Changes

In '''''Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ.''''', 489 U.S. 468, 474 (1989), the [[U.S. Supreme Court]] held that state law could preempt an arbitration provision in a contract where it also had a choice of law provision subjecting the contract to the law of that state.  The Court affirmed the California Supreme Court on this issue despite the enforceability of the [[Federal Arbitration Act]] of 1925, which gave effect to contractual arbitration provisions.

In '''Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ.''', 489 U.S. 468, 474 (1989), the [[U.S. Supreme Court]] held that state law could preempt an arbitration provision in a contract where it also had a choice of law provision subjecting the contract to the law of that state.  The Court affirmed the California Supreme Court on this issue despite the enforceability of the [[Federal Arbitration Act]] of 1925, which gave effect to contractual arbitration provisions.

 

The Court held that “the FAA’s primary purpose [is to] ensur[e] that private agreements to arbitrate are enforced according to their terms. Arbitration under the Act is a matter of consent, not coercion, and parties are generally free to structure their arbitration agreements as they see fit.”  489 U.S. at 479.

Chief Justice [[William Rehnquist]] wrote the decision for the 6-2 court.  He did not recuse himself from the case concerning his alma mater, even though his law school classmate Justice [[Sandra Day O'Connor]] did recuse herself.

Chief Justice [[William Rehnquist]] wrote the decision for the 6-2 court.  He did not recuse himself from the case concerning his alma mater, even though his law school classmate Justice [[Sandra Day O'Connor]] did recuse herself.

 

[[Category:United States Supreme Court Cases]]

[[Category:United States Supreme Court Cases]]