| | Throughout the early years of the war, British foreign secretary Lord Russell and Napoleon III, and, to a lesser extent, British Prime Minister Lord Palmerston, explored the risks and advantages of recognition of the Confederacy, or at least of offering a mediation. Recognition meant certain war with the United States, loss of American grain, loss of exports to the United States, loss of huge investments in American securities, loss of Canada and other North American colonies, much higher taxes, many lives lost and a severe threat to the entire British merchant marine, in exchange for the possibility of some cotton. Many party leaders and the general public wanted no war with such high costs and meager benefits. Recognition was considered following the [[Second Battle of Manassas]] when the British government was preparing to mediate in the conflict, but the Union victory at the [[Battle of Antietam]] and Lincoln's [[Emancipation Proclamation]], combined with internal opposition, caused the government to back away. | | Throughout the early years of the war, British foreign secretary Lord Russell and Napoleon III, and, to a lesser extent, British Prime Minister Lord Palmerston, explored the risks and advantages of recognition of the Confederacy, or at least of offering a mediation. Recognition meant certain war with the United States, loss of American grain, loss of exports to the United States, loss of huge investments in American securities, loss of Canada and other North American colonies, much higher taxes, many lives lost and a severe threat to the entire British merchant marine, in exchange for the possibility of some cotton. Many party leaders and the general public wanted no war with such high costs and meager benefits. Recognition was considered following the [[Second Battle of Manassas]] when the British government was preparing to mediate in the conflict, but the Union victory at the [[Battle of Antietam]] and Lincoln's [[Emancipation Proclamation]], combined with internal opposition, caused the government to back away. |
| | No country appointed any diplomat officially to the Confederacy, but several maintained their consuls in the South who had been appointed before the war.<ref>In 1861, [[Ernst Raven]] applied for approval as the [[Saxe-Coburg-Gotha]] consul, but he was a citizen of Texas and there is no evidence that Saxe officials knew what he was doing; Saxe was a firm supporter of the U.S. It is false to state that Saxe (or the Pope) recognized the Confederacy. No country did so. On the Pope see [http://cdl.library.cornell.edu/cgi-bin/moa/pageviewer?root=%2Fmoa%2Fofre%2Fofre2003%2F&tif=01042.TIF&cite=http%3A%2F%2Fcdl.library.cornell.edu%2Fcgi-bin%2Fmoa%2Fsgml%2Fmoa-idx%3Fnotisid%3DANU4547-2003&coll=moa&frames=1&view=50]</ref> | | No country appointed any diplomat officially to the Confederacy, but several maintained their consuls in the South who had been appointed before the war.<ref>In 1861, [[Ernst Raven]] applied for approval as the [[Saxe-Coburg-Gotha]] consul, but he was a citizen of Texas and there is no evidence that Saxe officials knew what he was doing; Saxe was a firm supporter of the U.S. It is false to state that Saxe (or the Pope) recognized the Confederacy. No country did so. On the Pope see [http://cdl.library.cornell.edu/cgi-bin/moa/pageviewer?root=%2Fmoa%2Fofre%2Fofre2003%2F&tif=01042.TIF&cite=http%3A%2F%2Fcdl.library.cornell.edu%2Fcgi-bin%2Fmoa%2Fsgml%2Fmoa-idx%3Fnotisid%3DANU4547-2003&coll=moa&frames=1&view=50]</ref> |