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Some persons have attempted to exert control over the disposition of their body after death, to the point of even successfully suing the state to allow non-traditional approaches.<ref>''Alcor Life Extension Found. v. Mitchell'', 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 572 (1992) (allowing post-mortem cryonic suspension with a firm not recognized by the State of [[California]]).</ref>
 
Some persons have attempted to exert control over the disposition of their body after death, to the point of even successfully suing the state to allow non-traditional approaches.<ref>''Alcor Life Extension Found. v. Mitchell'', 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 572 (1992) (allowing post-mortem cryonic suspension with a firm not recognized by the State of [[California]]).</ref>
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Courts in some jurisdictions have held that because a corpse is not "property," a [[will]] is not the place for a decedent to control the disposition of his body.<ref>''Enos v. Snyder'', 63 P. 170, 171 (Cal. 1900) ("It is quite well established ... that, in the absence of statutory provisions, there is no property in a dead body; that it is not part of the estate of the deceased person; and that a man cannot by will dispose of that which after his death will be his corpse.").</ref>  Even in the states that authorize a person to specify in his [[will]] how his body should be treated after death, the [[will]] may never be reviewed until it is too late.  Sometimes, as in the case of [[Ted Williams]], the statement in the [[will]] is overruled by contrary intentions of the next of kin as supported by less compelling evidence.<ref>''Cohen v. Guardianship of Cohen'', 896 So. 2d 950, 953 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (citing ''Kirksey v. Jernigan'', 45 So. 2d 188, 189 (Fla. 1950)), ''rev. denied'', 911 So. 2d 792 (Fla. 2005) (holding that the decedent's wishes as explained in his [[will]] were not conclusive, and that testimony from the decedent's family as to his desire was allowed to overrule it).</ref>
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Courts in some jurisdictions have held that because a corpse is not "property," a [[will]] is not the place for a decedent to control the disposition of his body.<ref>''Enos v. Snyder'', 63 P. 170, 171 (Cal. 1900) ("It is quite well established ... that, in the absence of statutory provisions, there is no property in a dead body; that it is not part of the estate of the deceased person; and that a man cannot by will dispose of that which after his death will be his corpse.").</ref>  Even in the states that authorize a person to specify in his will how his body should be treated after death, the will may never be reviewed until it is too late.  Sometimes, as in the case of [[Ted Williams]], the statement in the will is overruled by contrary intentions of the next of kin as supported by less compelling evidence.<ref>''Cohen v. Guardianship of Cohen'', 896 So. 2d 950, 953 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (citing ''Kirksey v. Jernigan'', 45 So. 2d 188, 189 (Fla. 1950)), ''rev. denied'', 911 So. 2d 792 (Fla. 2005) (holding that the decedent's wishes as explained in his will were not conclusive, and that testimony from the decedent's family as to his desire was allowed to overrule it).</ref>
    
The States of [[Delaware]] and [[Connecticut]] have two of the clearest and strongest statutes for empowering a person to control the disposition of his post-mortem body, which can be used to prevent cremation.
 
The States of [[Delaware]] and [[Connecticut]] have two of the clearest and strongest statutes for empowering a person to control the disposition of his post-mortem body, which can be used to prevent cremation.
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