Changes

Against overwhelming odds, all but 17 of 108 Australians survived wave after wave of attack until a relief force in the form of a company arrived in armoured personnel carriers (one soldier died later from his wounds, while 24 were wounded)

Against overwhelming odds, all but 17 of 108 Australians survived wave after wave of attack until a relief force in the form of a company arrived in armoured personnel carriers (one soldier died later from his wounds, while 24 were wounded)

At 15:40, a small group of VC soldiers walked into the middle of 11 Platoon on the right flank of D Company. One was killed in the action, the area was cleared and 11 Platoon moved forward again.

At 15:40, a VC squads walked into the middle of 11 Platoon on the right flank of D Company. One was killed in the action, the area was cleared and 11 Platoon moved forward again.

Several light mortar rounds were fired towards the company position landing to the east, most likely the same mortars that had fired at the base on the night of 16 August, causing several casualties. The accompanying Forward Observation Officer (FO), New Zealand Army Captain Morrie Stanley, organised counter battery fire, probably destroying them, as the mortars were not fired again. This diversion separated the main company slightly from 11 Platoon, putting the main body behind a slight rise.

Several light mortar rounds were fired towards the company position landing to the east, most likely the same mortars that had fired at the base on the night of 16 August, causing several casualties. The accompanying [[Forward Observation Officer]] (FO), New Zealand Army Captain [[Morrie Stanley]], organized counter battery fire, neutralizing them, as the mortars were not fired again. This diversion separated the main company slightly from 11 Platoon, putting the main body behind a slight rise.

As 11 Platoon continued to advance they were attacked by heavy machine gun fire and sustained several casualties. Following normal contact procedures, the platoon went into a defensive position. The VC formed an assault and attacked 11 Platoon around 20 minutes after initial contact with support from their heavy machine guns.

As 11 Platoon continued to advance they were attacked by heavy machine gun fire and sustained several casualties. Following normal contact procedures, the platoon went into a defensive position. The VC formed an assault and attacked 11 Platoon around 20 minutes after initial contact with support from their heavy machine guns.

Stanley called in all available artillery support from the 1 ATF artillery units, and 10 Platoon moved up to the left of 11 Platoon to relieve pressure on them and allow them to withdraw to the company defensive position out of the heavy machine gun fire. The commander of 11 Platoon, ex-conscript 2nd Lt Gordon Sharp, was killed and Sergeant Bob Buick assumed command of the platoon. During this engagement both platoons' radios went out.

Stanley called in all available artillery support from the 1 ATF artillery units, and 10 Platoon moved up to the left of 11 Platoon to relieve pressure on them and allow them to withdraw to the company defensive position out of the heavy machine gun fire. The commander of 11 Platoon, (ex-conscript) 2nd Lt Gordon Sharp, was killed and Platoon Sergeant [[Bob Buick]] assumed command of the platoon. During this engagement both platoons' radios went out.

Heavy monsoon rain began falling, obscuring the battlefield.

Heavy monsoon rain began falling, obscuring the battlefield.

10 Platoon, under 2nd Lt Geoff Kendall, also came under fire and went into a defensive position. 12 Platoon, commanded by 2nd Lt Dave Sabben, had been the reserve platoon, and it was ordered to the right to support 11 Platoon. 12 Platoon left one section behind to support Company HQ.

10 Platoon, under 2nd Lt [[Geoff Kendall]], also came under fire and went into a defensive position. 12 Platoon, commanded by 2nd Lt [[Dave Sabben]], had been the reserve platoon, and it was ordered to the right to support 11 Platoon. 12 Platoon left one section behind to support Company HQ.

Stanley called for close air support but when it arrived it was unable to identify targets due to the bad weather. The US aircraft dropped their bombs to the east causing disruption to the VC rear areas.

Stanley called for close US support but when it arrived it was unable to identify targets due to the bad weather. The US warplanes dropped their bombs to the east causing disruption to the VC rear areas.

The Australian soldiers were carrying a light load, approximately five magazines, and quickly ran low on ammunition. At 5:00pm Smith called for an ammunition resupply. By coincidence, two Iroquois helicopters from 9 Squadron, Royal Australian Air Force were available at the Nui Dat base, having just been used as transport for a Col Joye and Little Pattie concert. One of the Iroquois pilots, Flt Lt Bob Grandin, disobeyed orders by dropping supplies to D Company. He recalled: ''"[i]t did sound extremely bad on the radio. I recall Harry [Smith] saying, 'If you don't do this for us you all might as well start saying your prayers — it's all over'."''

The Australian soldiers were carrying a light load, approximately five magazines, and quickly ran low on ammunition. At 5:00pm Smith called for an ammunition resupply. By coincidence, two Iroquois helicopters from 9 Squadron, [[Royal Australian Air Force]] were available at the Nui Dat base, having just been used as transport for a [[Col Joye]] and [[Little Pattie]] concert. One of the Iroquois pilots, Flt Lt [[Bob Grandin]], disobeyed orders by dropping supplies to D Company. He recalled: ''"[i]t did sound extremely bad on the radio. I recall Harry [Smith] saying, 'If you don't do this for us you all might as well start saying your prayers — it's all over'."''

