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New Atheism and morality (view source)
Revision as of 15:17, February 27, 2017
, 15:17, February 27, 2017→New atheist Jerry Coyne and morality
[[File:Jerry Coyne at The Amazing Meeting - 2013.jpg|thumbnail|left|300px|The atheist [[Jerry Coyne]] speaking at a 2013 [[Atheist conferences|atheist meeting]] entitled The Amazing Meeting (TAM). TAM is an annual meeting.]]
[[File:Jerry Coyne at The Amazing Meeting - 2013.jpg|thumbnail|left|300px|The atheist [[Jerry Coyne]] speaking at a 2013 [[Atheist conferences|atheist meeting]] entitled The Amazing Meeting (TAM). TAM is an annual meeting.]]
The [[Christian apologetics|Christian apologetic]] article ''New Atheism’s Moral Meltdown'' indicates:
{{Cquote|A little while ago, [[Jerry Coyne]] replied to our critique of his approach to ethics. We’re not at all convinced by Coyne’s response, which essentially reduces to a rant about religious fundamentalism. Let us restate our case for the sake of clarity. Moral values seem quite at home in a theistic world-view; moral values do not fit in the New Atheist’s world-view. Therefore, any theist -be they merely a philosophical theist, or Hindu, Muslim, Jewish or Christian – has a better explanation for morality than Jerry Coyne, [[Sam Harris]], Richard Dawkins or their acolytes...
To explain morality is to explain principles of value and conduct. There is a wide consensus that moral principles have at least five traits. They are obligatory– they tell us what we ought to do in a given situation; they guide our actions. Such obligations are overriding – they take precedence over other considerations, be they aesthetic, legal, or political. They are also universalizable –they apply to all who are in relevantly similar situations; if it is immoral for Coyne to “kick an innocent dog” then it is immoral for everyone “to kick an innocent dog.” If there is an exception to that rule – perhaps we might be allowed to kick an innocent dog to save its life – then the exception counts for everyone in a relevantly similar situation.
Moral principles must be liveable – they must be able to motivate us to change our behaviour. Moral principles must be convincing and plausible. The life they prescribe must be achievable. Finally, moral principles are deep- they do not only prescribe acts and evaluate consequences. Moral principles also deal with our characters, our motives, our goals, the communities in which we live and the traditions that shape us. Now, Coyne might be able to explain the origin of moral feelings – call these “passions for the common good.” He might explain how such passions are good for the species. He might be able to explain how reciprocal altruism benefits the individual organism.The difficulty for Coyne, and New Atheism in general, is moving from moral feeling and social utility to deep, universally binding principles.
Suppose we have a fear of spiders; possibly, this fear has served the human race well in the past. However, it does not serve us well in our present circumstances. Furthermore, the beliefs incorporated in our fear are false: the spiders of Ireland are a harmless bunch. Our fear is irrational and inappropriate. Now, as we’ll see, Coyne denies that humans have moral responsibility. This means that most of our moral feelings – feelings of duty, guilt, obligation, shame, honour, praise – incorporate beliefs which are false.
Furthermore, such feelings might not suit our current circumstances (we might be able to climb the career ladder by being a little more ruthless; we could ease our workload if we cheated a little more). So moral obligation seems inappropriate and irrational on Coyne’s worldview. Coyne cannot explain why anyone living through life’s lonely emergencies, or in Hobbes dog eat dog state of nature, or the palace of Machiavelli’s Prince, should pay the blindest bit of attention to his or her moral feelings. In fact, Coyne presents them with very good reasons to set morality aside and do whatever it takes to live to fight another day. Our point is not that atheists will inevitably indulge themselves in the excesses of moral nihilism; the point is that Coyne’s account has failed to explain why morality is obligatory, over-riding and universal.
Nor can Coyne explain why we should develop moral virtues. Why should care for the good of the species? I won’t be around to see it prosper. And suppose the good of the species really reduces to the good of genes or other replicators? Isn’t that a good reason to ignore the moral passions whenever they suggest an inconvenient course of action? And why should I allow those pesky moral passions to over-ride my other passions? It might be fair to listen to another’s argument carefully; but suppose I have a passion for caricaturing the views of anyone who has the temerity to disagree with me? Why shouldn’t I indulge the latter passion? Why should I consider the passion for fairness to be binding?
At the end of the day, in Coyne’s world our evolved moral passions serve no deep purpose.<ref>[http://www.saintsandsceptics.org/scientism-morality-and-the-failure-of-new-atheism-part-1/ New Atheism’s Moral Meltdown], Answers for Saints and Skeptics website</ref>}}
Commenting on New Atheism and morality the [[Shadow To Light blog]] declares:
Commenting on New Atheism and morality the [[Shadow To Light blog]] declares: