| | Schlieffen retired in 1906 and was replaced by Moltke. Moltke showed little interest in the Schlieffen Plan until 1911, when the Agadir Crisis inspired the General Staff to prepare for war in earnest.<ref>Mombauer, Annika, ''[https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=t4gDyLfeUEQC&dq= Helmuth Von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War]'', p. 86.</ref> | | Schlieffen retired in 1906 and was replaced by Moltke. Moltke showed little interest in the Schlieffen Plan until 1911, when the Agadir Crisis inspired the General Staff to prepare for war in earnest.<ref>Mombauer, Annika, ''[https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=t4gDyLfeUEQC&dq= Helmuth Von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War]'', p. 86.</ref> |
| − | In November 1912, Moltke wrote a memorandum demanding full army conscription. The move suggested that Ludendorff, head of mobilization, had become the driving force of the General Staff. Army expansion had long been opposed by the Prussian Ministry of War, which worried that it would dilute the institution's aristocratic character. Wandel, chief of staff at the ministry, complained that "restless and ambitious people" had gained control of the General Staff. In January 1913, Minister Heeringen reassigned Ludendorff to regimental command. Ludendorff later portrayed himself as a martyr to army expansion. But if Moltke was preparing Ludendorff for wartime command, he would need command experience.<ref>Mombauer, pp. 147-149.</ref> | + | In November 1912, Moltke wrote a memorandum demanding full army conscription. Army expansion had long been opposed by the Prussian Ministry of War, which worried that it would dilute the institution's aristocratic character. Wandel, chief of staff at the ministry, complained that "restless and ambitious people" had gained control of the General Staff. This is presumably a reference to Ludendorff, Moltke's head of mobilization. In January 1913, Minister Heeringen reassigned Ludendorff to regimental command. Ludendorff later portrayed himself as a martyr to army expansion. But if Moltke was preparing Ludendorff for wartime command, he would need command experience.<ref>Mombauer, pp. 147-149.</ref> |
| | In April 1913, Moltke dropped an alternative plan for an offensive in the east against Russia so that the General Staff could focus on the Schlieffen Plan. This allowed the army "to rule out half measures" and interference from "the politicians," as Waldersee, a former chief of the General Staff, put it.<ref>Mombauer, p. 103.</ref> | | In April 1913, Moltke dropped an alternative plan for an offensive in the east against Russia so that the General Staff could focus on the Schlieffen Plan. This allowed the army "to rule out half measures" and interference from "the politicians," as Waldersee, a former chief of the General Staff, put it.<ref>Mombauer, p. 103.</ref> |