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The Schlieffen Plan allowed the Germans to occupy a vast region that included most of Belgium and northeastern France. But this is not usually interpreted to mean that the plan was successful. It fell far short of its goal to capture Paris quickly so that the Germans could turn their attention to the east. French leaders at the time stated that if Paris was captured, they would have retreated south and continued fighting. So the expectation of a quick victory was never realistic. Instead, the plan led to the realization of a worst case scenario: A four-year two-front war with horrific loss of life and ending in German defeat.  

The Schlieffen Plan allowed the Germans to occupy a vast region that included most of Belgium and northeastern France. But this is not usually interpreted to mean that the plan was successful. It fell far short of its goal to capture Paris quickly so that the Germans could turn their attention to the east. French leaders at the time stated that if Paris was captured, they would have retreated south and continued fighting. So the expectation of a quick victory was never realistic. Instead, the plan led to the realization of a worst case scenario: A four-year two-front war with horrific loss of life and ending in German defeat.  

In 1919, historian Hans Delbrück wrote an article in which he argued that an offensive against Russia would have been a more realistic strategy than one focused on France. As the immediate provocation for the war was Russian mobilization, an attack on Belgium and France was difficult to justify in terms of international opinion.

In 1919, Delbrück wrote an article in which he argued that an offensive against Russia would have been a more realistic strategy than one focused on France. As the immediate provocation for the war was Russian mobilization, an attack on Belgium and France was difficult to justify in terms of international opinion.

At this time, Schlieffen's name was not yet publicly associated with any plan. His role was disclosed by former General Staff officers who wrote responses to Delbrück's critique. They argued that Schlieffen's original plan would have worked. Moltke was to blame as he had fatally weakened the plan by not putting enough soldiers on the right wing. For this reason, the Germans were unable to envelop Paris as Schlieffen had wanted. Ironically, this criticism originates with the same group of officers who assisted Moltke in revising Schlieffen's unworkable version. Germany needed heroes to serve as examples to its officers, or "applicatory history" as the army called it. Wilhelm Groener, Moltke's railway planner and later the foremost spinner of the Schlieffen myth, wrote, "I do not write for history," but rather to teach officers "strategy in the next war."<ref>Foley, Robert, ''[https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=IfYrBgAAQBAJ&dq= Alfred Von Schlieffen's Military Writings]'' (2012), p. xvii.</ref>

At this time, Schlieffen's name was not yet publicly associated with any plan. His role was disclosed by former General Staff officers who wrote responses to Delbrück's critique. They argued that Schlieffen's original plan would have worked. Moltke was to blame as he had fatally weakened the plan by not putting enough soldiers on the right wing. For this reason, the Germans were unable to envelop Paris as Schlieffen had wanted. Ironically, this criticism originates with the same group of officers who assisted Moltke in revising Schlieffen's unworkable version. Germany needed heroes to serve as examples to its officers, or "applicatory history" as the army called it. Wilhelm Groener, Moltke's railway planner and later the foremost spinner of the Schlieffen myth, wrote, "I do not write for history," but rather to teach officers "strategy in the next war."<ref>Foley, Robert, ''[https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=IfYrBgAAQBAJ&dq= Alfred Von Schlieffen's Military Writings]'' (2012), p. xvii.</ref>