/0471414298/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1213460007&sr=1-1 excerpt and text search]; also [http://www.questia.com/read/108686361?title=Meeting%20the%20Fox%3a%20%20The%20Allied%20Invasion%20of%20Africa%2c%20from%20Operation%20Torch%20to%20Kasserine%20Pass%20to%20Victory%20in%20Tunisia online edition]

* Kelly, Orr. '' Meeting the Fox: The Allied Invasion of Africa, from Operation Torch to Kasserine Pass to Victory in Tunisia'' (2002) [http://www.amazon.com/Meeting-Fox-Invasion-Operation-Kasserine/dp/0471414298/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1213460007&sr=1-1 excerpt and text search]; also [http://www.questia.com/read/108686361?title=Meeting%20the%20Fox%3a%20%20The%20Allied%20Invasion%20of%20Africa%2c%20from%20Operation%20Torch%20to%20Kasserine%20Pass%20to%20Victory%20in%20Tunisia online edition]

* Meyer, Leo J. "The Decision to Invade North Africa (TORCH)," in Kent R. Greenfield, ed. ''Command Decisions.'' (1984) pp.&nbsp;173–189)

* Meyer, Leo J. "The Decision to Invade North Africa (TORCH)," in Kent R. Greenfield, ed. ''Command Decisions.'' (1984, pp.&nbsp;173–189)

* Mitcham,  Samuel W. ''Rommel's Desert War: The Life and Death of the Afrika Korps'' (2007) [http://www.amazon.com/Rommels-Desert-War-Stackpole-Military/dp/0811734137/ref=sr_1_5?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1213460007&sr=1-5 excerpt and text search]

* Mitcham,  Samuel W. ''Rommel's Desert War: The Life and Death of the Afrika Korps'' (2007) [http://www.amazon.com/Rommels-Desert-War-Stackpole-Military/dp/0811734137/ref=sr_1_5?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1213460007&sr=1-5 excerpt and text search]

* Morison, Samuel Eliot. ''The Two Ocean War: A Short History of the United States Navy in the Second World War.'' (1963). pp.&nbsp;215–239

* Morison, Samuel Eliot. ''The Two Ocean War: A Short History of the United States Navy in the Second World War.'' (1963). pp.&nbsp;215–239