Changes

The strong competition among the great naval powers, above all Great Britain and France, brought forth numerous new inventions and improvements in the shipping industry during the era of industrialization. Many naval forces conducted internal competitions to find out the best and fastest crews on the guns and to study their behavior and approach to take on the training. In addition, it was discovered that the simultaneous firing of bursts of different calibers made it difficult for the fire control personnel to distinguish the impacts of the different guns.  The technology made apparent during the American Civil War caused Britain and France - as well as other countries - to look at both armoring of hulls and installing turreted guns, which also made possible advances in larger gun calibers and the associated development of breech-loading, fire control, and ammunition handling and loading.

The strong competition among the great naval powers, above all Great Britain and France, brought forth numerous new inventions and improvements in the shipping industry during the era of industrialization. Many naval forces conducted internal competitions to find out the best and fastest crews on the guns and to study their behavior and approach to take on the training. In addition, it was discovered that the simultaneous firing of bursts of different calibers made it difficult for the fire control personnel to distinguish the impacts of the different guns.  The technology made apparent during the American Civil War caused Britain and France - as well as other countries - to look at both armoring of hulls and installing turreted guns, which also made possible advances in larger gun calibers and the associated development of breech-loading, fire control, and ammunition handling and loading.

Between 1880 and 1900, almost all navies of the Great Powers, including Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia, Italy, Japan and the USA, built armored ships, whose displacement had increased to 16,000 tons. At best, these ships reached a top speed of about 18 knots, were about 400 to 425 feet long, and had a crew of about 600 to 880 men. Typical representatives of this phase of war shipbuilding were for example the Japanese ''Mikasa'' (1902), the British ''Majestic'' (1895) or the German ''Braunschweig'' (1902). Usually these ships had a main armament consisting of four heavy guns (in the caliber of 9 inches to 12 inches) in two turrets, and about a dozen middle casemate guns, the calibers of which varied between 4 to just over 6 inches.  The American ''Kearsarge'' would mount what was essentially a "double" turret: one turret bearing a pair of 9-inch guns mounted on top of a primary turret bearing 12-inch guns.  This design proved awkward; both gun turrets interfered with each other and the fire line proved to be difficult.  

Between 1880 and 1900, almost all navies of the Great Powers, including Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia, Italy, Japan and the USA, built armored ships, whose displacement had increased to 16,000 tons. At best, these ships reached a top speed of about 18 knots, were about 400 to 425 feet long, and had a crew of about 600 to 880 men. Typical representatives of this phase of war shipbuilding were for example the Japanese ''Mikasa'' (1902), the British ''Majestic'' (1895) or the German ''Braunschweig'' (1902). Usually these ships had a main armament consisting of four heavy guns (in the caliber of 9 inches to 12 inches) in two turrets, and about a dozen middle casemate guns, the calibers of which varied between 4 and just over 6 inches.  The American ''Kearsarge'' would mount what was essentially a "double" turret: one turret bearing a pair of 9-inch guns mounted on top of a primary turret bearing 12-inch guns.  This design proved awkward; both gun turrets interfered with each other and the fire line proved to be difficult.  

Improvements in drive technology also made it possible to replace the high-pressure piston engines by the substantially lower cost steam turbines, making the silhouette of the ships lower and thus making them more difficult to hit, and which also accelerated the speed of the ships to a maximum of 23 knots.  But it would take a small, privately-constructed vessel - the ''Turbinia'' - to get the British Navy to adopt turbine power, especially after the embarrassment the small craft caused at the Spithead Navy Review review of 1897, weaving at high speed between two naval columns unchallenged and uncaught.   

Improvements in drive technology also made it possible to replace the high-pressure piston engines by the substantially lower cost steam turbines, making the silhouette of the ships lower and thus making them more difficult to hit, and which also accelerated the speed of the ships to a maximum of 23 knots.  But it would take a small, privately constructed vessel - the ''Turbinia'' - to get the British Navy to adopt turbine power, especially after the embarrassment the small craft caused at the Spithead Navy Review review of 1897, weaving at high speed between two naval columns unchallenged and uncaught.   

==Dreadnought==

==Dreadnought==

In the [[Second World War]], the weakness of the battleship became clear: despite a massive increase in air defense, battleships were not adequately protected against attacks by aircraft.  Developments in air warfare combined with the emergence of powerful carrier forces relegated battleships to a secondary status.  This fact was shown several times early in the war: a British attack on moored battleships at Taranto, Italy (Nov. 1940); the sinking of the German battleship ''Bismarck'' (May, 1941), which succeeded when antiquated British biplanes dropped the torpedoes which disabled the ship's rudders; the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor (Dec. 1941); and the Japanese sinking of the British battleship ''Prince of Wales'' while at sea near Singapore a few days later.   

