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→Reforming counter-insurgency doctrine
From the time [[Baghdad]] fell in 2003, American leadership at the highest levels, beginning with [[Secretary of Defense]] [[Donald Rumsfeld]], were reluctant to admit an insurgency - an armed uprising against the new Baghdad regime - was taking place.
From the time [[Baghdad]] fell in 2003, American leadership at the highest levels, beginning with [[Secretary of Defense]] [[Donald Rumsfeld]], were reluctant to admit an insurgency - an armed uprising against the new Baghdad regime - was taking place.
Traditional American counter-insurgency doctrine cuts deeply against the Army’s institutional instincts which focus on combat operations. The most recent field manual at the time was two decades old, focusing on hunting people and an approach called “kill-capture,” similar to the "search and destroy" methods used in Vietnam. Ultimately more insurgents than when they started.
Traditional American counter-insurgency doctrine cuts deeply against the Army’s institutional instincts which focus on combat operations. The most recent field manual at the time was two decades old, focusing on hunting people and an approach called “kill-capture,” similar to the "search and destroy" methods used in Vietnam. Ultimately there are more insurgents than when they started.
==Afghanistan==
==Afghanistan==