Changes

==Intelligence failure and response==

==Intelligence failure and response==

Kennedy believed Soviet assurances that there were no missiles—and warned Moscow there had better be none. A breakdown in data gathering prevented the CIA from convincingly refuting Moscow's cover story. An off-year election campaign was underway, and the White House loudly denied charges by Republican Senator Kenneth Keating from New York that the Soviets were installing nuclear weapons in Cuba to threaten the U.S. and Kennedy was covering it up.<ref>Keating's correct information came from dissident Cubans. Max Holland, "A Luce Connection: Senator Keating, William Pawley, and the Cuban Missile Crisis," ''Journal of Cold War Studies'' 1.3 (1999) 139-167 in [[Project Muse]]</ref>

Kennedy believed Soviet assurances that there were no missiles—and warned Moscow there had better be none. A breakdown in data gathering prevented the CIA from convincingly refuting Moscow's cover story. An off-year election campaign was underway, and the White House loudly denied charges by Republican Senator Kenneth Keating from New York that the Soviets were installing nuclear weapons in Cuba to threaten the U.S. and Kennedy was covering it up.<ref>Keating's correct information came from dissident Cubans. Max Holland, "A Luce Connection: Senator Keating, William Pawley, and the Cuban Missile Crisis," ''Journal of Cold War Studies'' 1.3 (1999) 139-167 in [[Project Muse]]</ref>

The missiles were discovered by a lone U-2 reconnaissance plane on October 14. Kennedy was stunned, and immediately assembled a high-level emergency group, called "ExComm" ("the Executive Committee of the National Security Council"), to immediately propose a solution. It considered military action almost inevitable.<ref>The ExComm, or Executive Committee, was the group of government officials whose office or relationship directly played a part in the Cuban Missile Crisis. The ExComm investigated new information, and thought out all possible options, for President Kennedy to consider. The ExComm met at unusual times and in unusual manners in order to keep the situation secret for the time being. The ExComm was composed of 22 members including:

The missiles were discovered by a lone U-2 reconnaissance plane on October 14. Kennedy was stunned, and immediately assembled a high-level emergency group, called "ExComm" ("the Executive Committee of the [[National Security Council]]"), to immediately propose a solution. It considered military action almost inevitable.<ref>The ExComm, or Executive Committee, was the group of government officials whose office or relationship directly played a part in the Cuban Missile Crisis. The ExComm investigated new information, and thought out all possible options, for President Kennedy to consider. The ExComm met at unusual times and in unusual manners in order to keep the situation secret for the time being. The ExComm was composed of 22 members including:

[[Image:Excommoj9.jpg|thumb|300px|The ExComm Meeting Inside The White House.]]

[[Image:Excommoj9.jpg|thumb|300px|The ExComm Meeting Inside The White House.]]

*George W.Ball'', Under Secretary of State''

*George W.Ball'', Under Secretary of State''

High-altitude [[U-2]] aircraft flown by the [[United States Air Force]], took photographs that were analyzed by the National Photointerpretation Center (NPIC), a joint CIA-military analytic group.  They showed missiles. Kennedy was stunned, and immediately assembled a high-level emergency group, called "ExComm" ("the Executive Committee of the National Security Council"), to immediately propose a solution. It considered military action almost inevitable. Although the president and his brother [[Robert Kennedy]], the Attorney General, distrusted men in uniform, they brought in a close friend General [[Maxwell Taylor]] (1901–87), the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. The other chiefs distrusted Taylor's dovish viewpoint and his inability to articulate their urgent advice. The Pentagon's civilian voice on ExComm was Defense Secretary [[Robert McNamara]].  McNamara largely ignored his generals and admirals and generally took a dovish position. ExComm decided that the SS-4 and SS-5s would not upset the strategic balance of power, but nevertheless represented a challenge to American prestige; they had to be removed, even at the risk of threatening war. When Navy Secretary [[Paul Nitze]] was added to ExComm, he forcefully argued the services' viewpoint that the missiles were highly destabilizing.

High-altitude [[U-2]] aircraft flown by the [[United States Air Force]], took photographs that were analyzed by the National Photointerpretation Center (NPIC), a joint CIA-military analytic group.  They showed missiles. Kennedy was stunned, and immediately assembled a high-level emergency group, called "ExComm" ("the Executive Committee of the National Security Council"), to immediately propose a solution. It considered military action almost inevitable. Although the president and his brother [[Robert Kennedy]], the Attorney General, distrusted men in uniform, they brought in a close friend General [[Maxwell Taylor]] (1901–87), the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. The other chiefs distrusted Taylor's dovish viewpoint and his inability to articulate their urgent advice. The Pentagon's civilian voice on ExComm was Defense Secretary [[Robert McNamara]].  McNamara largely ignored his generals and admirals and generally took a dovish position. ExComm decided that the SS-4 and SS-5s would not upset the strategic balance of power, but nevertheless represented a challenge to American prestige; they had to be removed, even at the risk of threatening war. When Navy Secretary [[Paul Nitze]] was added to ExComm, he forcefully argued the services' viewpoint that the missiles were highly destabilizing.

The U.S. could tolerate a gradual evening out of the strategic balance if it took several years and so permitted political adjustments as it proceeded and at least tacit understandings, if not formal ones, on a whole range of matters including arms control. What Washington could not accept was a swift, sudden, and secret shift in the strategic equation by using a new threat of nuclear weapons that would cause massive political and diplomatic upheaval.<ref>Roger Hilsman, ''The Cuban Missile Crisis: The Struggle over Policy.'' (1996) p. 96</ref>  

The U.S. could tolerate a gradual evening out of the strategic balance if it took several years and so permitted political adjustments as it proceeded and at least tacit understandings, if not formal ones, on a whole range of matters including arms control. What Washington could not accept was a swift, sudden, and secret shift in the strategic equation by using a new threat of nuclear weapons that would cause massive political and diplomatic upheaval.<ref>Roger Hilsman, ''The Cuban Missile Crisis: The Struggle over Policy.'' (1996) p. 96</ref>

 

 

==Photography==

==Photography==