Changes

In 1919, historian Hans Delbrück wrote an article in which he argued that an offensive against Russia would have been a more realistic strategy than one focused on France. The immediate provocation for the war was Russian mobilization, so an attack on France, let alone Belgium, was difficult to justify in terms of international opinion.

In 1919, historian Hans Delbrück wrote an article in which he argued that an offensive against Russia would have been a more realistic strategy than one focused on France. The immediate provocation for the war was Russian mobilization, so an attack on France, let alone Belgium, was difficult to justify in terms of international opinion.

At this time, Schlieffen's name was not yet publicly associated with any plan. His role was disclosed by former General Staff officers who wrote responses to Delbrück's critique. They argued that Schlieffen's original plan would have worked. Moltke was to blame as he had fatally weakened the plan by not putting enough soldiers on the right wing. For this reason, the Germans were unable to envelop Paris as Schlieffen had wanted. Ironically, this criticism originates with the same group of officers who assisted Moltke in revising Schlieffen's unworkable plan. Germany needed heroes to serve as examples to its officers, or "applicatory history" as the army called it. Wilhelm Groener, Moltke's railway planner and later the foremost spinner of the Schlieffen myth, wrote, "I do not write for history," but rather to teach officers "strategy in the next war."<ref>Foley, Robert, ''[https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=IfYrBgAAQBAJ&dq= Alfred Von Schlieffen's Military Writings]'', p. xvii.</ref>

At this time, Schlieffen's name was not yet publicly associated with any plan. His role was disclosed by former General Staff officers who wrote responses to Delbrück's critique. They argued that Schlieffen's original plan would have worked. Moltke was to blame as he had fatally weakened the plan by not putting enough soldiers on the right wing. For this reason, the Germans were unable to envelop Paris as Schlieffen had wanted. Ironically, this criticism originates with the same group of officers who assisted Moltke in revising Schlieffen's unworkable version. Germany needed heroes to serve as examples to its officers, or "applicatory history" as the army called it. Wilhelm Groener, Moltke's railway planner and later the foremost spinner of the Schlieffen myth, wrote, "I do not write for history," but rather to teach officers "strategy in the next war."<ref>Foley, Robert, ''[https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=IfYrBgAAQBAJ&dq= Alfred Von Schlieffen's Military Writings]'', p. xvii.</ref>

==References==

==References==