| Line 2: |
Line 2: |
| | The '''Schlieffen Plan''' was a plan for a German invasion of France that was drawn up in 1904 by Count Schlieffen, chief of the German General Staff. It evolved into the plan of attack used in [[World War I]] (1914-1918). Although the plan used in 1914 is quite different from any plan that Schlieffen himself was responsible for, it is customary to refer to it as the Schlieffen Plan. | | The '''Schlieffen Plan''' was a plan for a German invasion of France that was drawn up in 1904 by Count Schlieffen, chief of the German General Staff. It evolved into the plan of attack used in [[World War I]] (1914-1918). Although the plan used in 1914 is quite different from any plan that Schlieffen himself was responsible for, it is customary to refer to it as the Schlieffen Plan. |
| | | | |
| − | Schlieffen proposed that the German army outflank the fortresses on the Franco-German border by advancing through Belgium. After Moltke replaced Schlieffen in 1906, he made various modifications in the plan. However, this basic concept was retained. If France could be knocked out of the war quickly, Germany could then focus on Russia. When Moltke put the plan into effect in in 1914, the speedy result the Germans desired proved unobtainable. Violating Belgian neutrality was a major disadvantage of the plan since this provoked Britain to enter the war as a French ally. | + | Schlieffen proposed that the German army outflank the fortresses on the Franco-German border by advancing through Belgium. After Moltke replaced Schlieffen in 1906, he made various modifications in the plan. However, this basic concept was retained. If France could be knocked out of the war quickly, Germany could then focus on Russia. When Moltke put the plan into effect in 1914, the speedy result the Germans desired proved unobtainable. Violating Belgian neutrality was a major disadvantage of the plan since this provoked Britain to enter the war as a French ally. |
| | | | |
| | ==Development== | | ==Development== |
| Line 11: |
Line 11: |
| | When the Japanese defeated the Russians in 1905, the kaiser expressed interest in going ahead with the plan, even without Belgian consent. Schlieffen had to confess that the German army was not ready for war. The French had recoilless artillery, which the Germans lacked.<ref>Röhl, p. 416.</ref> The plan contemplated a significantly larger army than the one Schlieffen commanded.<ref name=Gross>Gross, Gerhard, "There was a Schlieffen Plan", ''[https://books.google.fi/books?id=IVjCBAAAQBAJ&hl=fi&source=gbs_navlinks_s The Schlieffen Plan: International Perspectives on the German Strategy for World War I],'' pp. 100-101.</ref> Despite these revelations, Schlieffen and subsequent chiefs of staff continued to use the plan as a tool for obtaining up-to-date weapons and more soldiers.<ref>Gross, pp. 103-104. Schlieffen's memorandum is, "A program for further expansion of the army and its mobilization," according to the archive's official description.</ref> | | When the Japanese defeated the Russians in 1905, the kaiser expressed interest in going ahead with the plan, even without Belgian consent. Schlieffen had to confess that the German army was not ready for war. The French had recoilless artillery, which the Germans lacked.<ref>Röhl, p. 416.</ref> The plan contemplated a significantly larger army than the one Schlieffen commanded.<ref name=Gross>Gross, Gerhard, "There was a Schlieffen Plan", ''[https://books.google.fi/books?id=IVjCBAAAQBAJ&hl=fi&source=gbs_navlinks_s The Schlieffen Plan: International Perspectives on the German Strategy for World War I],'' pp. 100-101.</ref> Despite these revelations, Schlieffen and subsequent chiefs of staff continued to use the plan as a tool for obtaining up-to-date weapons and more soldiers.<ref>Gross, pp. 103-104. Schlieffen's memorandum is, "A program for further expansion of the army and its mobilization," according to the archive's official description.</ref> |
| | | | |
| − | Schlieffen's practice of creating plans based on men and resources that Germany did not have puzzled many of his follow officers.<ref name="Gross" /> An agent called Le Vengeur provided a copy of Schlieffen's plans to French intelligence in 1904. The plan was no secret after January 1909, when a magazine article about it was published. This article was presumably written by Schlieffen himself.<ref>''[https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=M1fIlAmZKnsC&lpg=PA1917&vq=Lambling&pg=PA1917#v=onepage&q&f=true The Second Oldest Profession: Spies and Spying in the Twentieth Century]''</ref> If the Schlieffen Plan was bluster intended to intimidate the French, it seems to have worked. French war plans remained timidly defensive until 1911. | + | Schlieffen's practice of creating plans based on men and resources that Germany did not have puzzled many of his fellow officers.<ref name="Gross" /> An agent called Le Vengeur provided a copy of Schlieffen's plans to French intelligence in 1904. The plan was no secret after January 1909, when a magazine article about it was published. This article was presumably written by Schlieffen himself.<ref>''[https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=M1fIlAmZKnsC&lpg=PA1917&vq=Lambling&pg=PA1917#v=onepage&q&f=true The Second Oldest Profession: Spies and Spying in the Twentieth Century]''</ref> If the Schlieffen Plan was bluster intended to intimidate the French, it seems to have worked. French war plans remained timidly defensive until 1911. |
| | | | |
| | Schlieffen retired in 1906 and was replaced by Moltke. In April 1913, Moltke dropped an alternative plan for an offensive in the east against Russia so that the General Staff could focus on the Schlieffen Plan. This allowed the army "to rule out half measures" and interference from "the politicians," as Waldersee, a former chief of the General Staff, put it.<ref>''[https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=t4gDyLfeUEQC&dq= Helmuth Von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War]'', p. 103.</ref> The way was paved for world war, which broke out the following year. | | Schlieffen retired in 1906 and was replaced by Moltke. In April 1913, Moltke dropped an alternative plan for an offensive in the east against Russia so that the General Staff could focus on the Schlieffen Plan. This allowed the army "to rule out half measures" and interference from "the politicians," as Waldersee, a former chief of the General Staff, put it.<ref>''[https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=t4gDyLfeUEQC&dq= Helmuth Von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War]'', p. 103.</ref> The way was paved for world war, which broke out the following year. |
| Line 26: |
Line 26: |
| | ==References== | | ==References== |
| | {{Reflist|1}} | | {{Reflist|1}} |
| | + | |
| | + | [[Category:World War I]] |
| | + | [[Category:German History]] |