In the [[Second World War]], the weakness of the battleship became clear: despite a massive increase in air defense, battleships were not adequately protected against attacks by aircraft.  Developments in air warfare combined with the emergence of powerful carrier forces relegated battleships to a secondary status.  This fact was shown several times early in the war: a British attack on moored battleships at Taranto, Italy (Nov. 1940); the sinking of the German battleship ''Bismarck'' (May, 1941), which succeeded when antiquated British biplanes dropped the torpedoes which disabled the ship's rudders; the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor (Dec. 1941); and the Japanese sinking of the British battleship ''Prince of Wales'' while at sea near Singapore a few days later.   

Within months after the Pearl Harbor the battleship component of the US Pacific Fleet was back stronger than ever and capable of fighting the Japanese in the South Pacific. But the battleship fleet, designated Task Force One, went largely unused<ref>David C. Fuquea, "Task Force One: the Wasted Assets of the United States Pacific Battleship Fleet, 1942." ''Journal of Military History'' 1997 61(4): 707-734.</ref>. Initially, logistical problems played a large role in the failure to commit the battleships, but by late November 1942 considerations of operational capability and survivability were more important. Admiral [[William Halsey]], the South Pacific theater commander, believed the battleships were a liability, while Admiral [[Chester Nimitz]], commander of the Pacific Fleet, believed the benefit to be gained from using them was not worth the risk of losing them and their personnel in battle. As a result, the battleships were relegated to shore bombardment and a supporting role to the ship which replaced them as the chief offensive weapon: the aircraft carrier.  And it was planes launched from carriers that would turn the tide of the war, as well as sink nearly all of Japan's battleships, including the giant ''Yamato'' and her sister ''Musashi''.

Within months after the Pearl Harbor the battleship component of the US Pacific Fleet was back stronger than ever and capable of fighting the Japanese in the South Pacific. But the battleship fleet, designated Task Force One, went largely unused.<ref>David C. Fuquea, "Task Force One: the Wasted Assets of the United States Pacific Battleship Fleet, 1942." ''Journal of Military History'' 1997 61(4): 707-734.</ref> Initially, logistical problems played a large role in the failure to commit the battleships, but by late November 1942 considerations of operational capability and survivability were more important. Admiral [[William Halsey]], the South Pacific theater commander, believed the battleships were a liability, while Admiral [[Chester Nimitz]], commander of the Pacific Fleet, believed the benefit to be gained from using them was not worth the risk of losing them and their personnel in battle. As a result, the battleships were relegated to shore bombardment and a supporting role to the ship which replaced them as the chief offensive weapon: the aircraft carrier.  And it was planes launched from carriers that would turn the tide of the war, as well as sink nearly all of Japan's battleships, including the giant ''Yamato'' and her sister ''Musashi''.

After World War II battleships were largely scrapped.  The last battleship actually constructed and commissioned was Great Britain's HMS ''Vanguard'' in 1946; she had only 14 years of life before decommissioning in 1960 and scrapping.  French battleship ''Jean Bart'' only had two years in commission - 1955-1957 - before she too was scrapped.  Of the American battleships, the four ''Iowas'' (''Iowa'', ''New Jersey'', ''Missouri'', ''Wisconsin'') had a brief period of active duty during the 1980s, with ''Missouri'' and ''Wisconsin'' being the last battleships to fire their weapons in combat during the Persian Gulf War in 1991; all four were eventually decommissioned (the reason cited is high maintenance costs) and relegated to museum attractions.  The remaining battleships (''Massachusetts'', ''Alabama'', ''North Carolina'', ''Texas'') are also museums in their respective states.

After World War II battleships were largely scrapped.  The last battleship actually constructed and commissioned was Great Britain's HMS ''Vanguard'' in 1946; she had only 14 years of life before decommissioning in 1960 and scrapping.  French battleship ''Jean Bart'' only had two years in commission - 1955-1957 - before she too was scrapped.  Of the American battleships, the four ''Iowas'' (''Iowa'', ''New Jersey'', ''Missouri'', ''Wisconsin'') had a brief period of active duty during the 1980s, with ''Missouri'' and ''Wisconsin'' being the last battleships to fire their weapons in combat during the Persian Gulf War in 1991; all four were eventually decommissioned (the reason cited is high maintenance costs) and relegated to museum attractions.  The remaining battleships (''Massachusetts'', ''Alabama'', ''North Carolina'', ''Texas'') are also museums in their respective states.