The survivors of 11 Platoon withdrew under the cover provided by the torrential rain to the company position. Smith requested reinforcements from 6RAR. B Company HQ with its one platoon had not yet got back to Nui Dat and was ordered back to Long Tan. At Nui Dat, A Company was ordered to ready itself and the M-113 armoured personnel carriers of the 1st Armoured Personnel Carrier Squadron to transport them.  

The survivors of 11 Platoon withdrew under the cover provided by the torrential rain to the company position. Smith requested reinforcements from 6RAR. B Company HQ with one platoon had not yet got back to Nui Dat and was ordered back to Long Tan. At Nui Dat, A Company was ordered to ready itself and the M-113 armored personnel carriers of the 1st Armored Personnel Carrier Squadron to transport them.  

The VC continually formed assault groups and moved forward but were broken up by artillery fire. Fortunately for the attackers, the soft boggy ground reduced the effect of the shell bursts, but there were a large number of wounded. The soldiers of D Company held their line and repulsed any VC that got through the artillery barrage. D Company were supported by 24 105 mm and 155 mm guns from the Australian 1st Field Regiment, the 161st Battery, Royal New Zealand Artillery and the U.S. 2nd Battalion, 35th Artillery Regiment. Over 3,000 rounds of artillery were fired throughout the remainder of the battle and night, with fire concentrating on likely VC forming-up positions and escape routes. "A" Battery, 1st Field Regiment fired rounds every 15 seconds for three hours. The U.S. gunners were in the same base as "A" Battery and assisted the exhausted Australian gunners by carrying artillery rounds to their guns.

The VC continually formed assault groups and moved forward but were broken up by artillery fire. Fortunately for the attackers, the soft boggy ground reduced the effect of the shell bursts, but there were a large number of wounded. The soldiers of D Company held their line and repulsed any VC that got through the artillery barrage. D Company were supported by twenty-four 105 mm and 155 mm guns from the Australian 1st Field Regiment, the 161st Battery, Royal New Zealand Artillery and the U.S. 2nd Battalion, 35th Artillery Regiment. Over 3,000 rounds of artillery were fired throughout the remainder of the battle and night, with fire concentrating on likely VC forming-up positions and escape routes. "A" Battery, 1st Field Regiment fired rounds every 15 seconds for three hours. The U.S. gunners were in the same base as "A" Battery and assisted the exhausted Australian gunners by carrying artillery rounds to their guns.

The reverse slope that D Company used for defense meant that the VC found it difficult to use their heavy calibre weapons effectively; the VC could only engage the Australians at close range. The VC tried to find the Australian flanks but the wide dispersal and excellent defensive position meant the VC thought they were up against a larger enemy.

The reverse slope that D Company used for defense meant that the VC found it difficult to use their heavy calibre weapons effectively; the VC could only engage the Australians at close range. The VC tried to find the Australian flanks but the wide dispersal and excellent defensive position meant the VC thought they were up against a larger enemy.

At last light two rifle companies and APCs from 1 APC Squadron arrived under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Colin Townsend and assaulted the Vietnamese flank. In teeming rain, 3 Troop, A Company under Lieutenant Adrian Roberts and 2 Troop, A Company under Lieutenant Peter Dinham, also attacked the forward elements of D445 Battalion, taking them by surprise. A Company dismounted from 10 M-113s and attacked the fleeing enemy, withdrawing to the east. An Australian soldier from one of the rifle companies was killed as they attacked the D445 Battalion position.

At last light two rifle companies and APCs from 1 APC Squadron arrived under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel [[Colin Townsend]] and assaulted the Vietnamese flank. In teeming rain, 3 Troop, A Company under Lieutenant Adrian Roberts and 2 Troop, A Company under Lieutenant Peter Dinham, also attacked the forward elements of D445 Battalion, taking them by surprise. A Company dismounted from 10 M-113s and attacked the fleeing enemy, withdrawing to the east. One Australian soldier from the reinforcements was killed as they attacked the D445 Battalion position.

The fresh reinforcements formed a perimeter around D Company allowing them to treat the wounded and rest. The supporting artillery repeatedly fired on likely escape routes of the VC and some wounded were evacuated by helicopter. A and B Companies were a strong force and should have been able to repulse any night attack. As it was there was no further contact.

The fresh reinforcements formed a perimeter around D Company allowing them to treat the wounded and rest. The supporting artillery repeatedly fired on likely escape routes of the VC and some Australian wounded were evacuated by helicopter. A and B Companies were a strong force and should have been able to repulse any night attack. As it was there was no further contact.

The next day the dead and wounded from 11 Platoon’s position were recovered and 50 enemy dead buried. Australian historians later claimed US forces captured documents indicating 800 killed and 1,000 wounded. They also point out that the VC routinely carried away their dead during a battle, and this would have reduced the body count.

The next day the dead and wounded from 11 Platoon’s position were recovered and 50 enemy dead buried. Australian historians later claimed US forces captured documents indicating 800 killed and 1,000 wounded. They also point out that the VC routinely carried away their dead during a battle, and this would have reduced the body count.