Changes

In the 1890s, German strategy was defensive with most troops assigned to deterring a Russian attack. With Russian attention focused on the Far East during the Russo-Japanese war (1904-1905), such caution seemed excessive. Schlieffen sketched a plan to outflank the French fortresses on the Franco-German border by advancing through Belgium. A large German force would swing around Paris and attack the French from the south. This "Memorandum for a War against France" was an early version of the Schlieffen Plan. It ignored Russia altogether.

In the 1890s, German strategy was defensive with most troops assigned to deterring a Russian attack. With Russian attention focused on the Far East during the Russo-Japanese war (1904-1905), such caution seemed excessive. Schlieffen sketched a plan to outflank the French fortresses on the Franco-German border by advancing through Belgium. A large German force would swing around Paris and attack the French from the south. This "Memorandum for a War against France" was an early version of the Schlieffen Plan. It ignored Russia altogether.

The most controversial feature of the plan was the proposed advance across Belgium, a nation whose neutrality was guaranteed by Britain and other countries. Kaiser Wilhelm II invited Belgium's King Leopold to Berlin in January 1904 and offered him "the crown of Old Burgundy" if the Belgians consented to the plan. Leopold responded with the greatest astonishment.<ref>Tuchman, Barbara, ''[https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=CR3QAgAAQBAJ&dq= The Guns of August]''</ref>

The most controversial feature of the plan was the proposed advance across Belgium, a nation whose neutrality was guaranteed by Britain and other countries. Kaiser Wilhelm II invited Belgium's King Leopold II to Berlin in January 1904 and offered him "the crown of Old Burgundy" if the Belgians consented to the plan. Leopold responded with the greatest astonishment.<ref>Tuchman, Barbara, ''[https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=CR3QAgAAQBAJ&dq= The Guns of August]''</ref>

When the Japanese defeated the Russians in 1905, the kaiser expressed interest in going ahead with the plan, even without Belgian consent. Schlieffen had to confess that the German army was not ready for war. The French had recoilless artillery, which the Germans lacked.<ref>Röhl, p. 416.</ref> The plan contemplated a significantly larger army than the one Schlieffen commanded.<ref name=Gross>Gross, Gerhard, "There was a Schlieffen Plan", ''[https://books.google.fi/books?id=IVjCBAAAQBAJ&hl=fi&source=gbs_navlinks_s The Schlieffen Plan: International Perspectives on the German Strategy for World War I],'' pp. 100-101.</ref> Whatever its value in war, the plan could still be used as a tool for obtaining up-to-date weapons and more soldiers.<ref>Gross, pp. 103-104. Schlieffen's memorandum is, "A program for further expansion of the army and its mobilization," according to the archive's official description.</ref>

When the Japanese defeated the Russians in 1905, the kaiser expressed interest in going ahead with the plan, even without Belgian consent. Schlieffen had to confess that the German army was not ready for war. The French had recoilless artillery, which the Germans lacked.<ref>Röhl, p. 416.</ref> The plan contemplated a significantly larger army than the one Schlieffen commanded.<ref name=Gross>Gross, Gerhard, "There was a Schlieffen Plan", ''[https://books.google.fi/books?id=IVjCBAAAQBAJ&hl=fi&source=gbs_navlinks_s The Schlieffen Plan: International Perspectives on the German Strategy for World War I],'' pp. 100-101.</ref> Despite these revelations, Schlieffen and subsequent chiefs of staff continued to use the plan as a tool for obtaining up-to-date weapons and more soldiers.<ref>Gross, pp. 103-104. Schlieffen's memorandum is, "A program for further expansion of the army and its mobilization," according to the archive's official description.</ref>

Schlieffen's practice of creating plans based on men and resources that Germany did not have puzzled many of his follow officers.<ref name="Gross" /> An agent called Le Vengeur provided a copy of Schlieffen's plans to French intelligence in 1904. The plan was no secret after January 1909, when a magazine article about it was published. This article was presumably written by Schlieffen himself.<ref>''[https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=M1fIlAmZKnsC&lpg=PA1917&vq=Lambling&pg=PA1917#v=onepage&q&f=true The Second Oldest Profession: Spies and Spying in the Twentieth Century]''</ref> If the Schlieffen Plan was bluster intended to intimidate the French, it seems to have worked. French war plans remained timidly defensive until 1911.

Schlieffen's practice of creating plans based on men and resources that Germany did not have puzzled many of his follow officers.<ref name="Gross" /> An agent called Le Vengeur provided a copy of Schlieffen's plans to French intelligence in 1904. The plan was no secret after January 1909, when a magazine article about it was published. This article was presumably written by Schlieffen himself.<ref>''[https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=M1fIlAmZKnsC&lpg=PA1917&vq=Lambling&pg=PA1917#v=onepage&q&f=true The Second Oldest Profession: Spies and Spying in the Twentieth Century]''</ref> If the Schlieffen Plan was bluster intended to intimidate the French, it seems to have worked. French war plans remained timidly defensive until 1911.

Schlieffen retired in 1906 and was replaced by Moltke. In April 1913, Moltke dropped an alternative plan for an offensive in the east against Russia so that the General Staff could focus on the Schlieffen Plan. This allowed the army "to rule out half measures" and interference from "the politicians," as Waldersee, former chief of the General Staff, put it.<ref>''[https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=t4gDyLfeUEQC&dq= Helmuth Von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War]'', p. 103.</ref> The way was paved for world war, which broke out the following year.

Schlieffen retired in 1906 and was replaced by Moltke. In April 1913, Moltke dropped an alternative plan for an offensive in the east against Russia so that the General Staff could focus on the Schlieffen Plan. This allowed the army "to rule out half measures" and interference from "the politicians," as Waldersee, a former chief of the General Staff, put it.<ref>''[https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=t4gDyLfeUEQC&dq= Helmuth Von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War]'', p. 103.</ref> The way was paved for world war, which broke out the following year.

Germany artillery had been upgraded since 1905. But there was still an insufficient number of soldiers to execute the plan, as well as other problems. The retreating Belgians blew up several railway bridges, creating supply problems. In September 1914, German forces under Moltke's command arrived at the Marne, a river north of Paris, after an exhausting march across Belgium and northeastern France. After five days of fighting with French and British forces, they stopped to wait for needed supplies. As the armies rested, they dug trenches. Four years of trench warfare followed.  

Germany artillery had been upgraded since 1905. But there was still an insufficient number of soldiers to execute the plan, as well as other problems. The retreating Belgians blew up several railway bridges, creating supply problems. In September 1914, German forces under Moltke's command arrived at the Marne, a river north of Paris, after an exhausting march across Belgium and northeastern France. After five days of fighting with French and British forces, they stopped to wait for needed supplies. As the armies rested, they dug trenches. Four years of trench warfare followed.