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| − | '''Stuxnet''' is a notorious [[computer worm]] which was designed to attack centrifuge systems used to refine nuclear material. It is best known for its successes in this endeavor in the Islamic Republic of [[Iran]]. These successes made Stuxnet the first known [[cyberweapon]]. Stuxnet contains about 15,000 lines of code in all. | + | '''Stuxnet''' is a notorious [[computer worm]] which was designed to attack centrifuge systems used to refine nuclear material. It is best known for its successes in this endeavor in the Islamic Republic of [[Iran]]. These successes made Stuxnet the first known [[cyberweapon]]. Stuxnet contains about 15,000 lines of code in all, and is believed to have been a targeted attack on the Natanz uranium refinery. |
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| | ==History== | | ==History== |
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| | ==How it Works== | | ==How it Works== |
| − | The Stuxnet [[computer worm|worm]] spread like all other worms, on its own without human action. It jumped from [[Windows]] system to system, checking for Siemens [[industrial control systems]], which where used by several [[uranium]] refineries in [[Iran]]. If the systems where not detected, it would try to spread to other [[computer]]s, but not harm its new host. Only if these systems where present would it go to work, causing the equipment to malfunction while the monitors displayed false information. | + | The Stuxnet [[computer worm|worm]] spread like all other worms, on its own without human action. It jumped from [[Windows]] system to system, checking for Siemens [[industrial control systems]] PLC, which were used by [[uranium]] refineries in [[Iran]]. If the systems were not detected, it would try to spread to other [[computer]]s, but not harm its new host. Only if these systems where present would it go to work, causing the equipment to malfunction while the monitors displayed false information. |
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| | The targeted refinery systems where [[air-gap]]ped, that is, not connected to the [[internet]]. Therefore, the [[malware]] needed to be hand delivered. In such cases, an infected [[flash drive]] is often left outside of the facility, and a curious or well-meaning individual will connect it to a computer inside to see the contents. Once connected, it will infect the computer, and begin to spread. | | The targeted refinery systems where [[air-gap]]ped, that is, not connected to the [[internet]]. Therefore, the [[malware]] needed to be hand delivered. In such cases, an infected [[flash drive]] is often left outside of the facility, and a curious or well-meaning individual will connect it to a computer inside to see the contents. Once connected, it will infect the computer, and begin to spread. |
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| | ==Results== | | ==Results== |
| − | In all, about one fifth of Iran’s nuclear centrifuges where destroyed. However, Stuxnet was not intended to leave the targeted facilities, since they where [[air-gap]]ped. Unfortunately, it did escape and is still on the loose in the [[World Wide Web]]. It is not nearly as contagious as it was at first, but even so, the Czech Republic-based security firm [[Kleissner & Associates]] reported that at least 153 unique machines were infected with Stuxnet in 2013 and 2014.<ref>http://www.securityweek.com/stuxnet-still-present-some-organizations-researchers</ref> Since it was designed to attack [[Siemens]] [[industrial control systems]], it is still a threat to some such equipment which is controlled by older or unpatched [[operating system]]s.<ref>http://www.scmagazineuk.com/stuxnet-still-a-threat-to-critical-infrastructure/article/419802</ref><br /> | + | In all, about one fifth of Iran’s nuclear centrifuges where destroyed. However, Stuxnet was not intended to leave the targeted facility, since it was [[air-gap]]ped. Unfortunately, it did escape and is still on the loose in the [[World Wide Web]]. It is not nearly as contagious as it was at first, but even so, the Czech Republic-based security firm [[Kleissner & Associates]] reported that at least 153 unique machines were infected with Stuxnet in 2013 and 2014.<ref>http://www.securityweek.com/stuxnet-still-present-some-organizations-researchers</ref> Since it was designed to attack [[Siemens]] [[industrial control systems]], it is still a threat to some such equipment which is controlled by older or unpatched [[operating system]]s.<ref>http://www.scmagazineuk.com/stuxnet-still-a-threat-to-critical-infrastructure/article/419802</ref><br /> |
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| | There have been other repercussions as well. Now malware has been proven an effective attack against country as a whole or a specific program. Meanwhile, a powerful piece of code still capable of breaking into unprotected systems is "floating" around, out of control. If the wrong party was able to gain a copy of the malware, they could theoretically decompile, edit, and release it for their own purposes. | | There have been other repercussions as well. Now malware has been proven an effective attack against country as a whole or a specific program. Meanwhile, a powerful piece of code still capable of breaking into unprotected systems is "floating" around, out of control. If the wrong party was able to gain a copy of the malware, they could theoretically decompile, edit, and release it for their own purposes. |