Changes

Chief Justice [[William Rehnquist]] wrote the dissent, in which he suggested a jurisdictional bar on allowing the petition in [[federal court]]:

Chief Justice [[William Rehnquist]] wrote the dissent, in which he suggested a jurisdictional bar on allowing the petition in [[federal court]]:

:There is a good argument that § 2254(d) is itself jurisdictional. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 460, 97 L. Ed. 469, 73 S. Ct. 397 (1953) ("Jurisdiction over applications for federal habeas corpus is controlled by statute"); Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 547, n. 2, 66 L. Ed. 2d 722, 101 S. Ct. 764 (1981) ("The present codification of the federal habeas statute is the successor to 'the first congressional grant of jurisdiction to the federal courts,' and the 1966 amendments embodied in § 2254(d) [now codified, as amended by the AEDPA, at § 2254(e)] were intended by Congress as limitations on the exercise of that jurisdiction" (quoting Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 485, 36 L. Ed. 2d 439, 93 S. Ct. 1827 (1973)); cf. ''[[Arkansas v. Farm Credit Servs. of Central Ark.]]'', 520 U.S.    ,    (1997) (slip op., at 4) (explaining that the Tax Injunction Act--which has operative language similar to § 2254(d) ("The district courts shall not enjoin . . . ")--is "first and foremost a vehicle to limit drastically federal district court jurisdiction to interfere with so important a local concern as the collection of taxes" (internal quotations omitted)). But even if it is not jurisdictional, it shares the most salient characteristic of jurisdictional statutes: its commands are addressed to courts rather than to individuals. Section 2254(d) does not address criminal defendants, or even state prosecutors; it prescribes or proscribes no private conduct.  Instead, it is addressed directly to federal courts, providing, "an application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted . . . unless . . . " (emphasis added).

:There is a good argument that § 2254(d) is itself jurisdictional. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 460, 97 L. Ed. 469, 73 S. Ct. 397 (1953) ("Jurisdiction over applications for federal habeas corpus is controlled by statute"); Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 547, n. 2, 66 L. Ed. 2d 722, 101 S. Ct. 764 (1981) "The present codification of the federal habeas statute is the successor to 'the first congressional grant of jurisdiction to the federal courts,' and the 1966 amendments embodied in § 2254(d) [now codified, as amended by the AEDPA, at § 2254(e)] were intended by Congress as limitations on the exercise of that jurisdiction" (quoting Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 485, 36 L. Ed. 2d 439, 93 S. Ct. 1827 (1973)); cf. ''[[Arkansas v. Farm Credit Servs. of Central Ark.]]'', 520 U.S.    ,    (1997) (slip op., at 4) (explaining that the Tax Injunction Act--which has operative language similar to § 2254(d) ("The district courts shall not enjoin . . . ")--is "first and foremost a vehicle to limit drastically federal district court jurisdiction to interfere with so important a local concern as the collection of taxes" (internal quotations omitted)). But even if it is not jurisdictional, it shares the most salient characteristic of jurisdictional statutes: its commands are addressed to courts rather than to individuals. Section 2254(d) does not address criminal defendants, or even state prosecutors; it prescribes or proscribes no private conduct.  Instead, it is addressed directly to federal courts, providing, "an application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted . . . unless . . . " (emphasis added).

==References==

==References==