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| | In the words of the leading proponent of textualism, Justice [[Antonin Scalia]], statutory text always trumps "unenacted legislative intent."<ref>''INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca'', 480 U.S. 421, 453 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring)</ref> | | In the words of the leading proponent of textualism, Justice [[Antonin Scalia]], statutory text always trumps "unenacted legislative intent."<ref>''INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca'', 480 U.S. 421, 453 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring)</ref> |
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| − | Other leading textualists are Justice [[Clarence Thomas]] and Seventh Circuit Judge [[Frank Easterbrook]]. | + | Other leading textualists are Justice [[Clarence Thomas]], Seventh Circuit Judge [[Frank Easterbrook]] and [[Neil Gorsuch]]. |
| | + | <ref name="Carter20MAR2017">{{cite web |title=9 Things You Should Know About Neil Gorsuch and Supreme Court Confirmations |author=Joe Carter |publisher=The Gospel Coalition, Inc. |date=20 Mar 2017 |quote=In his judicial philosophy, Judge Gorsuch is considered a proponent of originalism, a manner of interpreting the Constitution that begins with the text and attempts to give that text the meaning it had when it was adopted, and textualism, a method of statutory interpretation that relies on the plain text of a statute to determine its meaning. |url=https://www.thegospelcoalition.org/article/9-things-you-should-know-about-neil-gorsuch-and-supreme-court-confirmations |accessdate=21 Mar 2017}}</ref> |
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| | The term "textualism" was originally coined by Justice [[Robert Jackson]] in his famous concurrence in ''[[Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer]]'', 343 U.S. 579 (1952), which became more influential than the Court opinion. Later, this term was used by a [[liberal]] commentator in an unsuccessful attempt to embarrass it.<ref>William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. Rev. 621, 623 (1990) (under the doctrine of textualism, "once the Court has ascertained a statute's plain meaning, consideration of legislative history becomes irrelevant").</ref> An older form of textualism was the "plain meaning" doctrine. | | The term "textualism" was originally coined by Justice [[Robert Jackson]] in his famous concurrence in ''[[Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer]]'', 343 U.S. 579 (1952), which became more influential than the Court opinion. Later, this term was used by a [[liberal]] commentator in an unsuccessful attempt to embarrass it.<ref>William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. Rev. 621, 623 (1990) (under the doctrine of textualism, "once the Court has ascertained a statute's plain meaning, consideration of legislative history becomes irrelevant").</ref> An older form of textualism was the "plain meaning" doctrine. |
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| | Textualism is similar to "[[originalism]]", or "original meaning." These are different from [[purposivism]]. Other competing legal doctrines include [[Critical Legal Studies]]. | | Textualism is similar to "[[originalism]]", or "original meaning." These are different from [[purposivism]]. Other competing legal doctrines include [[Critical Legal Studies]]. |
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| | + | == See Also == |
| | + | *[[Judicial activism]] |
| | + | *[[Originalism]] |
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| | == References == | | == References == |
| | + | <references/> |
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| − | <references/>
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| | [[Category:Law]] | | [[Category:Law]] |