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Schlieffen's practice of creating plans based on men and resources that Germany did not have puzzled many of his fellow officers.<ref name="Gross" /> An agent called Le Vengeur provided a copy of Schlieffen's plans to French intelligence in 1904. There is no record of any traitor being punished. The plan was no secret after January 1909, when a magazine article about it was published. The author of this article was presumably Schlieffen himself.<ref>''[https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=M1fIlAmZKnsC&lpg=PA1917&vq=Lambling&pg=PA1917#v=onepage&q&f=true The Second Oldest Profession: Spies and Spying in the Twentieth Century]''</ref> If Schlieffen's army lagged behind in terms of artillery, bluster was an inexpensive and effective equalizer. Despite the military advantage they enjoyed for much of this period, French war plans remained timidly defensive until 1911.

Schlieffen's practice of creating plans based on men and resources that Germany did not have puzzled many of his fellow officers.<ref name="Gross" /> An agent called Le Vengeur provided a copy of Schlieffen's plans to French intelligence in 1904. There is no record of any traitor being punished. The plan was no secret after January 1909, when a magazine article about it was published. The author of this article was presumably Schlieffen himself.<ref>''[https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=M1fIlAmZKnsC&lpg=PA1917&vq=Lambling&pg=PA1917#v=onepage&q&f=true The Second Oldest Profession: Spies and Spying in the Twentieth Century]''</ref> If Schlieffen's army lagged behind in terms of artillery, bluster was an inexpensive and effective equalizer. Despite the military advantage they enjoyed for much of this period, French war plans remained timidly defensive until 1911.

Schlieffen retired in 1906 and was replaced by Moltke. In April 1913, Moltke dropped an alternative plan for an offensive in the east against Russia so that the General Staff could focus on the Schlieffen Plan. This allowed the army "to rule out half measures" and interference from "the politicians," as Waldersee, a former chief of the General Staff, put it.<ref>''[https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=t4gDyLfeUEQC&dq= Helmuth Von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War]'', p. 103.</ref> The way was paved for world war, which broke out the following year.

Schlieffen retired in 1906 and was replaced by Moltke. In November 1912, Moltke wrote a memorandum demanding full army conscription. The move suggested that Ludendorff, head of mobilization, had become the driving force of the General Staff. Army expansion had long been opposed by the Prussian Ministry of War, which worried that it would dilute the institution's aristocratic character. Wandal, chief of staff at the ministry, complained that "restless and ambitious people" had gained control of the General Staff. In January 1913, Minister Heeringen reassigned Ludendorff to regimental command. Ludendorff later portrayed himself as a martyr to army expansion. But if Moltke was preparing Ludendorff for wartime command, he would need command experience.<ref>Mombauer, pp. 147-149.</ref>

 

In April 1913, Moltke dropped an alternative plan for an offensive in the east against Russia so that the General Staff could focus on the Schlieffen Plan. This allowed the army "to rule out half measures" and interference from "the politicians," as Waldersee, a former chief of the General Staff, put it.<ref>Mombauer, Annika, ''[https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=t4gDyLfeUEQC&dq= Helmuth Von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War]'', p. 103.</ref>

 

Army expansion was approved by the Reichstag in June 1913. The way was paved for world war, which broke out the following year.

Germany artillery had been upgraded since 1905. But there was still an insufficient number of soldiers to execute the plan, as well as other problems. The retreating Belgians blew up several railway bridges, creating supply problems. (The Germans were astonished and outraged that the Belgians dared to resist.<ref>Tuchman, Barbara W.. ''The Guns of August'' (1962). "11 Liège and Alsace."</ref>) In September 1914, German forces under Moltke's command arrived at the Marne, a river north of Paris, after an exhausting march across Belgium and northeastern France. After five days of fighting with French and British forces, they stopped to wait for needed supplies. As the armies rested, they dug trenches. Four years of trench warfare followed.

Germany artillery had been upgraded since 1905. But there was still an insufficient number of soldiers to execute the plan, as well as other problems. The retreating Belgians blew up several railway bridges, creating supply problems. (The Germans were astonished and outraged that the Belgians dared to resist.<ref>Tuchman, Barbara W.. ''The Guns of August'' (1962). "11 Liège and Alsace."</ref>) In September 1914, German forces under Moltke's command arrived at the Marne, a river north of Paris, after an exhausting march across Belgium and northeastern France. After five days of fighting with French and British forces, they stopped to wait for needed supplies. As the armies rested, they dug trenches. Four years of trench warfare followed.