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[[Image:House and Wilson.jpg|thumb|250px|right|Edward House standing next to Woodrow Wilson]]

'''Edward Mandell House''' (July 26, 1858 – March 28, 1938), commonly known by the honorific title of '''Colonel House''', was an American diplomat, politician and presidential advisor.  House had enormous personal influence with President [[Woodrow Wilson]] as his chief foreign policy advisor and negotiator regarding [[World War I]] from 1913 until Wilson removed him in 1919. Historians conclude House was naive and easily misled by others, and in turn misled Wilson and exceeded his authority.

| image      = Edward House.jpg

| birth_date  = July 26, 1858

| birth_place = Houston, Texas

| death_date  = March 28, 1938

| death_place = New York City

'''Edward Mandell House''' (July 26, 1858 - March 28, 1938), commonly known by the honorific title of '''Colonel House''', was an American diplomat, politician and presidential advisor.  House had enormous personal influence with President [[Woodrow Wilson]] as his chief foreign policy advisor and negotiator regarding [[World War I]] from 1913 until Wilson removed him in 1919. Historians conclude House was naive and easily misled by others, and in turn misled Wilson and exceeded his authority.

==Early career==

==Early career==

House and Wilson agreed that Bryan, who was incompetent in diplomacy, was so powerful he had to be Secretary of State, but House would be the chief advisor, despite his own lack of diplomatic experience. House threw himself into world affairs, promoting Wilson's goal of brokering a peace to end [[World War I]].  On his six missions to Europe he was the president's personal representative, sending back vivid, detailed letters full of impressions of key leaders and replete with details on every phase of the war. Wilson in turn enthused about the "thrill of deep pleasure" that House's reports gave him.  House was enthusiastic and articulate but lacked diplomatic finesse or deep insight into European affairs and was easily misled by European diplomats. Before the war in 1913 and more so during the war he forged a close relationship with the British foreign minister Sir [[Edward Grey]]. House misled Grey about Wilson's plans regarding Mexico. In turn Grey dazzled and manipulated the eager but naive House to benefit Britain, especially in 1916 when British interceptions of American shipping risked bad relations with Wilson.<ref>Williams (1984)</ref>  

House and Wilson agreed that Bryan, who was incompetent in diplomacy, was so powerful he had to be Secretary of State, but House would be the chief advisor, despite his own lack of diplomatic experience. House threw himself into world affairs, promoting Wilson's goal of brokering a peace to end [[World War I]].  On his six missions to Europe he was the president's personal representative, sending back vivid, detailed letters full of impressions of key leaders and replete with details on every phase of the war. Wilson in turn enthused about the "thrill of deep pleasure" that House's reports gave him.  House was enthusiastic and articulate but lacked diplomatic finesse or deep insight into European affairs and was easily misled by European diplomats. Before the war in 1913 and more so during the war he forged a close relationship with the British foreign minister Sir [[Edward Grey]]. House misled Grey about Wilson's plans regarding Mexico. In turn Grey dazzled and manipulated the eager but naive House to benefit Britain, especially in 1916 when British interceptions of American shipping risked bad relations with Wilson.<ref>Williams (1984)</ref>  

 

After the sinking of the ''[[Lusitania]]'' in May 1915, tension escalated with Germany and U.S. neutrality was precarious.  House decided the war was an epic battle between democracy and autocracy; he argued the United States ought to help Britain and France win a limited Allied victory.  However, Wilson still insisted on neutrality. Neu argues that by 1915, House had come to view himself as the indispensable man in both foreign and domestic affairs. "The more power he achieved," Neu concludes, "the more his fantasies expanded and his sense of reality weakened."<ref>Neu (1991) pp 261-62.</ref>  In early 1916 Wilson sent House to Europe seeking peace. The proposal was when the Allies were ready, Wilson would invite all the belligerents to a peace conference. Wilson approved the plan but told House not to get involved in territorial issues; House exceeded his instructions and began to examine French and Russian territorial demands with the British leaders. The British had broken the simple code House used to send dispatches to Wilson from London, Paris and Berlin, and cleverly manipulated the American into agreeing to the secret House-Grey Memorandum (22 Feb 1916) that indicated that if the Allies all attended and the Germans refused, the U.S. "would probably enter the war against Germany." Wilson endorsed the scheme, but both London and Berlin thought they could win, and neither side agreed to a conference.<ref>House told Wilson the British supported the plan but British Prime Minister Asquith told his colleagues that the House plan was "humbug and a mere manoeuvre of American politics," in preparation for Wilson's 1916 reelection campaign. Steven Roskill, ''Hankey: Man of Secrets,'' (1970) vol. 1 p. 247.</ref>  

After the sinking of the ''[[Lusitania]]'' in May 1915, tension escalated with Germany and U.S. neutrality was precarious.  House decided the war was an epic battle between democracy and autocracy; he argued the United States ought to help Britain and France win a limited Allied victory.  However, Wilson still insisted on neutrality. Neu argues that by 1915, House had come to view himself as the indispensable man in both foreign and domestic affairs. "The more power he achieved," Neu concludes, "the more his fantasies expanded and his sense of reality weakened."<ref>Neu (1991) pp 261-62.</ref>  In early 1916 Wilson sent House to Europe seeking peace. The proposal was when the Allies were ready, Wilson would invite all the belligerents to a peace conference. Wilson approved the plan but told House not to get involved in territorial issues; House exceeded his instructions and began to examine French and Russian territorial demands with the British leaders. The British had broken the simple code House used to send dispatches to Wilson from London, Paris and Berlin, and cleverly manipulated the American into agreeing to the secret House-Grey Memorandum (22 Feb 1916) that indicated that if the Allies all attended and the Germans refused, the U.S. "would probably enter the war against Germany." Wilson endorsed the scheme, but both London and Berlin thought they could win, and neither side agreed to a conference.<ref>House told Wilson the British supported the plan but British Prime Minister Asquith told his colleagues that the House plan was "humbug and a mere manoeuvre of American politics," in preparation for Wilson's 1916 reelection campaign. Steven Roskill, ''Hankey: Man of Secrets,'' (1970) vol. 1 p. 247.</ref>