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| − | A '''blitzkrieg''' is an operational level military doctrine which calls for a quick surprise attack by massive ground and air forces. "Blitzkrieg" is from the German words for lighting ("''blitz''") and war ("''krieg''"). The term was not used by [[Germany|German]] military planners, and had it's origins the Propaganda Ministry of Josef Goebbels. It was used in press accounts to describe the lightning speed of the German military during [[World War II]]. Modern American "Shock and Awe" doctrine is based upon the lessons of blitzkrieg. | + | A '''blitzkrieg''' is an operational level military doctrine which calls for a quick surprise attack by massive ground and air forces. "Blitzkrieg" is from the German words for lighting ("''blitz''") and war ("''krieg''"). The term was not used by [[Germany|German]] military planners, and had its origins at the Propaganda Ministry of Josef Goebbels. It was used in press accounts to describe the lightning speed of the German military during [[World War II]]. Modern American "Shock and Awe" doctrine is based upon the lessons of blitzkrieg. |
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| | ==Before World War II== | | ==Before World War II== |
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| − | Colonel John Fuller, the chief of staff of the British Tank Corps, is credited with developing this tactic after his extreme disappointment with the effect of tanks during World War I. His ideas, which were ignored by the British Army, called for long-range mass tank attacks. He envisioned this attack to be supported by air power as well as motorized infantry and artillery support. He wrote two books in the twenties which detailed his ideas: ''Reformation of War'' and ''Foundation of the Science of War''. In 1926, the German Army began ordering tanks and vehicles which would allow them to impliment Colonel Fuller's ideas. <ref>http://www.lycos.com/info/blitzkrieg--german-wehrmacht.html?page=2</ref><ref>http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/2WWblitzkreig.htm</ref> | + | Colonel John Fuller, the chief of staff of the British Tank Corps, is credited with developing this tactic after his extreme disappointment with the effect of tanks during World War I. His ideas, which were ignored by the British Army, called for long-range mass tank attacks. He envisioned this attack to be supported by air power as well as motorized infantry and artillery support. He wrote two books in the Twenties which detailed his ideas: ''Reformation of War'' and ''Foundation of the Science of War''. In 1926, the German Army began ordering tanks and vehicles which would allow them to impliment Colonel Fuller's ideas. <ref>http://www.lycos.com/info/blitzkrieg--german-wehrmacht.html?page=2</ref><ref>http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/2WWblitzkreig.htm</ref> |
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| | In 1937 Heinz Guderian wrote the book ''Achtung - Panzer!'' describing the combined arms tactics used initially by the Germans in WWII and later on by armies throughout the world. The Germans tested an application of these tactics in 1938 during the [[Spanish Civil War]] and as a result [[German High Command]] formulated plans to dismantle Polish defenses in 1939. <ref>http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9068990/Spanish-Civil-War</ref> | | In 1937 Heinz Guderian wrote the book ''Achtung - Panzer!'' describing the combined arms tactics used initially by the Germans in WWII and later on by armies throughout the world. The Germans tested an application of these tactics in 1938 during the [[Spanish Civil War]] and as a result [[German High Command]] formulated plans to dismantle Polish defenses in 1939. <ref>http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9068990/Spanish-Civil-War</ref> |
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| | Third, the blitzkrieg could be broken up by channeling the attack (holding the flanks) and attacking the point where the infantry and armored units met. This would separate the two and expose the armor to counter-attacks. The French and British used this tactic at the [[Battle of Arras]] in 1940, but lacked the armored units required to exploit their limited success. | | Third, the blitzkrieg could be broken up by channeling the attack (holding the flanks) and attacking the point where the infantry and armored units met. This would separate the two and expose the armor to counter-attacks. The French and British used this tactic at the [[Battle of Arras]] in 1940, but lacked the armored units required to exploit their limited success. |
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| − | The Soviets used all the above and had the additional fortune of vast swaths of land to design a defense-in-depth. As the panzer units moved further and further from their supplies, gaps would appear in their columns. These could then be attacked to break up the armor. Also, the Soviets used minefields to further disrupt the German armor. | + | The Soviets used all the above and had the additional fortune of vast swaths of land to design a defense-in-depth. As the panzer units moved farther and farther from their supplies, gaps would appear in their columns. These could then be attacked to break up the armor. Also, the Soviets used minefields to further disrupt the German armor. |
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| | By 1944, blitzkrieg as a German tactic was finished. The last actual appearance of blitzkrieg in the war was when [[George Patton | General George S. Patton's]] Third Army broke out of the Normandy Pocket in Operation Cobra. The Allied columns covered 600 miles in just under two weeks. | | By 1944, blitzkrieg as a German tactic was finished. The last actual appearance of blitzkrieg in the war was when [[George Patton | General George S. Patton's]] Third Army broke out of the Normandy Pocket in Operation Cobra. The Allied columns covered 600 miles in just under two weeks. |