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{{discrimlaw}}Otherwise known as the [[U.S. v. Virginia|VMI Case]], U.S. v. Virginia was a [[Supreme Court]] case that resulted in the opening of [[Virginia Military Institute]] to women.<ref>''U.S. v. Virginia'', 518 U.S. 515</ref>

{{discrimlaw}}Otherwise known as the [[U.S. v. Virginia|VMI Case]], U.S. v. Virginia was a [[Supreme Court]] case that resulted in the opening of [[Virginia Military Institute]] to women.<ref>''U.S. v. Virginia'', 518 U.S. 515</ref>

VMI forbade entry to women on the grounds that most women were neither capable nor willing to undergo the "[[adversative method]]" training at VMI.  This decision may have been based on a "real difference," in that fewer women than men may wish to attend a military institution.  Justice Ginsburg wrote for the Court that the effect of this stereotype's persistence, and action upon it, precluded even those women who ''were'' capable from attending VMI.  Viewing this action as stereotyping, the Supreme Court ordered VMI to accept female cadets, applying its [[intermediate scrutiny]] test.<ref>U.S. v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, opinion of the Court by Justice Ginsburg.</ref>   

VMI forbade entry to women on the grounds that most women were neither capable nor willing to undergo the "[[adversative method]]" training at VMI.  This decision may have been based on a "real difference," in that fewer women than men may wish to attend a military institution.  Justice Ginsburg wrote for the Court that the effect of this stereotype's persistence, and action upon it, precluded even those women who ''were'' capable from attending VMI.  Viewing this action as stereotyping, the Supreme Court ordered VMI to accept female cadets, applying its [[intermediate scrutiny]] test.<ref>''U.S. v. Virginia'', 518 U.S. 515, opinion of the Court by Justice Ginsburg.</ref>   

The holding pioneered the idea of "[[Intermediate scrutiny]]," that the Court would inspect any classification on the basis of gender at a heightened level of review, to see that a "compelling" state interest was being served by the classification.  Such a review, in the gender cases, would involve an inquiry into whether there was a "real difference" between men and women that was implicated, or simply an imagined or stereotyped difference.  In applying the test here, Justice Ginsburg noted that the reasons for pursuing single-sex education were not sufficient to outweigh the harm posed to women by forbidding them an education at VMI.   

The holding pioneered the idea of "[[Intermediate scrutiny]]," that the Court would inspect any classification on the basis of gender at a heightened level of review, to see that a "compelling" state interest was being served by the classification.  Such a review, in the gender cases, would involve an inquiry into whether there was a "real difference" between men and women that was implicated, or simply an imagined or stereotyped difference.  In applying the test here, Justice Ginsburg noted that the reasons for pursuing single-sex education were not sufficient to outweigh the harm posed to women by forbidding them an education at VMI.