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| | '''Collateral order doctrine''' is an exception in [[federal court]]s to the general rule that only final judgments are appealable. In other words, '''collateral order doctrine''' permits appeal of certain non-final judgments under the final judgment rule of 28 U.S.C. section 1291. | | '''Collateral order doctrine''' is an exception in [[federal court]]s to the general rule that only final judgments are appealable. In other words, '''collateral order doctrine''' permits appeal of certain non-final judgments under the final judgment rule of 28 U.S.C. section 1291. |
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| − | This doctrine has application only when: Digital Equipment, 114 S.Ct. at 1995-96 (the 'Cohen requirements'). | + | This doctrine has application only when:<ref>''See Digital Equipment'', 114 S.Ct. at 1995-96 (the 'Cohen requirements').</ref> |
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| | :"those district court decisions [1] that are conclusive, [2] that resolve important questions completely separate from the merits, and [3] that would render such important questions effectively unreviewable on appeal from final judgment in the underlying action."<ref>''Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc.'', 114 S.Ct. 1992, 1995-96 (1994).</ref> This known as the "Cohen requirements," named after the decision that set the precedent.<ref>''[[Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp.]]'', 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949).</ref> | | :"those district court decisions [1] that are conclusive, [2] that resolve important questions completely separate from the merits, and [3] that would render such important questions effectively unreviewable on appeal from final judgment in the underlying action."<ref>''Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc.'', 114 S.Ct. 1992, 1995-96 (1994).</ref> This known as the "Cohen requirements," named after the decision that set the precedent.<ref>''[[Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp.]]'', 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949).</ref> |
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| | The [[U.S. Supreme Court]] has rejected any attempt to generalize from the above cases to a rule permitting immediate appeal whenever the district court denied an asserted right to avoid the burdens of trial. Instead, the Court has emphasized that "it is not mere avoidance of a trial, but avoidance of a trial that would imperil a substantial public interest, that counts when asking whether an order is 'effectively' unreviewable" after trial.<ref>''Will v. Hallock'', 126 S. Ct. 952, 959 (2006).</ref> | | The [[U.S. Supreme Court]] has rejected any attempt to generalize from the above cases to a rule permitting immediate appeal whenever the district court denied an asserted right to avoid the burdens of trial. Instead, the Court has emphasized that "it is not mere avoidance of a trial, but avoidance of a trial that would imperil a substantial public interest, that counts when asking whether an order is 'effectively' unreviewable" after trial.<ref>''Will v. Hallock'', 126 S. Ct. 952, 959 (2006).</ref> |
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| | + | Another court has distilled the test to a four-part test: |
| | + | *is the trial court's order tentative; |
| | + | *is it capable of review without extensive examination of the merits; |
| | + | *does it raise issues which could not be effectively reviewed later; and |
| | + | *does it present important, unresolved legal questions for consideration by the appellate court. |
| | + | ''In re Gen. Motors Corp. Engine Interchange Litig.'', 594 F.2d 1106 (7th Cir. 1979) (allowing an appeal under collateral order doctrine). |
| | == References == | | == References == |
| | <references/> | | <references/> |